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Abstract 
  
 
This is a study of the mercantile organisation of the British fur trade in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. The thesis seeks to answer two over-arching questions. 
Firstly, why did the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) maintain its Charter and acquire a 
monopoly of the British fur trade during a period of significant trade liberalisation in 
British overseas commerce? Secondly, why did London remain the European emporium 
of the North-Atlantic fur trade despite the rise of the provincial outports in other branches 
of Britain’s colonial and foreign trades?  
In seeking to answer these questions, the thesis explores each stage of the British 
fur trade in order to establish the factors that prolonged the continuation of the London 
mercantilist system in the trade. Underpinning these explorations is a detailed study of 
the trade statistics contained within the British customs’ records, as well as, from sale, 
purchase, and employee ledgers, and correspondence contained within the HBC 
Archives. The thesis presents the argument that developments occurring on both sides of 
the North-Atlantic World supported the continuation of the mercantilist system in the fur 
trade, and that the trade was actually a more robust model of that system in 1821 than it 
had been in 1783. The factors that led the British government to grant the HBC a de facto 
monopoly of the British fur trade in 1821 were multifaceted and it was not, as much of 
the existing literature suggests, a simple business merger. Ecological constraints in North 
America limited the potential for growth in the trade and made the enterprise ever more 
specialised, which served to discourage new entrants and to increase pressure on existing 
participants. Limited prospects for expansion and the presence of the rival North West 
Company (NWC) restrained the critiques of British manufacturers towards the HBC. 
From 1815, violent confrontations between the HBC and NWC on the frozen frontiers of 
the British North American Empire increased political scrutiny of the fur trade and led 
metropolitan interests to conclude that a single company with a monopoly of the fur trade 
was preferable to the injurious effects of unrestrained free market competition. The 
continued importance of the re-export trade and the buying preferences of the consumers 
who purchased the trade’s high-value products kept the trade centred on the metropolitan 
economy and restricted its proliferation to other British ports. Finally, the role of Cain 
and Hopkins’ ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ proved crucial, as the total absence of provincial 
opposition allowed the future of the fur trade to be solely shaped by the hands of London’s 
commercial elite. 
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7 
Introduction 
 
 
On 23 June 1857, Edward Ellice — British merchant-banker, landowner, and politician 
— sat before the Parliamentary Select Committee that had been appointed to examine the 
affairs of the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC). 1  It was the final day of witness 
examinations and Ellice, with his expert knowledge of Canadian affairs, was well placed 
to inform the Committee on the activities of the Company and on the development of 
British North America. During the questioning, Ellice proudly reflected on his role in 
bringing about the 1821 agreement that had formed the basis upon which the British fur 
trade had been conducted in the intervening years. Ellice recollected how Lord Bathurst, 
then Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, had asked for his assistance in restoring 
order to the fur trade. He explained how open competition in the trade had brought about 
its ruin, with two great concerns, the HBC and North West Company of Montreal (NWC), 
having been brought to near-bankruptcy by their intense rivalry for control of the trade. 
In order to keep the peace, Ellice had devised a plan for the two companies to merge 
amicably, and for Parliament to pass legislation that would ensure that the rejuvenated 
HBC would have its new-found monopoly of the British fur trade protected by the 
conferral of a temporary royal license that would grant the exclusive right to trade in 
territories that were not included in the Company’s original Charter. By ensuring that a 
single company had a monopoly of the fur trade, Ellice envisaged that ‘Aboriginal 
peoples’ and the future prosperity of the trade would be protected, which in turn would 
guarantee the stability of Britain’s North American Empire.2 Some Committee members 
                                                 
1 See Report from the Select Committee on the Hudson’s Bay Company (P. P. 1857, Vol. XV.1), pp. 22-53. 
2 In line with the approach taken by Carolyn Podruchny, the term ‘Aboriginal peoples’ is used to refer to 
the diverse array of indigenous communities living in North America whose cultural association with 
the continent pre-dates the arrival of European settlers. This term is preferable over the use of 
‘indigenous peoples’ in this context because, when using the latter, it becomes confusing when 
discussing the children of western fur traders and Aboriginal women. In the Canadian context at least, 
the use of ‘Native American’ is frowned upon and the term ‘Amerindian’ is not as widely used as it is 
in the United States. The use of ‘native’ and ‘indian’ also comes with its own colonial baggage. 
Considering a greater proportion of the British fur trade took place in modern-day Canada it seems 
appropriate to adopt the Canadian convention. Of course it is preferable to refer to a specific community 
by name where possible as these were distinct societies with their own religious beliefs, rituals, social 
structures, and economic activities. No less than seven different ‘nations’ visited the NWC’s Fort 
George and the HBC’s Buckingham House — each situated far to the north-west of Lake Winnipeg — 
and they included the Cree, Swampy Ground Assiniboine, Ojibwa and Iroquois, Blackfoot, Assiniboine, 
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were rather bemused by Ellice’s position. This was after all the era of Free Trade, the 
philosophy that had become the quasi-religion of Victorian Britain.3 Just eight years 
before, indeed, the Navigation Acts, the central pillar of the mercantilist system, had been 
repealed. The British East India Company’s (EIC) role in overseas trade had ended with 
the loss of its China monopoly in 1833. Ever since the eighteenth century the view that 
chartered companies were inefficient institutions that hindered the growth of British 
overseas trade had gathered support amongst commercial elites. In the Wealth of Nations, 
Adam Smith had launched a devastating assault on the deficiencies of the mercantilist 
system and had targeted much of his criticism towards the EIC.4 Why then did the fur 
trade depart from the conventional wisdom that allowing exclusive trading rights to 
particular institutions was injurious to the nation’s overseas trade? 
This is the question that lies at the heart of this thesis. Why did monopoly emerge 
and a chartered company persist in the British fur trade? It is a development that runs 
counter to the accepted view that chartered companies were in retreat from the mid-
eighteenth century onwards. The extant literature of the British fur trade does not 
adequately address this question, and neither has imperial and economic history more 
broadly. For the most part, the fur trade has been studied in isolation. Much is known 
about the various trading companies that emerged in the trade, the origins and experience 
of the labour employed by these enterprises, the exchange of material goods between 
Western fur traders and Aboriginal peoples, and the role of women in the trade.5 Few 
                                                 
Gros Ventres, and the Sarsi, Blood, and Peigan. See Podruchny, Making the Voyageur World, pp. xii-
xiii; and Lynda Gullason, ‘“No less than 7 different nations”: Ethnicity and Culture Contact at Fort 
George-Buckingham House’, in Jennifer S. H. Brown, W. J. Eccles, and Donald P. Heldman, eds., The 
Fur Trade Revisited: Selected Papers of the Sixth North American Fur Trade Conference, Mackinac 
Island, Michigan, 1991 (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1994), pp. 117-42. 
3 For a compelling account of how ‘Free Trade’, through the interaction of commerce, consumption, and 
civil society, entered the British national consciousness from the mid-nineteenth century onwards see 
Frank Trentmann, Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption, and Civil Society in Modern Britain 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
4 See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations: Books IV-V, edited by Andrew Skinner (London: Penguin 
Books, 1999), especially pp. 33-4, 39-41, 44-5, 67, 72-5, 245-7, 344. 
5  On fur trading companies see in particular Marjorie Wilkins Campbell, The North West Company 
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1957); E. E. Rich, The History of the Hudson’s Bay Company 1670-1870: Vol 1: 
1670-1763 (London: The Hudson’s Bay Record Society, 1958); and E. E. Rich, The History of the 
Hudson’s Bay Company 1670-1870: Vol 2: 1763-1870 (London: The Hudson’s Bay Record Society, 
1959). On the labour employed by British fur-trading companies see Edith I. Burley, Servants of the 
Honourable Company: Work, Discipline, and Conflict in the Hudson’s Bay Company, 1770-1870 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997); Carolyn Podruchny, Making the Voyageur World: Travelers 
and Traders in the North American Fur Trade (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006); and 
Suzanne Rigg, Men of Spirit and Enterprise: Scots and Orkneymen in the Hudson’s Bay Company, 
1780-1821 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2011). On the material exchanges between Aboriginal peoples 
and Western fur traders see David V. Burley, J. Scott Hamilton and Knut R. Fladmark, Prophecy of the 
Swan: The Upper Peace River Fur Trade of 1794-1823 (Vancouver, UBC Press, 1996); Ann M. Carlos 
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studies have, however, attempted to compare the fur trade with other trades or situate it 
within broader debates about British imperialism. This is significant as the fur trade was 
an important part of the British imperial experience and requires greater attention and 
acknowledgement. It is true that studies of empire have explored in some detail the key 
role that the fur trade played in building trust and securing alliances between Europeans 
and Aboriginal peoples across North America or, alternatively, in the emergence of the 
so-called ‘middle ground’.6 What British imperial historiography lacks, however, is a 
study that asks more generally what the fur trade can tell us about the political economy 
of empire itself.  
In terms of the organisation of British overseas trade in the eighteenth century, there 
are very few studies of the fur trade that extend beyond North America to consider how 
the trade fitted into the world economy. 7  This is probably partly because the trade 
comprised only a tiny fraction of Britain’s imports and exports. As a result, it cannot be 
argued that the fur trade made a significant contribution to the rapid expansion of the 
British economy from the final decades of the eighteenth century. Indeed, the fur trade is 
more often talked about in terms of its importance to the development of Canada, a subject 
first surveyed by Harold Innis in his seminal study The Fur Trade in Canada (1930).8 
                                                 
and Frank D. Lewis, Commerce by a Frozen Sea: Native Americans and the European Fur Trade 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Philadelphia Press, 2010); George Irving Quimby, Indian Culture and 
European Trade Goods: The Archaeology of the Historic Period in the Western Great Lakes Region 
(Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966); and Arthur J. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: 
Their Role as Trappers, Hunters, and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay, 1660-1870 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974). On the role of women in the fur trade see Jennifer S. H. 
Brown, ‘Woman as Centre and Symbol in the Emergence of Metis Communities’, in Susan Sleeper-
Smith, ed., Rethinking the Fur Trade: Cultures of Exchange in an Atlantic World (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2009), pp. 519-28; Susan Sleeper-Smith, ‘Women, Kin, and 
Catholicism’, in Susan Sleeper-Smith, ed., Rethinking the Fur Trade: Cultures of Exchange in an 
Atlantic World (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), pp. 443-80; Sylvia Van Kirk, Many 
Tender Ties: Women in Fur-Trade Society, 1670-1870 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1983); and Sylvia Van Kirk, ‘“The Custom of the Country”: An Examination of Fur Trade Marriage 
Practices’, in Susan Sleeper-Smith, ed., Rethinking the Fur Trade: Cultures of Exchange in an Atlantic 
World (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), pp. 481-518. 
6 See Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Also see W. J. 
Eccles, ‘The Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century Imperialism’, in Susan Sleeper-Smith, ed., Rethinking 
the Fur Trade: Cultures of Exchange in an Atlantic World (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 
2009), pp. 215-45. 
7 The few studies that do have usually focused on the pre-1783 period. See Murray G. Lawson, Fur: A 
Study in English Mercantilism, 1700-1775 (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1943); Thomas 
Elliot Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686-1776 (Madison, WI: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1974); Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 1; Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2; 
E. E. Rich, ‘Russia and the Colonial Fur Trade’, The Economic History Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1955), 
pp. 307-28; and E. E. Rich, Montreal and the fur trade (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1966). 
8 Harold A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1956). 
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Since a chartered company played a major role in the British fur trade, one aspect that has 
been accorded greater attention is the HBC as an early prototype of the multinational 
corporation.9 The Company has also been used as a case study with which to explore how, 
in an age before modern communication, early modern firms and institutions involved in 
long-distance trade ensured that their overseas agents did not use their superior 
knowledge of local market conditions to defraud their managers. This is what economic 
historians commonly refer to as the ‘principal-agent problem’.10 The global trade network 
established by the NWC in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries has been 
another productive area of research that has shed light on the operation of the fur trade 
outside of North America.11 It is clear, therefore, that in these wider explorations of the 
British fur trade it is the fur-trading companies and not the commodity trade per se that 
have been the central focus of analysis.  
Despite the notable rise of Atlantic history over the past two decades, there has yet 
to be a detailed study of the fur trade that places the exchange into a wider conceptual 
framework that allows for connections to be drawn between Europe, America, and the 
rest of the world and for the impact of these linkages to be assessed. Indeed, very little is 
known about how the furs trapped in North America ended up in the hats, garments, and 
accessories that were worn in Europe and beyond. The organisation of the trade, the range 
and production methods of fur-using apparel, as well as distribution and retail channels 
remain largely unknown. Studies of the ‘Atlantic World’ certainly mention the fur trade 
in the context of interactions between Europeans and Aboriginal peoples in the Americas, 
although these discussions usually provide little more than a passing reference to the 
trade.12 Even the extensive Rethinking the Fur Trade: Cultures of Exchange in an Atlantic 
                                                 
9 Ann M. Carlos and Stephen Nicholas, ‘Giants of an Earlier Capitalism: The Early Chartered Companies 
as Modern Multinationals’, Business History Review, Vol. 62, No. 3 (1988), pp. 398-419. 
10 See Ann M. Carlos and Stephen Nicholas, ‘Agency Problems in Early Chartered Companies: The Case 
of the Hudson’s Bay Company’, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 50, No. 3 (1990), pp. 853-75; 
and Ann M. Carlos, ‘Agent Opportunism and the Role of Company Culture: The Hudson’s Bay and 
Royal African Companies Compared’, Business and Economic History, Vol. 20, No 1 (1991), pp. 142-
51. 
11  In particular, see Barry M. Gough, ‘The North West Company’s “Adventure to China”’, Oregon 
Historical Quarterly, Vol. 76, No. 4 (1975), pp. 309-32; H. Lloyd Keith, ‘Voyage of the Isaac Todd’, 
Oregon Historical Quarterly, Vol. 109, No. 4 (2008), pp. 566-97; Aisling MacQuarrie, et al, 
‘Transnational Dimensions’, in Saúl Bermejo, Martykánová Darina Martínez, and Momir Samardžić, 
eds., Layers of Power: Societies and Institutions in Europe (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2010), pp. 231-
68; and Marion O’Neil, ‘The Maritime Activities of the North West Company, 1813 to 1821’, The 
Washington Historical Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1930), pp. 243-67. 
12 For instance, see Thomas Benjamin, The Atlantic World: Europeans, Africans, Indians and Their Shared 
History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 250-1, 298, 319; and J. H. 
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World (2009) essentially confined its analysis to North America.13 If the ‘Atlantic World’ 
concept is to be used then it must be done so critically, as in the words of Toyin Falola 
and Kevin D. Roberts it ‘means more than simply adding the term ‘Atlantic’ to the subtitle 
of one’s book, article or conference paper’ and must connect one’s specialised topic to 
the broader themes in Atlantic history.14 In the context of the fur trade, therefore, the 
emphasis still appears to be on a one-way process that asks what Europe did to the 
Americas rather than a multi-faceted approach that forms connections across the Atlantic 
basin. This is, in essence, the main aim of Atlantic history.  
There is no single way to approach Atlantic history. The tripartite definition 
established by David Armitage is a useful starting point to determine how the perspective 
can be achieved in practice.15 The first, ‘circum-Atlantic’ treats the Atlantic rim as a zone 
of exchange and circulation, while the second, ‘trans-Atlantic’, is ultimately comparative 
and is akin to international history.16 The third, and for Armitage the most useful, is ‘cis-
Atlantic’, which treats nations, states, regions, and institutions as unique places and seeks 
to reveal how these units were defined by their relationship to the ocean.17 Atlantic history 
has had its fair share of critics however.18 Peter A. Coclanis has argued that the Atlantic 
                                                 
Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 (New Haven: CT: Yale 
University Press, 2006), pp. 265-6. 
13 Out of a total of 27 chapters only three could be said to bridge the Atlantic by looking at the interaction 
between developments in Europe and the Americas, although two of these are of the US fur trade rather 
than the British one. See Susan Sleeper-Smith, ‘Cultures of Exchange in a North Atlantic World’, in 
Susan Sleeper-Smith, ed., Rethinking the Fur Trade: Cultures of Exchange in an Atlantic World 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), pp. xvii-lxii; James L. Clayton, ‘The Growth and 
Economic Significance of the American Fur Trade, 1790-1890’, in Susan Sleeper-Smith, ed., 
Rethinking the Fur Trade: Cultures of Exchange in an Atlantic World (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2009), pp. 160-80; and James A. Hanson, ‘The Myth of the Silk Hat and the End of the 
Rendezvous’, in Susan Sleeper-Smith, ed., Rethinking the Fur Trade: Cultures of Exchange in an 
Atlantic World (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), pp. 420-35. 
14 Toyin Falola and Kevin D. Roberts, ‘Introduction’, in Toyin Falola and Kevin D. Roberts, eds., The 
Atlantic World 1450-2000 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), pp. xi-xiii. Alison Games 
has made a similar criticism that the ‘Atlantic history that many historians produce is rarely centred 
around the ocean, and the ocean itself is rarely relevant to the project’. See Alison Games, ‘Atlantic 
History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities’, American Historical Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 
(2006), pp. 741-57. 
15 David Armitage, ‘Three Concepts of Atlantic History’, in David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., 
The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 1-27. For another 
good discussion of what Atlantic history is see J. H. Elliott, ‘Atlantic History: A Circumnavigation’, in 
David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 233-49. 
16 Armitage, ‘Atlantic History’, pp. 16-21. 
17 Ibid., pp. 21-5. 
18  For an excellent overview of the criticisms levied at Atlantic history as well as a defence of the 
perspective and a number of prescriptions for its future application see Jack P. Greene, and Philip D. 
Morgan, ‘Introduction: The Present State of Atlantic History’, in Jack P. Greene, and Philip D. Morgan, 
eds., Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 3-33. 
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World gives too much weight to the Atlantic rim and inaccurately portrays the Atlantic 
as a discrete economic unit that is too sharply separated from other regions given that 
there was ‘lots of mixing, blending, blurring of East and West’.19 He proposes the addition 
of a fourth dimension to Armitage’s concepts — conjuncto-Atlantic history — over an 
endorsement of global history. It certainly seems too premature to speak of a ‘globalised’ 
economic system by 1800.20 Indeed, David Eltis sees a shift away from a globalised 
economy in the nineteenth century through the emergence of intra-American and re-
emergence of intra-African trade.21 Defenders of Atlantic history have also pointed to 
developments that occurred within the Atlantic World that were unprecedented in world 
history, such as the decimation of the Aboriginal population of the Americas and the 
unique aspects of transatlantic slavery. 22  Coclanis proposes that conjuncto-Atlantic 
history can ‘offer a broader, richer, amplified view of Atlantic dynamics’ by linking up 
Atlantic processes with those in the extra-Atlantic, thus engaging with wider questions 
and other historiographies. Focusing more on exchange circuits, he proposes, offers a 
more constructive way in which to approach the Atlantic (and indeed world) history.23  
This thesis acknowledges these criticisms and the several propositions suggested 
by Philip D. Morgan and Jack P. Greene for future works of Atlantic history.24 In order 
to understand the shift towards monopoly and mercantilism that took place in the British 
fur trade during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it is necessary to 
consider how developments on both sides of the Atlantic interacted and contributed to 
this historical outcome. It is also important to acknowledge the external influences of 
regions that lay outside of this exchange circuit. This is especially the case for the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a period when British and American merchants 
                                                 
19 Peter A. Coclanis, ‘Beyond Atlantic History’, in Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, eds., Atlantic 
History: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 337-56. Also see Peter A. 
Coclanis, ‘Atlantic World or Atlantic/World?’, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4 (2006), 
pp. 725-42. Alison Games has also argued that the borders between early-modern states and empires 
were more porous than many historians have believed. See Alison Games, ‘Beyond the Atlantic: English 
Globetrotters and Transoceanic Connections’, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4 (2006), 
especially p. 684. 
20 For a good critique of the ‘globalisation’ concept and its applicability to the eighteenth-century Atlantic 
see Frederick Cooper, ‘What Is the Concept of Globalization Good for? An African Historian's 
Perspective’, African Affairs, Vol. 100, No. 399 (2001), pp. 189-213. 
21 David Eltis, ‘Atlantic History in Global Perspective’, Itinerario, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1999), pp. 141-61. 
22 Ibid., p. 148; and Nicholas Canny, ‘Atlantic History and Global History’, in Jack P. Greene, and Philip 
D. Morgan, eds., Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
especially p. 326. 
23 Coclanis, ‘Beyond Atlantic History’, p. 349. Frederick Cooper has also supported the idea of using 
‘circuits’, at least in respect of religion and trade. See Cooper, ‘Concept of Globalization’, p. 210. 
24 See Morgan and Greene, ‘Atlantic History’, pp. 10-21. 
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established a thriving fur trade that stretched beyond the Atlantic and into the Pacific.25 
In this system, furs from the north-west coast of North America were shipped to Canton 
where they were exchanged for Asian tea, textiles, and ceramics. The elusive Northwest 
Passage continued to fascinate British explorers and several plans were proposed to 
integrate the Atlantic and Pacific fur trades. Alexander Dalrymple, Scottish hydrographer, 
even proposed in 1789 that the HBC should join with the EIC to grant Britain control of 
the fur trade to both Europe and China.26 The explorer Alexander Mackenzie — who had 
journeyed across the North American interior to reach the Pacific Ocean by land in 1793 
— envisioned the creation of comprehensive fur and fishing nexus that spanned across 
North America and into the Pacific.27 The Pacific dimension was an integral part of the 
British fur trade during this period but its importance must not be over-exaggerated. 
Indeed, the bulk of the British fur trade operated within the confines of the ‘North-Atlantic 
World’ and it is here where this study largely confines its analysis. This does not mean 
that the Atlantic rim is the sole focus of attention. The fur trade penetrated deep into the 
North American continent and it is not, as some historians have claimed, 
counterproductive to move far from the Atlantic shore when writing Atlantic history.28 
Indeed, the ‘frontier’ of the fur trade was a continually moving boundary of exploitation 
that was considerably more mobile than was the case for sugar, cotton, tobacco, and other 
plantation crops.29  
By linking production, consumption, and commerce, commodities offer a fruitful 
vantage point from which to analyse Atlantic and global integration.30 The ‘commodity 
                                                 
25 See Gough, ‘Adventure to China’, pp. 309-32; Keith, ‘Isaac Todd’, pp. 566-97; and O’Neil, ‘Maritime 
Activities’, pp. 243-67. While it is mainly focused on the American fur trade to China also see James 
R. Gibson, Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest 
Coast, 1785-1841 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992). 
26 Alexander Dalrymple, Plan for promoting the fur-trade, and securing it to this country, by uniting the 
operations of the East-India and Hudson’s-Bay Companys (London: Printed by George Bigg, 1789), 
especially pp. 25-32. 
27 Alexander Mackenzie, Voyages from Montreal on the river St. Laurence, through the continent of North 
America, to the Frozen and Pacific Oceans; In the years 1789 and 1793. With a preliminary account of 
the rise, progress, and present state of the fur trade of that country (London: Printed for T. Cadell and 
W. Davies, 1801), p. 411. 
28 See Benjamin, Atlantic World, p. xxvii. 
29 William Beinart, and Lotte Hughes, Environment and Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
43. 
30 Armitage, ‘Atlantic History’, p. 17; and Games, ‘Atlantic History’, pp. 754-6. On the integration of the 
Atlantic World see David Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of 
the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For a 
study that has focused on the circulation of goods across the Atlantic and the wide array of distributors 
who made this possible see Sheryllynne Haggerty, The British-Atlantic Trading Community, 1760-
1810: Men, Women, and the Distribution of Goods (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 
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frontiers’ and commodity chains created by expanding commercial activities, productive 
enterprises, and settlement ‘underpinned deep structures in the architecture of the British 
Empire’ and the Atlantic World more broadly.31 In the words of Jacob Price ‘when one 
looks at particular trades, one cannot but be impressed by the interdependence of the 
parts’.32 The fur trade, for example, linked the blanket makers of Witney in Oxfordshire, 
Brazilian and Virginian tobacco plantations, and the slave ports of Africa and Aboriginal 
peoples in the remote, sub-arctic regions of North America, as well as metropolitan hatters 
and furriers, and affluent consumers in Britain and the wider world. Commodity histories 
have become fashionable over the past decade and have focused on a broad range of 
commodities including cochineal, cod, coffee, cotton, sugar, vanilla, wine, and many 
others. 33  These studies can, however, sometimes fail to connect with wider 
historiographical questions or, as Frank Trentmann points out, can over-reach themselves 
in their assessments of wider global developments.34 This thesis is not an exhaustive 
‘commodity history’, rather it explores how the organisation of the British fur trade 
contributed to the emergence of monopoly and the persistence of a chartered company in 
the trade. In so doing, the study sheds light on stages of the commodity trade that have 
been neglected, especially European distribution and retail channels. Analysing these 
aspects allows the trade to be compared to other commercial activities and for it to be 
situated within the growing body of literature on the eighteenth-century ‘consumer 
revolution’.35  
In all, the study covers a total of 39 years. The study begins in 1783 as this marked 
the end of the American War of Independence and because the literature on the fur trade, 
                                                 
31 Beinart and Lotte, Environment, p. 2. 
32 Jacob M. Price, ‘What Did Merchants Do? Reflections on British Overseas Trade, 1660-1790’, The 
Journal of Economic History, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1989), p. 277. 
33 For instance, see Elizabeth Abbott, Sugar: A Bittersweet History (London: Duckworth Overlook, 2009); 
Sophie D. Coe and Michael D. Coe, The True History of Chocolate, Second Edition (London: Thames 
& Hudson, 2007); Tim Ecott, Vanilla: Travels in Search of the Ice Cream Orchid (London: Penguin 
Books, 2004); Amy Butler Greenfield, A Perfect Red: Empire, Espionage, and the Quest for the Colour 
of Desires (London: Doubleday, 2005); David Hancock, Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence 
of American Trade and Taste (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009); Mark Kurlansky, Cod: A 
Biography of the Fish that Changed the World (London: Cape, 1998); and Giorgio Riello, Cotton: The 
Fabric That Made the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). For several short 
discussions on commodities that ‘changed the world’ see Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, The 
World that Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 1400 to the Present, Second 
Edition (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2006). 
34 Frank Trentmann, Empire of Things: How We Became a World of Consumers, from the Fifteenth Century 
to the Twenty-first (London: Penguin Books, 2016), pp. 79-80. 
35 In particular, see John Brewer and Roy Porter, eds., Consumption and the World of Goods (London: 
Routledge, 1993). 
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and British overseas trade in general, has focused on the pre-revolutionary period. The 
year in which the HBC acquired a monopoly of the British fur trade largely determined 
1821 as the end point of the thesis. It could be argued that continuing beyond this date 
would allow for the impact of this development to be assessed but the changes that 
occurred in the HBC’s record-keeping following its merger with the NWC complicates 
such a task. The period between 1783 and 1821 was a period of rapid westward expansion 
in the fur trade, a circumstance that was in part facilitated by declining reserves of beaver 
in the ‘Canadian Shield’. The NWC, building upon the legacy of French fur traders, was 
at the forefront of this drive towards the Pacific North-West coast. In contrast, the HBC 
was rather slow to develop its inland trading activities but ultimately did so by changing 
its labour practices and logistical operations. New leadership among the London 
Committee gave further impetus to the Company’s competitiveness in North America and 
promoted the establishment of the Red River Settlement, the first attempt at colonisation 
within the land covered by the Company’s Charter. Another key theme of this period was 
the centralisation of the Montreal fur trade under the control of the NWC and, of course, 
the Revolutionary Wars and Napoleonic Wars, and War of 1812, with their adverse 
effects on the conduct of the fur trade in North America and the distribution of furs to 
European markets. These developments occurred in step with the long-term expansion of 
hat manufacturing in provincial Britain, especially in Lancashire and Cheshire, as well as 
the growth in Liverpool’s Atlantic trade.36  
The records contained in the archives of the HBC supply many of the primary 
sources used in this study.37 Included in the collection are a wide array of minute books, 
trading ledgers, letters, and employment records that relate to the HBC and the NWC. 
The sheer size of the collection precludes a full survey of available material. And while 
the years covered by the records are generally very informative, they are not 
comprehensive. The trade data contained within the British customs’ records at The 
                                                 
36 By the late eighteenth century, Bristol’s Atlantic trade had stagnated and the growth in Glasgow’s 
Atlantic trade was not as pronounced as it was in Liverpool. On eighteenth-century Atlantic trade and 
the British outports see P. G. E. Clemens, ‘The Rise of Liverpool, 1665-1750’, The Economic History 
Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1976), pp. 211-55; T. M. Devine, The Tobacco Lords: A Study of the Tobacco 
Merchants of Glasgow and their Trading Activities c.1740-90 (Edinburgh: Donald, 1975); Francis E. 
Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey: An economic history of a port, 1790-1970 (Newton Abbot: David and 
Charles, 1971); Kenneth Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Jacob M. Price, ‘The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake 
Tobacco Trade, 1707-1775’, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1954), pp. 177-99. 
37 For an excellent discussion of the records available in the Company’s archives see Deidre Simmons, 
Keepers of the Record: The History of the Hudson’s Bay Company Archives (Montreal: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2007). 
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National Archives, Kew, complement the resources contained in the HBC archive. The 
customs’ ledgers provide a near-complete coverage of British imports, exports, and re-
exports for the 39 years covered by the thesis. When used in conjunction with the HBC’s 
archives, these records open up a rich vein of information on the circulation and 
distribution of furs and their related manufactures across and beyond the North-Atlantic 
World. These records are, however, less useful for analysing the factors that led to the 
continuation of a chartered company in the trade, or to reveal how fur-related apparel was 
made and sold to consumers. The thesis therefore draws upon a wide range of other source 
material such as the Board of Trade Papers and Bankruptcy Papers at The National 
Archives, British trade directories, furrier and hatter records at London Metropolitan 
Archives, the minute books of the Feltmakers’ and Skinners’ Companies at the Guildhall 
Library, newspapers, documents relating to the blanket makers of Witney at Oxfordshire 
History Centre, various sorts of parliamentary papers, and the correspondence with 
government officials contained in the collections of the British Library.  
The thesis is composed of six chapters. Chapter one provides a synoptic history of 
the fur trade from ancient times through to the rise of the Atlantic fur trade. It discusses 
the factors that made the fur trade highly specialised, especially in terms of the 
organisation of the trade, the method of exchange used with Aboriginal peoples, and the 
labour required to conduct the trade. Chapter two uses trade data contained in the British 
customs’ records to analyse Britain’s fur imports. Such a task allows for a comparative 
assessment of the volume of the Hudson’s Bay and Montreal fur trades and can be used 
as a reasonable proxy for the extent of ecological exhaustion in the trade. The balance of 
trade between the two concerns and the decline of the beaver population were both 
important factors that influenced the post-1821 structure of the trade. The chapter 
concludes by evaluating the factors that contributed towards the union of the HBC and 
NWC in 1821, and the political manoeuvring that enabled the HBC to acquire a monopoly 
of the British fur trade. Chapter three explores the HBC’s commodity export trade, 
detailing the relationships that the Company forged with metropolitan and provincial 
tradespeople when sourcing its trade goods and provisions. Although the surviving source 
basis makes the identification of such links especially difficult, a number of comparisons 
with the relationships established by the London Houses that supplied the NWC can be 
drawn. The analysis sheds light on the HBC’s tendency to form long-lasting relationships 
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with its suppliers and the reasons why British merchants and manufacturers did not seek 
to reform the British fur trade. 
Chapter four looks at the British re-export trade in furs, the ways in which the HBC 
and NWC sold their furs, and the buyers who purchased these commodities from the 
companies. There were marked differences in the channels through which the two 
companies managed their fur sales and it has been suggested that the NWC had an 
advantage over the chartered company in this regard because it had greater flexibility over 
the markets in which its furs were sold. This hypothesis is tested and it is determined 
whether the re-export trade, divergent sale arrangements, or the buyers themselves 
influenced the emergence of monopoly in the trade. Chapter five surveys the manufacture 
of fur garments and accessories and their retail to consumers, and asks whether there were 
factors of production and distribution that encouraged the formation of monopoly. Apart 
from the use of beaver hats, very little is known about the other items that were made 
from fur and so this section breaks new ground by expanding analysis to these neglected 
articles. Chapter six uncovers another aspect of the fur trade that is rarely covered in the 
extant literature: the consumption practices of the HBC’s overseas servants. The success 
of the Company’s enterprise depended upon the labour of these distant employees who 
worked in a very unforgiving, isolated environment. The highly specialised skills that 
these servants developed were crucial to the Company, and they became even more 
important as the Company attempted to develop its interior trade. Keeping these servants 
loyal to the Company was imperative. Supplying its servants with material goods that 
made life in Hudson’s Bay more tolerable was one method used to encourage servants to 
remain in the Company’s employ. The rich employment and accountancy records in the 
Company’s archives allows for a detailed examination of the servants’ consumer 
behaviour and provides a novel way in which to add to debates over the eighteenth-
century ‘consumer revolution’.  
The study that follows is not a definitive commodity history but it does show that 
the 1821 resolution in the British fur trade was more significant than is currently 
recognised, and that the fur trade itself offers a fruitful way in which to deepen our 
understanding of commerce and consumption across the Atlantic.  
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1 
A Highly Specialised Trade 
 
 
In the boardroom of Hudson’s Bay House, the London headquarters of the HBC at Nos. 
3 and 4 Fenchurch Street, the major shareholders of the Company gathered on Thursday 
30 May 1811 to vote on the proposal to grant Thomas Douglas, the fifth Earl of Selkirk, 
116,000 square miles for the creation of a colony at Red River in North America.1 Selkirk, 
who had joined the Company in 1808 as a major shareholder, was well-known for his 
pro-emigration views and proposed that the colony would provide the Company with 
hundreds of able-bodied men and supply the Company’s posts with agricultural produce 
and so reduce the costs of importing British provisions.2 Selkirk, together with his wife’s 
brother Andrew Wedderburn Colville who was also a relatively new addition to 
Company’s list of proprietors, persuaded the majority of the Company’s old guard to back 
the plan. Over two-thirds (£29,937) of the total shares present at the meeting were cast in 
favour of the scheme.3 It was agreed that Selkirk could settle Scottish Highlanders in the 
colony in return for supplying the Company with provisions and 200 servants each year, 
as well as accommodating the families of retired Company servants.4 The out-voted 
faction was made up of individuals involved in the Montreal fur trade, several of whom 
were not entitled to vote on account of them having held their stock for less than six 
months.5 Among the disgruntled faction stood Edward Ellice and Alexander Mackenzie, 
who no doubt warned the Committee that the NWC would see the establishment of the 
colony as a provocative action, especially since the territory in question covered the route 
                                                 
1 See HBCA, A.1/50, London Minute Book, 1810-4, fos. 33-8. 
2 Rigg, Men of Spirit, pp. 7, 101-2. In 1803, Selkirk attempted to settle 800 Highlanders on Prince Edward 
Island and later tried to enact two similar schemes in Upper Canada, one at Moulton on Lake Erie and 
another at Baldoon on Lake St. Clair. See Campbell, North West Company, p. 199. 
3 According to the minute books of the London Committee, Selkirk owned £4,087. worth of Company stock 
and Wedderburn owned £4,474 worth. In the case of Selkirk, this is somewhat less than the one-third 
of the Company’s total stock as suggested by Rich. See Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 300-
1. 
4 Rigg, Men of Spirit, p. 7; and Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 300-1. 
5 HBCA, A.1/50, London Minute Book, 1810-4, fos. 33-8. 
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that the Montreal traders used to access the interior. While it cannot be said with certainty 
as to whether this ulterior motive served to produce such strong support for the scheme 
amongst the Company’s shareholders, the fact that the representatives of the NWC were 
at the meeting does suggest that all those present were at the very least made aware of the 
destabilising effect that the Colony could have on the British fur trade. What the granting 
of the Red River Colony undoubtedly does show, however, is that the environment of 
Hudson’s Bay and the labour required for the trade were two concerns that made the fur 
trade a highly specialised enterprise.  
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the attributes that made the fur trade a 
commercial activity that encouraged the formation of large-scale and monopolistic forms 
of business organisation. By 1763, Britain had established ascendency in the Atlantic fur 
trade through its control of a group of North American colonies that had been established 
by the British or conquered from other colonial empires. These included the Thirteen 
Colonies, ‘Canada’, and Hudson’s Bay.6 While the British continued to operate within 
the American fur trade following the independence of the United States, it is the Montreal 
and Hudson’s Bay fur trades that are the main focus here. The chapter explains the 
divergent forms of trade organisation used in each of these trades and assesses why they 
took the form they did. It also explores the different approaches used in the exchanges 
with Aboriginal peoples and the workforce regimes established by the HBC and Montreal 
fur traders. The chapter therefore provides a substantial amount of historical context for 
the rest of the thesis but does so analytically by arguing that there were several factors 
that made the fur trade a highly specialised trade which, in turn, promoted the emergence 
of monopoly. 
The first part of the chapter documents the emergence of the Atlantic fur trade and 
British involvement in the trade in the Thirteen Colonies, Hudson’s Bay, and Canada. 
The second section analyses the organisation of the British fur trade in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, especially the management and financing of the trade and 
                                                 
6 It is also important to point out that what contemporaries described as ‘Canada’ in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries specifically referred to the former French province of Quebec, which included 
the key fur-trading town of Montreal. In the Constitutional Act of 1791, the British partitioned the 
Province of Quebec into Upper and Lower Canada. Upper Canada included the British territory in the 
immediate vicinity of the Great Lakes, which became a prime area for new British settlement, whereas 
Lower Canada composed the largely French settlements that spanned the length of the St. Lawrence 
River. When ‘Canada’ is used in this thesis it thus refers to the Province of Quebec (Upper and Lower 
Canada from 1791) and does not extend to the other British territories in North America which includes 
Cape Breton, the Coast of Labrador New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward’s 
Island, all of which were marginal in the fur trade at this time. 
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its methods of transportation. The third section focuses on the exchanges with Aboriginal 
peoples and examines the commercial strategies that were employed by British fur 
traders. The fourth and final section sheds light on the recruitment, labour, and working 
environment of the men that were employed in the British fur trade. 
I.   The Rise of the British Fur Trade 
Furs were the epitome of noble fashions in late medieval England. Unrivalled in their 
style, elegance, and the comfort they afforded in cold medieval castles, furs trimmed and 
lined gowns of all seasons.7 This was certainly not an English phenomenon as members 
of the ruling courts across Western Europe, from Burgundy to the Italian city-states, clad 
themselves in the latest fur-bearing ensembles.8 An individual’s wealth and rank was 
reflected by the number of furs in their possession, so much so that some of the richest 
nobles not only clad their families in the luxury apparel but used them to embellish their 
entire retinues and even their horses. These extravagant furs were not, for the most part, 
sourced from England’s own shores. They originated from sub-arctic climes where the 
harsh winters dictated that the animal furs would be thicker and were thus considered 
superior to those harvested in warmer temperatures. In the medieval period, Russia and 
the Baltic were the principal sources of Britain’s fine furs but this trade was largely in the 
hands of foreign merchants, most notably the German Hanse. In the late fourteenth 
century, approximately 90 per cent of London’s fur imports were of Hanseatic origin.9 In 
association with Novgorod, the northernmost of the Russian principalities, the Hanse 
established a near-monopoly of the fur trade in the Baltic Sea, with the city of Lübeck 
acting as the central entrepôt of the trade.10 Thus the fur trade was, from an early age, an 
international operation that spanned immense distance.11  
                                                 
7 Elspeth M. Veale, The English Fur Trade in the Later Middle Ages, Second Edition (London: London 
Record Society, 2003), pp. 1-3. 
8 Ibid., pp. 7-8, 135-6. 
9 Ibid., pp. 69-70; and Janet Martin, Treasure of the Land of Darkness: The Fur Trade and its Significance 
for Medieval Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 49-52, 62-5, 68, 81, 159. 
10 Raymond H. Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade, 1550-1700 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1943), 
pp. 3-7; Simon Franklin and Jonathan Shepard, The Emergence of Rus 750-1200 (London: Longman, 
1996), pp. 331-2; and Janet Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pp. 76-7, 184-5, 200-1. 
11 Evidence has been uncovered which points towards a fur trade between Ancient Rome and Scandinavia 
and the Viking Rus are known to have ventured down the Volga River with fine furs to trade at Bulgar. 
See Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (London: University of California Press, 
1982), pp. 158-9. 
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Hanseatic dominance over the import of furs into England waned in the sixteenth 
century as relations between the Hanse and the English crown declined. The privileges of 
the merchant league were revoked and more concerted efforts were made by British 
merchants to develop the country’s overseas trade. 12  The Company of Merchant 
Adventurers to New Lands was established in London in 1551 and soon discovered a sea-
route to Arkhangelsk, after which it was re-chartered as the Muscovy Company in 1555.13 
Furs, however, never comprised a significant part of the new Company’s trade, which 
considered them to be ‘dead wares’, preferring instead to concentrate on timber, tar, 
hemp, and other raw materials that were central to the construction of naval vessels.14 
The Company’s ambivalence to trading furs is indicative of a decline in the demand for 
furs in high-quality garment manufacture, as velvets and silks increasingly became the 
status symbol of choice for the English aristocracy.15 While the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries were the ‘age of squirrel’ and martens were especially popular in the fifteenth 
century, the second-half of the sixteenth century witnessed the rapid disappearance of furs 
from fashionable wardrobes, exemplified in the case of Queen Elizabeth I who only wore 
fur-lined clothing at the beginning of her reign.16  
The English demand for furs in the following century no doubt floundered but the 
mid-seventeenth century heralded a new chapter in the trade as the felting and hatting 
industries expanded in a number of European centres as a result of the exploitation of new 
supplies of furs from the New World and the diffusion of manufacturing techniques 
westward from Central and Eastern Europe.17 Indeed, the development of the fur trade in 
North America shifted the centre of the trade away from Russia and the Baltic and towards 
the ports of Amsterdam, London, and La Rochelle, which handled increasing volumes of 
the burgeoning Atlantic trades. However, unlike France and the United Provinces, 
England was particularly slow at capitalising on the fur trade in North America. From 
New Netherland in North America, the Dutch conducted a thriving fur trade between 
1609 and 1664, symbolised in the use of a beaver in the colony’s seal, before the colony 
                                                 
12 For an authoritative account of diplomatic relations between the Hanse and England see T. H. Lloyd, 
England and the German Hanse, 1157-1611: A Study of their Trade and Commercial Diplomacy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
13 Veale, The English Fur Trade, pp. 146-7, 171. 
14 Ibid., pp. 146-7, 171. 
15 Ibid., p. 155. 
16 Ibid., pp. 57-8, 66-9, 134-43. 
17 Ibid., pp. 179-80; and Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, pp. 2-3, 9-10. 
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was eventually ceded to the English.18 Further north, French merchants took advantage 
of the great potential for fur-trading on the Saint Lawrence River, after the explorations 
of Jacques Cartier in the 1530s and 1540s.19 By the end of the seventeenth century, 
Montreal had become the site of an annual ‘Great Rendezvous’ that attracted as many as 
800 Odawas for the purposes of fur-trading.20 
English participation in the fur trade did not commence in earnest until the late 
seventeenth century when New Netherland fell into English hands. Dutch traders, 
however, still played a dominant role in the colony’s fur trade up until the mid-eighteenth 
century, largely meeting the Iroquois traders at Albany until the 1720s when the meeting-
point shifted towards the outpost of Oswego on the eastern shore of Lake Ontario.21 The 
British colonists at Pennsylvania also attempted to tap into the prime furs of beaver, otter, 
and marten that were available via trading at the Great Lakes but the governors of New 
York successfully maintained that the interference of another colony in diplomacy with 
the Iroquois Confederacy would threaten the security of all the mainland colonies.22 
Instead, Pennsylvanian traders focused their attention on the deer trade to the south.23 
Shipments of furs from the Thirteen Colonies remained considerable throughout the 
eighteenth century and provided a ready source of cash that was particularly useful in the 
early years of the fledging colonies.24 
In 1670, the HBC, or to provide its official title, the ‘Governor and Company of 
Adventurers of England Trading into Hudson’s Bay’, was established by a group of 18 
adventurers in London who, with the support of Prince Rupert, were granted a royal 
charter by King Charles II that same year.25 This charter conferred to the Company and 
its successors: 
the sole Trade and Commerce of all those Seas, Streights, Bays, Rivers, 
Lakes, Creeks, and Sounds, in whatsoever Latitude they shall be, that lie 
within the entrance of the Streights commonly called Hudson’s Streights, 
together with all the Lands, Countries and Territories, upon the Coasts and 
                                                 
18 Norton, Fur Trade, pp. 3-5; and Rich, ‘Russia’, pp. 307-28. 
19 Rich, Montreal, pp. 2-4. 
20 Ibid., pp. 11-12, 19. 
21 Norton, Fur trade, pp. 43, 50-4. 
22 Ibid., pp. 50-1. For an illuminating account of the role of the Indian Superintendent in maintaining 
alliances with the Iroquois of the Mohawk Valley and the gifts that were bestowed upon tribal leaders 
see Timothy J. Shannon, ‘Dressing for Success on the Mohawk Frontier: Hendrick, William Johnson, 
and the Indian Fashion’, in Susan Sleeper-Smith, ed., Rethinking the Fur Trade: Cultures of Exchange 
in an Atlantic World (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), pp. 344-84. 
23 Norton, Fur trade, pp. 50-1. 
24 Rich, ‘Russia’, pp. 308-9, 325. 
25 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 1, p. 53. 
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Confines of the Seas, Streights, Bays, Lakes, Rivers, Creeks and Sounds, 
aforesaid, which are not now actually possessed by any of our Subjects, or 
by the Subjects of any other Christian Prince or State.26 
In his classic two-volume history of the HBC, E. E. Rich convincingly argued that the 
Company’s Charter ‘has always been something of an enigma in the history of the 
Company, and has deluded both its supporters and its opponents’.27 The Charter, he 
argued, should be interpreted as a grant of rights and not specific duties; it did not compel 
the Company to promote settlement or exploration.28 In Rich’s view, it was a trading 
colony not a colony of settlement that was granted to the Company.29 This ‘trading 
colony’ encompassed the exclusive right to trade in and on the shores of the tributaries 
that flowed into the Hudson Straits, a huge area that included Hudson’s Bay and its entire 
water basin which extended the Company’s privileges into the interior of North America, 
a region that was more commonly known to contemporaries as Rupert’s Land. In 1670, 
however, contemporaries had limited geographic knowledge with which to comprehend 
the full scale of the territory to which the Charter referred.30  
In practice, the Company’s Charter was not, as Rich suggested, simply a case of the 
Company holding the exclusive right to trade within a specified territory. A number of 
contemporaries and later historians have contended that the Company actually owned 
Rupert’s Land and not just the sole right to trade within it.31 In 1821, Edward Ellice came 
to the conclusion that the Company held ‘proprietary rights’ over its chartered territory 
and this was a judgement that he reaffirmed at the 1857 Parliamentary Committee into 
the Company’s affairs.32 Ultimately, this was the interpretation that the British legislature 
took when negotiating the terms upon which the Company would ‘surrender’ Rupert’s 
Land to the Dominion of Canada in 1870, the latter of which was required to pay the 
Company £300,000 for the acquisition.33 The crux of the matter is that the meaning and 
legality of the Company’s Charter was contested right up until the Company relinquished 
                                                 
26 Anon., Charter and Supplemental Charter of the Hudson’s Bay Company (London: Printed by Sir Joseph 
Causton & Sons, 1884), pp. 1-29. 
27 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 1, pp. 56-7. 
28 Ibid., p. 56. 
29 Ibid., p. 56. 
30 Rupert’s Land composed around one-third of the territory of modern Canada. 
31 For instance, see Elizabeth Mancke, ‘Chartered Enterprises and the Evolution of the British Atlantic 
World’, in Elizabeth Mancke and Carole Shammas, eds., The Creation of the British Atlantic World 
(Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2005), especially p. 247. 
32 Report from the Select Committee on the Hudson’s Bay Company (P. P. 1857, Vol. XV.1), p. 328. 
33 Simmons, Keepers of the Record, p. 155. 
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its chartered privileges.34 The Charter’s ambiguity partly explains why — during the 
period of this study — the Company did not seek to prosecute the NWC for trading in 
Rupert’s Land and why the NWC did not challenge the HBC’s Charter in a Court of Law. 
It is similarly important to emphasise that the HBC did not, as some historians have 
claimed, possess a monopoly of the British fur trade before 1821.35 In London, the HBC 
was in open competition with furs from the Thirteen Colonies (the United States after 
1783) in addition to those from Canada after 1763.36 From its very inception the HBC 
also faced competition within its chartered territory from southern interlopers. Coureur 
de bois, French traders who spent time travelling and living with Aboriginal communities 
to learn indigenous languages, survival techniques, and to develop trading relationships, 
consistently intruded upon the trade of the HBC as they ventured north-west from 
Montreal, intercepting Cree, Assiniboine, and other Aboriginal traders on their way to the 
Company’s posts on Hudson’s Bay.37 There were thus two different patterns of trade. 
Until the late eighteenth century, the HBC’s principal strategy was to entice Aboriginal 
traders down to its fortified trading posts on Hudson’s Bay to exchange their furs for 
heavier goods that the Company, at this time, did not have the will, requisite knowledge, 
or the means with which to transport effectively into the interior.38 On the other hand, the 
French, while establishing a Great Rendezvous at Montreal to entice indigenous 
communities to trade, increasingly developed a system whereby their coureur de bois 
actively sought out Aboriginal traders in the interior.39 As the coureurs advanced further 
inland, their longer journeys stimulated the emergence of entrepôts at Detroit, Sault Ste. 
Maire, Machilimackinac, and Kaministiquia (later Fort William of the NWC) which 
enabled the French traders to re-supply themselves with provisions and trade goods 
upcountry, more commonly known as an ‘outfit’. 40  This had the adverse effect of 
intercepting indigenous peoples on their way down to the Montreal trade fairs, leading to 
the latter’s decline. 41  The coureurs also impacted upon the HBC by trading with 
                                                 
34 Uncertainty over the legality of the Company’s Charter can be seen in the questions asked at the 1857 
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36 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 1, pp. 56-7. 
37 Ibid., pp. 509-10; and Rich, Montreal, pp. 10-11. 
38 Rich, Montreal, p. 23; and Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 1, p. 573. 
39 Rich, Montreal, p. 23. 
40 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
41 Ibid., p. 20. 
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Aboriginal peoples before they reached the Company’s posts on Hudson’s Bay. The 
cessation of New France to the British in 1763 merely replaced the French bourgeois 
merchants of Montreal, who arranged the importation of trade goods and provided 
financial services, with a British mercantile elite that maintained the French style of 
trading and so continued to provide competition to the HBC.42  
By 1763 then, Britain had acquired supremacy of the North American fur trade, 
including that of the Thirteen Colonies, Canada, and Hudson’s Bay. It should be noted, 
however, that the acquisition of Canada, despite its strategic significance and its 
importance in the fur trade, was a highly contentious policy at the time, as many 
opponents to the cessation argued that Guadeloupe, with its sugar, coffee, cocoa, and 
other plantation trades, would be of greater benefit to Britain, an episode that became 
known as the ‘Canada versus Guadeloupe’ controversy.43 With the independence of the 
United States in 1783, Britain lost control of key fur-trading regions but this loss was, at 
least in the first two decades, not as severe as one might expect, as many fur traders from 
the former Thirteen Colonies, especially those from New York, followed the loyalist 
exodus and re-established themselves in Montreal, many of whom later entered into the 
association of partnerships that became the NWC.44 For several decades after American 
independence, these loyalist traders continued to engage in a southerly trade from 
Montreal through the Great Lakes and towards the Mississippi.45 While the Treaty of 
Paris (1783) acknowledged American sovereignty over the territories that lay to the south 
of the Great Lakes, Britain continued to occupy several military forts that now lay within 
                                                 
42 Ibid., pp. 43-4. 
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the jurisdiction of the United States such as Detroit, Grand Portage, and 
Michilimackinac.46 Under the terms of Jay’s Treaty (1794) — which was an effort to 
resolve unsettled commercial and territorial issues from the Treaty of Paris (1783) — 
Britain withdrew its military forces from the occupied outposts, but by this time the 
population of fur-bearing animals in the Great Lakes had been heavily depleted; only deer 
were a significant pelt that was traded in the region from this point forth.47 While the 
United States gradually assumed control of the fortifications to the south of the Great 
Lakes, trade in this region and in the uncharted Mississippi was still open to both 
American citizens and British subjects.48 Indeed, Canadian traders conducted a thriving 
trade after the signing of the Treaty, which not only reached into Illinois country but 
stretched further west into Louisiana.49  
The rise of British control over the supply of North American furs was accompanied 
by comparable shifts in their distribution to prime European markets. The Dutch, despite 
forfeiting their only fur-trading colony, established themselves as key intermediaries in 
the fur trade in the late seventeenth century. Indeed, so important was the Dutch role that 
the British state allowed furs from New York to be exported directly to the United 
Provinces, until the enumeration of furs in 1722. 50  The Dutch primarily became 
middlemen in the fur trade as a result of an over-accumulation of parchment beaver in 
England and France, parchment being an English term that was applied to beaver furs 
that had not been worn by the Aboriginal trappers of the furs, and thus the pelts still held 
their under-fur as well as their long guard hairs.51 This made the skin stiff and unworkable 
as the act of wearing the furs filled the hairs with sweat down to the roots of the fur and 
wore off the long guard hairs which made the skin pliant, hence the term coat beaver.52 
The solution was to comb the ‘beaver wool’ from the undercoat of the raw skins which 
also left the long fine guard hairs on the pelt.53 This provided two valuable products; 
‘combed beaver’ that was prized for trimming garments and for wearing, and ‘beaver 
wool’ that was used in felt- and hat-making.54 However, unlike in Russia, the technique 
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remained unknown in Western Europe until the early eighteenth century.55 The Dutch 
therefore developed a system whereby they shipped colonial furs from France and Britain 
to Arkhangelsk and Narva, where it was processed and then re-exported back to North-
West Europe.56  
Even before the Nonsuch, the first voyage chartered by the HBC, sailed to Hudson’s 
Bay, English merchants were already sending small consignments of furs for processing 
to Russia.57 In 1694, the HBC started to send considerable quantities of furs to agents in 
Hamburg for direct shipment to Arkhangelsk and Narva.58 These ventures were, for the 
most part, successful but they involved complex negotiation of bills of exchange and the 
handling of return cargoes.59 Indeed, when the private dealings of some of the Company’s 
associates were muddled with the Company’s own ventures and proved both costly and 
frustratingly difficult to disentangle, the Company gradually withdrew its direct trade to 
Russia, opting first to sell them in Amsterdam before purely returning to the use of sales 
in London.60 From 1682 to 1713, the Russia trade operated by the Dutch and partly by 
the HBC, served to clear the glut of furs in North-West Europe and thus brought stability 
to western markets.61 The elaborate route was, however, full of risk and uncertainties that 
were exacerbated by warfare.62 For these 30 years, British and French fur traders were 
predominantly dependent on Dutch access to Russian markets as their manufactories were 
not sophisticated enough and domestic demand was not large enough to absorb the 
volume of furs imported from North America. The trade required a reserve market that 
Russia initially provided but the growth in the felting and hatting industries in Paris, 
London, and other centres, alongside the diffusion of the ‘combing’ technique, created 
new and expanding outlets in the form of manufactured beaver and felt hats that found 
ready markets at home and abroad.63 For centuries Russia had acted as the supplier of furs 
to Western Europe but the resource depletion of the fur-bearing regions of ‘European 
Russia’ forced the Russian fur trade further east. By the late eighteenth century, Siberia 
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and Alaska supplied the vast majority of the pelts used in the Russian fur trade.64 Rather 
than the distant European market, Russian traders sent these furs to northern China where 
they were exchanged for tea, silks, and other China goods.65 During the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, Chinese demand for foreign furs increased as a result of 
population growth, urbanisation, and the Qing nobility’s interest in foreign consumer 
goods.66 The Chinese fashioned these fur imports into fur cloaks and trimmings, and they 
were especially prized in northern China as a way to keep warm during the particularly 
cold winters.67 
By the late eighteenth century, British merchants had become the main supplier and 
distributor of North American furs, a far cry from the late medieval period when the 
German Hanse dominated the international networks of the fur trade and when Russia 
and the Baltic were the primary suppliers of luxury furs to the European continent. Even 
so, Britain’s position as the leading fur-trading nation was not guaranteed. In the 
following decades the British fur trade faced numerous threats to its successful 
continuation. The newly independent United States began to assert her territorial 
boundaries, gradually excluding British traders access to the fur-trading regions that lay 
to the south of the Great Lakes and towards the Mississippi. While the Americans fortified 
their own fur trade, the trades operated from Montreal and Hudson’s Bay faced the 
prospect of decline in the midst of intense competition between rival traders, the 
disruptive impact of the war of 1812, and the depletion of the very resource that 
underpinned the enterprise. Before considering these challenges in the next chapter, 
however, it is first necessary to discuss exactly how the fur trades of Hudson’s Bay and 
Canada were organised.  
II.  The Organisation of the Hudson Bay and Canadian Fur Trades 
The HBC had, by 1783, developed a sophisticated mechanism with which to manage its 
transatlantic ventures. As was customary for British chartered joint-stock companies, the 
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HBC was headquartered in London and established a permanent, centralised base of 
operations soon after its creation. In 1696 the Company acquired its first long-term lease 
of premises on the north side of Fenchurch Street, situated at the upper end of Culver 
Court, which became known as Hudson’s Bay House. 68  Prior to this move, the 
Company’s shareholders had met at Prince Rupert’s House, Garraway’s Coffee House, 
                                                 
68 Simmons, Keepers of the Record, p. 41. 
Figure 1.1. View of Hudson’s Bay House on Fenchurch Street, c.1820. 
 
Source: LMA, Collage Record No. 3050, ‘View of Hudson’s Bay House on Fenchurch 
Street by Valentine Davis’, c.1820. 
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and Scrivener’s Hall.69  The Company remained at Culver’s Court until 1794, when 
Hudson’s Bay House was relocated to Nos. 3 and 4 Fenchurch Street.70 It is not clear why 
the Company chose to move at this time. It may be because the Company’s premises and 
the adjoining warehouse had become too small.71 The new Hudson’s Bay House directly 
faced onto Fenchurch Street and was thus more prominently placed than the secluded 
grounds of Culver’s Court. With the headquarters of the EIC just a short walk away on 
Leadenhall Street and the Bank of England on Threadneedle Street, the Company was 
firmly embedded in the vibrant hub of eighteenth-century commerce. The façade of the 
new premises had a simple, elegant design and was a fine display of brickwork (Figure 
1.1).72 As is the case today, architecture was an effective way for eighteenth-century 
institutions to enhance their status and communicate particular messages to onlookers. 
Margaret Makepeace has revealed that the EIC purposefully hired architects to create 
well-designed buildings in which to situate its warehouses in order to impress observers 
and dignitaries. 73  While not as grand or imposing as East India House, the subtle 
refinement of the HBC’s headquarters suggests that the Company attempted to cultivate 
an image of propriety and sound management that bears much similarity to Adam Smith’s 
favourable depiction of the Company. Smith reasoned that the HBC as: 
a joint stock company, consisting of a small number of proprietors, with a 
moderate capital, approaches very nearly to the nature of a private 
copartnery, and may be capable of nearly the same degree of vigilance and 
attention’.74 
                                                 
69 Ibid., pp. 5, 38-9. 
70 Ibid., p. 5. 
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Indeed, the street-front elevation of Hudson’s Bay House was similar in design to a 
successful British or American counting house involved in Atlantic trade, although 
perhaps a little more spacious and fashionable.75  
Internally, however, the Company’s headquarters were slightly different from the 
typical layout of an eighteenth-century counting house, the latter of which usually 
consisted of at least an entrance hall, counting room, drawing room, store room, and the 
merchant’s living quarters.76 Hudson’s Bay House was in fact spread over two buildings. 
The first was the headquarters of the Company which contained the residence of the 
secretary and his office, the accountant’s office, and a large entrance hall and lobby which 
led to the boardroom.77 The construction of the latter was immediately commenced upon 
the move to the new premises in 1794. The second building consisted of a warehouse, the 
warehouse keeper’s office and premises, and a book room. 78  The boardroom was 
necessitated by the need for a space large enough to accommodate the Company’s 
shareholders at the annual general meeting that took place in November or December 
each year. The inclusion of an on-site warehouse probably derived from the Committee’s 
wish to keep a watchful eye on the Company’s high-value furs, as well as to enable the 
Company’s sales to be conducted from the House itself.79 It is, however, the size of the 
Company’s administration that most separates it from the typical merchant firm of the 
period. The secretary, accountant, and warehouse keeper each either had an assistant or 
clerk so that the Company had, at the very least, a minimum of six permanent salaried 
managers (excluding the Committee members). If the chiefs of the Company’s posts in 
Hudson’s Bay are included, the total reaches as high as twenty. As Ann Carlos and 
Stephen Nicholas have pointed out, few late-nineteenth-century multinationals had an 
administration greater than the HBC did in the eighteenth century.80 The reason for this 
unusually large administration — albeit small in comparison to the EIC — was because 
the Company directly undertook a large number of the transactions that were involved in 
the operation of the fur trade.  
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For instance, from November to April each year, the London Committee placed 
orders with British merchants and manufacturers for trading goods to supply to its trading 
posts in North America and for provisions to provide to its overseas servants, which were 
more commonly known as the annual ‘outfit’. Along with parcels for the Company’s 
servants, many of which were sent from their friends and relatives in Britain, these 
commodity exports were packed and loaded onto the Company’s ships in time for their 
departure to Hudson’s Bay in late May or early June. 81  Unlike most other British 
chartered companies, the HBC owned its own ships.82 The Company was, therefore, 
required to purchase and maintain its vessels, although its fleet only numbered between 
two and four vessels between 1783 and 1821.83 On the outbound voyage to Hudson’s 
Bay, the captains of the Company’s ships traded with Inuit communities as they passed 
through Hudson Strait, and these exchanges were conducted according to detailed 
instructions from the London Committee.84 The ships arrived at the Company’s major 
posts in Hudson’s Bay between mid-August and mid-September.85 Since Hudson’s Bay 
froze over for much of the year, there was only a small window of opportunity to unload 
the annual outfit from the ships, load the seasons fur returns, and safely navigate out of 
the Bay. By 1783, the Company was developing its inland trading operations so that the 
Company’s factories on Hudson’s Bay increasingly served as distribution centres rather 
than points of trade themselves. Specific consignments of provisions and trading goods 
were made up at the coastal posts for the inland trade and, as the bay-side posts were 
strategically located at the mouths of rivers, were transported by canoe into the interior. 
Throughout the year, Aboriginal peoples visited the Company’s trading posts to exchange 
furs for woollen textiles, alcohol, tobacco, and many other commodities. With the return 
of the Company’s ships, which usually docked at Ratcliff or Gravesend on the River 
Thames between mid-October and early December, the imported furs were sorted, 
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graded, placed into lots, and sold at auction.86 Furthermore, the Company had to manage 
and remit wages to its existing workforce, as well as continually recruit new servants.  
The successful coordination of these numerous transactions — many of which took 
place thousands of miles away from Fenchurch Street — led the Company to develop 
complex administrative structures.87 While not as extensive as those established by the 
EIC, the HBC had at least two London sub-committees: the Committee of Sale and a 
committee to settle tradesmen’s bills.88 In Hudson’s Bay, the Chiefs and Masters of the 
Company’s posts, often with the assistance of a clerk (or ‘writer’ as they were known 
until the early nineteenth century), had to maintain a post journal, a post account book, 
and write a report on the social and economic conditions of their district. In addition to 
their report and a copy of local correspondence, every year each post was required to send 
a copy of their journal and account book to London. The Company’s secretary and 
accountant then used these records to ensure that the London Committee were kept well-
informed of the Company’s North American operations. Indeed, it was not until 1821 that 
Nicholas Garry became the first member of the London Committee to visit Hudson’s 
Bay.89  
Very little is known about the members of the Company’s Committee. In total, the 
Committee consisted of the Governor, Deputy-Governor, and seven other members. They 
met in Hudson’s Bay House every Wednesday at 11:45 AM, although there were usually 
fewer meetings when the Company’s ships were on their annual voyage to Hudson’s Bay, 
especially during the months of July, August, and September.90 There are three features 
of the Committee that have been established. The first is the committee members’ 
longevity of service.91 Indeed, for over half of the eighteenth century, four members of 
the Lake family served as the Company’s Governor.92 Secondly, from the Company’s 
early years, there was a close relationship between Committee members and the Royal 
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Society.93 Samuel Wegg, for example, was Governor of the Company from 1780 to 1799, 
and he had previously served on the council of the Society.94 Thirdly, some Committee 
members extended short-term credit to the Company.95 For instance, on 19 November 
1794, Richard Neave loaned £3,000 to the Company at a rate of 4 per cent interest per 
annum, which was repaid two months later.96 It should be noted, however, that for most 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it was the Bank of England that 
supplied credit to the Company. As Ann Carlos has demonstrated, the Company’s 
relationship with the Bank of England was hugely important to the survival of the 
Company, particularly during the worst years of the Napoleonic Wars in the early 
nineteenth century. 97  Prior to these turbulent years, however, the Company did not 
usually have a significant need for credit despite its lack of working capital, a 
circumstance that arose from the mismatch between the proceeds of its fur sales (from 
December to May) and the mid-year payments to its suppliers.98 Mike Wagner has shown 
that the Company effectively solved this problem through temporary investments in Bank 
of England, East India, and South Sea securities, which were then sold off a few months 
later to equip the Company’s ships and pay its servants’ salaries.99 For this and other 
reasons, Wagner argues that the Company was a ‘financial innovator’ and that ‘its 
financial strength gave it a greater ability to withstand competition’.100 It should be noted, 
however, that McTavish, Fraser & Co. — one of the London Houses that served the NWC 
— also invested in securities as a way to resolve their lack of working capital.101  
While the fur trade to Hudson’s Bay was conducted by a chartered company that 
integrated many of the transactions that the fur trade required, the Canadian fur trade 
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involved the use of partnerships, which was the more conventional form of business 
organisation used in Atlantic trade.102 In the initial decade after 1763, these partnerships 
were between a fur trader who wintered in the interior and conducted the exchanges with 
Aboriginal peoples, and a merchant in Montreal or Quebec who outfitted the venture. In 
this way, the British continued the operation of the Canadian fur trade along much the 
same lines as the French had done previously, following the policy of bringing the trade 
to Aboriginal peoples. One key change was, however, the gradual displacement of French 
merchants with the ‘Old’ Subjects of the British Crown, many of whom were first 
generation British emigrants from the Thirteen Colonies.103 British participation in the 
inland trade also increased. From 1763, so-called ‘pedlars’ (who were usually British) 
emerged as intermediaries between the merchants and the coureurs.104 These ‘pedlars’ 
transported goods to and from Grand Portage, Michilimackinac, Kaministiquia (later Fort 
William of the NWC), and other interior centres. The term ‘pedlars’ was also used to 
describe English-speaking coureurs.105 French-Canadians did, however, remain heavily 
involved in navigation and the transactions with Aboriginal communities.  
These small-scale partnerships — whether between a British merchant in Montreal 
or Quebec and a coureur or pedlar — were relatively short-lived, few lasting for more 
than one or two years.106 In order to reduce costs, in 1779 seven of these partnerships 
agreed to form a loose association that became known as the NWC, which became the 
largest fur trading enterprise in Montreal.107 The Company was a fluid association and 
the shares allocated to each concern shifted in accordance with their relative importance 
and the addition or removal of other fur-trading ventures from the combination. The 
Company thus had no common capital. Instead each partner contributed to a collective 
stock of provisions and trade goods.108 On the one hand, this provided the Company with 
a considerable pool of resources with which to conduct its ventures but it also resulted in 
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a stark lack of corporate responsibility for any unscrupulous occurrences in the trade.109 
The immense distance between Montreal and the interior was a key stimulus behind the 
need to economise. A journey between Montreal and ‘Athabasca’, the El Dorado of the 
north-west that yielded high-quality furs, totalled 2,750 miles, and it was another 1,540 
miles to the mouth of the Mackenzie River.110 The conveyance of trade goods and furs 
inland required the use of complex trading routes that made extensive use of waterborne 
navigation. The birch-bark canoe was the craft that was most commonly used to traverse 
the many lakes and rivers that a voyage into the interior required. These canoes were 
copied from Aboriginal technology but were typically larger than those utilised by 
Aboriginal peoples as they were designed to carry far more lading.111  
There were two stages to a voyage into the north-west. The first stage was between 
Montreal and Lake Superior for which two major routes were used. The first ran up the 
St. Lawrence River and through the Great Lakes, and the second went up the Ottawa and 
Mattawa Rivers, to reach Lake Nipissing where the route continued along the French 
River and then into Georgian Bay, Lake Huron, and finally Lake Superior.112 For this 
journey, large canoes known as canot du maître were used to transport goods in bulk and 
they frequently travelled in brigades made of between three and six canoes.113 Schooners 
and sloops were also in use on the Great Lakes by the early nineteenth century and the 
NWC used such vessels to assist the transportation of goods from Michilimackinac and 
Sault Ste. Marie to the western edge of Lake Superior.114 For the voyages north of Lake 
Superior, smaller and more agile canots du nord were used, which carried little more than 
half of what the canot du maître did.115 Like the entry of the HBC’s ships into Hudson’s 
Bay, the seasons dictated that inland voyages were timely completed, as many of the 
waterways froze over during the winter.116  
In addition to savings in the cost of transportation, the centralisation of the Montreal 
fur trade under the NWC made it easier to access long-term credit, and eliminated much 
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of the competition over supplies and in the trade with Aboriginal peoples.117 In many 
ways the emergence of the NWC was part of the eighteenth-century ‘revolution of scale 
in overseas trade’, whereby a small number of merchants quickly came to dominate 
Atlantic trade.118 Although there were setbacks in the process of centralisation that saw 
the Canadian fur trade become concentrated in the hands of a few merchants, a series of 
revised agreements in 1779, 1783-4, 1787, 1792, 1798, and 1804 saw the eventual 
emergence of monopoly in the Montreal fur trade. 119  The rise of the NWC was 
accompanied by the advent of fur-trading merchant firms in Montreal and Quebec. There 
were thus two forms of partnership in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century 
Canadian fur trade: those between groups of merchants; and those between merchants 
and ‘wintering partners’, the latter either being coureurs or pedlars. The NWC was, 
therefore, a combination of these partnership forms. There were, at the very least, seven 
Montreal firms that were part of the NWC over the course of its existence from 1779 to 
1821. These included Alexander Mackenzie & Co., Forsyth, Richardson & Co., Grant, 
Campion & Co., Gregory, McLeod & Co., Todd, McGill & Co., and McTavish, Frobisher 
& Co. (McTavish, McGillivrays & Co. from 1804).120 It was the latter of these that was 
the driving force behind the NWC’s ascendency. Formed between Simon McTavish and 
Joseph Frobisher in 1787, the firm, with the help of its associated wintering partners, 
acquired a commanding number of shares in the Company.121 McTavish, Frobisher also 
gradually became the main agent through which the other Montreal firms procured the 
supplies for their annual outfits.122  
The Montreal merchants thus initiated a process of vertical integration between 
themselves and inland fur traders, in addition to a vertical integration with their London 
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supply houses. London firms supplied, on credit, the goods required by the Montreal 
merchants and sold the return cargoes of furs on Montreal accounts. The Canadian fur 
trade was, therefore, part of the commission system that emerged in Atlantic trade from 
the late seventeenth century onwards.123 As part of this system, British merchants served 
as agents who sold, on commission, consignments of goods received from American 
planters and merchants, and in return fulfilled their colonial clients’ orders for 
manufactured goods and supplied them with a wide range of services, such as shipping, 
insurance, and finance.124 The commission system remained a part of the Canadian fur 
trade until 1821, when the HBC assumed control of the trade. There were not many 
London firms involved in the fur trade. In fact, there were only around five that were of 
significance in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. These included Dyer, 
Allan & Co., Brickwood, Pattle & Co. (latter Brickwood, Daniel & Co.), Phyn, Ellice & 
Inglis (later Inglis, Ellice & Co.), McTavish, Fraser & Co., and Mackenzie, Gillespie & 
Co.125 These London Houses often had commercial interests outside the fur trade and 
were not formally within the NWC’s structure.  
Until 1788, Dyer, Allan & Co. and Phyn, Ellice & Inglis were the NWC’s 
commission agents, each with an equal share of the Company’s business. In this year, 
Dyer, Allan withdrew from the trade and Phyn, Ellice & Inglis assumed their former share 
of the commission trade.126 From at least 1790, Phyn, Ellice & Inglis became closely 
associated with the Montreal firm of Forsyth, Richardson & Co., with ties of kinship and 
marriage connecting the two concerns.127 Meanwhile, Simon McTavish and John Fraser 
established the London House of McTavish, Fraser in 1788, although this firm, initially 
at least, apparently purchased most of its goods from Brickwood, Pattle.128 In 1792, 
McTavish, Frobisher edged Brickwood, Pattle and Phyn, Ellice & Inglis out of the 
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business of supplying the NWC, and McTavish, Frobisher used McTavish, Fraser as their 
commission agents.129 McTavish, Fraser were based at 2 Suffolk Lane, Cannon Street and 
the premises included a warehouse.130 In June 1794, £56,000 worth of furs was insured 
at Suffolk Lane, but the volume of the furs consigned to the firm evidently surpassed the 
available space as the insurance policy covered another £85,400 worth of furs at the 
warehouses of the brokers Robinson, Goat, Row & Co..131 While McTavish, Frobisher 
and McTavish, Fraser were separate firms, McTavish had, in essence, carried out a 
vertical integration of the Montreal and London branches of the fur trade. The same could 
also be said for Forsyth, Richardson and Phyn, Ellice & Inglis. This vertical integration 
process occurred throughout British Atlantic trade in the second half of the eighteenth 
century.132 Gary Spraakman and Julie Margret maintain that vertical integration in the 
Canadian fur trade occurred because the trade required a London firm that was capable 
of supplying the specific range and quality of commodities demanded by Aboriginal 
peoples, as well as effective sales services in London.133 Harry Duckworth has, however, 
argued that the formation of the NWC was in part encouraged by the London merchants 
themselves, particularly John Strettell, whose business was the precursor to Brickwood, 
Pattle.134  In 1783, Strettell’s customers held half of the shares in the NWC and so, 
Duckworth contends, Strettell must have encouraged an arrangement that would limit 
competition between the furs he received from his customers.135 Indeed, when the NWC 
acquired a monopoly of the Montreal fur trade in 1804, the agreement then signed 
stipulated that the Company’s furs were not to be divided prior to their sale, despite the 
fact that the proceeds were to be split across three London Houses.136  
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Vertical integration was further encouraged by the need for the long-term credit that 
underpinned the entire Canadian fur trade. The London Houses supplied goods to the 
Canadian firms on credit, as did the Canadian merchants to the wintering partners who 
similarly advanced credit to Aboriginal peoples.137 As the search for untapped regions of 
high-quality furs propelled the Montreal fur traders to venture ever further into the North-
West, which increased the length of the trading routes, larger amounts of capital were 
required for extended periods of time.138 On average, the London Houses had to extend 
credit to their Montreal counterparts for around three years.139  In the first year, the 
London Houses first purchased the goods for the outfit in the winter and spring, and then 
had to ensure that the goods reached Quebec by November before ice closed off the 
port.140 By April, or the beginning of the second year, the goods had to have been shipped 
to Montreal, and thence to Grand Portage or Fort William by July, after which they were 
transported further inland. The goods were exchanged inland for furs during the winter 
and spring, and were back at Fort William for July, by which point the trade entered its 
third year. The furs reached Montreal in September, were sent to England in October, and 
were then sorted and put up for sale in the winter and spring.141 For the most distant posts 
— those that were located near Lake Athabasca or towards the eastern foothills of the 
Rocky Mountains — the trade took a fourth year, as there was not enough time before the 
onset of the winter freeze for the canoes to reach Fort William.142 The return on capital 
in the Canadian fur trade therefore took three to four years, an unusually long period in 
the context of eighteenth-century trade.143 Even the Levant trade, which was the preserve 
of only the richest merchants, would see a return in two years.144 Merchants involved in 
the fur trade needed a lot of capital because they had to wait a very long time for returns, 
and this thus promoted the emergence of a few, large merchant firms in Montreal and 
London. Indeed, when Dyer, Allan withdrew from the trade in 1788, Brickwood, Pattle 
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considered the risk of taking on their business as too great, leading to the involvement of 
Phyn, Ellice & Inglis.145 
While McTavish, Frobisher and McTavish, Fraser increased their hold over the 
NWC and the Montreal fur trade from 1788 onwards, this centralisation of power was 
contested. In addition to the north-west trade, until around 1800, there was also a south-
west trade that stretched from Montreal to the Great Lakes and the Mississippi. This 
branch of the Canadian fur trade endured a prolonged decline following the instigation of 
Jay’s Treaty (1794), as the merchants involved in this division of the trade shifted their 
activities into the north-west trade. By 1791, the Canadian fur trade was highly 
centralised, with the three firms of Forsyth, Richardson & Co., Todd, McGill & Co., and 
McTavish, Frobisher reportedly controlling two-thirds of the trade.146 The first two firms 
had largely focused on the south-west trade but in the 1790s they expanded into the north-
west trade in an attempt to mitigate their losses. The NWC accommodated these new 
firms, in addition to another south-west firm by the name of Ogilvy, Forsyth & Co., 
through the signing of ‘non-opposition agreements’, which stipulated that their trade in 
the north-west was to be conducted on the Company’s account and that these ventures 
were to be outfitted by McTavish, Frobisher.147 These agreements thus did not grant full 
partnership status to the rival firms, but in 1795 an attempt to do so failed.148 The bitter 
way in which these negotiations ended set the stage for a six-year commercial feud that 
engulfed the Montreal fur trade at the turn of the nineteenth century.149  
As the non-opposition agreements came to an end in 1798-9, the firms that were 
not a part of the NWC joined together to form The New North West Company (XYC), 
which was also known as the ‘XY’ Company because of the unique markings that the 
Company placed on its cargoes. The Company is also sometimes referred to as Sir 
Alexander Mackenzie & Co., due to the fact that the Company was led by the renowned 
explorer. The XYC composed the Montreal firms of Forsyth, Richardson & Co., Leith, 
Jamieson & Co., John Mure & Co., and Parker, Gerrard, Ogilvy & Co., while the Phyn, 
Ellice & Inglis served as the Company’s London House.150 Considering that McTavish, 
Fraser had pushed out Phyn, Ellice & Inglis from the business of supplying the NWC in 
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1792, it is likely that the latter firm played a major role in the creation of a new, effective 
opposition. From 1798 to 1804, the rivalry between the NWC and XYC led to unheard of 
levels of intimidation, pilfering, and incitement of indigenous communities as the two 
rivals attempted to acquire ascendency of the trade.151 The two companies frequently 
constructed their trading posts in close proximity, and while everyday relations between 
each side were largely ones of mutual assistance, as instanced in the sharing of provisions 
to ward off starvation, when it came to trading furs there was virtually no limit to their 
efforts to claim the furs of indebted Aboriginal peoples.152 On more than one occasion, 
this drive for furs resulted in bloodshed.153 In August 1802, Joseph-Maurice Lamothe, a 
young clerk of the XYC, murdered James King of the NWC after the latter attempted to 
steal his furs.154 The disturbances unsettled the colonial administration and led to the 
passage of the Canada Jurisdiction Act (1803) in the British Parliament, which allowed 
for nominated Justices of the Peace to arrest those suspected of wrongdoings in the 
‘Indian Country’ to then be sent for trial in the courts of Lower Canada.155 It was only 
with the death of Simon McTavish in 1804 that a reconciliation of the two companies was 
made possible. In that same year, the two companies merged under the banner of the 
NWC. Shares were allocated to each of the Company’s Montreal firms and wintering 
partners, and the London business was split between McTavish, Fraser, the reorganised 
Inglis, Ellice & Co., and Mackenzie, Gillespie & Parker.156 The revitalised NWC now 
possessed a monopoly of the Canadian fur trade, with the resources of all the Montreal 
firms still active in the trade, and the backing of their respective London Houses. This 
agreement lasted until the merger of the NWC and HBC in 1821. In effect, the fracture 
that occurred in the Canadian fur trade between 1798 and 1804 was a precursor to the 
later conflict between the HBC and NWC, a subject that is subsequently explored in 
chapter two. 
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A large proportion of the participants in the Canadian fur trade were Scottish. Many 
of these individuals had previously operated in the fur trade of the Thirteen Colonies. 
Indeed, Heather Devine has argued that the NWC was a partial legacy of William 
Johnson, an Irish emigrant who became one of the most influential men in the colony of 
New York. 157  Johnson served as the British Indian Superintendent of the Northern 
Department between 1755 and 1774 and, in addition to the prestigious responsibility of 
ensuring favourable British relations with the indigenous communities of the Mohawk 
Valley, Johnson was a powerful landed proprietor and consistently extended patronage to 
Scottish immigrants.158 This included one of the most significant men in the development 
of the NWC, Simon McTavish, who worked as a clerk in Johnson’s household.159 Other 
Scottish expatriates who later became partners in the NWC included Normand MacLeod, 
James Phyn, Alexander Ellice, James McGill, and John Richardson.160 After the outbreak 
of the American Revolution in 1775, these individuals relocated their business to 
Montreal and abandoned their involvement in the fur trade of New York, Albany, 
Schenectady, and Detroit.161  Thus the Seven Years’ War and the American War of 
Independence infused the Montreal fur trade with English-speaking fur-traders from New 
England and New York.  
Scots were well-represented in Britain’s colonial enterprises and their tendency to 
form bonds based upon regional and familial ties was a central factor in the formation of 
their business networks.162 Indeed, in 1763 the fur trade involved a diverse array of 
French, French-Canadian, English, Scottish, and colonial British traders, but by 1821 the 
enterprise was largely dominated by those with a Scottish connection and this extended 
to the London firms that were involved in the trade. In light of the small number of 
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merchant firms that operated within the fur trade and the initial support that William 
Johnson afforded to Scottish emigrants this development is perhaps not surprising. The 
role of associational culture — such as the Beaver Club in Montreal and the Canada Club 
in London — in reinforcing ties between Scots should also be acknowledged.163 Indeed, 
Kathleen Burke has found that approximately half of the individuals admitted to the 
Canada Club in the first five years of its existence were Scots or had Scottish ancestry.164 
These associations provided opportunities for those who sought to maintain or further 
develop their commercial interests in Canada. The uniqueness of the Scottish case should 
not be over-emphasised however. During the early modern period it was common for 
merchants to use their kinship and friendship connections when building their commercial 
networks, which was one of the methods used to fortify trust between geographically 
distant agents.165 The Scots involved in the Canadian fur trade did, of course, deal with 
people who were outside of their family and ethnic circles but these ties did evidently 
play a crucial role in the construction of their business networks.166  
As has been shown, as the Canadian fur trade advanced westward a ‘revolution of 
scale’ occurred in its organisation. While the concentration of the trade into the hands of 
a few merchants was a development that occurred in other eighteenth-century Atlantic 
trades, the extent of this transformation in the Canadian fur trade was unique. The 
increasing length of trade routes necessitated the need to find cost reductions, secure long-
term credit, and limit competition. This process culminated in the NWC securing a 
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monopoly of the Montreal fur trade in 1804, one that lasted for 17 years. The HBC was, 
of course, already a large-scale form of business organisation that operated within the 
trade, and it has been pointed out that the management accounting practices adopted by 
the HBC and NWC were remarkably similar.167 In the second decade of the nineteenth 
century, John Jacob Astor’s American Fur Company (AFC) followed many of the same 
management practices, although the physical environment ultimately curtailed his 
capacity to monopolise the trade, as there existed multiple routes through which the 
American fur trade could be conducted.168 Even so, it is clear that the North American fur 
trade gravitated towards large-scale types of business organisation between 1783 and 
1821. In essence, the Canadian fur merchants adopted a multi-partnership form of trade 
organisation in an attempt to solve the problems created by their expanding commodity 
frontier. While the HBC continued as a joint-stock company, it too adopted new forms of 
organisation in the early nineteenth century through the implementation of the so-called 
‘retrenchment system’. Devised by Andrew Wedderburn Colville in 1810, the system 
reorganised the Company’s trading posts into districts that reported to either the Northern 
Department (based at York Factory) or Southern Department (Moose Factory) and 
changed the way the Company assessed profitability to a method that analysed the trade 
balance of each individual post as opposed to just those on Hudson’s Bay. 169  The 
reorganisation also granted more autonomy to the Company’s fur traders by allowing 
them greater flexibility in decision making and a larger share of the Company’s profits. 
To this end, the developments that occurred in the organisation of the late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth-century British fur trade gives weight to the idea that merchants (and 
entrepreneurs) — in their attempts to expand and sustain their enterprises — 
experimented with different ownership forms and organisational structures well before 
the proliferation of the joint-stock company in the late nineteenth century. 170  The 
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increasing complexity of the fur trade thus promoted the emergence of a few, large trading 
companies.  
III.   Enticing Aboriginal Peoples to Trade 
Another aspect that made the fur trade a highly specialised enterprise was its dependence 
upon the non-coerced labour of Aboriginal peoples in the Americas. In contrast to the use 
of African slaves in the sugar, tobacco, and other plantation trades, the Atlantic fur trade 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries necessitated cooperation between 
Europeans and indigenous communities. This circumstance was partly because 
Aboriginal peoples in North America were more adept at trapping furs than European fur 
traders, and partly due to the fact that European powers were often not in a position to 
subjugate these indigenous groups, either on account of their need for allies or the 
impracticability of placing the remote environments in which these dispersed groups lived 
under direct imperial control. The fur trade thus became a diplomatic mechanism for 
European powers (and the United States) to extend sovereignty over these distant 
territories and the Aboriginal communities that subsisted within them, whereas for 
indigenous peoples, the fur trade served as an effective means through which to acquire 
foreign manufactures and other imported commodities.  
While Richard White’s concept of ‘the middle ground’ was originally focused on 
the Great Lakes region during the French colonial period, it is transferable to the cross-
cultural interactions that took place in the Hudson’s Bay and Canadian fur trades between 
1783 and 1821.171  In White’s words, the middle ground was ‘the place in between 
cultures, peoples, and in between empires and the nonstate world of villages’.172 Since 
neither side was able to achieve their ends through force, Europeans and Aboriginal 
peoples were inclined to follow negotiation over confrontation and so each attempted to 
understand the reasoning of the other and ‘to assimilate enough of that reasoning to put it 
to their own purposes’.173 For this reason, the method of exchange that was used at the 
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point of trade between Aboriginal peoples and the HBC and Montreal fur traders 
contained values and practices that were unique to the trade. Each side adapted their own 
customs in an effort to appeal to what they perceived were the customs of the other, and 
in so doing often misinterpreted and distorted those customs, yet these misunderstandings 
created new meanings and practices that became those of the middle ground.174  
The exchanges in the fur trade started with the giving of gifts.175 The British traders 
gifted the Aboriginal group or ‘band’ with items like prunes, tobacco, and alcohol, and 
the leader of the band — which the trading companies generally referred to as a ‘trading 
captain’ — was gifted with a suit of clothes that could also include stockings, shoes, a 
sash, handkerchief, and hat.176 In return, the trading captain gifted some furs, after which 
there was ceremonial drinking and tobacco smoking.177 It was only after this that the 
actual trading began, which involved both parties drinking alcohol.178 The European-
styled garments and accessories that were gifted to the trading captain served to enhance 
the captain’s or chieftain’s authority over his own people.179 Access to European trade 
goods became a major factor that Aboriginal peoples looked for when selecting their 
leaders. The clothing therefore symbolised the chieftain’s ability to provide his people 
with European goods and so served to reinforce their eminent position within their own 
community. Enhancing the status of the chiefs also assisted in the collection of trade 
debts.180  
The trade that took place at the HBC’s bay-side posts was more complex, as a 
trading ceremony was integrated into the customary gift-giving, drinking, and tobacco 
smoking. Figure 1.2 shows a modern rendition of this grand spectacle, which involved an 
intricate use of processions, pageantry, and salutes of canon fire.181 For instance, upon 
arrival at the Company’s post, it was customary for Aboriginal peoples to discharge their 
guns, which was in turn reciprocated by the Company through the firing of the fort’s 
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cannons and the raising of the Company’s flag. 182  The ceremony represented the 
Company’s efforts to turn its posts on Hudson’s Bay into thriving entrepôts in an attempt 
to entice Aboriginal peoples to return the following year. In the late eighteenth century, 
as the HBC moved its focus to inland trade, the elaborate trading ceremonies at the 
Company’s posts on Hudson’s Bay gradually withered away in much the same way as 
the Great Rendezvous at Montreal. Transactions in the interior involved smaller quantities 
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Figure 1.2. Trading Ceremony at York Factory, 1780s. 
 
Source: HBC Heritage, ‘Trading Ceremony at York Factory, 1780s by Adam Sherriff Scott’, 
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of goods than those conducted at the forts on Hudson’s Bay, as the inland posts were 
situated much closer to Aboriginal communities and so could be more regularly visited. 
While inland posts were more convenient for many Aboriginal communities, this greater 
accessibility invariably meant that the exchanges at these interior locations could not 
emulate the grand spectacles that were a feature of the trade on Hudson’s Bay. The use 
of these ceremonies does, however, question Rich’s interpretation that the Company was 
essentially ‘sleep[ing] by the frozen sea’ until the development of its inland trade in the 
late eighteenth century.183 Instead, for the Company’s first 100 years, it was the central 
strategy of the Company to confine its efforts to the shores of Hudson’s Bay, with the 
London Committee and their servants in North America being pro-active in their attempts 
to turn the Company’s bay-side posts into prosperous trade centres.184 
Indeed, whether it was trade by Hudson’s Bay or in the interior, the gathering of 
market information about the commodities that appealed to Aboriginal peoples was vital 
to success in the fur trade. Trading posts needed to be stocked with a wide range of well-
assorted commodities that appealed to indigenous traders and trappers in order to induce 
them to part with their furs, and the quality dimension was especially important as 
Aboriginal communities meticulously examined the products on offer before agreeing to 
transactions.185 During the eighteenth century, the HBC’s London Committee continually 
attempted to expand the range of trade goods available at the Company’s posts and 
endeavoured to ensure that the quality of these commodities met the satisfaction of the 
Cree, Chipewyan, and other Aboriginal peoples who journeyed to acquire them.186 For 
instance, in the case of tobacco, this led the Company to offer two types: Virginian and 
Brazilian. The Brazilian variant was of a decidedly higher quality than the cheaper 
Virginian roll and was most demanded by the Company’s Aboriginal customers.187 In 
order to source Brazilian tobacco, the Company established contact with Lisbon 
merchants.188 In an effort to improve the quality and reliability of the firearms that were 
offered for trade, which frequently suffered from operational issues as a result of the sub-
arctic climate, the Company stationed armourers at the Company’s posts. The armourers 
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checked the supplied guns for defects, made any required repairs, serviced the guns of 
Aboriginal peoples, and, together with the Company’s blacksmiths, made other metal 
products at Hudson’s Bay itself so that the produced wares were suited to local 
conditions.189 While the acquisition of market information was a vital part of any overseas 
trade, the challenging climatic conditions that the British fur trade operated within, as 
well as the diversity, customs, and migratory lifestyles of Aboriginal communities, added 
further complexities to the process. This market information was not easily accessible to 
merchants that lay outside of the trade, and it became even more difficult to access with 
the centralisation of the Montreal fur trade. The peculiar method of exchange and the 
barriers to procuring market information thus favoured the emergence of a few large 
trading concerns in the Atlantic fur trade.  
The extension of credit to Aboriginal peoples also promoted commercial 
concentration. The use of credit was necessitated by the seasonality of the trade. Since 
the best furs were procured in the winter months, credit was advanced to Aboriginal 
peoples in the autumn so that they could purchase hunting tools and other commodities 
for the winter, although credit was also occasionally issued in the spring.190 The problem 
for British and American fur traders was how to collect these debts, as they needed their 
indigenous debtors to return to them with furs and not to another trader.191 The most 
obvious solution, beyond encouraging loyalty, was to limit competition between traders 
so that Aboriginal communities had fewer opportunities to renege on their debts. 
Unfortunately, there are very few studies that look in-depth at the use of credit in the 
exchanges between British or American fur traders and Aboriginal peoples. The 
consensus seems to be that periods of intense competition between fur traders led to the 
more liberal use of credit.192 While there was always the risk that an indigenous trapper 
or trader would not return to pay their debts, their opportunities to do so were limited, 
especially after 1804 when only the HBC and NWC were active in the British Atlantic 
fur trade. Each company kept a record of the debts owed to them so it was relatively easy 
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to establish whether an individual was repeatedly failing to repay their debts, and thus 
should be refused future credit. Larger amounts of credit were usually extended to trading 
captains or band leaders as they were considered to be more trustworthy.193 Furthermore, 
the HBC and NWC were not always active in the same region, so there was not always 
an alternative source of trade goods.194 Royce Kurtz has, however, questioned the extent 
to which Aboriginal peoples purchased commodities on credit, as his study of the ‘Indian 
debt books’ kept by American fur traders from 1820 to 1840 found that Sauk and 
Mesquakie hunters used a mix of credit and skins during their transactions with American 
traders.195 Even so, it is clear that fewer participants in the trade assisted the collection of 
debts, and that the extension of credit to indigenous communities increased the 
specialisation of the fur trade. 
How elastic was Aboriginal peoples’ demand for imported commodities? Until the 
last few decades, it was generally thought that indigenous communities only participated 
in the fur trade to acquire a predetermined volume of trade goods from European 
traders.196 In other words, the view was that Aboriginal groups stopped trapping furs once 
the number of trade goods in their possession reached a particular threshold. This meant 
that when European traders attempted to expand their trade by offering a greater volume 
of goods for trade, indigenous peoples responded by bringing fewer furs to trade as they 
did not need as many furs to attain the commodities they desired. Ann Carlos and Frank 
Lewis have, however, convincingly argued that the demand for trade goods amongst 
Aboriginal peoples was more flexible, as once these communities had acquired certain 
‘necessities’ they sought to obtain ‘luxuries’.197 With a nod to Jan de Vries’ ‘industrious 
revolution’, Carlos and Lewis maintain that there were ‘industrious Indians’ who, like 
many households in North West Europe and British North America between 1650 and 
1850, were essentially willing to work more in order to buy more goods.198 Indigenous 
communities thus increased the time they spent in the fur trade so that they could purchase 
additional imported goods, although in so doing they depleted the fur-bearing animal 
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population upon which the trade depended. 199  Nevertheless, there were limits to 
Aboriginal peoples’ demand for trade commodities as their migratory way of life limited 
the volume of goods that their ‘household’ could contain. As British fur traders 
established trading posts further inland during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, these limits were partially offset by the increased accessibility of these new 
posts, and so purchases could be made more regularly. 
IV.   Labour in the British Fur Trade 
As the HBC and Canadian fur traders expanded their inland operations in the late 
eighteenth century, they developed a large workforce that was capable of transporting 
furs, trade goods, and provisions between the North American interior and the Atlantic 
coast. The men hired to undertake these feats of endurance required skills that were not 
commonly present in Britain or the settler societies in British North America. Canoe-men 
were needed to navigate the canoes that carried the trade’s prized cargo swiftly across 
rivers that often contained treacherous rapids, as well as to carry the canoe and all its 
contents between bodies of water (known as a portage).200 Traders had to be well-versed 
in indigenous languages and in the keeping of financial records. All of these servants also 
had to adapt to life in isolated and often sub-arctic climates, and had to be willing to spend 
a considerable time away from their families. In addition to these specialities, inland 
trading required a detailed knowledge of the physical landscape and the movements of 
Aboriginal peoples so that trading posts could be optimally sited and the most efficient 
routes followed. Indeed, it was rare for interior trading posts to operate for more than 
three years. While the HBC and Canadian fur traders conducted their interior trade in 
much the same way, the places from which they sourced their servants differed.  
As outlined above, the HBC was slow to develop its inland trade. This was partly 
because the Company’s initial trading strategy was to entice Aboriginal peoples to 
Hudson’s Bay, but it was also because the Company faced a number of barriers that made 
the development of its inland trade particularly challenging. For one, birch trees only 
grew in the southernmost part of Hudson’s Bay so the Company did not have easy access 
to the key raw material needed to construct birch-bark canoes. 201  Furthermore, the 
                                                 
199 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, pp. 106-29, 149-66. 
200 On the tasks involved in the navigation of these canoes see Podruchny, Making the Voyageur World, pp. 
87, 127, 130-1, 124, 128. 
201 Wagner, ‘Financial Innovator?’, p. 181. 
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Company’s initial attempts at inland trade were disastrous. The Company’s first inland 
post, Henley House, was established on the Albany River in 1743, although its purpose 
was to persuade Aboriginal traders to venture down to Hudson’s Bay rather than acting 
as a point of exchange itself.202 Despite being well-defended with cannon, in 1755 the 
post was destroyed during the course of a conflict with the ‘home-guard’ Cree — who 
were so-called because they had largely abandoned their migratory way of life in favour 
of supplying the Company’s posts with locally sourced provisions — and the clash 
resulted in the deaths of all the personnel stationed at the post.203 The post was rebuilt 
during the Seven Years’ War but two weeks after its construction the post was attacked 
by Frenchmen disguised as Aboriginal peoples who shot one HBC servant dead and 
wounded another, with the two remaining servants forced to abandon the post and leave 
the wounded man with some indigenous women.204  More pertinently, the Company 
lacked servants with the requisite skills that inland trading required, and it was only in 
1775 when the Company firmly committed to the policy of inland trade that it moved to 
address this issue.205 
Since there was no ready supply of labour in Hudson’s Bay that the Company could 
recruit from, for most of the eighteenth century the Company relied upon sojourners from 
the British Isles to conducts its overseas trade. Table 1.1 shows how the average annual 
number of the servants and officers employed by the Company in North America and 
their ‘place of origin’ changed between 1785 and 1819. The servants stated their place of 
origin when signing a contract with the Company, but this did not necessarily accurately 
reflect their birthplace. Indeed, it is possible that many of the servants who stated a 
London parish actually came from elsewhere in England. The average number of servants 
employed by the Company increased from 282 in 1785-92 to 485 in 1793-1800, and then 
to 506 in 1812-9.206 There was, therefore, a rapid expansion in the Company’s workforce 
at the end of the eighteenth century as the Company sought to develop its inland trade, 
with a 70 per cent increase in a mere eight years. After 1800, the growth in the number 
of servants slowed.  
                                                 
202 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, pp. 66-7. 
203 It is not clear why the ‘home-guard’ Cree chose to attack the post. See Ibid., pp. 66-7; and Rich, 
Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 1, pp. 610-3. 
204 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 1, p. 614. 
205 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, pp. 66-7. 
206 See Table 1.1. 
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By the late eighteenth century, the majority of the Company’s servants came from 
the Orkney Isles on the north-east coast of Scotland. Indeed, by 1785-92, almost three-
quarters of the Company’s overseas servants originated from Orkney.207 The Company’s 
association with Orkney began in the early eighteenth century, with the first Orkneymen 
entering the Company’s overseas division in 1702.208 There were a number of reasons 
why Orkney became the predominant source of the Company’s servants. First, the 
                                                 
207 See Table 1.1. 
208 John Nicks, ‘Orkneymen in the HBC, 1780-1821’, in Carol M. Judd and Arthur J. Ray, eds., Old Trails 
and New Directions: Papers of the Third North American Fur Trade Conference (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1980), pp. 102-126; and Rigg, Men of Spirit, p. 4. 
Table 1.1. Average annual number of servants and officers employed by the HBC 
in North America by place of origin, 1785-1819. 
 1785-1792 1793-1800 1812-1819 
England 
     Middlesex 
     Other 
     Total 
 
30 (10.6%) 
29 (10.3%) 
59 (20.9%) 
 
32 (6.6%) 
28 (5.8%) 
60 (12.4%) 
 
22 (4.3%) 
14 (2.8%) 
36 (7.1%) 
Ireland 
     Total 
 
0 (0%) 
 
0 (0%)   
 
29 (5.7%) 
North America 
     Canada 
     Hudson’s Bay 
     Total 
 
4 (1.4%) 
3 (1.1%) 
7 (2.5%) 
 
8 (1.7%) 
15 (3.1%) 
23 (4.7%) 
 
14 (2.7%) 
78 (15.5%) 
92 (18.2%) 
Scotland 
     Orkney 
     Other 
     Total 
 
209 (74.1%) 
7 (2.5%) 
216 (76.6%) 
 
393 (81.0%) 
9 (1.9%) 
402 (82.9%) 
 
280 (55.3%) 
60 (11.9%) 
340 (67.2%) 
Other 
     Total 
 
<1* 
 
<1* 
 
9 (1.8%)** 
Overall Total 282 485 506 
Notes: When no parish or discernible locality was determinable from the lists of servants, 
corresponding information from alternative years was used, as well as, if available, the details 
contained within the servant’s contract. 
*Consists of Wales. 
**Consists of Botany Bay, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Wales. 
Source: HBCA, A.30/3-16, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1785-1819; 
and HBCA, A.32/1-19, Servants’ Contracts, 1783-1818. 
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London Committee became increasingly dissatisfied with the calibre of the servants that 
were recruited from London, who it believed encumbered the company’s operations as 
they possessed a poor work ethic and consumed copious amounts of alcohol.209 Second, 
the search for alternative labour supplies led the Company to prioritise the recruitment of 
English ‘country lads’, who were supposedly free of the unscrupulous qualities that the 
committee detested in its metropolitan recruits, and Scots, who were especially well-
regarded for their ‘perceived qualities of subordination, sobriety, obedience and ability to 
endure deprivation’.210 Orkneymen were thought to possess these qualities in abundance, 
were already used to sojourning in the whaling and fishing industries, and were willing 
to work for comparatively lower wages than their London counterparts. 211  Finally, 
Orkney was conveniently located for trade to Hudson’s Bay, offered a lower threat from 
privateers than the alternative voyage along the southern coast of England, and the port 
of Stromness provided cheap provisions alongside good harbours and servicing for the 
Company’s vessels.212 Between 1785 and 1819, Orkneymen comprised the majority of 
the Company’s labourers, canoe-men, artisans, and traders.213 
The makeup of the Company’s workforce gradually diversified in the early 
nineteenth century as the London Committee became increasingly concerned that their 
reliance on Orkneymen made the Company vulnerable to collective bargaining for higher 
wages, a form of resistance that Orkneymen sometimes used when a large number of their 
contracts expired in the same year.214 This created a tension between the need to maintain 
the size of the Company’s workforce and the desire to not rely too heavily upon any one 
region. Selkirk’s attempts to populate the Red River Settlement in the second decade of 
the nineteenth century brought Scottish Highlanders and Irishmen into the Company’s 
employ, and the Company also began to recruit the male children of the Company’s 
servants and Aboriginal women who were born in Hudson’s Bay.215 Chapter six discusses 
                                                 
209 Rigg, Men of Spirit, p. 3. 
210 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
211 Ibid., p. 4. The northern fisheries were another significant form of overseas employment that was readily 
available to Orkneymen. Whaling vessels from Newcastle, Whitby, and Hull stopped at Stromness en-
route to fishing grounds off the Greenland and Iceland coasts. See Ibid., p. 40. 
212 Ibid., p. 4. 
213 On average each year between 1785 and 1819, Orkneymen made up 89 per cent of the Company’s 
labourers, 84 per cent of the canoe-men, 79 per cent of the artisans, and 54 per cent of the inland traders. 
Derived from an analysis of the data contained in HBCA, A.30/3-16, Names &c of the Company’s 
Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1785-1819; and HBCA, A.32/1-19, Servants’ Contracts, 1783-1818. 
214 Jennifer S. H. Brown, Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company Families in Indian Country (London: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1980), p. 31; and Burley, Servants, pp. 194-7. 
215 See Table 1.1. 
 
~50~ 
 
these family units in more detail but suffice to say that, by 1800, the Company had begun 
to see the advantages of hiring their servants’ so-called ‘native sons’ as this helped the 
Company to keep its existing workforce happy and, in time, to acquire a workforce well 
equipped with the skills required to survive in the challenging local environment. Very 
few Englishmen were employed by the Company at this time and they usually worked as 
clerks or officers.216 
Unlike the HBC, the British merchants who entered the Montreal fur trade after 
1763 did not have to rely upon sojourning British servants or build from scratch a labour 
force with the necessary aptitudes for inland trade, as their French predecessors had 
already carried on a long tradition of trading in the interior. French-Canadian canoe-men, 
known as voyageurs, were a well-established feature of the trade, and they had developed 
unique oral and symbolic traditions. ‘Mock baptisms’ inaugurated newcomers into the 
fraternity of voyageurs, the last church in the parish of St. Anne became a site for ritual 
prayer and donation, and the singing of repetitive songs such as ‘It is the Paddle That 
Brings Us’, ‘My Birch-Bark Canoe’, and ‘The Little Rock’ served to coordinate canoe 
strokes, stave off fatigue, and commemorate the victims of fur trade tragedies.217 The 
voyageurs were mainly habitant farmers from the province of Quebec who were seen as 
‘cheap and docile’ by their fur-trade employers.218 The men primarily joined the fur trade 
to supplement the small returns that their farms made so they could better support their 
families and thus recruitment fluctuated in accordance with the price of wheat.219 The 
men were contracted for at least three years in a form of indentured servitude whereby 
they supplied their labour in return for food, shelter, and wages.220 The NWC, like the 
                                                 
216 On average each year between 1785 and 1819, 48 per cent of the Company’s clerks and half of the 
Company’s officers originated from a parish in England. Derived from an analysis of the data contained 
in HBCA, A.30/3-16, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1785-1819; and HBCA, 
A.32/1-19, Servants’ Contracts, 1783-1818. Some of the Company’s English servants were charity 
school boys from the Grey Coat Hospital at Westminster. The Company apprenticed these boys as 
surveyors, traders, and ship captains. See Richard I. Ruggles, ‘Hospital Boys of the Bay’, The Beaver, 
Vol. 308, No. 3 (1977), pp. 4-11. On London’s Charity Schools see Dianne Payne, ‘London’s Charity 
School Children: The ‘Scum of the Parish’?’, The Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, Vol. 29, No. 
3 (2008), pp. 383-97. 
217  Podruchny, Making the Voyageur World, pp. 52-3, 58-65, 86-7, 89, 93, 114. Also see Carolyn 
Podruchny, ‘Baptizing Novices: Ritual Moments among French Canadian Voyageurs in the Montreal 
Fur Trade, 1780-1821’, The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 83, No. 2 (2002), pp. 1-18. 
218 Podruchny, Making the Voyageur World, pp. 28-9. 
219 Ibid., pp. 20, 28, 33, 47. 
220 Ibid., pp. 11, 35, 66. 
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HBC, also provided a pension fund for long-running servants of the Company, which is 
known to have operated between 1799 and 1811.221 
At the end of the eighteenth century, there was a rapid expansion in the size of the 
labour force employed in the Canadian fur trade.222 The NWC increased the number of 
French-Canadians in its employ, whom were the overwhelming source of the Company’s 
voyageurs, from around 500 in 1784 to up to 3,000 in the decade before 1821.223 This 
growth is perhaps not surprising in light of the Company’s gradual domination of the 
Montreal fur trade, but it was also a result of the increasing length of the Company’s trade 
routes. Indeed, the Company divided its voyageurs into three groups: the ‘pork eaters’ 
who were employed in the summer months and worked the canoes between Montreal and 
Lake Superior; ‘north-men’ who worked all year round and brought the canoes to the 
interior posts in the northwest; and ‘Athabasca-men’ who had to navigate the most 
challenging portages, cover the longest distances, and wintered north of Lake Athabasca 
and so were unable to make it to the summer rendezvous at Lake Superior.224 While the 
voyageurs made up the bulk of the labour involved in the Canadian fur trade, there were 
also clerks and traders who were known as ‘bourgeois’ or wintering partners. The 
bourgeois were the ones that kept the accounts of the venture, managed the distribution 
of provisions, and controlled the trades with Aboriginal peoples.225 Rather than French-
Canadians, the wintering partners were usually of British origin. 
The British fur trade thus required a highly specialised workforce. The Canadian 
fur traders were able to make use of a voyageur tradition amongst French-Canadians that 
was already well-established before they assumed control of the trade, whereas the HBC 
largely had to create an effective inland workforce from sojourning British servants. 
Orkneymen, and to a lesser extent the ‘native sons’ of Company servants, were the HBC’s 
response to the revered French-Canadian voyageurs. The formation of this new workforce 
was not an easy one, however, especially considering that Britain was virtually 
continually at war from 1793 to 1815. The Company needed young men who were 
                                                 
221 Ibid., pp. 42-3. On the HBC’s pensions see Rigg, Men of Spirit, pp. 86-9, 172. Also see the biography 
of the HBC servant Thomas Bunn who received a pension of £50 per annum for seven years after his 
retirement to the Red River Colony in 1822. See Denis Bayley, A Londoner in Rupert’s Land: Thomas 
Bunn of the Hudson’s Bay Company (Chichester: Moore & Tillyer, 1969), p. 50. The EIC also 
developed a pension scheme for its London warehouse workers. See Makepeace, Warehouse Labourers, 
pp. 72-3, 84-5, 157-9, 161-6.  
222 Podruchny, Making the Voyageur World, pp. 4-6. 
223 Ibid., pp. 4-6. 
224 Ibid., p. 94. 
225 Ibid., p. 7, 65, 111, 146. 
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physically mature yet at an age where they would be amenable to the unfamiliar 
environment they were contracted to work in. 226  As John Nicks has estimated, the 
Company’s labourers — the entry role to becoming canoe-men — were usually only 
around 20 years of age at the time of their recruitment.227 These young men were in short 
supply as evidenced by the seemingly constant labour shortages at the Company’s posts 
during the French Wars.228  
V.   Conclusion 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the British Atlantic fur trade 
gravitated towards monopolistic forms of trade organisation. This development was 
partly a result of the westward expansion of the fur trade within North America, which 
greatly increased the distances that the trade involved, and this was especially the case 
for Montreal fur traders, whose route into the interior was far longer than the one available 
to the HBC. In response to this challenge, the Canadian fur trade underwent a ‘revolution 
of scale’ in an effort to reduce costs and secure long-term credit. Eventually, this resulted 
in the vertical integration of wintering agents and Montreal merchants, and the horizontal 
integration of these Canadian firms into the NWC. As the Montreal trade became 
centralised under the NWC, the London Houses that supplied them were, in effect, 
vertically integrated with the Montreal firms. There were other factors that promoted the 
emergence of monopoly. The involvement of Aboriginal peoples, who were discerning 
consumers, favoured the reduction of competition between British merchants and limited 
the diffusion of market information to those who stood outside the trade. The need for a 
highly skilled workforce acted as a further barrier to entry into the trade and was a major 
problem for the HBC during this period, one the Company attempted to solve by 
recruiting large numbers of Orkneymen to train in the art of inland navigation. The fur 
trade became, therefore, a highly specialised enterprise that favoured large-scale forms of 
trade organisation. 
                                                 
226 Nicks, ‘Orkneymen in the HBC’, pp. 112-3. 
227 Ibid., p. 112. 
228 Rigg, Men of Spirit, pp. 61 17, 25, 167. 
 
~53~ 
 
 
2 
The View from the Customs’ House: Analysing 
Britain’s fur imports 
 
The Americas were the principal source of the furs imported into Britain in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Though the fur trade has been written about 
extensively, few substantial quantitative analyses have been undertaken. This is made all 
the more surprising by the abundance of trade statistics available in the British customs’ 
records. These ledgers provide a comparative view of the regions that supplied furs to 
Britain and its wider re-export markets, a perspective that is missing from much of the 
historiography that largely treats the fur trades of Hudson’s Bay, Montreal, and the United 
States in isolation.1 Comparative studies have usually focused on the rivalry between the 
NWC and the HBC. This has had the unfortunate effect of marginalising the United 
States, another key region from which Britain imported furs, in the historical literature 
written from the British perspective.2 Furthermore, the vast majority of studies in the 
post-1783 period overwhelmingly focus on the business of the fur trade within North 
America, and so the operation of the trade in Britain and Europe remains relatively 
obscure.3 
                                                 
1 See Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2; and Rich, Montreal. 
2 For instance, see Carlos, Duopoly. Britain also maintained interests in the deer trade of south-eastern 
North America through Pensacola, Florida. See Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels: 
The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815, Second Edition (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska, 1993), especially pp. 139-88; and Gregory A. Waselkov, ‘The Eighteenth-Century Anglo-
Indian Trade in Southeastern North America’, in Jo-Anne Fiske, Susan Sleeper-Smith, William Wicken, 
eds., New Faces of the Fur Trade: Selected Papers of the Seventh North American Fur Trade 
Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1995 (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1998), 
especially p. 192. 
3 Some studies have explored fur trade activities within Britain and Europe after 1783. Marjorie Campbell 
has shown that the NWC made multiple attempts to amalgamate with the HBC prior to the eventual 
merger between the two companies in 1821. See Campbell, North West Company, especially pp. 200-
2, 250. Through a study of the financial records of the HBC, Ann Carlos has discerned that the company 
was close to bankruptcy in 1809-10 following the imposition of Napoleon’s Continental Blockade, 
which she argues was a major factor in heightening competition in North America as the HBC responded 
to this crisis by stepping up its attempts to develop inland trade. See Carlos, Duopoly, especially pp. 
100-6, 115-6, 165-7, 212. 
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A quantitative analysis of British fur imports therefore sheds light on a number of 
neglected aspects. For one, the statistics reveal the origin, composition, and scale of the 
furs traded between the different regions of North America and Britain. As a source of 
evidence that was compiled annually and which identifies a geographic provenance, 
import data is a very useful indicator that can be used to determine how the trade 
responded to the circumstances of war, commercial competition, and the depletion of the 
fur-bearing animal population. Indeed, Britain’s Atlantic and European trades suffered 
from substantial market dislocations as a result of the protracted French Wars and the 
War of 1812. The customs’ records are also a useful tool for analysing the effectiveness 
of the inland trading strategy embarked upon by the HBC from the late eighteenth century 
onwards, and offers new insights into the performance of the Montreal fur trade during a 
period when this branch of the trade was seriously challenged by its resurgent rival to the 
north, and was increasingly pressured by the new American republic to the south, which 
sought to assert its territorial jurisdiction. The trade ledgers also shed light on the under-
researched trade in furs that operated between the United States and Britain. In addition, 
when the import data is compared alongside re-export figures, they enable the calculation 
of retained fur imports, a measure that can be used to infer the scope of demand for fur-
bearing products in the British home market (chapter four). Comparing the trade of these 
diverse regions in a quantitative way thus affords a greater understanding of the trade’s 
structure and the interconnections between communities in the North-Atlantic World.  
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first section discusses the practicalities 
involved in the study of the British customs’ records and introduces the methodology that 
was used to analyse the import data. Of particular significance is the way in which the 
ledgers record trade in ‘official values’ and how furs were categorised in the records. 
Sections two, three, and four establish the origin of Britain’s fur imports and the volume 
of the trade, ascertaining the shifts in relative importance of the key fur-trading regions, 
uncovering the commodity composition of the British fur trade, as well as determining 
the changing significance of the many types of furs that were imported into Britain. While 
the trade has often been described by historians as predominantly a trade in beaver furs, 
the customs’ records reveal the importance of other varieties, especially marten and deer. 
In light of the relative size of the Montreal and Hudson’s Bay fur trades, the fourth and 
final section considers why the ‘chartered’ HBC triumphed over the ‘private’ NWC 
traders at a time when British merchants and manufacturers increasingly thought that the 
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granting of exclusive commercial privileges to particular institutions restricted the growth 
in the nation’s overseas trade. 
I.   The British Customs’ Records 
Despite the insights offered by the British customs’ records, few studies have employed 
these statistics in their analyses of the fur trade. In the late nineteenth century, Henry 
Poland gathered quantities of what are presumably British fur imports for the period 1752-
1891.4 There are, however, a number of major limitations with Poland’s dataset. First, no 
references are provided and so, while it seems probable that the figures were taken from 
the British customs’ records, this is not certain. Second, while the imports of the HBC are 
specified, imports from British North America and the United States were combined into 
a single category and so it is not possible to draw inferences on the relative importance 
of these two regions. 5  Finally, the credibility of Poland’s data has been called into 
question. James Clayton claims that, prior to 1822, Poland’s statistics, especially those 
for the combined category of the United States and Canada, are estimates rather than 
tabulations.6 Unfortunately, however, Clayton has not yet published, in quantitative form, 
his own estimates of the volume of the United States fur trade from data contained in the 
annual reports of the secretary of the United States treasury. Murray Lawson has collated 
an extensive array of British fur import, export, and re-export data from all parts of the 
world for the period 1700 to 1775.7 Lawson has produced tables that list furs by type and 
country of origin but this data does not include deer and seal skins and the exclusion of 
the former greatly underestimates the scale of the pre-1783 trade. 
In 1696, the British government instructed the Inspector-General of Customs to 
compile a regular and inclusive series of statistics concerning the nation’s overseas trade, 
a practice that continued until the end of the nineteenth century. These ledgers listed the 
volumes and values of commodities that England and Wales — and later Scotland and 
Ireland — imported, exported, or re-exported each year.8 The quantities recorded were 
                                                 
4 See Henry Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals in Nature and in Commerce (London: Gurney & Jackson, 1892), 
pp. xxi-xxxiii. 
5 Poland also established the volume of ‘European furs’ imported for the period 1820-41 but the source is 
not identified.  
6 See Clayton, ‘American Fur Trade’, pp. 160-80. 
7 See Lawson, Fur, pp. 87-135. 
8 Despite the Union of Ireland Act 1800, from 1783 to 1821, the customs’ records treated Ireland as a 
foreign country. This continued until 1825. See Ralph Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British 
Overseas Trade (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1979), p. 81. 
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taken from day-to-day declarations that were made by merchants at the British port on 
the quantities of commodities they imported or exported, and these depositions were used 
by state officials to calculate the charges that were due.9 A declaration of the market or 
‘real value’ of the commodities was unnecessary for this purpose. Though most duties 
were nominally ad valorem, the rates that were charged during the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries largely pertained to a list of commodity valuations that had 
been made in the immediate years after 1700.10 Due to the complexities involved in 
working out real values, contemporaries rarely improved these ‘official’ valuations. As 
Ralph Davis points out, even though the valuations contained in the customs’ records had 
little resemblance to market values, the fact that commodity prices were largely constant 
for most of the eighteenth century means that the official trade figures provide an 
acceptable representation of reality until its closing years.11 The official values only 
significantly diverged from real values during the 1790s and beyond, as the inflationary 
pressures of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars instigated a sharp general 
rise in prices.12 At the end of the century, indeed, concern arose in mercantile and official 
circles that the trade statistics falsely depicted British overseas trade. From 1798 onwards, 
a calculation of the real value of exports, based on merchant declarations and data from 
published price currents, was placed alongside the official value.13 However, and most 
importantly for this chapter, little attempt was made to update the official valuations of 
imports or re-exports until 1854, and, in consequence, British imports and re-exports were 
only recorded in the form of ‘official values’.14  
The analysis presented here primarily uses the ‘official values’ contained in the 
British customs’ records as the most convenient measure from which to assess the relative 
importance of each branch of the trade. Customs’ officials recorded the quantities of furs 
that merchants imported or exported as per the number of pelts. Since the skins of many 
different animals were traded, it becomes problematic to use the stated quantities when 
referring to the whole trade. For example, over 6.3 million coney (rabbit) skins and around 
                                                 
9 Ibid., pp. 77-8. 
10 Ibid., pp. 11, 77-8. Ad valoreum is Latin for ‘according to value’. Of course new valuations had to be 
made for commodities that had never appeared in the records before. See Ibid., p. 11. 
11 Ibid., p. 78. 
12 Ibid., p. 78. 
13 Ibid., pp. 11, 78-9. 
14 Ibid., p. 24. 
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5.9 million beaver furs were imported into Britain between 1783 and 1821.15 There are, 
of course, distinct differences in the size of the two mammals, but beaver fur was also 
worth substantially more than rabbit fur, and so any consideration of the trade’s 
significance needs to take some account of the value of each fur type. Rather than 
calculate the real value of the imported furs — a difficult task given the problem of finding 
consistent yearly price data and the fact that the quality of furs, and hence their price, 
varied considerably — it makes more sense to use the recorded official values.16 While 
official values do not reflect actual market value, they can be used to show the relative 
significance of the trade in each type of fur and the importance of each region.  
In order to manage the copious amounts of data contained in the customs’ records, 
the thesis largely uses the annual trade data to construct four- and five-year averages. The 
use of such averages eliminates the impact of short-term trade fluctuations and so 
provides a long-term view that allows broad trends in the trade to be established. This is 
not to say that a year-by-year picture of the trade is not useful; rather, what is lacking 
from the current literature is an overall evaluation of the how the trade fared in the post-
1783 period. It is unlikely that this long-term view would have been available to 
contemporaries, as it seems improbable that the Montreal traders kept such copious 
accounts and that the Inspector-General of the British Customs kept such a close eye on 
the performance of the British fur trade, especially considering that the trade comprised 
so small a proportion of the nation’s overseas trade. Indeed, using Davis’s estimates of 
the real value of ‘hides and skins’ imported into Britain from the Americas, the fur trade 
only accounted for 2 per cent of all British imports from all parts of the world in the period 
1784-1816.17 Only the HBC Committee, overseeing the trade from afar with its detailed 
accountancy procedures, monitored the performance of its own trade in such a 
                                                 
15 TNA, CUST 17/8-30, States of navigation, commerce and revenue, 1783-1808; and TNA, CUST 4/5-16, 
Ledgers of imports under countries, 1809-21. 
16 Indeed, in the words of R. C. Nash, ‘no attempt has so far been made to revalue imports, since it has 
proved impossible to devise a price index for the purpose which adequately reflects the commodity 
composition of the import trades’. Such a task is further confounded by the fact that the customs’ 
records, as they do for all commodities, take no account of the qualities of the recorded furs. See Davis, 
British Overseas Trade, p. 84; and R. C. Nash, ‘The Balance of Payments and Foreign Capital Flows in 
Eighteenth-Century England: A Comment’, The Economic History Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1997), p. 
111. 
17 Davis’s figures are estimates of real values that were calculated for three consecutive years in each decade 
(1784-6, 1794-6, 1804-6, 1814-6). The stated percentage was worked out by calculating the average 
annual real value of ‘hides and skins’ that were imported into Britain from Canada (including Hudson’s 
Bay), the United States, the West Indies, and Latin America (£315,500) in 1784-1816 by the average 
annual value of imports from all parts of the world (£15,669,333). See Davis, British Overseas Trade, 
pp. 110-7. 
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comparable way. The calculation of the averages used in this study follow a relatively 
straightforward methodology, one designed to reflect many of the major events of the 
period. Five-year averages were calculated for the period 1783-1812, followed by four-
year averages for the period 1814-21, owing to the fact that the fire at the Customs’ House 
in February 1814 destroyed the official trade records for the preceding year. 1783-7 and 
1788-92 cover a period of trade reconstruction following the dislocations caused by the 
American War of Independence. The next set of averages, 1793-7 and 1798-1802, reflect 
the trade following the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars and the latter average 
also includes the years of the major trading rivalry between the NWC and the XYC. 1803-
7 and 1808-12 cover most of the Napoleonic War period, while 1814-7 and 1818-21 show 
how the trade proceeded after the French Wars and the War of 1812, as well as, the 
escalation in the HBC-NWC rivalry.  
In the ledgers, the various types of furs are listed under the broad heading of ‘skins’. 
This umbrella term therefore includes both raw and tanned livestock hides, such as calf, 
goat, kid, and lamb, in addition to, bear, beaver, calabar, cat, coney, ‘deer’, elk, ermine, 
fisher, fox, hare, marten, mink, ‘musquash’, otter, raccoon, sable, ‘seal’, squirrel, and 
wolf furs.18 Table 2.1 shows that 99 per cent of the livestock hides imported into Britain 
                                                 
18 In the historical literature of the fur trade, the terms ‘deerskin’ and ‘sealskin’ are frequently used to refer 
to both raw and worked skins. The British customs’ records did not refer to them in this way, opting to 
use the name of the animal. In this study, ‘deer’ and ‘seal’ are used to refer to undressed skins, and 
Table 2.1. Average annual official value of ‘skins’ imported into Britain, 1783-1821 
(in £). 
 Africa Americas Asia Europe Total 
Skins 
     Furs a 
     Livestock b 
     Other 
 
1,465 (1%) 
70 (0%) 
102 (2%) 
 
117,632 (92%) 
877 (1%) 
3,924 (58%) 
 
310 (0%) 
488 (0%) 
184 (3%) 
 
7,067 (6%) 
97,083 (99%) 
2,558 (38%) 
 
126,473 
98,518 
6,767 
Total 1,637 (1%) 122,432 (53%) 982 (0%) 106,708 (46%) 231,759 
Notes: The ‘southern fisheries’ were included in the figures for the Americas. The table does not 
include any data for the year 1813 as the customs’ records were destroyed in fire at the Customs’ 
House in February 1814. 
a comprises bear, beaver, calabar, cat, coney, deer, elk, ermine, fisher, fox, hare, marten, mink, 
musquash, otter, raccoon, sable, seal, squirrel, and wolf; 
b includes raw and tanned calf, goat, kid, and lamb skins. 
Source: The National Archives (TNA), CUST 17/8-30, States of navigation, commerce and revenue, 
1783-1808; and TNA, CUST 4/5-16, Ledgers of imports under countries, 1809-21. 
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originated from Europe and that 92 per cent of the imported furs came from the Americas. 
On average, skins to the official value of £107,000 (46 per cent of the overall total) were 
imported into Britain from Europe each year, and £122,000 of skins (53 per cent of the 
overall total) were imported from the Americas to Britain to each year.19 The two trades 
were thus of a similar size but it is clear that the supply of livestock hides to Britain was 
principally a European trade, while the supply of furs to Britain was predominantly an 
Atlantic trade. Russia and the Baltic had evidently ceased to be a major supplier of furs 
to Britain, and in light of this clear distinction between the two markets, the rest of the 
chapter focuses on examining the trade with the Americas.   
First, however, it is useful to consider the use to which each of these furs was put. 
While they were used in many different ways, the furs can be divided into three broad 
groups: luxury fur, ‘staple’ fur, and leather. Luxury or fancy fur was valued for its beauty, 
lustre, and warmth. This characteristic comes from the long, coarse guard hairs on the 
pelt and was used in garment manufacture, such as for boas, muffs, trimmings, and coat-
linings.20 The majority of furs were used for this purpose and included bear, beaver, fox, 
marten, musquash, mink, otter, raccoon, seal, and wolf. On the other hand, staple fur 
refers to those that were used in the hatting industry through the manufacture of felt, a 
process that used the layer of short, sharp, curly, barbed hairs that lie close to the skin’s 
surface.21 The removal of these hairs from the pelt forms a so-called fur-wool that is 
highly suited to the manufacture of felt. Beaver, coney (rabbit), and musquash were 
particularly well-suited to this purpose. In the case of the imported deer and seal, another 
key use was the manufacture of leather. Of course, livestock hides were also tanned but 
it seems that the imported deer were primarily used to make deerskin breeches, although 
along with sealskin, deerskin was also used to make footwear, gloves, and book -
bindings.22 
                                                 
deerskin and sealskin are used when referring to those that have been tanned. While they are now better 
known as muskrats, the thesis uses the contemporary ‘musquash’. Although marten was spelt ‘martin’ 
at this time, it is the modern usage that has been followed. 
19 See Table 2.1. 
20 Lawson, Fur, p. 1. 
21 Ibid., p. 1. 
22 Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, pp. 87-8; and Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals, pp. 348-9. Also see chapter 
six for a discussion of the uses of sealskin. 
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II.   The Twilight of the Montreal Fur Trade 
Britain’s Atlantic trade flourished in the eighteenth century and the fur trade, while 
statistically small, was one of its most distinct components. The fur trade characterised 
economic activity across huge swathes of the American continent, was a site of cross-
cultural exchange, and in some areas was used to formulate military alliances between 
European powers and Aboriginal peoples. It is therefore somewhat surprising that despite 
the extensive literature which adopts an ‘Atlantic World’ approach, few studies have 
utilised British trade statistics to compare the relative scale of the different branches of 
the fur trade, particularly in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Figure 2.1 shows the average official value of furs imported into Britain from the 
Americas between 1699 and 1821, with the pre-1783 data taken from Davis’s tabulations 
of official values. The data show that the British fur trade peaked in 1788-92, in the period 
of trade reconstruction following the independence of the United States. By 1818-21, the 
trade had endured a substantial decline, as is evident in the official value of British 
imports from the Americas falling from an annual average of £150,000 in 1788-92 to 
£102,000 in 1818-21, a decrease of almost one-third.23 In the years prior to 1803, the fur 
trade appears to have been relatively stable at around £145,000 per year. In 1803-7, 
however, the value of the trade declined by over a quarter to £108,000.24 This was 
followed by a further decline of 28 per cent in 1808-12 (£77,845), and another 11 per cent 
fall in 1814-17 (£69,153). Only in 1818-21 did a notable upturn occur with a 47 per cent 
increase, which resulted in imports reaching a similar level to those in 1803-7.25  
The reasons why there was an overall decline over the period and such a pronounced 
depression between 1803 and 1817 is best explained by analysing Britain’s fur imports 
from the Americas by their place of origin. Focusing on the fortunes of the Canadian fur 
trade shows a near-terminal decline in this branch of the trade. Only in 1798-1802, at the 
time of the stand-off between the NWC and the XYC, and in 1818-21, when the disputes 
between the NWC and the Earl of Selkirk had largely moved to the courts of Lower and 
Upper Canada, did the Montreal route show any sign of recovery. Evidently, the jewel of 
the British fur trade experienced major problems at this time. The official value of the 
colony’s fur exports to Britain were £39,405 in 1818-21, less than half of what they had 
                                                 
23 See Figure 2.1. 
24 For 1803-7, the average annual official value of furs imported from the Americas was £108,000, as 
compared to £145,000 for 1798-1802.  
25 The average for 1818-21 was £101,913. 
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been in 1788-92 (£83,174) and examinations of the official values and the quantity of furs 
presented in the customs’ records confirms that the method of valuation remained 
constant and so does not account for this notable shift.26 The Montreal fur traders clearly 
found it very difficult to maintain the volume of their trade during this period. 
There are four key reasons to explain why the Canadian fur trade declined to such 
a degree. The most important factor appears to have been problems in the availability of 
furs. At a Select Parliamentary Committee in 1812, which had been established to 
investigate concerns surrounding the Orders in Council, Sir Alexander Mackenzie, the 
former leader of the XYC and now a partner in the NWC, was questioned on the Canada 
trade and was asked to provide his opinion on its future prospects. The Committee asked 
Mackenzie whether there was any probability of an extension to the fur trade, to which 
he replied: 
I do not suppose it can be extended; it may be extended in respect of the 
territory, but in quantity it is almost impossible, for the country is very 
much exhausted, and those who follow it have got as far as the Pacific 
Ocean; no exertion they can make can continue the quantity that is now got 
from that country, and regularly imported to this country.27 
Depletion of the fur-bearing animal population was evidently a major factor in the decline 
in the volume of the Canadian fur trade. This was particularly the case for beaver, which 
had been driven to near-extinction in much of eastern North America by the early 
nineteenth century.28 
Another cause was the tightening trade regulations of the United States, legislation 
that acted to hinder the activity of British subjects in territory that lay to the south of the 
Great Lakes. The imposition of Jay’s Treaty in 1794 compelled the British to abandon 
garrisons at Detroit, Grand Portage, and Michilimackinac, sites that now lay within the 
boundaries of the new American republic, which the British government had actually 
acknowledged a decade earlier in the Treaty of Paris (1783).29 Jay’s Treaty supposedly 
guaranteed British subjects free and unhindered access to the Great Lakes and beyond. 
The treaty stated that the traders of both parties and all their property would be protected 
                                                 
26 The only re-evaluation that took place for ‘fur’ imports between 1783 and 1821 was for coney skins, the 
official value for which changed from approximately 6½d. to 1d. in 1790. 
27 Minutes of evidence, taken before the Committee of the Whole House, to whom it was referred, to consider 
of the several petitions which have been presented to the House, in this session of Parliament, relating 
to the orders in council (P.P. 1812, Vol. 111.1), p. 603. 
28 Richards, The World Hunt, p. 52. 
29 Rich, Montreal, pp. 56-9; Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, p. 177; and Campbell, The North West 
Company, pp. 30-2.  
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and that they would continue to enjoy an unmolested trade.30 American citizens, British 
subjects, and Aboriginal peoples were to be able to pass freely across the boundaries 
between British North America and the United States, excepting the territories of the 
HBC.31 In addition, there were to be no duties of entry levied by either party on pelts 
traded inland so long as such articles were purely in transit.32 
The United States, however, gradually imposed obstructions on British traders’ 
access to the Great Lakes and the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers after 1794. Heavy taxes, 
disagreements with American officials, and delays in transport, on top of existing 
problems with the availability of pelts and increasingly protracted trade routes, deterred 
Montreal traders involved in the south-west trade from continuing their operations.33 This 
not only caused several south-west traders to move into the north-west trade but also 
resulted in some entirely withdrawing from the fur trade. The advance of American 
settlers westward also impeded the south-west trade. 34  The creation of the 
Michilimackinac Company in 1803, an organisation that operated in American territory 
but was based in Montreal, was designed to protect the interests of several Canadian 
merchants in the south-west fur trade following the Louisiana Purchase.35 By the early 
nineteenth century American opposition towards Canadian traders on US territory had 
increased to the extent that there were reports of Canadian boats being seized at Detroit 
and Niagara.36 On 21 May 1808 American authorities at Niagara actually fired on a NWC 
canoe brigade that was engaged in the south-west trade.37 The outbreak of the War of 
1812 caused yet more difficulties. As was often the case with merchants during wartime, 
the NWC traders were called on to arrange the transportation of provisions and supplies 
to assist British military efforts. William McGillivray, then the leader of the NWC, played 
a crucial role in orchestrating the supply of provisions and in securing the support of 
Aboriginal communities to fight under the British flag.38 McGillivray even raised a Corps 
of Voyageurs to assist in the conflict. The Voyageur Corps fought alongside other NWC 
members and Aboriginal peoples led by the chief Tecumseh, an armed force that went on 
                                                 
30 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between His Britannick Majesty and the United States of 
America (P.P. 1794, Vol. 1), p. 4. 
31 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation (P.P. 1794, Vol. 1), p. 5. 
32 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation (P.P. 1794, Vol. 1), p. 6. 
33 Campbell, North West Company, p. 108. 
34 Ibid., p. 108. 
35 Ibid., p. 159. 
36 Ibid., p. 159. 
37 Marjorie Wilkins Campbell, McGillivray: Lord of the Northwest (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1962), p. 161. 
38 Ibid., pp. 188, 191. 
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to capture Fort Michilimackinac from the Americans.39 The NWC also contributed to the 
British war effort by loaning the use of many of its ships to the British military. The NWC 
lent at least five of its vessels stationed on the Great Lakes to this end. The Caledonia and 
Detroit, two of the Company’s brigs, in addition to three schooners, the Nancy, Mink, and 
Perseverance, were all loaned to the British government. The first four were destroyed in 
the conflict so that by the war’s end the Perseverance and the Invincible were the only 
two vessels the NWC had left to shuttle goods efficiently across the Great Lakes.40 
McGillivray later commented in 1818 that the war had severely disrupted the NWC’s 
operations, as the defeat of the British fleet on Lake Erie had left the Americans in 
complete possession of the Great Lakes and had cut off the forwarding of supplies 
between the interior and Upper and Lower Canada for the whole of 1814.41   
The debilitating impact of war with the United States was compounded by the 
activities of John Jacob Astor, a figure who played an instrumental part in the closing of 
the south-west trade to Canadian traders. Astor had long been involved in business 
dealings with Montreal merchants and the NWC, and these connections intensified 
following the imposition of Jay’s Treaty when he had leased a warehouse belonging to 
McTavish, Frobisher on Vaudreuil Street, Montreal.42 In 1808, Astor established the 
AFC, which received a Charter from the state of New York and was capitalised at 1 
million dollars. 43  Together with the Pacific Fur Company, Astor sought to expand 
American trade across the entire North American continent to reach the shores of the 
Pacific Ocean.44 Astor had previously mainly acted as an intermediary but he now started 
purchasing furs on his own account and made another play for the North American fur 
trade by avowing to absorb the Michilimackinac Company.45 The South West Company, 
the successor to the Michilimackinac Company, was formed in 1811 to resolve 
differences between Astor and Montreal merchants involved in both the north- and south-
west trade. The NWC held a one-third interest in the new concern and agreed to transfer 
the posts that it had in the territory of the United States to the new South West Company.46 
Certain goods could be obtained under better terms in either New York or Montreal and 
                                                 
39 Ibid., pp. 191-2. 
40 Ibid., pp. 195, 200. 
41 Papers relating to the Red River Settlement (P.P. 1819, Vol.XVIII.1), p. 125. 
42 Campbell, North West Company, p. 57; and Campbell, Lord of the Northwest, p. 91. 
43 Campbell, North West Company, p. 163; and Campbell, Lord of the Northwest, p. 161.  
44 Campbell, North West Company, pp. 166-7. 
45 Ibid., pp. 166-7. 
46 Ibid., pp. 167-9. 
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so Astor and William McGillivray agreed to split the lucrative supply business in half, 
which also enabled them to pay the least amount of duties. Another agreement to continue 
the SWC for another five years was signed in 1815 but events on the Pacific coast had 
led Astor to step up his efforts to end Canadian involvement in the south-west trade.47 
During the War of 1812, the NWC purchased Fort Astoria, the flagship post of the Pacific 
Fur Company at the mouth of the Columbia River, from the officers stationed at the post.48 
In retribution for this slight, Astor successfully lobbied the US Congress to pass 
legislation that limited licenses for fur trading on American soil to American citizens, 
which came into effect in 1817.49 The NWC was thus barred from the south-west trade 
and William McGillivray was compelled to sell the Company’s shares in the South West 
Company at a considerable loss.50 The door to the southern Great Lakes and Mississippi 
was thereafter closed to Canadian ventures.  
Alongside the development of the American fur trade, the withdrawal of Canadian 
fur merchants from the south-west trade, and the depletion of the fur-bearing animal 
population, the Canadian fur trade also had to contend with the resurgence of the HBC. 
As was highlighted in chapter one, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
the HBC ploughed substantial fiscal resources into expanding its workforce, in 
incentivising its servants to work inland, and in encouraging its workers to re-contract to 
keep experienced men within the Company in order to train new recruits.51 The building 
of craft for inland navigation was another key objective. The NWC’s voyageurs may have 
initially scoffed at their northern rival’s attempts at canoe-building, for the HBC’s ‘York 
boats’, as they were called, were supposedly ‘great clumsy craft that brought howls of 
laughter from the skilled Canadian voyageurs’ but there was no doubting that the HBC’s 
shift to inland trade would challenge Montreal’s hegemony of the North American fur  
trade.52 By the early nineteenth century, the NWC would certainly have begun to feel the 
effects of the HBC’s inland ventures but it is debatable how successful the HBC was in 
wresting market share away from the Montreal traders, a question that will be addressed 
below.  
                                                 
47 Ibid., p. 223. 
48 Ibid., pp. 188-92. 
49 Ibid., pp. 223-4. 
50 Ibid., p. 234. 
51 Rigg, Men of Spirit, pp. 21-2, 25, 34-5. 
52 Campbell, North West Company, pp. 60-1. 
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The extent to which the HBC commercially out-competed the NWC is debatable, 
but it is clear that the HBC’s support for Selkirk’s colonisation scheme at Red River had 
a profound impact on the fortunes of the Montreal fur trade. This is perhaps best shown 
by comparing the official values of British fur imports from Hudson’s Bay and Canada. 
In 1783-7, Canada accounted for £75,949 and Hudson’s Bay made up £10,548 of fur 
imports.53 The ratio between the two trades was thus roughly 8:1. By 1818-21 the gap 
had narrowed in the HBC’s favour so that the ratio was 3:2. In fact, the ratio between the 
two trades was at its narrowest in 1818-21. Table 2.2 shows British fur imports from 
Canada and Hudson’s Bay as a percentage of their combined total and states the 
percentage change for each average as compared to the previous one. The data show that 
fur imports from Hudson’s Bay were gradually gaining ground on those from Canada but 
this shift was far from uniform. Prior to 1807, the change was slight and in 1798-1802 
there was none at all. It was in 1808-12 and 1818-21 that the most substantial alterations 
to the market share of the two trades occurred. In 1808-12, fur imports from Hudson’s 
Bay were 7 per cent higher than they were in 1803-7.54 This was not because of any 
                                                 
53 See Figure 2.1. 
54 See Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. Official value of furs imported from Canada and Hudson’s Bay as a 
percentage of their combined total, 1783-1821 (in %). 
 Canada Hudson’s Bay Percentage Change 
1783-87 
1788-92 
1793-97 
1798-1802 
1803-07 
1808-12 
1814-17 
1818-21 
88% 
84% 
80% 
80% 
79% 
72% 
71% 
62% 
12% 
16% 
20% 
20% 
21% 
28% 
29% 
38% 
- 
+4% 
+4% 
0% 
+1% 
+7% 
-1% 
+9% 
Notes: ‘Canada’ refers to the province of Quebec in British North America (BNA) which includes 
the fur-trading centre of Montreal. The positivity or negativity of the percentage change is in 
relation to the figures for Hudson’s Bay. 
Source: TNA, CUST 17/8-30, States of navigation, commerce and revenue, 1783-1808; and 
TNA, CUST 4/5-16, Ledgers of imports under countries, 1809-21. 
 
~67~ 
 
notable change in the trade of the HBC but rather the result of the disturbances to 
Montreal’s south-west trade. Indeed, the official value of Britain’s fur imports from 
Hudson’s Bay annually averaged £15,121 in 1803-7, which was very similar to the 
£15,967 in 1808-12. This was not the case in 1818-21. The final years of this study bore 
witness to the most significant reduction in the gap between fur imports from Hudson’s 
Bay and Canada. Imports from Hudson’s Bay increased to such an extent that the 
difference between the two was reduced by 9 per cent.55  
While this surge in the trade of the HBC did not lead to a fall in fur imports from 
Canada, it is clear that this denied the Montreal fur traders the opportunity to recover their 
trade to the levels they had been prior to the onset of major troubles with the United States. 
Instrumental in this was the Earl of Selkirk’s Red River Settlement. Like Selkirk’s three 
previous attempts at colonisation, the scheme at Red River was fraught with difficulties. 
The first ship carrying settlers was led by Miles Macdonnell, the HBC’s appointed 
Governor of the new colony, and set sail from Stornoway in July 1812 but stormy seas 
delayed their arrival at York Factory. This was particularly problematic as York Factory, 
although it was the HBC’s main post in North America, was ill-equipped to cater for the 
105 migrants who had journeyed across the Atlantic.56 The colonists were forced to 
overwinter at the post in poor accommodation and with meagre provisions before they 
could venture inland to the outlined territory in the spring of 1813. During the journey 
inland, so many settlers died from scurvy and starvation or deserted the expedition that 
the colonists numbered only 22 by the time they reached Red River.57 The colonists’ 
fortunes did not improve. Inadequate planning and knowledge of the local environment, 
a recurring feature of Selkirk’s schemes, hampered the development of the colony. Of 
most concern was the lack of food. The frozen soil complicated attempts at agriculture 
and even the hardiest varieties of crops were spoiled by harsh frosts.58 The colonists were 
largely dependent on the goodwill of the HBC and the NWC for their provisions but this 
amicable relationship did not last.59 Increasingly desperate for food as successive waves 
of colonists added to the number of mouths to feed, and convinced that he had the power 
to dictate policy for all the peoples within the confines of the vast Red River territory, 
Governor MacDonnell issued a proclamation in 1814 that prohibited the export of 
                                                 
55 See Table 2.2. 
56 Campbell, North West Company, p. 204. 
57 Ibid., p. 204; and Campbell, Lord of the Northwest, p. 212. 
58 Campbell, North West Company, pp. 205-8. 
59 Campbell, Lord of the Northwest, p. 212.  
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pemmican from Red River.60 Derived from dried buffalo meat, pemmican was a high 
protein foodstuff that was vital to the trade of NWC and to an indigenous community 
known as the Métis, who were the masters of the annual buffalo hunt which was the main 
food item available in the region. The Métis were a people who largely originated from 
the unions between Aboriginal women and French-Canadian voyageurs, and naturally 
had a close relationship with the Montreal traders.61 The proclamation and subsequent 
seizure of pemmican from NWC canoes and posts and Métis communities brought cordial 
relations with the colonists to an end, and fuelled mutual resentment amongst the two 
opposing sides.62 
On 19 June 1816 the situation reached breaking point and the most tragic event in 
the disputes between the HBC and NWC occurred within the confines of the Red River 
Colony at Seven Oaks. Here, an armed confrontation erupted between the Red River 
settlers, now led by Governor Robert Semple, and the Métis. There are different accounts 
of how the event unfolded but most historians would now agree that the first act of 
aggression came from the colonists.63  A group of 20 to 30 Métis were transporting 
pemmican from the NWC’s post on Assiniboine River to Lake Winnipeg.64 Governor 
Semple spotted the group and after one Métis rode forward to meet him, Semple 
attempted to take him prisoner. The rider escaped, however, after which Semple ordered 
his men to open fire on the fleeing target. The shots missed the rider but the other Métis 
opened fire in order to defend their companion, sparking generalised shooting.65 The 
fighting resulted in 23 deaths, which included Governor Semple, 21 colonists, and one 
Métis.66  The settlers’ bodies were reportedly found ‘barbarously mangled’, possibly 
having been scalped, and so the episode became known as the Seven Oaks Massacre.67 
This was the most violent occurrence during the so-called ‘civil war’ phase (1811-21) of 
the HBC-NWC rivalry but it was far from the only disturbance.68  
Contemporary British newspapers reported that ‘the disputes between the North-
west Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company are among the most extraordinary 
                                                 
60 Ibid., pp. 212-3. 
61 Rigg, Men of Spirit, p. 109; and Podruchny, Making the Voyageur World, pp. 15, 75. 
62 Campbell, Lord of the Northwest, pp. 213, 216, 228-9. 
63 Rigg, Men of Spirit, p. 109; and Campbell, Lord of the Northwest, pp. 228-9. 
64 Campbell, Lord of the Northwest, p. 228. 
65 Ibid., p. 229. 
66 Ibid., p. 229; and Rigg, Men of Spirit, p. 109. 
67 The Times, 15 February 1817; and Rigg, Men of Spirit, p. 109. 
68 For the use of the term ‘civil war’ to describe the occurrences see The Lancaster Gazette, 22 February 
1817; The Morning Post, 6 November 1818; and The Morning Chronicle, 3 July 1819. 
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transactions permitted within the authority of regular Government’.69 The rivalry between 
the two fur-trading companies in the ‘Indian Country’ provided a continuous stream of 
mayhem, scandal, and recrimination for the British press to fill their commentaries of 
colonial affairs between 1816 and 1820.70 An occurrence that took place at Fort William 
on Lake Superior, the headquarters of the NWC, had even more far-reaching 
consequences for the trade of the NWC. Selkirk, who had been absent for the formative 
years of the Red River Colony, arrived in Montreal in 1816 and immediately set about 
publishing a pamphlet to smear the NWC, which responded by questioning the legality 
of the HBC Charter and thus Selkirk’s grant in the Montreal Gazette.71 As reports about 
the Seven Oaks Massacre reached Montreal, Selkirk, frustrated at the refusal of Sir 
George Drummond, the Governor-General and Administrator of Canada, to offer soldiers 
to defend the colonists, took the law into his own hands and set about raising his own 
private army.72 This proved a straightforward task as the end of the hostilities with the 
United States meant that there were numerous discharged mercenaries looking for 
employment. Selkirk recruited 100 men from the recently disbanded ‘De Meuron’ 
regiment of Swiss mercenaries, contracted over 100 voyageurs to assist in transportation, 
and procured artillery equipment from the United States.73 The host approached Fort 
William on 12 August 1816 and Selkirk issued a warrant for William McGillivray’s arrest 
on the charges of treason, conspiracy, and as an accessory to murder.74 McGillivray 
ventured out of the Fort to protest but was immediately arrested. With their leader 
captured and their Fort surrounded by cannon, the remaining partners surrendered 
themselves and Fort William to Selkirk’s forces.75 This was not the end of the matter for 
Selkirk, who was ‘near collapse from fatigue and excitement’, was told by his doctor to 
rest and resume his activities in the morning.76 Selkirk begrudgingly had the NWC’s 
possessions secured with locks and warned the partners not to touch any of them. To the 
                                                 
69 The Morning Chronicle, 27 November 1817. 
70 For instance, articles appeared in: The Caledonian Mercury, 19, 29 February 1816, 2, 4 November 1816, 
7 April 1817, 27 November 1817, 25 April 1818, 23 July 1818, and 3 January 1820; The Bristol 
Mercury, 4 January 1819; The Bury and Norwich Post, 12 November 1817; The Examiner, 10 
November 1816; The Hull Packet and Original Weekly Commercial, Literary and General Advertiser, 
6 July 1819; The Lancaster Gazette and General Advertiser, 22 February 1817, 8 November 1817, 6 
December 1817, and 3 July 1819; The York Herald and General Advertiser, 24 April 1819; Trewman’s 
Exeter Flying Post, 21 November 1816, 19 November 1818, and 22 April 1819. 
71 Campbell, North West Company, p. 219. 
72 Ibid., p. 222.  
73 Ibid., p. 222. 
74 Ibid., p. 227. 
75 Ibid., p. 227. 
76 Ibid., p. 228. 
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historian’s dismay, as Selkirk withdrew, the Montreal traders set about burning great 
batches of papers that they thought Selkirk could use to their disadvantage.77 The next 
morning, furious at the partners’ actions, but delighted at finding certain papers that he 
deemed to be incriminating, Selkirk had the NWC partners escorted under guard to 
Montreal. In the partners’ absence, Selkirk had the posts of Rainy Lake, Fort Douglas, 
and Bas de la Rivière Winnipic captured from the NWC in order to provide for his men.78 
More concerning for McGillivray was the fate of £100,000 worth of furs that were stored 
in the warehouses at Fort William, for their loss would cause a severe shortage of credit 
for the forthcoming season. Unfortunately for McGillivray, Selkirk had imprisoned three 
NWC clerks at Fort William and forced one of them, Daniel MacKenzie, who was 
allegedly kept in an intoxicated state, to sign documents that permitted Selkirk to purchase 
a large consignment of food from the NWC and to transfer ownership of the £100,000 
worth of furs in the Fort’s storehouses to Selkirk in exchange for a measly annual rental 
of £3,000 on the Earl’s estate in Kirkcudbrightshire.79 After securing their release in 
Montreal, McGillivray and the other NWC partners rescinded the coerced agreement and 
set about bringing order to their concern, now understandably in chaos.  
The Red River Settlement, the Seven Oaks Massacre, and the capture of Fort 
William help to explain why the Montreal fur trade did not recover following the War of 
1812. In fact, the American war could be viewed as the principal reason for the decline 
of the NWC and its subsequent merger with the HBC a decade later in 1821. For as the 
War of 1812 weakened the NWC’s trade, it also made the Company more susceptible to 
Selkirk’s dubious activities. Indeed, what the customs’ records clearly show is that 
Selkirk and the HBC struck a critical blow to the Montreal fur trade in the second decade 
of the nineteenth century by preventing the NWC sufficient opportunities to improve the 
state of its trade.  
There is, however, one problem with this rather pessimistic portrayal of the 
Canadian fur trade in the post-1783 period. While the official values of the Canadian fur 
trade substantially declined in the nineteenth century, in terms of overall market share the 
trade was remarkably resilient. Figure 2.1 displays the official values of the furs imported 
into Britain from each of the key regions as a percentage of the overall total imported 
from the Americas. The figures show that for three whole decades, from 1783-7 through 
                                                 
77 Ibid., pp. 228-9. 
78 Ibid., pp. 233-4. 
79 Ibid., pp. 234-5. 
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to 1814-7, Canada consistently provided half of all Britain’s fur imports. It was only in 
1818-21 that the share of furs imported from Canada notably decreased to 39 per cent. 
Rather than a consequence of increased competition with the HBC, Figure 2.1 suggests 
that this was largely because of a recovery in trade between Britain and the United States. 
The decline in the Canadian fur trade therefore appears to have matched broader 
dislocations in the overall fur trade, so much so that Canada’s market share of Britain’s 
fur imports remained largely static until the final years of the NWC. This retention of 
market share suggests that despite declining animal populations in old regions of the 
trade, the loss of access to territories south of the Great Lakes, the Red River Settlement, 
and more fervent competition from the HBC, the NWC remained competitive, 
presumably as a result of its attempts to find new acquisition areas towards the Rocky 
Mountains and Pacific coast that offset troubles elsewhere. In many ways ‘Perseverance’, 
the NWC motto, aptly describes how the fur trade of Montreal laboured on despite the 
enormous pressures placed upon it so that by 1818-21 Canada was still the prime region 
from which Britain imported its furs.80 Ultimately, in terms of the volume of trade, the 
Canadian fur trade reached its pinnacle in the late eighteenth century and entered its 
twilight years in the early nineteenth century, before the subsequent shift in the centre of 
trade towards York Factory and Hudson’s Bay.  
The customs’ records can also be used to analyse the types of furs that were 
imported from Canada. As is shown in Figure 2.2, in 1783-7 the Canadian fur trade was 
comprised of a rather diverse assortment of furs. Beaver skins were the most significant 
fur that was imported and an average of £21,458 was imported each year, which made up 
28 per cent of Canada’s total fur exports. Indeed, the 1780s and 1790s were peak decades 
for the Canadian beaver trade, which never dipped below £20,000 during these years. 
Deer was a close second at £19,524 (26 per cent) and marten furs were the third highest 
at £12,240 (16 per cent).81 The disturbances to the trade over the following decades 
notably changed the components of the Montreal fur trade. By 1818-21, marten furs were 
the predominant fur type that was imported into Britain, comprising 54 per cent of fur 
imports from Canada with an annual average official value of £21,177.82 At £10,019 in 
1818-21, beaver furs were less than half the value that they had comprised in 1783-7 and 
accounted for one-quarter of the imports. In light of the difficulties in the south-west 
                                                 
80 See Figure 2.1. 
81 See Figure 2.2. 
82 See Figure 2.2. 
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trade, Britain’s deer imports from Canada had diminished to a mere £3,092 or 8 per cent 
of the overall total.83  
By the end of the period, therefore, the Canadian fur trade was far less diverse and 
was increasingly reliant on the trade in marten furs. It thus appears that there was a degree 
of elasticity in the fur trade and that problems in one branch of the trade could potentially 
be offset by developing the trade in other fur varieties. Although they did not elevate the 
Montreal fur trade to its former heights, marten furs clearly acted as a buffer against the 
respective declines in the Canadian deer and beaver trades.  
III.   Britain and the US Fur Trade 
The decline of the Canadian fur trade is the central pattern that is identifiable from the fur 
import data contained within the British customs’ records. But the statistics also enable a 
detailed analysis of the respective fur trades of the United States and Hudson’s Bay. 
British fur imports from the United States were rather more volatile than those from 
Canada. In terms of official values, the United States remained the second most important 
supplier of furs to Britain until 1808-12, when the trade collapsed in line with Anglo-
American trade generally as the United States Congress passed the Embargo Act of 1807 
in response to Britain’s disregard for American neutrality in the Napoleonic Wars and the 
outbreak of the Anglo-American War of 1812-4.84 For a whole decade, poor relations 
between the two countries severely limited Britain’s imports of furs from the United 
States; Britain’s average yearly fur imports from the region declined from an official 
value of £21,366 in 1803-7 to just £3,026 in 1808-12. It seems probable that, after 1800, 
American merchants either became much more active in exporting furs directly to 
continental European markets, stockpiled the furs in warehouses and waited for trading 
conditions to improve, or exported their skins to China.  
Table 2.3 compares the number of beaver furs exported from the United States to 
Britain from the British custom’s records with the exports of US furs to China, the latter 
of which is derived from a paper submitted by Charles Grant, former director of the EIC, 
to a Parliamentary Committee in 1821.85 The table shows that US beaver furs were 
                                                 
83 See Figure 2.2. 
84 See Figure 2.1; and Clayton, ‘American Fur Trade’, p. 162. 
85 TNA, CUST 17/8-30, States of navigation, commerce and revenue, 1783-1808; TNA, CUST 4/5-13, 
Ledgers of imports under countries, 1809-21; Report [relative to the trade with the East Indies and 
China,] from the Select Committee of the House of Lords, appointed to inquire into the means of 
extending and securing the foreign trade of the country, and to report to the House; together with the 
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predominantly exported to China, even before the War of 1812. In fact, between 1804 
and 1818, 86 per cent of the beaver furs were exported to China, whereas only 14 per cent 
                                                 
minutes of evidence taken in sessions 1820 and 1821, before the said committee (P.P. 1821, Vol.VII.1), 
p. 187; and C. H. Philips and D. Philips, ‘Alphabetical List of Directors of the East India Company from 
1758 to 1858’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. 73, No. 4 (1941), 
pp. 325-36. 
Table 2.3. Number of beaver furs exported from the United States to 
Britain and China, 1804-18. 
 Britain China Total 
1804 
1805 
1806 
1807 
1808 
1809 
1810 
1811 
1812 
1813 
1814 
1815 
1816 
1817 
1818 
134 
622 
8,050 
4,660 
1,233 
53 
13 
2 
42 
N/A 
0 
0 
2,488 
1,021 
9,897 
8,756 
34,464 
23,368 
11,750 
5,170 
20,000 
14,200 
20,000 
2,330 
3,928 
Merged with above 
168 
1,579 
15,067 
15,570 
8,890 
35,086 
31,418 
16,410 
6,403 
20,053 
14,213 
20,002 
2,372 
3,928 
- 
168 
4,067 
16,088 
25,467 
Total 28,215 (14%) 176,350 (86%) 204,565 
Notes: The figures for China are probably more inaccurate than those for Britain which were 
taken from the British customs’ records. This is because the China data are not derived from 
official American or Chinese figures but rather made from the observations of the EIC’s 
officers in Canton. 
Source: TNA, CUST 17/26-30, States of navigation, commerce and revenue, 1804-8; TNA, 
CUST 4/5-13, Ledgers of imports under countries, 1809-18; and Report [relative to the 
trade with the East Indies and China,] from the Select Committee of the House of Lords, 
appointed to inquire into the means of extending and securing the foreign trade of the 
country, and to report to the House; together with the minutes of evidence taken in sessions 
1820 and 1821, before the said committee (P.P. 1821, Vol.VII.1), p. 187. 
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were traded in Britain.86 The low proportion of US beaver furs exported to Britain was 
not a consequence of deteriorating Anglo-American relations or Napoleon’s Continental 
Blockade. Fewer beaver pelts were actually exported from the US to Britain on average 
each year in 1783-1803 (1,671 pelts) than in 1804-18 (2,015 pelts).87 Rather than export 
beaver furs to London, which was well stocked with high-quality pelts from Canada and 
Hudson’s Bay, US merchants clearly sent a large proportion of their beaver to China.88 
Silks, porcelain, tea, and other ‘China goods’ could be purchased for the return voyage 
from Canton. Indeed, furs were one of the few imported commodities for which the 
Chinese market had a high demand. Unfortunately, it is not clear how important mainland 
Europe was for US fur exports. The 1790s and early 1800s was a period when US 
merchants became heavily involved in the colonial carrying trade to Europe, especially 
in Caribbean coffee and sugar.89 Furs were likely another key US export to Europe until 
the Continental Blockade. The US-China trade was also not immune to wartime 
disruption, as it is clear from Grant’s provided statistics that American traders found it 
increasingly difficult to access the China trade in 1812-6, most likely due to the threat of 
capture by the Royal Navy. In 1811, American beaver exports to China numbered 20,000 
pelts but with the outbreak of war the trade did not reach above 4,000 until 1817, when it 
rebounded sharply.90  
Since the United States was the second largest supplier of furs to Britain prior to 
1808-12, and in light of the marginal Anglo-American trade in beaver fur, US fur exports 
to Britain were evidently comprised of other important fur varieties. Figure 2.3 charts the 
official value of furs imported into Britain from the United States and delineates them by 
type of fur. Most striking is the predominance of deer. Between 1783 and 1807 well over 
50 per cent of the official value of US fur exports to Britain was made up of deer, and 
they rose to above three-quarters of all exports between 1793 and 1802.91 Bear, marten, 
and mink furs were other notable imports in particular years.92 On the other hand, beaver 
exports were only the fifth highest and were virtually negligible until the end of the 
                                                 
86 See Table 2.3. 
87 TNA, CUST 17/8-30, States of navigation, commerce and revenue, 1783-1808; TNA, CUST 4/5-13, 
Ledgers of imports under countries, 1809-21. 
88 On the use of fur in the US-China trade see Gibson, Otter Skins, especially pp. 54, 95, 101. 
89 Nash, ‘British Atlantic Economy’, pp. 119-20. Also see Michelle Craig McDonald, ‘The Chance of the 
Moment: Coffee and the New West Indies Commodity Trade’, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 
62, No. 3 (2005), pp. 441-72.  
90 See Table 2.3. 
91 See Figure 2.3. 
92 See Figure 2.3. 
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period. As previously discussed, Canada was another region that supplied significant 
quantities of deer to the British market. Table 2.4 compares British deer imports from 
Canada, Florida, and the United States. Before 1800, Florida, a Spanish colony until 1819, 
was a major source of Britain’s deer skins and in 1788-92 accounted for 44 per cent of 
these imports, substantially more than the quantities provided by either Canada or the 
United States.93 Over the period as a whole, Canada and the United States supplied similar 
quantities of deer to the British market but when smaller time periods are analysed there 
are noticeable changes in their relative importance. In the 1780s over 30 per cent of the 
deer originated from the Canadian branch of the trade but there was a marked growth in 
US deer imports during the 1790s. In 1793-7, 49 per cent of Britain’s deer imports came 
from the United States, with an average of 207,000 deer imported each year, an increase 
                                                 
93 See Table 2.4. East and West Florida were British colonies that were formed from French and Spanish 
territories that were acquired in 1763 and remained under British control until 1783 when the Treaty of 
Paris returned ownership to Spain. Much of the British deer trade with Florida was undertaken by 
Panton, Leslie & Co. of Pensacola, Florida, who were shipping over 100,000 deer a year to England by 
the 1780s. See Waselkov, ‘Anglo-Indian Trade’, p. 204.   
Table 2.4. Average annual number of deer imported into Britain from Canada, 
Florida, and the United States, 1783-1821. 
 Canada Florida United States Total 
1783-87 
1788-92 
1793-97 
1798-1802 
1803-07 
1808-12 
1814-17 
1818-21 
149,089  (35%) 
116,050  (31%) 
133,734  (31%) 
191,057  (41%) 
177,247  (50%) 
103,786  (75%) 
13,274  (25%) 
24,593  (24%) 
139,798  (33%) 
161,792  (44%) 
83,672  (20%) 
47,005  (10%) 
27,164  (8%) 
180  (0%) 
9,061  (17%) 
0  (0%) 
134,817  (32%) 
92,671  (25%) 
207,572  (49%) 
226,603  (49%) 
150,321  (42%) 
35,146  (25%) 
29,751  (57%) 
79,459  (76%) 
423,704 
370,514 
424,977 
464,666 
354,731 
139,111 
52,086 
104,051 
Overall Average 113,604  (39%) 58,584  (20%) 119,543  (41%) 291,730 
Notes: The averages were calculated using data taken directly from the British customs’ records and 
include Scottish imports. Apart from the year 1813, the records for which were destroyed in a fire at 
the Customs’ House in February 1814, all years between 1783 and 1821 were used to work out the 
averages. Overall, Canada, Florida, and the United States made up 93 per cent of Britain’s deer 
imports from all parts of the world. 
Source: TNA, CUST 17/8-30, States of navigation, commerce and revenue, 1783-1808; and TNA, 
CUST 4/5-16, Ledgers of imports under countries, 1809-21. 
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on the 135,000 in 1783-7.94 This upsurge did not last. Total deer imports from the two 
regions peaked in 1798-1802 but thereafter began to decline. The trade collapsed in the 
second decade of the nineteenth century and only 52,086 deer were annually imported in 
1814-17.95 The American branch was the first to deteriorate, especially after 1808, and a 
similar albeit slower decline befell the Canadian deer trade. 
The rise and decline of the deer trade during this period had both supply and 
demand-based factors. On the supply side, war between Britain and the United States 
clearly disrupted the trade but the Creek Civil War of 1813-4 — which pitted the Red 
Stick Cree against the Lower Creeks, Cherokee, Choctaw, and United States — led to the 
cessation of 30 million acres of land in the modern-day states of Georgia and Alabama to 
the United States in the Treaty of Fort Jackson (1814).96 The deer population also declined 
as a result of over-hunting and the growth in livestock agriculture.97On the demand side, 
European consumers’ use of deerskin breeches declined after 1800 as trousers made from 
woollen or cotton fabrics became more fashionable.98 Furthermore, as is shown in chapter 
four, sealskin became a popular material for gloves, footwear, and book-bindings in early-
nineteenth-century Britain. There is also the issue of whether American merchants 
developed their own carrying trade in furs after 1800, one that conveyed their procured 
skins directly to European markets. The establishment of such ventures likely started 
much sooner, as the historiographical literature emphasises the strong growth in US 
shipping and overseas trade in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.99 It is, 
however, somewhat less clear whether US merchants continued to be as active in directly 
conveying goods to European markets after the outbreak of the War of 1812. Most 
historians argue that the conflict severely hampered US overseas trade in the Atlantic, as 
well as on the north-west coast of North America.100 If US overseas trade was indeed 
crippled by the hostilities, then it would be expected that furs accumulated in US merchant 
warehouses.  
The disruption of the overall Anglo-American fur trade was only temporary, as by 
1818-21 Britain’s fur imports from the United States had recovered to pre-1807 levels. 
                                                 
94 See Table 2.4. 
95 See Table 2.4. 
96 Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, pp. 186-8; and Richards, The World Hunt, p. 40. 
97 Richards, The World Hunt, p. 40. 
98 John Styles, The Dress of the People: Everyday Fashion in Eighteenth Century England (London: Yale 
University Press, 2007), pp. 39, 87-8. 
99 See Nash, ‘British Atlantic Economy’, especially pp. 119-20. 
100 Ibid., p. 120. 
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The collapse of the American branch of the trade and its subsequent recovery suggests 
that US fur exports to Britain were used to finance the purchase of British manufactured 
goods, which rose to peak levels in 1815 and 1816.101 The imported furs were then 
purchased by British merchants and tradesmen for re-export to European markets or used 
to produce manufactures for domestic consumption or export. Such a relationship would 
explain the swift recovery in this facet of Anglo-American trade. By 1817-8 (£23,134), 
the average annual official value of Britain’s fur imports from the United States was 
above that which they had been in 1806-7 (£16,843).102 This view is further substantiated 
by Clayton’s findings that Britain received 74 per cent of the value of US fur exports 
between 1822 and 1890.103  
One final aspect that the customs’ records can reveal about the nature of the Anglo-
American fur trade is with regard to the individual states that supplied furs to Britain. 
Table 2.5 displays the total official value of furs imported into Britain from each state 
over the entire period under study and further delineates the imports by fur type. The 
whole trade was actually rather dispersed; the fur-trading centres of New York and 
Pennsylvania only handled 40 per cent of Britain’s fur imports from the United States.104 
In fact, South Carolina was the State where most of the imports originated, accounting 
for 24 per cent of the imports with an overall official value of £207,000.105 New England 
was another notable source at £124,000 or 14 per cent of the US imports. The trade was 
much smaller in the other States but the 7 per cent from North Carolina and the same from 
Louisiana were not insignificant. There was a clear distinction between the ‘northern’ and 
‘southern’ states. Deer comprised over 95 per cent of the fur imports from the southern 
states of North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana.106 As the trade moved north, 
the deer trade became less important. For Virginia and Maryland, deer made up around 
80 per cent of their fur exports to Britain, whereas they were less prevalent in the trade of 
Pennsylvania (59 per cent), New York (53 per cent), and New England (8 per cent). South 
Carolina, and no doubt the port town of Charleston, was the centre of the US deer trade 
and the fur traders in the southern states were far more specialised in the trade of deer 
                                                 
101 This was certainly the case for merchants in New York from the late-seventeenth to mid-eighteenth 
centuries. See Norton, Fur Trade, pp. 83, 101. 
102 TNA, CUST 17/28-30, States of navigation, commerce and revenue, 1806-7; and TNA, CUST 4/11-2, 
Ledgers of imports under countries, 1816-7. 
103 Clayton, ‘American Fur Trade’, p. 162. 
104 See Table 2.5. 
105 See Table 2.5. 
106 See Table 2.5. 
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than their northern counterparts. Deer was still by far the most significant fur type that 
Pennsylvania and New York exported to Britain but their consignments were much more 
diverse and comprised notable amounts of bear, beaver, marten, mink, musquash, and 
otter skins. Whereas the fur trade in the northern states was less dependent on a single fur 
type, there was evidently some degree of specialisation in each state; 64 per cent of US 
beaver exports to Britain originated from New York. The fur trade of New England, a 
region that was largely thought to have undergone severe resource depletion, comprised 
the bulk of US fox (70 per cent), marten (68 per cent), and mink (65 per cent) exports.107 
Thus, as in the Canadian fur trade, trouble in New England’s supply of beaver furs 
seemingly stimulated the exploitation of other fur varieties.  
IV.   The Hudson’s Bay Fur Trade 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries was a period when the HBC attempted to expand its share of the fur trade by 
moving the Company’s point of contact with Aboriginal fur traders away from Hudson’s 
Bay and into the interior of North America. The Company exclusively shipped furs from 
the Bay at this time and since the British customs’ records listed the region in its own 
individual category, the trade statistics can be used as a way of measuring the success of 
the Company’s new inland trading strategy.  
In the 1780s and 1790s the HBC greatly enlarged the number of servants in its 
employ so that it had the manpower required to transport goods to and from inland posts. 
Despite the Company’s larger payroll, the import ledgers indicate that the return on this 
greater investment was modest. The average number of servants in the Company’s 
employ increased by 42 per cent between 1785-92 (282 servants) and 1793-1800 (485 
servants) yet the average annual official value of the imported furs was only 23 per cent 
higher in 1793-1802 (£17,284) than it had been in 1783-92 (£13,236).108 Despite further 
expansion in the workforce, albeit now at a slower rate, an increasing pool of servants 
trained in the art of inland navigation, and a new settlement colony that was obliged to 
provide recruits to the Company, imports were lower in 1803-7 (£15,121), 1808-12 
(£15,967), and 1814-17 (£15,018) than they were in 1798-1802. It was not until the very 
end of the period that the most substantial expansion in the trade occurred, when the 
                                                 
107 See Table 2.5. 
108 See Table 1.1 and Figure 2.1. 
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official value of fur imports from the Bay increased to £24,259, a 60 per cent rise on the 
preceding average, suggesting that the Company struck a critical blow to the Montreal 
traders in the aftermath of the events at Seven Oaks and the capture of Fort William. Even 
so, analysing the ratio of fur imports in relation to the number of servants employed 
suggests a clear problem at the heart of the efforts of the HBC: the Company’s inability 
to make its increased capital investments yield a favourable return. In fact, these ratios 
point towards the Company’s operations actually becoming less productive. Using the 
average annual official value of fur imports from Hudson’s Bay for 1783-92 (£13,236) 
and the average number of servants employed by the Company each year between 1785 
and 1792 (282 servants) yields a ratio of £47 for every one servant.109 By the end of the 
period this ratio had decreased to £38 per servant.110 While Ann Carlos points out that the 
HBC was close to bankruptcy as a result of Napoleon’s Continental Blockade, the 
analysis here suggests that the Company faced a more long-term dilemma over how to 
make its inland ventures worthwhile.111 Over-trapping and intensive competition with the 
NWC resulted in the HBC’s trade not keeping pace with the growth in the Company’s 
workforce. Indeed, this predicament no doubt helps to explain why the Company was so 
fixated on finding the archetypal servant during this period, and why it decided to risk 
combining trade with colonisation in territories that relied upon the support of Aboriginal 
peoples.  
Considering that the HBC first embarked upon its new commercial strategy in the 
1770s, it took almost 40 years for the Company to establish a firm hold on inland trade 
and it seems likely that this foothold was largely acquired because of the difficulties faced 
by the Montreal traders. It was, therefore, not so much a case that the Company enticed 
Aboriginal traders away from the NWC but rather that the War of 1812 and Selkirk’s 
actions disrupted the operations of the latter. This raises the question as to why the HBC 
was seemingly so ineffective at increasing its market share for most of the period. 
Historians have long emphasised the pivotal role played by the cost of physical barriers 
in the demise of the NWC and its subsequent merger with the HBC. Harold Innis and E. 
E. Rich supported such an interpretation by highlighting the lower transportation costs 
for goods consigned to the north-west via the Hudson’s Bay route rather than through 
                                                 
109 See Table 1.1 and Figure 2.1. 
110 This ratio was calculated by taking the annual average official value of the imported furs between 1814 
and 1821 (£19,639) and comparing this to the 506 servants that were on average employed by the 
Company each year between 1812 and 1819. 
111 Carlos, Duopoly, pp. 100-6. 
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Montreal, discerning that such an advantage ultimately enabled the HBC to trump its 
southern counterpart.112 It would be logical to expect, however, that if geographic factors 
had caused the union then the HBC would have had both greater and more consistent 
success at increasing its own market share at the expense of the Canadian fur trade. 
Instead, the HBC appears to have not been in a position to capitalise on its more 
advantageous route into the interior, an advantage that William McGillivray determined 
enabled the HBC to transfer goods at less than half the cost of the NWC.113  
There are several possible explanations as to why the HBC largely failed to increase 
its share of the trade through commercial competition. Provisioning is one largely 
neglected factor. The posts of the HBC were especially reliant on imported foodstuffs, 
whereas the NWC could procure provisions in Montreal. Until the War of 1812, therefore, 
the NWC was able to avoid the high war-induced inflation that affected Britain in the 
1790s and 1800s, a factor that may have negated the HBC’s cost advantage over the 
shipping of trade goods.114 Indeed, the prices of the HBC’s provisions rose by 60 per cent 
between 1803-4 and 1808-9. 115  Another possible factor concerns the Company’s 
workforce. While the Company made huge strides to create a labour force that could 
match that of the NWC and their French-Canadian voyageurs, the skills gap may well 
have been too great to be filled by sojourning servants, a view that is certainly supported 
by the HBC’s increased use of North American servants and Red River colonists. Indeed, 
the supply of men was the main benefit that Selkirk proposed to the HBC’s shareholders 
while negotiating his land grant, promising to provide the Company with 200 ‘effective 
men’ each year.116 The ‘poaching’ of experienced and innovative explorers such as David 
Thompson by the NWC was also a huge blow to Company’s endeavours.117 It does not 
appear that the quality of trade goods stocked by the HBC’s posts impeded its attempts at 
trade expansion, as the Company gathered commercial intelligence on the commodity 
specifications that appealed to Aboriginal peoples, and then used this information to 
inform its export procurement (chapter three).   
While the customs’ data reveal the slow growth in the HBC’s trade and cast doubt 
on the Company’s ability to compete commercially with the Montreal traders, analysing 
                                                 
112 Innis, Fur Trade in Canada, especially pp. 158, 164, 387; and Rich, Montreal, especially p. 98. 
113 Campbell, McGillivray: Lord of the Northwest, p. 303. 
114 Carlos, Duopoly, pp. 21, 107-8, 168-9. 
115 Ibid., pp. 104-5. 
116 HBCA, A.1/50, London Minute Book, 30 May 1811, fo. 36. 
117 Campbell, McGillivray: Lord of the Northwest, pp. 105-7. 
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the Hudson’s Bay, Canadian, and American fur trades in terms of their overall market 
share presents a more favourable view of the HBC’s efforts. Because of the decline in 
total British fur imports, the Company’s share of the fur trade gradually increased over 
the period. In 1783-7, the HBC supplied a mere 7 per cent of Britain’s fur imports, yet 
the Company provided almost one-quarter by 1818-21. Perhaps during a rather turbulent 
period maintaining a stable trade was a success in itself.  
While British fur imports from the United States were heavily focused on deer and 
those from Canada were comprised of a more diverse assortment of furs, imports from 
Hudson’s Bay were primarily centred on two types of skins; beaver and marten. As Figure 
2.4 shows, before 1800 beaver furs made up around half of the exports from Hudson’s 
Bay but they subsequently declined to a reach a mere 14 per cent by 1818-21.118 The 
official value also slightly declined over the period, from £4,471 in 1783-7 to £3,436 in 
1818-21. The HBC, like the Montreal traders, thus seemingly found it very difficult to 
maintain its beaver trade at this time, which led to a focus on alternative varieties of fur. 
Marten furs had always made up a notable share of the Company’s imports into Britain 
and they made up no less than 27 per cent of the HBC’s imports until the second decade 
of the nineteenth century. There was a notable upturn in marten furs after 1812 to the 
extent to which they made up 67 per cent of the skins by 1818-21. In fact, marten furs 
actually accounted for a greater share of HBC fur imports than beaver for five of the eight 
averages analysed here.119 While the beaver trade declined in volume, martens were 
seemingly in good supply as an annual average of £16,383 was imported in 1818-21, 
more than triple the £4,789 imported in 1783-7. Both the HBC and the Montreal fur 
traders compensated for declining returns of beaver with increased procurements of 
martens, although the trade in the latter was always considerable.  
The shift towards marten skins in the second decade of the nineteenth century may 
also point towards changes in European consumption patterns as well as indicating a 
degree of elasticity of supply. Consumer studies of the fur trade in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries are few in number but overwhelmingly focus on the rise of 
beaver and felt hats in the apparel of late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century consumers. 
In light of the prevalence of Britain’s imports of deer and marten furs, analysis into the 
consumption of these articles within Britain would no doubt be a useful addition to the 
                                                 
118 See Figure 2.4. 
119 See Figure 2.4. 
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historical literature of the eighteenth-century ‘consumer revolution’, a subject that will be 
returned to in chapter five.  
V.   The Hudson’s Bay Company Prevails: The emergence of monopoly 
By 1821, the Montreal fur trade had substantially declined in scale but it was still the most 
important source of Britain’s fur imports, a larger enterprise than either the fur trades of 
the HBC or the United States. But when, on 5 December 1821, the NWC and HBC 
merged, under the banner of the chartered company, it was not on equal terms, for while 
the NWC held a greater slice of the fur trade the balance of power within the new HBC 
was decidedly against the former NWC. The new HBC was overseen by a joint board of 
management composed of five members; two from each of the former companies and the 
fifth being the governor or deputy-governor of the old HBC.120 In addition, the shares 
were also not equally split as the former NWC was granted only £100,000 worth of shares 
in the new HBC, as opposed to the £150,000 held by the old HBC.121 Over the next few 
years many of the former partners of the NWC were slowly edged out of the management 
of the trade so that by 1825 the so-called ‘second part’ of the combined enterprise had 
vanished from the HBC’s books. Indeed, in 1824 William McGillivray was ousted and 
the joint board of management was abolished.122 What was sold as a ‘union’ was in truth 
‘absorption’.123  
This leads to two questions. First, why did the NWC become the weaker partner in 
the joint concern when, according to the customs’ ledgers, the company controlled a 
higher proportion of the trade even after the disruptions of 1818-21? Second, why did the 
HBC retain its Charter and indeed acquire a monopoly of the fur trade at a time when, on 
the other side of the world, the trading privileges of the EIC were in retreat? These 
questions are all the more pertinent in light of the decline of chartered companies in 
British overseas trade during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The decline 
of the ‘free’ NWC traders and the conferral of a de facto monopoly of the British fur trade 
to the HBC runs counter to the broader historical trend of trade liberalisation. 
The answer to the first question principally rests on the different forms of trade 
organisation of the two companies. The NWC was a loose association that relied on 
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cooperation between the mercantile agents in Montreal and Fort William, and the inland 
clerks, traders, and partners. The ‘bourgeois’ and the ‘wintering partners’ shared their 
resources and expertise in order to conduct an advantageous trade that reduced the ruinous 
impact of competition, a feature that was so evident during the operation of the XYC, and 
which acted to maintain profitability. Conversely, the HBC, as a joint-stock company, 
was less dependent upon cooperation as control ultimately rested within a small executive 
committee that was drawn from the prominent shareholders. The ownership of all assets 
rested solely with the registered Company. Disgruntled shareholders and committee 
members could therefore sell their shares without necessitating the removal of resources 
from the enterprise. This key difference was a central reason for the demise of the NWC, 
as any division between the wintering partners and bourgeois would endanger the 
cooperative spirit that sustained the Company’s existence.124 
Such a split occurred in 1819-21 as the latest NWC Agreement neared its end. 
Unknown to the bourgeois, representatives of the wintering partners had secretly sent 
overtures to Selkirk’s lawyer in Montreal to enquire as to whether the HBC would 
consider becoming the supplier of their trade goods rather than McTavish, McGillivrays 
as per their current arrangements.125 In the autumn of 1819, William McGillivray had 
journeyed to London to conduct business and had left Dr McLoughlin in charge of Fort 
William.126 Upon his return the following year, McGillivray learned that McLoughlin had 
warmly received a visit from a new HBC clerk by the name of George Simpson.127 
McGillivray’s suspicions were confirmed at a meeting with the wintering partners at Fort 
William, when his attempts to negotiate a renewed partnership agreement were thwarted 
by the revelation that several dissident winterers were planning to make arrangements 
with another supply firm that McGillivray correctly presumed was the HBC.128 The rift 
between winterer and agent jeopardised the future continuation of the NWC, which was 
still in financial disarray and was in desperate need of credit.129 As the leaders of the 18 
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dissident winterers, McLoughlin and Angus Bethume, travelled to London to meet with 
the HBC Committee, the NWC’s agents drew up a plan to launch a campaign in 
Parliament against the HBC’s Charter by tapping into anti-monopoly sentiment amongst 
the British public and by galvanising the support of the Anglo-Canadian community in 
London. 130  Contrary to the original plan, however, Simon McGillivray, brother of 
William McGillivray and the NWC’s agent in this matter, together with the assistance of 
Edward Ellice, opted to open negotiations with the HBC in a bid to arrange a union 
between the chartered company and the NWC. 
In December 1820, Andrew Wedderburn Colville, Lady Selkirk’s brother and HBC 
Committee member, received representatives from the two discordant parties.131 At first, 
the offers from both interests were met with little enthusiasm from the HBC. A second 
meeting between Colville, Simon McGillivray, and Ellice, resulted in a proposed union 
that was acceptable to both parties. Forced to remain in Canada as a result of his efforts 
to stabilise the NWC, William McGillivray would later lament his brother’s bargaining 
efforts. The split within the NWC had compelled Simon and Ellice to accept a union on 
far lesser terms than that proposed in previous attempts over the past three decades.132 
Simon McGillivray’s inexperience in such high-stakes business negotiations may well 
have weakened the agents hand but it was ultimately Ellice who was the key player. Ellice 
had become MP for Coventry in 1818, had strong personal and business ties to Canada, 
was a frequent speaker on Canadian issues in the British Parliament, and had been a 
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shareholder in the HBC since at least 1811.133 Ellice had a plan to unify the two competing 
companies, a proposition that was attractive to Earl Bathurst, the Secretary of State for 
War and the Colonies, for the on-going disturbances in the fur trade following the Seven 
Oaks Massacre were of deep concern to the Colonial Office.134 In November 1816, Sir 
John C. Sherbrooke, Governor-in-Chief of British North America, had written to Bathurst 
to warn him of the dangers posed by instability in the ‘Indian’ territories.135 Not only did 
the conflict between the two companies disrupt trade, it also threatened the security of 
Upper Canada for the Métis, though loyal to the NWC, would ‘in the event of their [the 
NWC’s] fall, easily persuade the Indians, as the lords of the soil, to expel the white 
inhabitants from the whole western territory’.136 Sherbrooke further warned that relations 
with the United States could be worsened by the conflict, especially as the Métis 
supposedly ‘look that way for assistance to assert their independence, and express an 
intention of sending delegates to Washington in the Spring’.137  
Bathurst saw the benefits of Ellice’s idea of a lasting union between the two 
companies, which would bring order to this distant part of the Empire. Bathurst thus 
promised Ellice that he would enact a special Act of Parliament that would enable the 
Privy Council to grant a 21-year exclusive right to trade in Athabasca, the Mackenzie 
basin, New Caledonia, and the Pacific slope, or in other words, the entirety of the 
territories explored by British subjects on the North American continent that were not 
claimed by a foreign power, had already been colonised, or were a part of the HBC’s 
Charter (Rupert’s Land).138 Upon the merger of the two companies, Bathurst would then 
have the Council confer this grant to the HBC and the former proprietors of the NWC. 
Significantly, none of the clauses inserted into the Act to Regulate the Fur Trade affected 
the HBC’s Charter in any way.139 Thus the Company’s Royal Charter remained un-
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ratified by the British Parliament.140 Indeed, the Charter and the 1821 Act shows the 
multifaceted way in which the British state administered the empire, for the Company’s 
Charter remained a royal prerogative, while Parliament authorised the use of an exclusive 
trading license, and the Privy Council possessed the power to choose whom to grant such 
a license.141 This coexistence of multiple forms of imperial administration does somewhat 
question Elizabeth Mancke’s view that the chartering of corporations had become a 
Parliamentary prerogative by the early eighteenth century.142 The union between the HBC 
and NWC was outlined in the Deed of Covenant that was agreed at Hudson’s Bay House 
on 26 March 1821, and was later formally signed by the respective parties on 5 December 
that same year.143 The Deed paved the way for the Act of Parliament that came into effect 
on 5 November 1821.144  Ellice, of course, had his own political considerations and 
commercial interests at heart during discussions with the HBC, as the NWC was heavily 
indebted to him.145 In light of Ellice’s ulterior motives and the disruption caused to the 
NWC by the Earl of Selkirk, it is not an over-exaggeration to suggest that the Montreal 
fur trade had been subject to a metropolitan takeover. 
Outside of Canadian historiography, the union between the NWC and HBC is either 
overlooked or has been viewed as purely an aspect of business history. Yet, on the 
margins of Empire in North America where fur-trading posts were the only real claim to 
territory, the prospects of the NWC held great significance for the future of the entire 
continent. In essence, the NWC held a claim to hundreds of thousands of acres, and this 
influence only remained British so long as the Company remained centred in the British 
Empire. Astor would have no doubt jumped at the opportunity to merge the AFC with the 
NWC had an offer been forthcoming and such an outcome would have sparked a major 
diplomatic incident.146 Only the Montreal merchants distrust of Astor and their staunch 
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loyalty to the British crown — maintained despite the unwillingness of the British 
government to provide a Charter to the NWC in reward for their contribution to the 
expansion of British influence — prevented an alternative scenario of an Astor-NWC 
pact.147 The NWC, itself born from the exodus of British Loyalists from the United States, 
and its union with the HBC acted to preserve British influence over vast swathes of 
territory that were vulnerable to American and Russian expansion, and served to maintain 
British political stability by avoiding yet another quarrel with the American republic. 
There were clear political motivations behind the union but as Marjorie Campbell argues, 
the agreement ultimately came about because the cooperative spirit required by the 
NWC’s business model was compromised by internal division, which acted to weaken 
the bargaining position of the Company’s agents. 148  This discord was a partial 
consequence of the difficulties brought about by the War of 1812 and Selkirk’s colony, 
which led to accusations that the NWC’s proprietors had not done enough to reconcile 
with the HBC. Internal disputes in the Montreal trade were, therefore, paramount over 
geographic factors.  
Although it did not cause the disunity in the NWC, access to credit was another key 
reason for the NWC’s capitulation. The NWC’s finances were in disarray after the capture 
of Fort William but the HBC was also in an unenviable position; the London Company 
owed over £100,000 to the Bank of England by 1821.149 Indeed, William McGillivray 
bemoaned his brother’s failure to capitalise on this circumstance.150 Even so, there were 
two central financial differences between the two companies that allowed the HBC 
greater flexibility. First, while both concerns could acquire credit from fellow proprietors 
the HBC had superior access to metropolitan finance, especially the Bank of England. In 
connection to this was the asset that the HBC could offer as security on the debt owed to 
the Bank: the Company’s Charter.151 For the entire eighteenth century the Company’s 
Charter remained un-ratified by the British Parliament, but the Royal Charter was deemed 
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an acceptable form of collateral for the Bank of England. Therefore, even though the HBC 
was significantly indebted, it is questionable that this would have significantly impeded 
the HBC’s bargaining position had Simon McGillivray managed to ‘push’ this factor in 
the deliberations. While lack of credit did not lay the grounds for division within the 
NWC, it inhibited the Company’s agents from envisioning a situation in which they could 
continue without the dissident winterers. Second, Ellice, a long-standing ally and 
powerful potential creditor, had his own motives for pushing a union between the two 
companies. Indeed, the merger was not forced onto the two companies by the British 
legislature as is often claimed, but was a master plan orchestrated by Ellice with the 
support of Bathurst.  
Disunity and lack of credit thus undermined the NWC’s hand and left it open to 
Ellice’s manipulation but this leads on to the question as to how it was possible for the 
HBC to be allowed a monopoly of the fur trade at a time when there was considerable 
popular opposition to trade monopolies within Britain. Throughout the course of the 
eighteenth century, the exclusive privileges of chartered corporations were regularly 
subject to campaigns that sought their alteration or their outright withdrawal. In 1690, the 
HBC’s attempt to gain parliamentary approval for its Charter was thwarted by the 
protestations of the Feltmakers’ Company in London and by interested parties in New 
England and New York.152 As a result of these grievances, Parliament only approved the 
HBC’s Charter for a mere seven years. Confronted by a deluge of opposition while 
attempting to prolong parliamentary ratification, the Company allowed the approval to 
expire in 1698 and hereafter relied solely upon Royal prerogative. 153  As Glyndwr 
Williams has shown, the HBC’s response to this setback was to defend itself by shrouding 
its operations in secrecy for almost half a century.154  The Company did not publish 
accounts of its explorations, cartographic material, or names of shareholders, kept copies 
of the Company’s Charter strictly within the London Executive Committee, and never 
floated its shares on the open market during this period.155 At a time when the EIC, Royal 
African Company, Levant Company, and South Sea Company were targeted by anti-
monopoly proponents, the HBC remained conspicuously devoid of criticism until the 
1740s.156 Extreme secrecy, however, ultimately became the catalyst for an attack on the 
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Company. The campaign stemmed from the agitations of Arthur Dobbs, the Surveyor-
General of Ireland, who had convinced the Admiralty to send an expedition to find the 
Northwest Passage in 1741.157 After the failure of the voyage, Dobbs condemned the 
HBC’s lack of assistance in the endeavour and succeeded in instigating an official inquiry 
into the handling of the expedition. Dobbs used the inquiry to accuse the HBC of making 
enormous profits and by deliberately limiting the fur trade for its own benefit.158 With the 
support of merchants in Bristol, Glasgow, Liverpool, and London, Dobbs formed a North 
West Committee in 1747 that advocated a free trade to Hudson’s Bay by emphasising 
that such was the right of all Englishmen.159  
To meet the mounting challenge, the HBC bypassed the inquiry and focused on 
directly lobbying each MP by issuing each member a pamphlet that exposed the vast 
exaggerations that critics had made of the Company’s profits and prospects for trade 
expansion.160  This strategy proved remarkably effective in light of the considerable 
respectability that the Company had built within the City of London, principally derived 
from the Company’s financial prudence.161 In 1749, the Company successfully defeated 
the motion to have its Charter revoked by a majority of two to one, as the House rallied 
behind the defence that a chartered company was the most effective way in which to 
finance the necessary fortifications in Hudson’s Bay, rather than burdening the public 
coffers with this expense.162 The HBC was not the only chartered company that was 
compelled to stave off a mid-century assault on its exclusive privileges. In 1750 the Royal 
African Company was dissolved and three years later the Charter of the Levant Company 
was revised.163 These mid-century campaigns, however, reflected a shift towards more 
co-ordinated efforts against chartered monopolies in British overseas trade. Indeed, 
Williams has shown that many of the participants in the campaign against the Royal 
African Company were also part of the campaign against the HBC. John Hardman, a 
Liverpool merchant, was one of the leading figures of the Royal African Company 
campaign and became a member of Dobbs’ North West Committee, as did many others 
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whom were active in the slave trade. 164  Anti-monopoly campaigns were not only 
beginning to be linked to one other but were increasingly co-ordinated by provincial 
mercantile interests, especially those from Liverpool, Bristol, and Glasgow.  
In the 1812 debate over the EIC’s Charter, provincial merchants and manufacturers 
succeeded in opening up the India trade. Compared to the mid-eighteenth campaigns, the 
provincial involvement in 1812 was more organised and drew upon a far wider spectrum 
of support. Liverpool once again led the campaign but the deputation that was sent to 
London comprised additional representatives from Belfast, Birmingham, Bristol, Dudley, 
Glasgow, Greenock, Hull, Manchester, Newcastle, Plymouth, and Sheffield.165 Anthony 
Webster has argued that while the provincial campaign pushed George Rose, the Vice 
President of the Board of Trade into action, the EIC’s monopoly was curtailed in an effort 
to maintain domestic stability, as an open India trade was perceived by the British 
government as a solution to inflationary pressures that were partly brought about by the 
disruption of the supply of raw materials from the United States.166  More recently, 
however, Yukihisa Kumagai has maintained that provincial merchants and manufacturers 
played a more crucial role in the opening of the India trade than Webster originally 
thought.167 
Despite the highly effective campaign launched against the EIC in 1811-3, the HBC 
once again remained beyond the anti-monopolists’ gaze. Lessons had been learned from 
Dobbs’ campaign. In addition to maintaining the Company’s financial competency, the 
HBC Committee had recognised the benefits of publishing information about the natural 
environment of Hudson’s Bay. This practice allowed the Company to appear as a patron 
of the Enlightenment, which was further supported by the Company’s blossoming 
relationship with the Royal Society that was largely brokered by Samuel Wegg, a member 
of the Committee from 1760 and Governor between 1782 and 1799.168 By the end of the 
eighteenth century, the HBC had thus neutralised the most damaging criticism that had 
propelled Dobbs’ attempt to end the Company’s Charter. Adam Smith’s favourable 
portrayal of the Company’s management and his deduction that Dobbs’ claims about the 
Company’s excessive profits had been greatly overstated no doubt further assisted the 
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Company’s reputation. 169  As late as 1789, however, there were still those who 
contemplated the opening of the trade to Hudson’s Bay. In that year, a treatise entitled 
‘Considerations Respecting a Free Trade to Hudson’s Bay’ was sent to William Pitt the 
Younger, which both criticised the conduct of the HBC and claimed that it was absurd 
that many of the Company’s furs were transported to China by way of the overland route 
through Russia.170  
The continuance of the HBC’s Charter was also enabled by the absence of any 
requirement to petition Parliament at regular intervals for a renewal of the Company’s 
privileges and the fact that the Company did not require financial assistance from the 
government. Yet, it was also because the NWC failed to tap into popular anti-monopoly 
sentiment within Britain. The NWC were ‘free traders’ and yet they did not attempt to 
attach themselves to the buoyant and highly successful campaign that had played a 
significant part in ending the EIC’s monopoly of trade in the Indian Ocean in 1813. 
Considering that the NWC operated a more substantial trade than the HBC and had 
greatly surpassed its rival’s achievements in exploration, the Montreal traders certainly 
had the ammunition with which to launch a devastating critique of the London Company. 
The Canada merchants, however, never fully committed themselves to ending the 
Company’s monopoly, and instead tried to lease transit rights through Hudson’s Bay, gain 
control of the chartered company by purchasing sufficient stock, and by even attempting 
to acquire a Charter of their own. These reasons help to explain why the HBC retained its 
Charter but they cannot explain how the Company was granted a de facto monopoly of 
the fur trade in 1821. As the trading arm of the EIC was dismembered and the Company 
completed its metamorphosis from trader to sovereign, the HBC acquired a merchant 
kingdom of ice and snow that stretched from Hudson’s Bay to the shores of the Pacific 
Ocean, and in which it claimed sovereignty over thousands of Aboriginal peoples. The 
strengthening of a chartered company at a time of growing opposition to such institutions 
requires explanation.  
Peter Cain and Antony Hopkins ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ thesis provides such an 
explanation.171 The central premise of Cain and Hopkins’ hypothesis is that rich and 
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influential merchants, bankers, insurers, and shipping magnates within the City of London 
were granted access to ruling circles so that the huge resources of the financial elite could 
be harnessed to fund the defence of the Hanoverian dynasty and to help the aristocracy 
modernise their agricultural assets. Trade and finance were considered ‘gentlemanly’ 
occupations as they enabled a similar lifestyle to that of the landed interest.172 Overseas 
markets were the forte of the gentlemanly capitalist and so they used their connections to 
elite circles to guide and shape British imperial policy. When the HBC-NWC union is 
considered in relation to this concept, Ellice emerges as the archetypal gentlemanly 
capitalist through his guiding of imperial policy to suit his own commercial interests. 
Bathurst’s receptiveness to Ellice’s scheme provides a good example of the government 
formulating imperial policy with cues from the gentlemanly capitalist group. Even the 
HBC’s survival during the Dobbs’ Affair could be considered a manifestation of 
gentlemanly capitalism in light of the crucial role played by the Company’s financial 
respectability within the City of London. 
Gentlemanly capitalism provides a useful device with which to explain how the 
HBC was, in effect, granted a monopoly of the British fur trade in 1821 but the concept 
is not without its flaws. Webster has noted that the thesis works better when applied after 
the mid-nineteenth century, as before this time ‘the City’ was subject to major 
disturbances that were brought about by the French Wars and the social implications of 
industrialisation. 173  Instability sowed division amongst metropolitan merchants and 
financiers, as well as with overseas associates, as is evident in the 1813 EIC Charter 
debate and the abortive attempt to establish a London-based joint stock central bank for 
India in 1833-7.174 Cain and Hopkins have also been criticised for their portrayal of links 
between industry and finance. Rather than their depiction of distant and side-lined 
industrialists, it has been argued that the relationship between industry and finance was a 
more cooperative and complementary one.175 Indeed, Huw Bowen has revealed that the 
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Press, 2006), pp. 160-1. 
174 See Webster, ‘Political Economy of Trade Liberalization’, pp. 404-19; and Anthony Webster, ‘The 
Strategies and Limits of Gentlemanly Capitalism: The London East India Agency Houses, Provincial 
Commercial Interests, and the Evolution of British Economic Policy in South and South East Asia 1800-
50’, The Economic History Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (2006), pp. 743-64. 
175 Daunton, M. J., ‘“Gentlemanly Capitalism” and British Industry 1820-1914’, Past and Present, No. 122 
(1989), pp. 119-58; Webster, Rise of the British Empire, pp. 157-8; and Anthony Webster, The Twilight 
of the East India Company: The Evolution of Anglo-Asian Commerce and Politics, 1790-1860 
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2009), especially pp. 154-5, 162. 
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EIC, one of the hives of gentlemanly capitalism, fostered connections with provincial 
manufacturers in order to source profitable export commodities.176  
The conversion of gentlemanly capitalists to the mantra of ‘free trade’ is viewed by 
Cain and Hopkins as a central reason for Britain’s adoption of laissez-faire economics 
from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, not least because they were the main 
beneficiaries of trade liberalisation.177 Britain’s transition from mercantilism to free trade 
was not a smooth process however. In fact, despite the rise of free trade ideology from 
the late eighteenth century onwards, it was not until the 1840s that Britain adopted liberal 
trade policies following the Repeal of the Corn Laws (1846) and Navigation Acts 
(1849). 178  In 1821, therefore, Britain remained a highly protectionist nation; the 
liberalisation of the India and China trades in 1813 and 1833 respectively were more to 
do with the exceptional situation of the EIC rather than symbolising a notable slide 
towards free trade policies. 179  As the extension of the HBC’s Charter shows, the 
mercantilist system was very much alive and well in 1821. The HBC and the fur trade 
remained a bastion of mercantilism even as ‘Free Trade’ matured into a quasi-religion of 
Victorian Britain.180 It was not until 1870 in the Deed of Surrender that the Company 
relinquished the rights encapsulated within its Charter to the British crown, which was in 
turn handed to the fledging Dominion of Canada.  
There is also the question of why monopoly was deemed the appropriate solution 
to the disturbances in the fur trade. When asked whether the HBC ought to have a 
monopoly of the fur trade by the 1857 Parliamentary Committee, Ellice responded: 
If you were to allow competition to take place again in the trade of the north 
west territories, the competition might last eight or ten years, and the trade 
would be utterly destroyed; and the Indians would be reduced to a state of 
want and starvation of which one can give no description.181 
Ellice thus concluded that the peace and stability that the fur trade brought to British 
North America was only maintained so long as a single company had a monopoly of the 
fur trade. Indeed, from 1821 through to the early 1840s, the HBC introduced a series of 
                                                 
176 H. V. Bowen, ‘Sinews of Trade and Empire: The Supply of Commodity Exports to the East India 
Company during the Late Eighteenth Century’, The Economic History Review, Vol. 55, No. 3 (2002), 
pp. 466-86. 
177 See P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, ‘The Political Economy of British Overseas Expansion, 1750-1914’, 
The Economic History Review, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1980), pp. 463-90; and Webster, Rise of the British 
Empire, p. 151. 
178 Trentmann, Free Trade Nation, pp. 2, 5. 
179 Cain and Hopkins, ‘The Old Colonial System’, p. 522. 
180 See Trentmann, Free Trade Nation. 
181 Report from the Select Committee on the Hudson’s Bay Company (P. P. 1857, Vol. XV.1), p. 342. 
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conservation measures in an effort to restore the beaver population. 182  As Sheilagh 
Ogilvie has argued, the central reason why medieval and early-modern European states 
granted exclusive commercial rights and privileges to merchant guilds and chartered 
companies was because these organisations solved particular problems encountered by 
rulers.183 This hypothesis holds true in the case of the HBC. Further privileges were 
granted to the HBC in 1821 because the Company was viewed as the most effective means 
through which to regulate the fur trade.  
VI.   Conclusion 
The view from the London Customs’ House has largely been neglected by historians of 
the fur trade, despite the usefulness of the quantitative data that is contained within the 
trade records. This analysis of the customs’ ledgers has revealed the distinctive attributes 
of key fur-trading regions, such as the scale and diversity of the Montreal fur trade, the 
predominance of the Anglo-American deer trade, and the modest yet stable beaver and 
marten trade of the HBC. The study has also shown the strength of an integrated approach 
to Britain’s fur trade, a methodology that provides an authoritative explanation for the 
decline of the Montreal fur trade and the HBC-NWC union in 1821. The merger is made 
all the more curious by the fact that the fur trade of Montreal was a more substantial trade 
than that of the HBC and remained so even after the considerable disturbances to the 
NWC’s operations. This finding yet again shows the importance of developments across 
the North-Atlantic World as it emerges that the NWC was, in many ways, as much the 
unfortunate victim of London’s ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ as it was the War of 1812 or 
internal power struggles. Out-manoeuvred by metropolitan forces, the ‘free’ Montreal 
traders capitulated to the orthodox mercantilist philosophy that was embodied in the 
persistence of the HBC. As Washington Irving, American poet and author, later noted in 
1836, ‘the feudal state of Fort William is at an end… the lords of the lakes and forests 
have passed away; and the hospitable magnates of Montreal—where are they!’.184 In their 
                                                 
182 These efforts included restrictions on the use of traps, maximum quotas of beaver, and an emphasis on 
other types of fur. See Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 469-76, 494-6. 
183 Sheilagh Ogilvie, Institutions and European Trade: Merchant Guilds, 1000-1800 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
184 Washington Irving, Astoria, or, Anecdotes of an Enterprize Beyond the Rocky Mountains, New Edition 
edited by Richard Dilworth Rust (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), p. 13. 
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place stood ‘the little emperor’ George Simpson, under the watchful eye of Fenchurch 
Street’s ‘gentlemanly capitalists’.185  
                                                 
185 Stephen R. Bown, Merchant Kings: When Companies Ruled the World 1600-1900 (London: Conway, 
2010), pp. 195-37; and Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, p. 475. 
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3 
The Supply of Commodity Exports to the Hudson’s 
Bay Company 
 
The commodities demanded by Aboriginal peoples in exchange for furs were wide-
ranging and had to be adapted to the tastes of these disparate communities. This meant 
that the collection of market information on the items that were favoured by Aboriginal 
peoples was essential to the successful prosecution of the trade and constituted a form of 
‘insider knowledge’ that was not easily accessible to outsiders. Understanding and 
satisfying the desires of Aboriginal consumers further increased the highly specialised 
nature of the fur trade and raised barriers to new entrants into the trade. Extant studies of 
the fur trade have shed light on the process of exchange between western fur traders and 
Aboriginal communities in North America, and have considered in some depth the 
political and cultural impact of the fur trade on the everyday lives of Aboriginal peoples. 
Analyses of archaeological sites, explorer journals, and trading ledgers have established 
the extensive range of commodities demanded by Aboriginal communities. Regional and 
inter-tribal disparities in material culture have been explored, as have the specific 
meanings that were attached to a number of the imported commodities.1 Further research 
would add much to these explorations but there is one notable gap in our understanding 
of the barter economy of the fur trade: the specific origin of the commodities that western 
traders used in their exchanges with Aboriginal peoples.2  
                                                 
1 For instance see: (on glass beads) Shepard Krech, ‘The Early Fur Trade in the Northwestern Subarctic: 
The Kutchin and the Trade in Beads’, in Bruce G. Trigger, Toby Morantz, and Louise Dechene, eds., 
Le Castor Fait Tout: Selected Papers of the Fifth North American Fur Trade Conference, 1985 
(Montreal: Lake St. Louis Historical Society, 1987), pp. 236-77; and (on the inferred meanings attached 
to pipe tomahawks and silver ornaments) Wilcomb E. Washburn, ‘Symbol, Utility, and Aesthetics in 
the Indian Fur Trade’, in Minnesota Historical Society, Aspects of the Fur Trade: Selected Papers of 
the 1965 North American Fur Trade Conference (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1967), pp. 50-
4. 
2 There are two commodities whose origins of manufacture have been considered in some depth: silver 
ornaments and textiles (namely blankets). For silver see: Ramsay Traquair, ‘Montreal and the Indian 
Trade Silver’, Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1938), pp. 1-8. For textiles see: Cory 
Willmott, ‘From Stoud to Strouds: The Hidden History of a British Fur Trade Textile’, Textile History, 
Vol. 36, No. 2 (2005), pp. 196-243. 
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This chapter addresses this gap through a detailed analysis of the commodity 
exports of the HBC between 1783 and 1821, a study that reveals the lengths to which the 
Company had to go in order to satisfy the needs and desires of their Aboriginal customers. 
More significantly, such an analysis helps us to understand the role of the HBC in the 
British domestic economy during a period punctuated by the severe dislocation in 
international markets as a result of the Napoleonic Wars, and one in which there was a 
very significant growth in the volume of British overseas trade. Recent studies have 
shown that the EIC played a more significant role in stimulating the metropolitan and 
wider British economy than historians had previously thought.3  In particular, H. V. 
Bowen has argued that the EIC’s export trade supported a range of traditional industries 
which faltered in the late eighteenth century, namely the copper mines of Cornwall and 
South Wales, and the West Country and East Anglian textile industries.4  While the 
contribution of the EIC to the domestic economy has been reassessed, the influence of 
other ‘great’ chartered companies on the British economy in the early modern period 
remains largely unknown. While it was a smaller concern than the EIC, the HBC also 
made regular purchases of commodities for trade, as well as for the provision of its 
overseas servants. What was the scale and scope of these purchases? From where and 
from whom did the HBC purchase its commodities? Did the HBC forge links with 
provincial industries that were comparable to those established by the EIC?  
In order to answer these questions and uncover the impact of the HBC on the British 
economy the chapter draws upon trading ledgers contained within the archives of the 
HBC. These records list the purchase of commodities and services from an extensive 
number and range of tradespeople.5 Analysis of the accounts is supplemented by evidence 
from the Company’s minute books, correspondence, and British trade directories. These 
primary sources show that the HBC provided a regular and reliable source of income to 
a large number and wide range of tradespeople, especially those in London. The 
Company’s influence also extended beyond the metropolis and into provincial regions. 
Above all, it appears that British merchants and manufacturers were content with the 
                                                 
3 In particular, see Maxine Berg, ‘From Imitation to Invention: Creating Commodities in Eighteenth-
Century Britain’, The Economic History Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2002), pp. 1-30; Maxine Berg, ‘In 
Pursuit of Luxury: Global Origins of British Consumer Goods in the Eighteenth Century’, Past and 
Present, No. 182 (2004), pp. 85-142; Maxine Berg, Luxury and Pleasure in Eighteenth-Century Britain 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Bowen, ‘Sinews’, pp. 466-86; and Bowen, Business of 
Empire. 
4 Bowen, ‘Sinews’, pp. 466-86. 
5 See HBCA, A.25/3-5, Merchandise Exported, 1778-1823.  
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organisation of the British fur trade as there is no evidence that they sought to attack the 
HBC’s Charter during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, or prevent its 
merger with the NWC in 1821. This lack of opposition helped the HBC to maintain its 
Charter and reduced the political difficulties involved in granting the Company a de facto 
monopoly of the fur trade. Indeed, provincial firms played a major role in the 1813 and 
1833 campaigns against the renewal of the EIC’s trading privileges and their absence in 
the case of the HBC reaffirms how important their contribution was to the expansion of 
‘free trade’.  
The chapter is structured into three parts. The first establishes the scale of the 
Company’s commodity export trade by comparing the real values listed in the Company’s 
accounts with the official value of exports to Hudson’s Bay as contained in the British 
customs’ records. This analysis shows that the Company’s commodity export trade 
roughly doubled over the period but that this growth was far from uniform. Second, the 
methodology that was used to categorise the purchases contained in the Company’s 
ledgers, and the range of trading commodities purchased is explored alongside the ways 
in which Aboriginal peoples used these articles. It is revealed that the Company’s 
purchases were predominately for consumer goods, especially textiles, alcohol, and 
tobacco. The third and final section analyses the relationships that the Company 
established with the suppliers of its trading commodities and uncovers over-arching 
trends in the duration and distribution of the Company’s supply networks. It is shown that 
the Company provided regular, reliable custom to a wide range of tradespeople and that 
the majority of the Company’s purchases of trading commodities was heavily focused on 
London, although the Company did support a number of provincial industries when it 
proved expedient to do so. While sources are scarce, it is also revealed that the London 
Houses which supplied the NWC also purchased a number of their trading commodities 
from the same suppliers as the HBC. 
I.   The Scale of Commodity Exports 
The Company’s account books suggest that between 1783 and 1821 the HBC’s 
commodity export purchases averaged £30,899 each year.6 This figure was over 40 times 
smaller than the average £1.3 million annually exported by the EIC in 1795-9.7 The 
                                                 
6 HBCA, A.25/3-5, Merchandise Exported, 1778-1823. This figure includes shipping costs. 
7 Bowen, ‘Sinews’, p. 470. 
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British fur trade — whether it was the trade from Hudson’s Bay or Montreal — was, 
therefore, a minor market for British merchants and manufactures. The small scale of the 
fur trade, together with its limited potential for growth, was a key reason why there were 
no calls to reform the trade during this period. It should be reaffirmed, however, that 
British merchants and manufacturers had attempted to open the trade to Hudson’s Bay 
during the Dobb’s Affair of the mid-eighteenth century, so it was not the case that such 
groups did not care about their access to the fur trade.8 Rather, the British acquisition of 
Canada in 1763 brought a degree of trade liberalisation to the fur trade as it granted British 
merchants and manufacturers another way in which to access the trade. Furthermore, it 
was the ending of the EIC’s monopoly of the India and China trades that most captivated 
the British mercantile community at this time. The small scale of the fur trade, the fact 
there was competition between the Hudson’s Bay and Canadian fur trades, and the 
perceived riches to be gained from opening the India and China trades, largely explains 
why British merchants and manufacturers did not attempt to challenge the HBC’s Charter 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  
Despite the fact that the HBC’s trade was small and vastly over-shadowed by its 
counterpart on Leadenhall Street, the Company was well-integrated into the metropolitan 
economy and provided a wide number of tradespeople with a reliable and secure source 
of income. Figure 3.1 shows the HBC’s annual purchases of provisions, trading goods, 
and other services in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Considering the 
disruption that the French Revolutionary, Napoleonic, and 1812 Wars caused to 
international trade, the Company’s trade was remarkably stable; there were few years of 
depression. Only 1804 and 1811-2 stand out as years when significant decreases in the 
value of exported merchandise occurred since declines in 1817 and 1821 were in the midst 
of years that were marked by exceptional growth.9  Unlike in the War of American 
Independence, when a French naval expedition destroyed York and Churchill Factories, 
Hudson’s Bay was not subject to an armed confrontation during the post-1783 period.10 
The remote location of Hudson’s Bay therefore explains why there was no considerable 
fall in the Company’s trade. 
There are, however, a number of potential limitations of relying on conclusions 
drawn from the Company’s account books. The ledgers recorded the real value of the 
                                                 
8 Williams, ‘Critics’, p. 159. 
9 See Figure 3.1. 
10 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 84-7. 
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purchased commodities and so cannot be used to provide an accurate view of how the 
scale of the Company’s trade changed over time. Rapid inflation in the Napoleonic War 
era means that apparently stable levels of purchases in the Company’s records may 
actually represent a reduction in real terms. While the Company did not record volumes, 
analysis of the ‘official value’ of merchandise exported to Hudson’s Bay, as recorded in 
the British customs’ records, can be used to determine the impact of inflation on the 
Company’s accounts. Unfortunately, the aggregate official values for Hudson’s Bay in 
the 1780s and 1790s are incomplete. For instance, in 1783 exports of key commodities 
such as blankets, guns, and iron were not listed in the customs’ ledgers, yet they were by 
1821. Nonetheless, the official value of specific commodities that were routinely recorded 
in the custom’s records can provide an indication as to the extent of the omissions.  
Table 3.1 compares the percentage change in the HBC’s average annual purchases 
of commodity exports with the percentage change in the average annual official value of 
exports to Hudson’s Bay, in addition to, the percentage change in the official value of 
gunpowder and woollen long cloth exported (two commodities that were regularly listed 
in the customs’ records). The Company’s trade clearly expanded in 1788-92 but the 
customs’ records greatly over-estimate this growth. The increase in the official value of 
gunpowder (79 per cent) and woollen long cloth (60 per cent) is closer to the Company’s 
records (59 per cent) than the customs’ figures (172 per cent).11 The reason for this 
discrepancy is because new commodities were being added to the customs’ ledgers so 
that they were becoming more accurate, although there would always be a degree of 
variation between the two sets of sources as — unlike the customs’ ledgers — the 
Company’s records include expenditure relating to ‘shipping’, packing, warehousing, 
docking, and lightering. 12  During the Napoleonic War period, the Company’s trade 
evidently declined as the real values in the Company’s records were largely stagnant.13 
In addition, the customs’ records are more accurate after 1800, and the aggregate value 
declined by 29 per cent in 1798-1802 and by a further 32 per cent in 1803-7.14 Despite 
the return to peace and the resultant fall in prices, it is apparent that the Company’s trade 
almost doubled in 1818-21 as the Company’s purchases increased by 40 per cent at the 
                                                 
11 See Table 3.1. 
12 Shipping includes anchors, masts, oars, pitch, rope, ship builders, ship carvers, ship chandlers, ship 
glaziers and painters, and tar. 
13 See Table 3.1.  
14 See Table 3.1. 
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end of period.15 The official values show that on average each year twice as much woollen 
long cloth was exported in 1818-21 (£2,964) than in 1783-7 (£1,496), and for the same 
period exports of gunpowder tripled.16 It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the 
Company’s trade roughly doubled between 1783-7 and 1818-21, and that most of this 
increase occurred at the end of the period.  
II.   The Range of Commodity Exports 
In order to examine the wide array of commodities that the Company exported to 
Hudson’s Bay, the Company’s transactions with tradespeople need to be categorised. This 
is a problematic process due to the diverse range of tradespeople involved and the various 
terminologies that were used to describe them, although there were a few instances where 
a specific commodity was listed rather than a tradesperson, such as in the case of kettles 
and powder horns. In total around 443 tradespeople are named in the Company’s ledgers 
of ‘merchandise exported’ over the period of this study, and they consisted of a wide array 
of occupations.17 To circumvent these challenges and collate the numerous occupations 
into a more manageable form, this analysis has grouped the transactions into various 
categories. In the first instance, this was into three key groupings that focused on a 
commodity rather than an occupation: trading commodities, provisions, and services. The 
distinction between trading commodities and provisions was partially determined by the 
findings of previous studies of the trade between Aboriginal peoples and European fur 
traders, as well as the Company’s own delineation of the two groupings that was present 
for the years 1799-1809, 1811-3, and 1821.18 ‘Trading commodities’ includes those items 
that were used for trade with Aboriginal peoples, although it should be noted that it is 
possible that the Company also included some items that were purchasable by the 
                                                 
15 See Table 3.1. 
16 See Table 3.1. 
17 The occupations included: anchor-smiths, armourers, baize factors, bead merchants, bell founders, biscuit 
makers, blanket makers, blockmakers, book sellers, box makers, braziers, brewers, butchers, button 
makers, cabinet makers, chart and map sellers, cheesemongers, chemists, chinamen, clothiers, coal 
merchants, comb makers, coopers, coppersmiths, cutlers, distillers, druggists, dyers, flour factors, garter 
and lace makers, grocers, gunpowder merchants, gunsmiths, haberdashers, hardwaremen, hat makers, 
Irish factors, ironmongers, lacemen, lead and shot merchants, linen drapers, mast makers, mealmen, oar 
makers, oilmen, opticians, pewterers, plumasiers (sellers of feathers), ribbon manufacturers, rope 
makers, rum brokers, sail makers, seed merchants, ship builders, shoemakers, slop sellers, stationers, 
tallow chandlers, timber merchants, tobacco-pipe makers, tobacconists, trunk makers, warehousemen, 
and wine merchants. 
18 See for instance Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, especially pp. 69-105; and HBCA, A.25/4, Merchandise 
Exported, 1800-12, fo. 2. 
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Company’s servants in Hudson’s Bay within this category. ‘Provisions’ includes those 
commodities that were for the use of the Company’s servants and ‘services’ consists of 
the necessary activities that were required for the export of commodities such as shipping, 
storage, and packing. 19  These groupings necessarily have limitations. Alcohol and 
tobacco, two commodities that were of vital importance to the trade with Aboriginal 
peoples, were also purchased by the Company’s servants from the Company’s stocks. 
The Company’s accounts always list tobacco as a trading commodity, but purchases of 
rum are noted as both a provision and a commodity for trade. For this study, tobacco, 
brandy, and rum have been classed as ‘trading commodities’ whereas other liquors, such 
as beer and wine have been categorised as provisions.  
Figure 3.2 shows the Company’s annual purchases of trading commodities, 
provisions, and services for export to Hudson’s Bay. It is clear that most of the purchases 
were of trading commodities and that they increased substantially over the period, 
especially after 1814. Purchases of provisions rose notably between 1791 and 1810, 
decreasing thereafter until another surge in 1817-20.20 Service costs exhibited a similar 
trend to that of provisions.21 The annual averages contained in Table 3.2 shed further light 
on the scale of the Company’s export trade. On average each year, 55 per cent (£16,644) 
of the Company’s export purchases were on trading commodities, 29 per cent (£8,743) 
on provisions, and 16 per cent (£4,735) on services.22 While looking in-depth at the 
provisions and services supplied to the Company would no doubt be useful, the remaining 
parts of this section focuses on the trading commodities purchased by the Company.  
Table 3.3 breaks down the Company’s purchases of trading commodities into 
‘consumer’ and ‘producer’ goods. Consumer goods were those items that were for 
                                                 
19 The service category has its limitations as roughly about one-eighth of the purchases from ‘coopers’ was 
listed as a trading commodity and the rest as provisions. Furthermore, purchases of empty rundlets, 
bottles, and kegs were generally listed as a trading commodity in the account books but analysis from 
the Company’s minute books suggest that this distinction was not so clear cut. At a meeting at Hudson’s 
Bay House on 19 January 1785 the Committee ‘resolved that for the easier conveyance of provisions 
inland the Beef and Port be packed in Rundlets of 15 pieces each, and that twenty such Rundlets be 
provided’.19 Rundlets were purchased by Aboriginal peoples at the Company’s posts to hold small 
quantities of alcohol to ease transportation but they were clearly also used by the Company to transport 
provisions. It was therefore deemed preferable that such items be placed in an altogether separate 
category. See HBCA, A.1/46, London Minute Book, 1783-8, fo. 40. Another such instance is noted in 
the record of the Committee meeting held on 5 April 1786, during which it was resolved that ‘Twelve 
Rundlets of Beef, nine of pork and thirty of flour be packed in London for Inland service at Albany and 
the same number of each for Moose to forward the conveyance of provisions to the most distant places’. 
See HBCA, A.1/46, London Minute Book, 1783-8, fo. 80. 
20 See Figure 3.2. 
21 See Figure 3.2. 
22 See Table 3.2. 
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decorative, or recreational purposes. Producer goods were articles that were used for 
hunting, food preparation, and other work-related activities. As the table shows, the 
majority of the purchases were for consumer goods (71 per cent), while around 30 per 
cent of the purchases were for producer goods.23 While purchases of producer goods 
roughly tripled from an annual average of £1,754 in 1783-7 to £5,689 in 1818-21, the 
exports of consumer goods more than quadrupled between 1783-7 (£3,696) and 1818-21 
(£20,202).24  
By far the most significant export over the period was textiles and clothing. A total 
of £305,202 was spent on such articles, which accounts for 67 per cent of the consumer 
goods purchased for trade, and just over half (£155,519) of this was made up of cloth.25 
Included in the cloth category were purchases from clothiers, cloth factors, cloth drawers, 
setters, and dyers. While the Company’s accounts do not list the specific fabrics that the 
Company purchased, the primary textile used in the fur trade was a coarse type of woollen 
broadcloth sometimes referred to as ‘strouds’. 26  The Company largely purchased 
                                                 
23 See Table 3.3. 
24 Calculated using the data in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 that shows the Company’s purchases of the six most 
important consumer and producer goods.  
25 See Table 3.3. 
26 See Willmott, ‘British Fur Trade Textile’, pp. 196-243. 
Table 3.2. HBC’s average annual purchases of trading commodities, provisions, and 
services for export to Hudson’s Bay by type, 1783-1821 (in £). 
 Trading 
Commodities 
Percentage 
Change 
(%) 
Provisions Percentage 
Change 
(%) 
Services Percentage 
Change 
(%) 
     1783-7 
     1788-92 
     1793-7 
     1798-1802 
     1803-7 
     1808-12 
     1813-7 
     1818-21 
7,850 
13,212 
15,767 
16,898 
15,905 
15,187 
19,118 
29,219 
 
+68 
+19 
+7 
-6 
-5 
+26 
+53 
5,762 
6,825 
8,773 
11,635 
10,378 
10,554 
7,135 
8,882 
 
+18 
+29 
+33 
-11 
+2 
-32 
+24 
3,038 
3,144 
4,316 
6,040 
6,643 
5,442 
4,171 
5,088 
 
+3 
+37 
+40 
+10 
-18 
-23 
+22 
Overall 
Average 
16,644  8,743  4,735  
Source: HBCA, A.25/3-5, Merchandise Exported, 1778-1823. 
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unfinished white woollen cloth that had to be dyed, the staple colours of which were dark 
blue and red but small amounts of emerald green, yellow, and light blue were also used.27 
These colours had significant spiritual meaning for many Aboriginal communities and so 
the intensity of the dye was a critical component in the types of textiles that they 
purchased.28 Blankets accounted for a further 20 per cent (£61,824) of the textile and 
                                                 
27 HBCA, A.1/46, London Minute Book, 1783-8, fo. 11; and Willmott, ‘British Fur Trade Textile’, pp. 223-
4. 
28 Harold Tichenor, The Collector's Guide to Point Blankets of the Hudson’s Bay Company and Other 
Companies Trading in North America (Bowen Island, BC: Cinetel Film Productions, 2002), p. 8. 
Table 3.3. Composition of the HBC’s overall purchases of trading commodities, 
1783-1821 (in £). 
Consumer Goods Total Producer Goods Total 
Metalware 
     Total a 
Textiles & Clothing  
     Blankets 
     Cloth b 
     Haberdashery c 
     Slops 
     Other d 
     Total 
Other Luxuries 
     Alcohol e 
     Glass Beads 
     Tobacco 
     Other f 
     Total 
 
4,567 (1%) 
 
61,824 (20%) 
155,519 (51%) 
10,833 (4%) 
56,379 (18%) 
20,647 (7%) 
305,202 (67%) 
 
78,066 (54%) 
6,393 (4%) 
44,989 (31%) 
14,512 (10%) 
143,960 (32%) 
Armaments  
     Gunpowder 
     Guns 
     Lead & Shot 
     Other g 
     Total 
Metalware  
     Iron h 
     Kettles 
     Knives & Hardware 
     Total 
Lines & Twine 
     Total 
 
38,455 (39%) 
40,605 (41%) 
19,143 (19%) 
873 (1%) 
99,076 (54%) 
 
33,894 (59%) 
13,152 (23%) 
10,465 (17%) 
57,511 (31%) 
 
28,221 (15%) 
Overall Total 184,808 (29%)  453,729 (71%) 
Notes: The percentages included alongside each sub-category relate to the overall purchases 
of the respective category. The percentages stated in the category totals correlate to the 
overall total; 
a contains copper, cutlery, medals, pewter, silver, tin, and tinplates; 
b includes dyeing costs that total £25,730; 
c consists of buttons, crape, ribbons, and silk; 
d comprises flannel, hosiery, lace, linen, and silk handkerchiefs; 
e includes products of ‘distillers’, English brandy, and malt;  
f includes cards, combs, earthenware, feathers, glass, hats, leather straps, shoes, tobacco 
pipes, ‘toys’, trunks, and vermillion; 
g consists of gun flints, powder horns, and swords; 
h also includes transactions with ‘braziers’ (£3,418). 
Source: HBCA, A.25/3-5, Merchandise Exported, 1778-1823. 
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clothing purchases.29 That blankets came second to woollen cloth is perhaps surprising as 
the sub-arctic Cree, one of the Company’s primary customers, supposedly preferred 
blankets to broadcloth.30 These blankets were usually made out of wool and had one or 
more coloured stripes near each end.31 The Company began selling woollen blankets to 
Aboriginal peoples as early as 1682 but it was not until 1779 that the well-known ‘point 
blanket’ became a staple of the Company’s trade.32 Unlike other woollen blankets, the 
point blanket had one to four short threads of wool yarn woven or sewn into the corner of 
the blanket, and these lines or ‘points’ were intended to identify the size and thus the 
value of the blanket.33  
The next most significant item in the textiles and clothing category was ‘slops’, 
which comprised 18 per cent (£56,379) of the textiles and clothing purchased.34. Slops 
was a term used to refer to ready-made clothing, and included coats, lined and unlined 
jackets, breeches, trousers, shirts, frocks, and handkerchiefs.35 The extent of the exports 
of slops is substantial and was rather unexpected. None of the detailed studies of the 
HBC’s exchanges with Aboriginal peoples in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries have suggested such significant use of ready-made clothing in the trade.36 Cory 
Willmott has suggested that the NWC was, by the early eighteenth century, making ready-
made garments for the trade from imported woollen textiles.37 In his ambitious study of 
eighteenth-century dress across the Atlantic World, Robert DuPlessis found that in the 
1720s and 1740s Aboriginal peoples supplied by a merchant in Pennsylvania and by 
French traders at Green Bay on the north-east edge of Lake Michigan increased the 
proportion of ready-made clothing that they traded.38 A similar trend has been observed 
in the deer trade conducted by Creek peoples in Georgia, South Carolina, and East and 
West Florida, particularly the popularity of ready-made shirts amongst Creek men.39 
Many of these slops were made out of cotton fabrics, and so, while DuPlessis maintains 
that woollens remained the primary textile intended for Aboriginal peoples in North 
                                                 
29 See Table. 3.3. 
30 Willmott, ‘British Fur Trade Textile’, p. 209. 
31 Tichenor, Point Blankets, p. 4. 
32 Ibid., p. 6. 
33 Ibid., pp. 4, 7. 
34 See Table 3.3. 
35 HBCA, A.1/46, London Minute Book, 1783-8, fos. 26, 88, 106.  
36 There are no mentions of ‘slops’ as an article of exchange in the two principal studies of the HBC’s fur 
trade. See Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea and Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade. 
37 Willmott, ‘British Fur Trade Textile’, p. 205. 
38 DuPlessis, The Material Atlantic, pp. 95-7, 115, 120. 
39 Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, p. 125. 
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America, he argues that these communities at least partially participated in the eighteenth-
century rise of cotton textiles across the Atlantic.40 Aboriginal peoples did not, however, 
necessarily use these items of clothing in the same way as Europeans. For instance, while 
shirts were commonly worn as an undergarment in Europe, DuPlessis finds that 
Aboriginal peoples in North America generally wore them over their dress as they wanted 
them greasy and water-resistant.41 Similarly, not all European apparel found ready appeal 
within Aboriginal communities in the Americas; the HBC stopped offering breeches as 
an item of trade in the early eighteenth century on account of poor demand, and several 
other indigenous groups shared this dislike of breeches.42 Of the remaining items in the 
textiles and clothing category, haberdashery made up 4 per cent (£10,833) of the 
purchases and included items such as buttons, crape, and ribbons, and the remaining 7 per 
cent (£20,647) consisted of items such as flannel, hosiery, lace, linen, and silk 
handkerchiefs. 43  
In his seminal study Indians and the Fur Trade (1974), Arthur Ray noted how the 
depletion of game resources and fur-bearing animals in the eastern portions of Hudson’s 
Bay forced many Aboriginal groups to increasingly turn to the use of European clothing 
materials. 44  This shift was partly out of economic necessity but the comfort and 
practicalities of quick-drying cotton over leather assisted the proliferation of European 
textiles.45 In addition, the bright colours of these imported textiles became very popular 
with Aboriginal peoples.46 The transition occurred most rapidly in the northeast where 
the weather was cooler and wetter than the parkland-grassland area to the southwest. The 
‘home guard Cree’ and other Aboriginal peoples who resided in close proximity to the 
Company’s posts and acted as a highly skilled form of labour for the acquisition of 
country provisions, were one such group that quickly became reliant on European textiles 
for their clothing as large game animals disappeared. In areas that were less depleted, 
blankets were more in demand than woollen cloth. The blankets were versatile items that 
could be placed over other garments during the winter for added warmth or could easily 
be repurposed into socks and mitten linings.47 Woollen cloth and haberdashery were also 
                                                 
40 DuPlessis, The Material Atlantic, p. 99. 
41 Ibid., p. 115. 
42 Ibid., pp. 106-7. 
43 See Table 3.3. 
44 Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade, especially pp. 79-81. 
45 Ibid., p. 81. 
46 Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, p. 123. 
47 Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade, p. 81. 
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commonly used by the Company’s tailors in Hudson’s Bay to make the trading coats that 
were gifted to Aboriginal chieftains.  
Other key items of trade included alcohol, tobacco, glass beads, and metallic 
ornaments. Alcohol made up 17 per cent (£78,066) of the overall exports of consumer 
goods and surpassed the total value of metalware purchased (Table 3.3).48 Overall, 12 per 
cent of the purchases contained in the Company’s accounts were for brandy, rum, or the 
produce of ‘distillers’. This amount is not, however, as high as might be expected. 
Alcohol was supposedly liberally supplied to Aboriginal communities during the intense 
competition between the HBC and NWC in the early nineteenth century.49 This low share 
of the Company’s exports to Hudson’s Bay may indicate that the Company did not 
substantially increase the volumes of alcohol sent to the Bay. This would not be entirely 
without precedent, as Carlos and Lewis have shown through their use of the Company’s 
post account books at York Factory, alcohol did not comprise a large proportion of the 
Company’s trade in the first three-quarters of the eighteenth century.50 They found that 
in 1720 only 5 per cent of the goods purchased by Aboriginal visitors to York Factory 
were for alcohol.51 There was an upward trend over the period however. In 1760, 20 per 
cent of the purchases were for alcohol, but from this peak the share of alcohol declined 
to 13 per cent in 1770.52 It should be reaffirmed, however, that the way alcohol was listed 
in the Company’s ledgers of ‘merchandise exported’ is particularly problematic. Some of 
the brandy, malt, rum, and products of distillers exported to Hudson’s Bay would have 
been purchased by the Company’s servants and added to their account with the Company. 
Even with this complication it is improbable that alcohol made up a greater part of the 
Company’s trade than it had in 1760. Indeed, if the £23,123 worth of beer and wine 
exports are added to that spent on brandy, distillers, malt, and rum, the total amount would 
only make up 15 per cent (£101,000) of the new calculated purchases of trading 
commodities (£662,000).53  
Most intriguing is that there were no purchases described as brandy or from a 
distiller after 1810. In addition, brandy is not mentioned in the London minute books after 
this date. The last entry to mention brandy was on 18 April 1810 when R. Dowding & 
                                                 
48 See Table 3.3. 
49 Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade, pp. 85-6, 155, 214. 
50 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, pp. 89-94. 
51 Ibid., pp. 82-3, 92. 
52 Ibid., pp. 82-3, 92. 
53 Using data from Tables 3.4 and 3.5. 
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Co. were ordered to ‘supply this Company with puncheons instead of Brandy Pipes for 
the English spirits exported this year to the Bay’.54 The Company did not cease to offer 
alcohol as an item of exchange but this final entry strongly suggests that the Company 
changed the type of alcohol that it made available for trade in Hudson’s Bay. Closer 
inspection of the accounts suggests that there was more rum purchased after 1810, and 
thus rum may have replaced brandy as the principal liquor supplied for the Company’s 
trade. The purchases of rum or those from rum brokers prior to this year were generally 
small. John Macfarlane & Co. provided £562 of rum in 1786 and J. & C. Cowell supplied 
£34 worth that same year. Coe & Co. supplied £3,729 worth of rum in 1794-1800 and a 
further £3,177 was provided by James Man & Son in 1801-10. If all of the entries that 
included rum in the 27 years before 1810 are totalled, the value comes to £9,769. 
Purchases from Graham, Simpson & Co. alone totalled £15,783 in the seven years 
between 1810-6, and an additional £10,043 was purchased from the rum merchants 
Webster, Simpson & Co. in 1817-21. Therefore, in the 12 years after 1809, twice the 
value of rum was supplied to the Company as had been in last 27 years.  
It appears, therefore, that in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the 
Company abandoned its long-established practice of supplying brandy for the trade. 
Indeed the use of ‘English brandy’, which appears to have been a raw sort of gin, was 
originally adopted in order to appease Aboriginal consumers who had become 
accustomed to French brandy during the hegemony of New France, and the supply of the 
latter was frequently disrupted by war.55 English brandy was apparently not especially 
popular with Aboriginal communities and shipments of French brandy were, in fact, still 
made in the early nineteenth century. 56  It is probable that the worst years of trade 
dislocation during the Napoleonic Wars (1808-14) propelled the Company to search for 
alternatives. Rum clearly was that alternative as subsequent entries in the Company’s 
minutes are littered with proposals and discussions about whether to purchase Jamaica, 
Leeward Island, or Tobago rum.57 This shift was no doubt influenced by the appointment 
                                                 
54 HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute Book, 1805-10, fo. 121. 
55 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 1, pp. 283, 310-1, 544-5. 
56 For instance, on 15 April 1807 it was ‘resolved that French Brandy be sent to the Factories the ensuing 
season being cheaper than Jamaica Rum by six pence per gallon’. Similarly, on 27 April 1808 the 
Committee agreed with Messers James Mann & Sons proposals to supply the Company with French 
Brandy at 4/9 per gallon. HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute Book, 1805-10, fos. 37, 64. On ‘English 
brandy’ see Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 1, p. 545. 
57 See entries on 15 May 1811, 4 May 1814, and 27 March 1816 in: HBCA, A.1/50, London Minute Book, 
1810-1814, fos. 30, 110; and HBCA, A.1/51, London Minute Book, 1814-8, fo. 48. 
 
~116~ 
 
of Andrew Wedderburn Colville to the HBC Committee on 17 January 1810. Wedderburn 
held an interest in the West India merchant firm of Graham, Simpson & Wedderburn, of 
Upper Tower Street, London, and was likely a critical agent in the award of the 
Company’s rum contract to this firm in 1810-6, and to its successor Webster, Simpson & 
Co. in 1817-21.58 Within the extant literature of the British fur trade there has been a 
tendency to romanticise that the HBC did not use rum in its transactions with Aboriginal 
peoples, unlike the more ‘unscrupulous’ Canadian and American fur traders.59 This view 
is unfounded however. While Carlos and Lewis found that brandy was the main type of 
alcohol traded by the Company in the mid-eighteenth century, they also note that the 
Company traded rum.60 Furthermore, this chapter has shown that the Company certainly 
traded more rum than brandy in the early nineteenth century.   
While only around three-fifths of the value of alcohol, the tobacco exported to 
Hudson’s Bay was considerable. 10 per cent (£44,989) of the purchases of consumer trade 
goods over the period was for tobacco and there were several varieties exported, including 
Virginia leaf tobacco from the United States, English roll tobacco, and imported Brazil 
tobacco.61 The quality of the latter was especially prized by Aboriginal peoples and was 
a key item that enticed many canoe bands to venture down to the Company’s posts on 
Hudson’s Bay before trade shifted inland. 62  The Company’s accounts do, however, 
underestimate the Company’s tobacco exports, as only a small amount of the purchased 
Brazil tobacco is listed. This was because the Company usually arranged for the direct 
importation of Brazil tobacco from merchants in Lisbon. Thus the tobacco was already 
paid for and in the Company’s warehouse when the ledgers of ‘merchandise exported’ 
were compiled. 
Glass beads were another article of particular importance to the trade. While bead 
purchases only made up 4 per cent (£6,393) of the sums spent on consumer goods over 
the period, they were more significant than their low value suggests. Indeed, HBC traders 
considered glass beads to be a ‘low-cost, high-profit bauble’.63 Thousands of such beads 
have been recovered from archaeological fieldwork at historic sites of fur trading posts 
                                                 
58 See HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘Andrew Colville’; and HBCA, A.25/5, Merchandise Exported, 1813-
1823. 
59 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 1, pp. 391, 544-5; and Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 145, 
228. 
60 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, pp. 82-3, 92. 
61 See Table 3.3. 
62 Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade, pp. 143-4. 
63 Krech, ‘The Kutchin and the Trade in Beads’, p. 252. 
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across North America. 64  From 1760 to 1820, however, fewer types of beads were 
traded. 65  Monochrome beads were the most common variety, followed by imitation 
wampum beads, whereas polychrome beads were rare during this period.66 George Irving 
Quimby argued that the rise of trade silver in the fur trade supposedly reduced demand 
for glass beads among Aboriginal communities but the fact that the Company spent more 
on beads (£6,393) than on silver ornaments (£144) suggests that this may not have been 
the case for the HBC.67 The beads were sewn onto tunics and moccasin trousers and were 
used to decorate gartering, hairbands, headbands, and knee and ankle bands.68 Beads were 
also is such high demand because they were integrated into a number of local spiritual 
cultures, which dictated that they be destroyed when people were sick, offered as 
payments to shamans, and buried with the departed.69 
The final consumer trade good that was of some significance were metallic 
ornaments. Only 1 per cent (£4,567) of the purchases on consumer goods over the period 
relates to such items, yet they were more important than this low value suggests.70 There 
were three articles of particular importance in this category: pewter, tin, and silver. Pewter 
dishes, plates, and spoons were shipped to the Bay as early as 1674.71 In particular, 
‘alchemy spoons’ were attractive items for Aboriginal peoples and they were often 
repurposed into decorative uses by separating the bowl of the spoon from the handle, 
which was then ‘affixed to outer garments in various decorative patterns’ along with such 
items as coloured beads, pewter buttons and finger rings.72 The handles were not wasted 
                                                 
64 For instance, see Burley, Hamilton, and Fladmark, Prophecy of the Swan, pp. 113-6; Quimby, Indian 
Culture, pp. 81-90, 183-196; and Marvin T. Smith, ‘Eighteenth-Century Glass Beads in the French 
Colonial Trade’, Historical Archaeology, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2002), pp. 55-61. 
65 Quimby, Indian Culture, p. 87-9. 
66 Popular larger types of monochrome beads used during this period were ‘about ¼ inch in diameter and 
¼ to ½ inch long, with eighteen or more facets’ and their colours included ‘aquamarine blue, emerald 
green, crystal, and old heliotype or lavender’. Smaller monochrome beads were ‘3∕16 inch in diameter 
and from 3∕16 to 5∕16 inch in length… have fifteen or more facets and generally are cobalt blue although 
some are of crystal colour’. The imitation wampum beads were ‘small tubular beads about ⅛ inch in 
diameter and 3∕16 to 5∕16 inch in length’ and were ‘opaque white, black, or dark blue’ in colour. 
Polychrome beads used at this time included ‘oval or barrel-shaped (wire-wound) beads of blue or green 
translucent glass with wreaths of leaves in yellow or white enamel encircling the mid-sections 
(equators)’ and polka dot beads that were ‘round or spheroidal, usually about ⅜ inch in diameter, and 
made of opaque glass that is dark blue or black’. The dots were enamel and their colours included plain 
white or white that was partially superimposed by yellow, or red and blue dots on top of the white. See 
Ibid., p. 88. 
67 Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
68 Krech, ‘The Kutchin and the Trade in Beads’, p. 253; and Quimby, Indian Culture, pp. 89-90. 
69 Krech, ‘The Kutchin and the Trade in Beads’, p. 269. 
70 See Table 3.3. 
71 Red Smith, ‘The Hudson’s Bay Company, London Pewterers and the North American Fur Trade’, 
Journal of the Pewter Society, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1995), pp. 49-61. 
72 Ibid., pp. 57-8. 
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but instead ‘made into trinkets or melted down and cast into small amulets’.73 Whereas 
the initial shipments of pewter to Hudson’s Bay were rather sporadic, by the late 
eighteenth century they were a routine part of the Company’s trade. The export of tin was 
more substantial, with a value of £2,998 purchased by the Company between 1783 and 
1821. Unfortunately, the Company’s minutes do not shed any light on what items of tin 
were purchased. The Company’s accounts occasionally described the Company’s 
‘tinman’ as supplying medals and decorative tinplates. It is perhaps thus logical to surmise 
that such items were for decorative purposes. More is known about the use of silver in 
the North American fur trade. Archaeological discoveries of silver ornaments, together 
with analysis of the trademarks, hallmarks, and date letters imprinted by silversmiths onto 
such items, has allowed scholars of the fur trade to accurately date the period in which 
silver was used.74 Silver ornaments only became a feature of the trade after 1760 and 
rapidly became very popular as an item of exchange with Aboriginal communities.75 
These silver ornaments were specifically produced for the fur trade in the form of 
armbands, small circular brooches, plain and star-shaped brooches that were often pierced 
with geometrical patterns, single and double crosses, crucifixes, earbobs, gorgets (a form 
of armour worn about the neck), and wristbands. 76  Their engravings often depicted 
animals. Amongst Algonkian-speaking peoples, mythical animals were likely an 
expression of religious beliefs, whereas real animals were probably clan or personal 
symbols.77 Trade silver was produced in Canada, the United States, and Britain.  
While the Company’s purchases of producer trade goods (those used for work-
related activities) was lower than that spent on consumer trade goods, there were a wide 
range of items sourced for export. At 54 per cent (£99,076) of the exports, armaments 
were the highest purchase in the producer goods category. 78  Purchases here were 
primarily for guns and gunpowder, which respectively made up 41 (£40,605) and 39 per 
cent (£38,455) of armament spending.79 There appear to have been two sorts of trade guns 
                                                 
73 Ibid., p. 58. 
74 Quimby, Indian Culture, p. 91. 
75 Ibid., p. 91. 
76 Ibid., p. 92; and Traquair, ‘Trade Silver’, pp. 1-3. Crosses worn by Aboriginal peoples at this time were 
purely ornamental and did not represent any belief in Christianity. See Ibid., p. 95. 
77 Ibid., pp. 95-7. 
78 See Table 3.3. 
79 See Table 3.3. 
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procured by the Company. 80  The first was a three-and-one-half foot gun that was 
generally referred to as a fowling piece. These guns were popular among Aboriginal 
peoples who lived in forested areas as the gun offered easier handling than longer types.81 
The shorter guns were less accurate but woodland communities had less need for 
precision as they used scatter shot to kill large numbers of birds and fired at deer and 
other large game animals at close quarters.82 The other variant was a four foot gun and 
was generally used by indigenous groups in parkland-grassland areas, as its greater 
accuracy made it more suitable for warfare. 83  Purchases of lead and shot was also 
substantial at 19 per cent (£19,143).84 Several varieties of lead and shot were purchased 
including: pig lead, sheet lead, Bristol shot, duck shot, small mould shot, and partridge 
shot.85  
Metalware comprised 18 per cent (£57,511) of the exports of producer goods.86 59 
per cent (£33,894) of this was accounted for by purchases of ironmongery, or the products 
of ‘ironmongers’ and ‘braziers’.87 While the Company’s account books shed little light 
on what exactly was purchased from ‘ironmongers’ the Committee minutes provide some 
clues. On 5 March 1806: 
Messers Moreton & Foster, Ironmongers, delivered their proposals on the 
19th February for supplying the Company with the following articles at the 
prices undermentioned which was agreed to: 
Bayonets large 36/ per dozen 
Bayonets small 34/ per dozen 
Ice Chissels 24/ per dozen 
Ice Chissels common 18/ per dozen 
Hatchets large 24/ per dozen.88 
Ice chisels and hatchets were used by Aboriginal trappers to break open beaver lodges. 
Guns were rarely used to hunt beaver as bullet holes damaged the quality of the pelt.89 
The second most significant article in the metalware category were kettles and these made 
                                                 
80 While the lengths of the Company’s trade guns are not noted in the Company’s minutes, an entry on the 
9 February 1803 makes clear that the Company still procured guns of various sizes in the early 
nineteenth century. See HBCA, A.1/48, London Minute Book, 1799-1805, fo. 76. 
81 Ray, Indians and the Fur Trade, p. 73. 
82 Ibid., p. 73. 
83 Ibid., pp. 73-5. 
84 See Table 3.3. 
85 HBCA, A.1/48, London Minute Book, 1799-1805, fo. 115; and HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute Book, 
1805-10, fo. 60. 
86 See Table 3.3. 
87 See Table 3.3. 
88 HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute Book, 1805-10, fo. 10. 
89 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, p. 86. 
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up just under one-quarter (£13,152) of such purchases.90 Kettles were used by Aboriginal 
groups to assist food preparation such as in the collecting and boiling of maple syrup.91 
Aboriginal communities also often repurposed broken kettles into new items such as 
‘tubular beads, hair pipes, conical trinkets, and arrowheads’. 92  According to the 
Company’s minute books it appears that the kettles were made out of brass from 1783 to 
c.1787.93 Tin kettles were briefly tried in 1788.94 It was, however, copper kettles that were 
the mainstay of the Company’s trade from 1790s onwards. The first reference to copper 
kettles was in 1787 when Samuel Hands & Co. agreed to provide ‘copper camp kettles of 
2 4 and 8 Quarters at 16d. per lb.’.95 The fact that copper has a higher thermal conductivity 
than brass or tin probably accounts for why the Company switched to the use of copper 
kettles, as this would make them especially well-suited to the cold climes of North 
America. A vast array of different kettle sizes were supplied including: one-half and one 
pint kettles; one, two, and three quart kettles; and one, one-and-a-half, two, three, four, 
five, and six gallon kettles.96  
Third in the metalware category were knives and hardware, which made up 17 per 
cent (£10,465) of such exports.97 Unfortunately there is no indication in the Company’s 
minutes as to what other items of hardware were routinely purchased. The only entries 
that specifically mentioned knives were those with George Russell & Co., who were also 
occasionally described as a ‘hardwareman’. Knives acquired through trade were highly 
useful to Aboriginal peoples as metal was scarce in the interior regions of North America. 
Metal tools such as knives helped to raise productivity in hunting, cooking, and other 
activities. 98  One final notable producer good purchased was lines and twine, which 
comprised 15 per cent (£28,221) of the purchases of producer goods.99 Twine was used 
by Aboriginal communities in the setting of traps underwater, primarily through the use 
                                                 
90 See Table 3.3. 
91 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, pp. 86-7; and Quimby, Indian Culture, pp. 72, 170-5. 
92 Quimby, Indian Culture, p. 72. 
93 HBCA, A.1/46, London Minute Book, 1783-8, fos. 22, 45. 
94 Samuel Hall was described as a ‘tinman’ in the Company’s account books and since he was only 
mentioned once in the minute books as a supplier of tin kettles transactions with him were included in 
the ‘other metalware’ category. See HBCA, A.1/46, London Minute Book, 1783-8, fo. 146. 
95 HBCA, A.1/46, London Minute Book, 1783-8, fo. 112. 
96 HBCA, A.1/48, London Minute Book, 1799-1805, fo. 95. 
97 See Table 3.3. 
98 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, pp. 167-8. 
99 See Table 3.3. 
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of twine nets which caught the beaver as they tried to escape from their lodges.100 Twine 
nets made hunting easier and increased productivity.101 
While caution has to be taken when using the Company’s purchases in this way — 
due to fact that they reflect the real value of commodities during a period of high inflation 
— a number of observations about the changing volume of the Company’s trade can be 
made. Table 3.4 shows the Company’s average annual purchases of six different 
consumer trade goods. At first glance, there appears to have been an impressive growth 
in the Company’s export of tobacco but much of this apparent increase is because the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars forced the Company to purchase its Brazil tobacco 
in London rather than from agents in Lisbon, and thus these orders were now listed in the 
Company’s accounts of ‘merchandise exported’.102 In the case of the purchased slops, 
however, it is clear that there was a pronounced growth in the volume of such items 
exported as the increase is too great to be accounted for by war-time inflation. Between 
1783-7 (£144) and 1818-21 (£3,994), the value of the slops purchased by the Company 
rose by 2,674 per cent.103 Purchases of blankets were almost five times higher in 1818-
21 (£3,022) than they were in 1783-7 (£510), and so it seems reasonable to suggest that 
the volume of trade at the very least doubled if not tripled.104  The value of ‘cloth’ 
purchased by the Company in 1818-21 (£7,471) was more than three times higher than it 
was in 1783-7 (£2,017).105 Furthermore, in the 1810s, the average annual percentage 
changes for cloth purchases are not so dissimilar to the official values of woollen long 
cloth as contained in Table 3.1; in 1813-7, the official values were 48 per cent higher than 
they were in 1808-12, and for the same period the Company’s purchases of cloth 
increased by 45 per cent.106 Similarly, the annual average official value of woollen long 
cloth exported in 1818-21 was 84 per cent higher than it was in 1813-7, whereas the 
Company’s cloth purchases had increased by 80 per cent.107 Alcohol is somewhat more 
problematic. The Company’s purchases of alcohol increased by 67 per cent in 1788-92 
and by 108 per cent in 1793-7, so it does seem that more alcohol was traded at the close 
                                                 
100 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, pp. 86, 168. 
101 Ibid., pp. 95, 120. 
102 See Table 3.4. 
103 See Table 3.4. 
104 See Table 3.4. 
105 See Table 3.4. 
106 See Tables 3.1 and 3.4. 
107 See Tables 3.1 and 3.4. 
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of the eighteenth century.108 In the early nineteenth century, however, the value of alcohol 
purchased did not substantially change, which perhaps suggests that the Company did not 
increase the amount of alcohol that it traded despite its intensive rivalry with the NWC.109 
Glass beads present a similar problem, as although purchases of such items was 69 per 
                                                 
108 See Table 3.4. 
109 See Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4. HBC’s average annual purchases of consumer trade goods for export to 
Hudson Bay, 1783-1821 (in £). 
 Textiles & Clothing 
 Blankets Percentage 
Change (%) 
Cloth Percentage 
Change (%) 
Slops Percentage 
Change (%) 
     1783-7 
     1788-92 
     1793-7 
     1798-1802 
     1803-7 
     1808-12 
     1813-7 
     1818-21 
510 
1,245 
1,183 
1,353 
1,727 
1,403 
2,526 
3,022 
 
+144 
-5 
+14 
+28 
-19 
+80 
+20 
2,017 
4,127 
3,836 
4,267 
3,881 
2,852 
4,148 
7,471 
 
+105 
-7 
+11 
-9 
-26 
+45 
+80 
144 
646 
1,138 
1,469 
1,331 
1,172 
2,181 
3,994 
 
+348 
+76 
+29 
-9 
-12 
+86 
+83 
 Other  
 Alcohol 
a 
Percentage 
Change (%) 
Glass 
Beads 
Percentage 
Change (%) 
Tobacco Percentage 
Change (%) 
     1783-7 
     1788-92 
     1793-7 
     1798-1802 
     1803-7 
     1808-12 
     1813-7 
     1818-21 
843 
1,406 
2,918 
2,100 
1,923 
2,151 
2,414 
2,134 
 
+67 
+108 
-28 
-8 
+12 
+12 
-12 
122 
217 
173 
193 
210 
119 
80 
206 
 
+78 
-20 
+11 
+9 
-44 
-33 
+157 
60 
136 
301 
1,132 
999 
1,383 
2,287 
3,375 
 
+125 
+121 
+277 
-12 
+38 
+65 
+48 
Notes:  
a includes products of distillers, English brandy, malt, rum, and rum brokers.  
Source: HBCA, A.25/3-5, Merchandise Exported, 1778-1823. 
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cent higher in 1818-21 (£206) than they were in 1783-7 (£122), inflation could easily 
account for this increase.110 
Table 3.5 shows the HBC’s annual average purchases of six key producer goods 
that were principally used for trade. The official values contained in Table 3.1 showed 
                                                 
110 See Table 3.4. 
Table 3.5. HBC’s average annual purchases of producer trade goods for export 
to Hudson Bay, 1783-1821 (in £). 
 Armaments  
 Gunpowder Percentage 
Change 
(%) 
Guns Percentage 
Change 
(%) 
Lead & 
Shot 
Percentage 
Change 
(%) 
    1783-7 
    1788-92 
    1793-7 
    1798-1802 
    1803-7 
    1808-12 
    1813-7 
    1818-21 
523 
581 
867 
1,428 
1,083 
1,164 
1,146 
1,123 
 
+11 
+49 
+65 
-24 
+7 
-2 
+2 
853 
1,395 
1,170 
1,116 
888 
863 
716 
1,400 
 
+64 
-16 
-5 
-20 
-3 
-17 
+95 
378 
559 
444 
432 
585 
520 
391 
650 
 
+48 
-21 
-3 
+35 
-11 
-25 
+66 
 Metalware 
 Iron a Percentage 
Change 
(%) 
Kettles Percentage 
Change 
(%) 
Knives & 
Hardware 
Percentage 
Change 
(%) 
    1783-7 
    1788-92 
    1793-7 
    1798-1802 
    1803-7 
    1808-12 
    1813-7 
    1818-21 
849 
662 
935 
663 
631 
794 
760 
1,515 
 
-22 
+41 
-29 
-5 
+26 
-4 
+99 
90 
245 
398 
415 
348 
313 
365 
570 
 
+172 
+62 
+4 
-16 
-10 
+16 
+56 
222 
288 
279 
268 
225 
221 
244 
431 
 
+30 
-3 
-4 
-16 
-2 
+10 
+77 
Notes:  
a also includes transactions with ‘braziers’ 
Source: HBCA, A.25/3-5, Merchandise Exported, 1778-1823. 
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that three times as much gunpowder was exported to Hudson’s Bay in 1818-21 (£921) 
than was in 1783-7 (£296).111 In contrast, for the same period, the Company’s purchases 
of gunpowder only doubled, rising from £523 to £1,123.112 The fact that more gunpowder 
was exported does suggest that the Company’s trade in guns and lead and shot expanded 
between 1783-7 and 1818-21, and this growth was probably greater than the 64 per cent 
(gunpowder) and 72 per cent (lead and shot) increase in the cost of the Company’s 
purchases of these articles.113 The Company’s trade in kettles certainly did increase over 
the period, as purchases were five times greater in 1818-21 (£570) than they were in 1783-
7 (£90).114 While the Company’s iron purchases increased by 78 per cent between 1783-
7 (£849) and 1818-21 (£1,515), and that spent on knives and hardware almost doubled 
from £222 to £431, it cannot be said with certainty as to whether this reflects an actual 
expansion in the trade of such items or an increase in their price.115 
From this analysis of the HBC’s commodity export trade, it is apparent that rum 
became the principal form of alcohol traded by the Company in the early nineteenth 
century, and that there was a growth in the Company’s trade of several commodities. 
Much of this expansion was in the form of consumer goods, especially in the case of 
ready-made clothing and blankets. There was an increase in the trade of some types of 
producer trade goods; this was especially the case for kettles, although the trade in 
armaments also increased. What remains to be established is the tradespeople who 
supplied the Company with these commodity exports, the origin of these goods, the 
relationships that the Company formed with its suppliers, and the reasons why these 
dealings took the form that they did. 
III.   The Suppliers 
How, then, did the Company make its purchases from tradespeople? And how did this 
reflect the wider pattern of export procurement in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries? Table 3.6 shows the duration and value of the HBC’s supplier contracts and 
Table 3.7 shows the value distribution of these contracts. These figures include all of the 
Company’s suppliers, whether they provided trading commodities, provisions, or 
                                                 
111 See Table 3.1. 
112 See Table 3.5. 
113 See Table 3.5. 
114 See Table 3.5. 
115 See Table 3.5. 
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services. First, it is clear that the majority of tradespeople from whom the Company 
purchased commodities only supplied the Company for a short period of time: 159 
suppliers held a contract for just one year and 165 suppliers held one for between two and 
nine years.116 But short-term relationships with suppliers were not the conventional way 
in which the Company sourced its commodity exports. One-year contracts only accounted 
                                                 
116 See Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6. Duration and value of the HBC’s supplier 
contracts, 1783-1821 (in years). 
No. of Years No. of Suppliers Purchases (£) 
     39 
     30-8 
     20-9 
     10-9 
     2-9 
     1 
11 
21 
32 
55 
165 
159 
302,538 (27%) 
233,639 (21%) 
167,962 (15%) 
191,444 (18%) 
181,626 (17%) 
15,287 (1%) 
Total 444 1,092,496 
Notes: Purchases to the value of £82,769 from anonymous 
‘clothiers’ were discounted. 
Source: HBCA, A.25/3-5, Merchandise Exported, 1778-1823. 
 
 
 
Table 3.7. Value distribution of the 
HBC’s supplier contracts, 1783-1821 
(in £). 
 No. of Suppliers 
     10,000-99,999 
     1,000-9,999 
     100-999 
     <100 
28 
84 
129 
202 
Notes: Purchases to the value of £82,769 from 
anonymous ‘clothiers’ were discounted. 
Source: HBCA, A.25/3-5, Merchandise 
Exported, 1778-1823. 
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for 1 per cent (£15,287) of the purchases. 117  In addition, 202 suppliers provided 
commodities valued under £100 and so while there were a notable number of tradespeople 
that the Company did business with, most of these transactions were clearly for small 
purchases of miscellaneous items.118 More striking is the significant number of long-term 
relationships that the Company developed with suppliers. 119 tradespeople held a 
contract with the Company for a decade or more and they accounted for 81 per cent of 
the total purchases.119 Indeed, 11 suppliers held a contract for the full 39 years of the study 
and they alone provided 27 per cent of the Company’s commodity exports.120 Over 100 
firms maintained contracts with the Company that exceeded £1,000, and 29 suppliers 
received payments that totalled more than £10,000.121 The Company thus provided a 
regular and reliable source of income to over 100 tradespeople in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries.  
These long-term relationships were not confined to specific types of commodities. 
For instance, Favell & Bousfield, slop sellers of 247 Tooley Street, London held a contract 
for the full 39 years of the study (£48,740).122 Thomas & John Whitehead at Bankside, 
Southwark were the Company’s dyers for the entire period (£25,730).123 For 25 years 
(1797-1821), Langford & Currey, tobacconists at 8 Shoemaker Row, Blackfriars, 
supplied most of the Company’s English roll and Virginia leaf tobacco.124 The majority 
of the Company’s glass beads came from Robert Vigne & Sons, merchants at 1 Coleman 
Street Buildings, London, and they held a contract for 29 years from 1783-1811 
(£5,130). 125  For 27 years from 1797 to 1821 (£31,162), Pigou, Andrews & Co., 
                                                 
117 See Table 3.6. 
118 See Table 3.7. 
119 See Table 3.6. 
120 See Table 3.6. 
121 See Table 3.7. 
122 Kent’s Directory, 51st Edition (1783). Small amounts of slops were also provided by Samuel Hill & Son 
in 1786-92 (£3,358), Robertson & Co. in 1814-6 (£2,254), and Loft & Wallace in 1815-21 (£2,027). 
London was the centre of the ready-made clothing industry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
See Stanley Chapman, ‘The Innovating Entrepreneurs in the British Ready-made Clothing Industry’, 
Textile History, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1993), pp. 5-25. 
123 Kent’s Directory, 51st Edition (1783). John and George Whitehead were also one of the London cloth 
factors that supplied the EIC. See Bowen, ‘Sinews’, p. 478. 
124 There were at least eight suppliers of tobacco to the Company between 1783 and 1821. Sainsbury’s & 
Co., tobacconists at 22 Ludgate Hill supplied tobacco to the Company in 1783-96 (£1,768). For 
Sainsbury’s & Co. see Kent’s Directory, 51st Edition (1783); and for Langford & Currey see Kent’s 
Directory, 78th Edition (1810). Analysis of the entries noted in the Company’s minute books shows that 
Sainsbury’s & Co. and Langford & Currey only supplied Virginia leaf and English roll tobacco to the 
Company. See A.1/46, London Minute Book, 1783-8, fo. 17; and HBCA, A.1/51, London Minute Book, 
1814-8, fo. 11. 
125 Kent’s Directory, 51st Edition (1783). 
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gunpowder merchants at 34 Throgmorton Street supplied gunpowder to the Company.126 
Thomas Izod, brazier at 6 Adams Place, Borough High Street, Southwark, was the 
Company’s supplier of kettles for 30 years between 1787 and 1816 (£10,294).127 The 
Company’s grain provisions were supplied by Curtis, Clarke & Co., biscuit baker at 
Horsleydown Old Stairs, Southwark for the full 39 years (£97,175), and the Company’s 
meat provisions were supplied by Peter & William Mellish, merchant at Shadwell dock 
for 36 years between 1783 and 1818 (£73,514).128 Other major commodities where a 
supplier held a contract for more than 15 years include: blankets, groceries, guns, iron, 
lines and twine, knives and hardware, and tin-plate.129 
It could be argued that the Company’s tendency to maintain long-term relationships 
with its suppliers was poor business practice as this limited competition for contracts and 
led to the Company paying higher prices for its commodity exports. This view neglects a 
number of key points however. First, analysis of the Company’s minute books shows that 
there was competition for supplier contracts as the Company routinely considered 
proposals from several different tradespeople before a contract was assigned. Second, the 
Company needed to trust its suppliers to provide high-quality merchandise that would 
meet the exacting standards of Aboriginal peoples. And third, the Company needed its 
suppliers to fulfil their orders in good time, especially considering there was only one 
shipment to Hudson’s Bay each year. On the whole, these three factors led the Company 
to maintain long-term relationships with suppliers whom the Company thought 
reliable.130 They also resulted in the Company procuring the majority of its orders from 
                                                 
126 Kent’s Directory, 78th Edition (1810). Other suppliers included John Walton, merchant at 15 Angel 
Court, Throgmorton Street, from 1783-5 (£1,860) and Thomas Sutton & Co. of the Gunpowder Office, 
33 Walbrook, from 1786-96 (£5,433). For John Walton see Kent’s Directory, 51st Edition (1783); and 
for Sutton & Co. see Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794). 
127 LMA, CLC/B/192/F/001/MS11936/346/533278, ‘Insured: Thomas Izod, 6 Adams Place, Borough High 
Street, Southwark, brazier’, Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Group, 24 July 1787. 
128 The new complete guide to all persons: who have any trade or concern with the City of London, and 
parts adjacent, 16th Edition (1783); and Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794). 
129  Of those not subsequently mentioned: Davidson, Newman & Co., grocers and tea dealers at 441 
Fenchurch Street were the suppliers of the Company’s groceries for all the years of the study; John 
Burgon & Son, hardwaremen at 15 and 16 Fish Street Hill, held a contract for 30 years between 1792 
and 1821 (£2,737); the vast majority of the lines and twine came from Philip & Christopher Splidt, rope, 
line, twine and net-makers at 74 New Road near Wellclose Square, London, and the Splidts’ supplied 
the Company for 39 years from 1783-1816 (£21,572); the Company’s tin-plate came from Samuel Hall, 
tin-plate-worker at No. 152 Fenchurch Street for the entire 39 years (£2,224) of the study. See HBCA, 
A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fo. 82; Baileys Western and Midland Directory, Vol. 59 (1783); 
Kent’s Directory, 51st Edition (1783); Bailey’s British Directory, Vol. 61 (1784); Kent’s Directory, 78th 
Edition (1810); and Jacob M. Price, ‘William Russell (1740-1818)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
130 The EIC remained loyal to particular suppliers for similar reasons. See Bowen, ‘Sinews’, p. 474. 
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metropolitan tradespeople, which included beer, brandy (and gin), glass beads, grains, 
groceries, guns, gunpowder, hardware, lines and twine, meat, rum, tin-plate, slops, 
tobacco (English leaf and Virginia roll), wine, and woollen cloth.131 These suppliers were 
either manufacturers or intermediary merchants and wholesalers. 
While much of the Company’s woollen cloth was purchased from unnamed 
‘clothiers’ between 1783 and 1813 (£82,769), it is clear from the Company’s minute 
books that these payments were made to cloth factors at Blackwell Hall, which included 
Richard Burford, John Fryer, Pearse & Bowen, and George Whitehead, several of whom 
also supplied cloth to the EIC.132 The foremost named suppliers of woollen cloth in the 
Company’s accounts were J. & B. Pearse who provided £40,144 worth of cloth for nine 
years between 1809 and 1821. Interestingly, the Company’s packer, Richard & Charles 
Alsager of 12 Bearbinder Lane, Mansion House, was also occasionally tasked with 
securing cloth for the Company, and they were provided with strict instructions from the 
Committee for this purpose.133 For instance, on 7 December 1796 the Company ‘ordered 
that Mr Alsager the Company’s packer do procure the cloth agreeable to the indents from 
the different factories’. 134  Similarly, on 10 December 1800 Alsager ‘attended and 
received orders from the Deputy Governor to provide 300 cloths’.135 Ralph Davis noted 
that during the eighteenth-century it was customary for participants in the British overseas 
trade with the Levant to rely upon Blackwell Hall factors and London packers to source 
their woollen broadcloth exports.136 Their reliance upon these intermediaries, Davis finds, 
was partly because these agents made it easy for the Levant merchant to buy cloth for 
                                                 
131 Of those not already stated: Goodwyn, Skinner & Thornton at 21 Lower East Smithfield supplied beer 
to the value of £6,632 between 1795 and 1821; Joseph Skinner, distiller and tobacconist at 34 Aldgate 
supplied £7,031 worth of ‘English brandy’ to the Company between 1783 and 1791; Hatch, Smith & 
Co. were the Company’s suppliers of brandy and malt in 1792-1806 (£27,945) and in 1807-10 (£7,155) 
Smith & Curries — probably a subsidiary of Hatch, Smith & Co. — supplied the Company, and this 
firm was possibly located at Vine Street, Bloomsbury; William Wilson, hardwaremen at 35 Cannon 
Street, supplied hardware for 10 years from 1783-92 (£1,959); Graham, Simpson & Wedderburn of 
Upper Tower Street and its successor firm of Webster, Simpson & Co. supplied the Company with rum 
to the value of £25,826 in 1810-21; Beachcroft & Calcrow, merchants at 36 St. Mary Hill, provided 
£7,174 worth of wine between 1792 and 1821. See HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘Andrew Colville’; Kent’s 
Directory, 51st Edition (1783); Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794); Kent's Directory, 78th Edition 
(1810); and Barnett, Hub of the Industrial Revolution, p. 45. 
132 HBCA, A.1/46, London Minute Book, 1783-8, fo. 48; HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, 
fos. 12, 67; HBCA, A.1/50, London Minute Book, 1810-4, fo. 53; Bowen, ‘Sinews’, p. 478; and 
Willmott, ‘British Fur Trade Textile’, p. 209. 
133 Kent’s Directory, 51st Edition (1783). Alsager & Co. acted as the Company’s packers for the full 39 
years of this study and received payments to the sum of £10,543. 
134 HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fo. 83. 
135 HBCA, A.1/48, London Minute Book, 1799-1805, fo. 29. 
136 Davis, Devonshire Square, pp. 96, 107-9, 114-5. 
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export but — even when the merchants wanted to take a more active role in cloth 
purchases — they were largely dependent upon the cloth factors’ connections with 
provincial manufacturers in Yorkshire and the West Country.137 This was even more the 
case when the merchant desired high-quality cloth, as the supply of these sorts was often 
limited on account of the fineness of the wool or the skill of the individual weaver.138 The 
HBC’s extensive use of London intermediaries to supply its exported woollen cloth was 
not, therefore, because the Company was ‘lazy’, but rather it was necessitated by the 
Company’s need for high-quality textiles. Like the EIC and British merchants trading to 
the Levant, the HBC’s woollen cloth was dyed in London so that it could be suitably 
adapted to the specific tastes of Aboriginal peoples in North America.139 
Until at least 1802, most of the Company’s woollen cloth came from the West 
Country but after this year, however, it does appear that the Company switched to 
suppliers in Yorkshire. On 13 January 1802, the Company’s packer informed the London 
Committee that ‘Swaines manufactured a cloth superior in quality and two pence half 
penny per yard lower than the cloths called Worcesters usually sent to the Bay’.140 
Presumably this was a reference to the Swaines who were ‘established in all branches of 
the cloth industry throughout Yorkshire’.141 The Committee decided that Swaines would 
supply the Company with cloth from their manufactory, yet there is no record of them in 
the Company’s accounts of ‘merchandise exported’.142 This is probably because the trade 
was still conducted through a Blackwell Hall factor so the Company made payment to 
them rather than Swaines.143 In addition, Abram Greenwood, manufacturer of strouds at 
Dewsbury near Leeds, offered the Committee a bale of strouds in December 1802.144 On 
this occasion, there is no record that the Company accepted the request and Greenwood 
is not listed in the Company’s ledgers. The fact that it was the Company’s packer that 
informed the Committee of the superior quality and cheaper price of Swaines’ woollen 
cloth, shows how the Company relied upon the commercial contacts of these 
intermediaries. It is also known that the woollens used by the NWC in the early nineteenth 
                                                 
137 Ibid., pp. 107, 114-5. 
138 Ibid., pp. 110-1. 
139 See Ibid., p. 112; and Bowen, ‘Sinews’, p. 475. 
140 HBCA, A.1/48, London Minute Book, 1799-1805, fo. 52. 
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~130~ 
 
century were produced in Yorkshire, and that Swaines was one of their suppliers.145 
While the HBC did not do business with the new breed of Yorkshire ‘merchant-
manufacturers’ that emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries — who 
sought to bypass the London cloth factors by establishing their own warehouses in the 
capital — the Company’s use of Blackwell Hall factors no doubt continued because of 
the Company’s need for high-quality woollens.146 Willmott maintains that the NWC did 
do business with some London ‘warehousemen’ who sold Yorkshire woollens around 
1800, but more research is needed to firmly establish who these suppliers were.147 The 
fact that the HBC sourced its woollen cloth from Yorkshire after 1802, rather than from 
the West Country, suggests that the Company was receptive to some of the innovative 
textile industries in the north of England.148 In the case of woollen cloth, therefore, it may 
be the case that the HBC was actually more amenable to northern manufacturers than was 
the EIC. 149  Indeed, since there was little prospect that British merchants and 
manufacturers would attack the HBC’s Charter, the Company, unlike the EIC, had little 
need to support ailing parts of the British economy in an effort to ensure a degree of 
support from British manufacturers.150 There is also the issue of whether northern textile 
manufacturers were, by 1800, able to replicate the exact commodity specifications that 
the Asian market required.151 
The Company did source a number of its commodity exports from regions outside 
of London when this proved expedient. This was particularly the case for the Company’s 
blankets, Brazil tobacco, knives, and silver ornaments. The Company’s blankets were 
exclusively sourced from Witney in Oxfordshire, first from Thomas Empson in 1783-
1805 (£26,164) and then subsequently from John Early & Sons in 1806-21 (£35,592).152 
By 1783, the Company’s connection to the Witney blanket makers was already a well-
established one, as a James Empson supplied blankets to the Company as early as 1737.153 
The Company’s minutes show that the Company maintained a regular correspondence 
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with its Witney blanket makers. Often this was to ensure that the produced blankets and 
duffels were suitable for the fur trade. For instance, on 27 February 1805 Thomas Empson 
was asked to make the coloured strips on the white duffels ‘as bright and lively as 
possible’.154 The Company was not afraid to show its dissatisfaction, such as on 21 
January 1795 when Empson was desired ‘to reconsider his proposals for supplying the 
Company with Blankets this year.’155 The Company’s patronage was evidently a lucrative 
one for the blanket makers as individual manufactures took great lengths to maintain the 
Company’s business. It was also a highly convenient relationship for the blanket makers, 
as the need to fulfil the Company’s orders by April kept their looms at work during the 
winter.156  Upon the death of Thomas Empson in the spring of 1805, the Company 
received numerous letters recommending John Early & Sons as the Company’s future 
blanket makers. 157  John Early solicited the Company’s business on 18 April 1805, 
specifically mentioning that he was one of the executors to the late Thomas Empson, and 
Susanna Empson sent a letter to the Committee on 28 April 1805 ‘recommending John 
Early & Son Executors of the late brother Thomas Empson to succeed to the Company’s 
business’.158  
The Committee acceded to these requests, and the Company became John Early & 
Son’s most important customer. The surviving sales ledgers of the Witney firm show that 
the value of the duffels, blanketing, and point blankets (referred to as ‘kerseys’) purchased 
by the Company each year ranged from £1,384 to £1,977 in 1815-9.159 After the HBC, 
Early’s next most important customers were usually the London Houses that supplied the 
NWC. For instance, Inglis, Ellice purchased kerseys and another form of point blanket 
called ‘Hudson’ from the Witney firm in 1815 (£754), 1816 (£539), 1817-8 (£540), and 
1819 (£526).160 Gillespie, Gerrard & Co. (the successor firm of Mackenzie, Gillespie & 
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155 HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fo. 47. 
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160 OHC, B1/2/F4/2, ‘John Early’s Ledgers’, Early’s of Witney PLC (Blanket Manufacturers), 1818-23; and 
OHC, B1/2/F1/1, ‘John Early Sales and Purchase Ledger’, Early’s of Witney PLC (Blanket 
Manufacturers), 1815-29. 
 
~132~ 
 
Parker) purchased kerseys to the value of £692 in 1815 and £539 in 1816.161 There is also 
correspondence which shows that Inglis, Ellice placed an order with Early’s for 125 pairs 
of point blankets in March 1814, and that Brickwood & Daniel purchased duffels and 
point blankets from the firm in 1803.162 The fact that Early’s was supplying point blankets 
to both the HBC and the Canada merchants suggests that this firm specialised in supplying 
the fur trade. It also shows that manufacturers had effective access to both the Canada 
and Hudson’s Bay fur trades. In the early nineteenth century, British manufacturers 
challenged the EIC’s monopoly precisely because they believed that they could better 
access the Indian market through an open trade. Therefore, a central reason why British 
merchants and manufacturers did not challenge the HBC’s Charter in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries — or oppose the emergence of monopoly in 1821 — was 
because they already thought that they had effective access to the fur trade. 
Brazil tobacco was another commodity that the Committee sought to source from 
outside of London. In the late eighteenth century, the Company imported Brazil tobacco 
directly from contacts in Lisbon. From at least 1783 to 1788, there was a regular 
correspondence with Mellish & Devisme in Lisbon for this purpose.163 However, it does 
appear that the Company had several contacts in the Portuguese capital as a letter was 
read to the London Committee from Creusè, Silva & Co. in December 1784 and the 
Secretary reported on 17 May 1786 that he had paid £1,021 18s. 6d. for duty and fees on 
19 rolls of Brazil Tobacco which had arrived on the Hope as consigned from John Hughes 
in Lisbon.164 Indeed, a significant amount of duty was charged on the importation of 
Brazil tobacco and the amount was several times the actual value of the produce.165 The 
expense could, however, be reclaimed in part through a drawback (a remittance of the 
customs’ duties paid when imported foreign produce was exported) when the tobacco was 
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re-exported to Hudson’s Bay. 166  Unfortunately, none of the payments to Mellish & 
Devisme were listed in the Company’s accounts of exported merchandise, no doubt 
because the Company had already paid for these direct imports. The Company’s minutes 
do occasionally record the amount that was paid to the Company’s Lisbon agents. In 
1784, £361 was paid to Mellish & Devisme.167 This was considerably more than the £109 
paid to Sainsbury’s & Co. for English roll and Virginia leaf that same year.168   
It is not clear who supplied Brazil tobacco to the Company in 1789-94, in part 
because there are no minute books for the years 1789-92 but also because the minutes do 
not mention Brazil tobacco until 1795. In that year, three rolls to the value of £78 were 
purchased from David-Alves Rebello & Co., merchant at Mare Street, Hackney, and the 
Rainbow Coffee House, Cornhill.169 Direct importation from Lisbon was re-established 
from 1796 to at least 1800, when Lucena & Crawford supplied Brazil tobacco to the 
Company.170 Thereafter the Company started to rely solely upon metropolitan tobacco 
brokers. Perhaps the first of these was Edward Spencer, tobacco merchant and 
manufacturer at ‘Vine-co.’, Queen Street, who supplied £41 worth of Brazil tobacco in 
1799.171 In 1803-9 (£561), Brazil tobacco was purchased from Kymer M. Taggart & Co. 
and they were followed by Brandon & Sons in 1810-7 (£449). The total amounts paid to 
these firms for the six and seven years that they respectively supplied the Company show 
that the amount of Brazil tobacco that the Company exported to Hudson’s Bay in the early 
nineteenth century was much less than that supplied by Mellish & Devisme in the 1780s. 
Dislocation to overseas trade as a result of the Napoleonic Wars no doubt accounts for 
why the Company stopped arranging its own importation of Brazil tobacco via Lisbon, 
as well as the low amounts purchased from London tobacco brokers. 
By the end of 1814, the Company had severe difficulties in sourcing its tobacco. 
While purchases of Brazil tobacco were reduced in the early nineteenth century, the War 
of 1812 severely disrupted the supply of Virginia leaf tobacco to the British market. As a 
result, Virginia tobacco rose to an ‘extreme high price’.172 The Company asked Langford 
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& Currey whether they could manufacture their roll tobacco from Brazil leaf tobacco 
instead of the usual Virginia leaf.173 They informed the Committee that no drawback 
would be payable on the manufactured tobacco as drawbacks were only valid on articles 
that maintained their precise form at the time of entry.174 In consequence, English roll 
that was manufactured from Brazil leaf tobacco would be extortionately expensive. A 
more realistic alternative soon presented itself. While in New York on 14 March 1814, 
Colin Robertson, a former NWC clerk who was now in the service of the HBC — and 
was preparing an inland trading venture that would set out from Montreal — wrote a letter 
to Andrew Wedderburn Colville. In the letter he explained that ‘I have got an excellent 
lot of tobacco for the Indian trade which belonged to Mr Astor’, and a further letter of the 
same date that was addressed to the London Committee explained that Wedderburn had 
procured ‘seven thousand weight of excellent tobacco made on purpose for the Indian 
trade’.175 The fact that this tobacco was made especially for the fur trade shows, once 
again, that the trade required close attention to the commodities that were offered to 
Aboriginal communities. The tobacco was shipped to Maitland, Garden & Auldjo, the 
HBC’s new agents in Montreal. It is unclear exactly how Robertson’s transaction with 
Astor worked in practice due to the on-going Anglo-American war. On 29 March 1815, 
it was ordered that 8,000 lbs. of the ‘Maryland tobacco’ should be shipped from Montreal 
to London for the use of the Company.176 Alternative sources were therefore found and 
problems in the Company’s supply of English roll proved temporary.  
Even though the amount of Brazil tobacco acquired by the Company had notably 
declined since the late eighteenth century, the Company was still presented with problems 
in sourcing a satisfactory supply. Branden & Son reported to the London Committee on 
5 April 1815 that there was ‘no Brazil tobacco in town but what is[, is] very bad’.177 With 
an unsatisfactory quality of Brazil tobacco available on the London market and peace in 
Europe, the Company seems to have looked into re-establishing its practice of arranging 
the direct importation of its own tobacco from Lisbon. In May 1820, a Lisbon 
correspondent informed the Company that ‘Brazil Tobacco had considerably advanced in 
price’.178 Whether the Company actually rekindled its more proactive efforts to source an 
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acceptable quality of Brazil tobacco for its trade remains unknown. What is evident from 
this analysis is that the HBC went to great lengths to source tobacco that would satisfy 
the desires of Aboriginal communities. Direct connections with Lisbon were routinely 
made to arrange the importation of high-quality Brazil tobacco that was scarce on a 
London market that was limited by strict commercial legislation. 
Knives and silver ornaments were another example where the Company went 
beyond the use of London intermediaries. At the very least, £5,465 was spent on knives 
between 1789 and 1821, and all of this is attributable to Russell & Co. of Birmingham 
who were large-scale exporters of Birmingham and Sheffield ironware.179 The reason 
why the Company established this direct connection with Birmingham’s burgeoning 
metallurgical industry appears to be because the Company wanted its knives to be 
specially adapted to the fur trade. Indeed, the Company’s minutes specifically mentioned 
‘Indian knives’ when noting the reading of a letter from William Russell, the Company’s 
principal supplier of knives, to the Committee.180 As regards the Company’s trade silver, 
it is clear that compared to the Montreal fur trade, the HBC was slow in adding silver 
ornaments to its trade. The first mention of trade silver in the Company’s minute books 
was on 5 March 1794 when a ‘dozen of silver plate trinkets according to the pattern sent 
from AR [Albany] and EM [Eastmain] be provided and sent to those Factories’.181 This 
view is further substantiated by the fact that the standard of trade for the Company’s silver 
articles was not fixed until May 1797.182 The Company’s accounts list four different 
silversmiths, although they do not span the entire period. Thomas Ayres supplied the 
Company with silver ornaments for four years between 1801 and 1807 (£62), Joseph 
Hearn in 1803 (£13), John Gray in 1820 (£13), and M. R. Boulton, no doubt meaning 
Matthew Robinson Boulton of the Birmingham firm Boulton & Watt, in 1820 (£56).183 
Interestingly, none of these names correspond to the London silversmiths who are thought 
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to have made silver ornaments for the fur trade between 1763 and 1805.184 At only £144, 
the total amount purchased by the Company from Ayres, Boulton, Gray, and Hearn was 
especially low. Indeed, the Canadian fur traders James and Andrew McGill purchased 
£4,181 worth of ‘silverworks’ from various Montreal silversmiths in 1797-1801.185 It is 
possible that the Company’s trade silver did not always come from those exclusively 
described as silversmiths but rather from other suppliers. For example, on 30 November 
1796 it was requested that a letter be sent ‘to William & George Russell of Birmingham 
to be informed of the prices of certain articles of silver according to the pattern sent 
them’. 186  Therefore, in addition to supplying the Company with knives and other 
hardware, it is clear that Russell & Co. were, at least for a time, also manufacturing the 
Company’s trade silver.187 Since Russell & Co. were asked to engrave designs onto silver 
ornaments it is possible that they also made decorative handles for the knives that they 
supplied to the Company. 188  More significantly, it is clear that the Company had 
established links with manufacturers in Birmingham for its supply of silver ornaments in 
order to procure items that were explicitly designed for the fur trade.  
While it is less clear as to where the Company’s kettles were manufactured, there 
were at least a few temporary connections with provincial suppliers. Mark Harford of the 
Brass Battery, Wire & Copper Company supplied kettles to the HBC from 1783-5 (£282). 
Harford’s company actually manufactured its kettles in Bristol but had a warehouse in 
London at 43 Bread Street. 189 Harford was followed by Hands & Co. in 1786 (£63) but 
for the next 30 years between 1787 and 1816 (£10,294), Thomas Izod, brazier at 6 Adams 
Place, Borough High Street, Southwark, provided the Company’s kettles.190 During the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, London had a significant copper industry 
                                                 
184 The London silversmiths who are thought to have manufactured silver ornaments for the fur trade 
include Peter Arno (c.1768), Hester Bateman (c.1771-81), William Evans (c.1761-74), George 
Hemming and William Chawner (c.1781), and Luke Kendall (c.1775). See Quimby, Indian Culture, p. 
197. 
185 Traquair, ‘Trade Silver’, pp. 4-5. 
186 HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fo. 82. For other mentions of Russell & Co. in the 
Company’s minutes see HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fos. 83-4. 
187 The Company regularly corresponded with George Russell in Birmingham over the knives and ‘trinkets’ 
that he supplied to them. See HBCA, A.5/4, London Correspondence Book Outwards — General, 1788-
1808, fo. 157. 
188 Some of the iron knives excavated from Odawa burial sites in modern-day Michigan had decorative 
handles with perforated brass. See Quimby, Indian Culture, p. 146. 
189  Peter Wakelin, ‘James Harford (1734-1817)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004); and Kent’s Directory, 51st Edition (1783). 
190 LMA, CLC/B/192/F/001/MS11936/346/533278, ‘Insured: Thomas Izod, 6 Adams Place, Borough High 
Street, Southwark, brazier’, Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Group, 24 July 1787. There was also a 
very small purchase of kettles from William Savage in 1815 (£9). 
 
~137~ 
 
that was particularly specialised in manufacturing equipment for brewing, distilling, and 
sugar refining so it is probable that Izod did manufacture the Company’s kettles in the 
capital rather than acting as an intermediary.191 Furthermore, in 1820, McTavish, Fraser’s 
invoice to the NWC shows that Izod supplied the London firm with copper kettles to the 
value of £439.192 The HBC did consider returning to provincial suppliers however. In 
1793, the Company made an application to the Mines Royal Company for their prices of 
brass and copper kettles, which had mines and smelters in Cumberland and Cardiganshire, 
and it is known that the Mines Royal were one of the sources of the EIC’s copper 
exports.193 While the HBC Committee decided not to award their patronage to the Mines 
Royal due to the ‘considerably lower’ prices of Thomas Izod, it is clear that the Company 
was actively considering provincial sources of supply.194 In 1817, the HBC passed its 
kettle contract to Shelton & Son and the firm held it to at least 1821 (£2,504). It is 
significant that the Company and McTavish, Fraser seem to have chosen to do business 
directly with manufacturers and not merchants or wholesalers when purchasing their trade 
kettles. This decision no doubt reflected the specialised nature of the trade: the need to 
meet the exacting standards demanded by Aboriginal consumers and ensure that the 
exported commodities were suitable for the cold climes of North America.  
Of all the commodities that the Company exported to Hudson’s Bay, it was the 
quality of the supplied armaments and metalwares that were most susceptible to the 
challenging local environment. Gun-making was one of London’s pre-eminent industries, 
and the Company exclusively sourced its guns from two metropolitan gunsmiths; William 
Wilson & Son, gun-makers at 154 Minories, and Edward Bond, gunsmith at 59 Lombard 
Street and 31 Nicholas Lane, respectively supplied £34,732 and £5,807 worth of guns to 
the Company between 1783 and 1821. The quality of the exported guns was always a 
central concern for the Company as any faults in the metalwork could be rendered more 
serious by the low temperatures in Hudson’s Bay. Armourers were stationed at the 
Company’s posts to maintain quality control and they were also checked prior to export 
by an experienced gun inspector.195 From the winter of 1815 onwards, Edward James 
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Bond continued his late father’s role as the Company’s ‘Inspector of Guns’.196 As in the 
case of blankets, knives, and other commodities, the Company showed great loyalty to 
those who supplied the Company with high-quality guns. For instance, upon attending a 
general meeting at Hudson’s Bay House, William Wilson ‘received additional orders to 
make as many of the better kind of locks for the guns intended for the Factories the 
ensuing season as he possibly can’.197  
The lead and shot supplied to the HBC was not sourced direct from manufacturers 
but it is highly probable that most of these articles came from the north-east of England. 
Indeed, the Company’s principal supplier of lead and shot over the period was John Locke 
& Co. of London who sold the manufactured lead goods produced by Locke, Blackett & 
Co. of Newcastle, and much of the lead used by this northern firm no doubt came from 
the colliery owned by the Blackett family in Wylam, Northumberland.198 The Company 
purchased lead and shot to the value of £10,078 from Locke & Co. between 1797 and 
1821. Prior to this, the Company’s lead shot was produced in London, as Freeman & Co., 
lead merchants and shot-makers at 24 Mark Lane, held the Company’s lead contract in 
1783-96 (£6,567).199 By the second decade of the nineteenth century there appears to have 
been competitive bidding for the Company’s orders, as alternative suppliers managed to 
briefly wrestle the contract away from John Locke. Thomas Preston & Co. held the 
contract for the years 1808-9 (£1,478), Bowring, Lockner & Co. for 1811 (£405), and 
Walker, Maltby & Co. for 1819 (£615). Many of these firms also supplied the EIC, and 
in 1820, Walker, Maltby supplied Inglis, Ellice and McTavish Fraser with £126 and £319 
worth of lead and shot respectively.200  
Quality control was also a key concern for the Company when it came to 
ironmongery. There were nine ironmongers who supplied the Company over the period 
but the most significant of these was Moreton & Foster who supplied the Company for 
16 years between 1806 and 1821 (£13,868). On 13 December 1809, Foster of the firm 
Moreton & Foster attended a general meeting to answer the complaints that the 
Company’s servants had made against the hatchets, ice chisels, and other goods supplied 
by them.201 Thereafter, a representative of Moreton & Foster appear to have attended a 
                                                 
196 HBCA, A.1/51, London Minute Book, 1814-8, fo. 43a. 
197 HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute Book, 1805-10, fo. 55. 
198 D. J. Rowe, Lead Manufacturing in Britain: a history (London: Croom Helm, 1983), pp. 122-7, 148. 
199 Kent’s Directory, 51st Edition (1783). 
200 HBCA, F.4/20, North West Company — Account Book, 1820, fos. 1, 16; and Bowen, ‘Sinews’, pp. 481-
2. 
201 HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute Book, 1805-10, fo. 108. 
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committee meeting each year ‘to receive instructions respecting the hatchets, nails &c to 
be sent to the Bay’, such as on 18 March 1812 in the case of a Mr Cook.202 As Carlos and 
Lewis have shown, the Company made many attempts to improve the quality of the 
supplied metal products during the first three-quarters of the eighteenth-century.203 The 
early metal products that were sent to the Bay proved highly susceptible to the sub-arctic 
climate, where winter conditions were far more severe than in England.204 Any cracks in 
the metal surface made such tools especially brittle, as when water froze in the cracks it 
weakened their structure. To combat this, higher quality items were sourced and some 
metal items were crafted by smiths at the Company’s posts but it appears that, in the case 
of Moreton & Foster at least, the Company closely worked with its suppliers to make sure 
that they produced metalwares that could withstand the severe cold.205 Unfortunately, it 
cannot be said with certainty as to the origins of the hatchets, ice chisels, nails, and 
bayonets that Moreton & Foster supplied to the Company, but by 1783, most of the 
hardware and iron products retailed in London were most probably made by manufactures 
in Birmingham rather than metropolitan craftsmen.206  
Glass beads are another item whose origins are unclear. The Company sourced glass 
beads from two main suppliers. The majority were purchased from Robert Vigne & Sons, 
merchants at 1 Coleman Street Buildings, London, and they held a contract for 29 years 
from 1783-1811 (£5,130).207 In 1812, Joseph Philips & Sons took on the Company’s bead 
orders and they fulfilled them until at least 1821 (£1,263). One of the varieties purchased 
by the Company around 1750 was known as ‘barleycorn’, and this bead had its origins in 
mid-eighteenth century Venice. 208  Indeed, existing studies of the fur trade usually 
attribute Venice, Bohemia, or the Low Countries as the place of manufacture for the beads 
that were used in the fur trade.209 In light of the expansion of British glassmaking in the 
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the notable innovations that occurred in 
many British industries at this time, the view that all of the glass beads used in the Atlantic 
                                                 
202 A.1/50, London Minute Book, 1810-4, fo. 56. 
203 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, pp. 97-9. 
204 Ibid., pp. 97-9. 
205 Ibid., pp. 98-9. 
206 Barnett, Hub of the Industrial Revolution, p. 164. 
207 Kent’s Directory, 51st Edition (1783). 
208 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, p. 105. Barleycorn were ‘small, round beads in white, black, and more 
rarely blue’. See Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, p. 219. 
209 Burley, Hamilton, and Fladmark, Prophecy of the Swan, pp. 113-6; Donald Scott Crull, ‘The Economy 
and Archaeology of European-made Glass Beads and Manufactured Goods Used in First Contact 
Situations in Oregon, California and Washington’, PhD Thesis (University of Sheffield, 1997), pp. 16-
30; and Quimby, Indian Culture, p. 82. 
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fur trade were European imports is questionable.210 It is certainly possible that at least 
some of the beads purchased by the Company were manufactured in Britain. David 
Barnett notes that Vigne, Neave, Winscote & Walker had a large-scale glass bottle 
manufactory in Southwark in 1774.211 Was this the same Vigne whom the Company 
purchased their glass beads from and which Kent’s Directory (1783) listed as a 
‘merchant’? Thomas Birch’s History of the Royal Society of London (1760) notes that 
attempts were made to produce blue beads ‘much esteemed by those of Guinea’ as early 
as 1680, but while the colour could be successfully replicated, the strength and durability 
could not.212 By 1764, glass beads were still imported from Italy but the Society for the 
Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce issued a premium on 11 April 1764 
in order to promote their production:  
251. To the Person who shall produce to the Society, on or before the first 
Tuesday in March 1765, the greatest Quantity and Variety of Glass Bugles 
or Beads, made in England or Wales, fit for the African, American, and 
Asiatic Trade; the nearest in Goodness and Quality to those imported from 
Italy, and which may be afforded as cheap for Exportation; not less than 
one hundred and half weight; fifty Guineas.213 
It is unclear as to whether this attempt was successful. Around 1797, artificial pearls made 
out of glass and filled with wax were still supposedly imported into Britain from 
manufactories in France and possibly the Netherlands and Germany.214 On 4 October 
1814, however, an article in The Times noted that ‘while the Slave Trade was lawful in 
England, great quantities of glass beads were manufactured here of a sort not used in this 
country, or in any other part of the world than Africa, but which were largely exported to 
the continent, where they were greedily purchased by the natives’.215 If glass beads were 
specifically manufactured in Britain for the slave trade then it seems plausible that at least 
some of the glass beads that were used in the fur trade after 1765 were also British 
manufactures. 
                                                 
210 In particular, see Berg, Luxury and Pleasure, especially pp. 111-92; and Geoffrey Edwards, Art of Glass: 
Glass in the Collection of the National Gallery of Victoria (Melbourne: National Gallery of Victoria, 
1998), pp. 100-33. 
211 Barnett, Hub of the Industrial Revolution, p. 104. 
212 Thomas Birch, The History of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 4 (London, 1760), p. 34. 
213 Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufacturers and Commerce, Premiums Offered by the Society 
Instituted in London for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufacturers and Commerce (London, 1764), p. 
54. 
214 John Beckmann, A History of Inventions and Discoveries, Vol. 2, trans. William Johnson (London: 
Printed for J. Bell, No. 148, Oxford Street, 1797), pp. 1-20. 
215 The Times, 4 October 1814. 
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What is certain from this study is that quality was a defining feature of the HBC’s 
export procurement between 1783 and 1821. Indeed, in a letter to William Auld and the 
Council at Churchill Factory on 25 May 1803, the Company stated that: 
Our articles of trade from their superior quality will we are persuaded 
command a preference. The cloth and blankets are superior to any we ever 
before sent to the Bay, and particular attention has been paid to every other 
article.216 
Sourcing high-quality commodity exports was, therefore, a key way in which the 
Company sought to ensure that Aboriginal peoples traded with the Company rather than 
its competitors. The search for quality largely defined the suppliers with whom the 
Company did business, but these were pragmatic transactions as the Company sought to 
acquire such goods on the best possible terms and from those who could timely fulfil their 
orders. The Company’s woollen cloth continued to be supplied by factors at Blackwell 
Hall but early in the nineteenth century it is apparent that Yorkshire woollens were 
favoured over those from the West Country. In the case of blankets, Brazil tobacco, 
knives, and silver ornaments, the Company established direct connections with merchants 
and manufacturers outside of London. The Company also seems to have, at the very least, 
acquired its exported guns and kettles direct from manufacturers rather than through 
intermediaries. The concern over quality can also be seen in the provisions that were 
supplied to the Company’s servants. The types of meat that the Company exported to 
Hudson’s Bay mainly consisted of beef, pork, and bacon, although veal and mutton were 
also occasionally sent out, and these were to be of ‘the very best quality’, as was the 
exported beer.217 The Company’s preference for Jamaica rum over Leeward Island rum 
was also largely determined by quality.218 The reason why the Company supplied its 
servants with high-quality provisions was because it needed to keep these servants loyal 
to the Company and to encourage them to renew their contracts. This was especially 
important during the period of this study, as the Company sought to expand its inland 
operations. For similar reasons, the Company also attempted to satisfy its servants 
requests for particular commodities, which is an aspect that chapter six explores in detail. 
The discerning tastes of Aboriginal communities in North America ultimately fed 
the Company’s desire to source high-quality trade items. In order to meet the exacting 
                                                 
216 HBCA, A.6/16, London Correspondence Book Outwards — Official, 1796-1803, fo. 185. 
217 For instance, see HBCA, A.1/48, London Minute Book, 1799-1805, fo. 39; and HBCA, A.1/49, London 
Minute Book, 1805-10, fos. 57-8. 
218 HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute Book, 1805-10, fo. 16. 
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standards demanded by indigenous peoples, the Company collected commercial 
intelligence on the commodity specifications that most appealed to these communities. 
Carlos and Lewis have shown that during the first three-quarters of the eighteenth century 
the Company’s officers compiled detailed reports on what Aboriginal peoples thought of 
the commodities that the Company offered for sale, which were then delivered to 
Hudson’s Bay House. 219  Such information continued to be gathered after 1783. On 
occasion it was necessary to directly communicate this market intelligence to 
manufacturers. This was most notably the case for the knives and silver ‘trinkets’ that 
George Russell of Birmingham supplied to the Company. It is likely that at least one of 
the designs that Russell was asked to manufacture was based on a description of a scene 
that had been sent from Albany Factory to London in 1796.220 The order was for gorgets 
and asked that they be engraved ‘to represent Albany (fort), two or three houses, some 
Indian tents and Indian Men and Women’. 221  Furthermore, on 4 May 1803, the 
Committee ‘ordered a few silver earrings to be made according to the pattern sent from 
Albany by Mr Robert Goodwin’.222 This again shows that the Company collected and 
responded to market information gathered in Hudson’s Bay but it also suggests that the 
Company was still in the early stages of establishing the types of silver ornaments that 
would appeal to Aboriginal communities. The designs that Russell crafted onto the 
‘Indian knives’ no doubt also derived from patterns sent from Hudson’s Bay. In the case 
of haberdashery (particularly ribbons) and glass beads, the Company sent out pattern 
books so that the officers in Hudson’s Bay could identify the styles that most appealed to 
indigenous peoples.223 For instance, on 28 January 1795, the Committee ordered 20lbs. 
of large black beads for York Factory on the recommendation of the post’s master.224 
Like Bowen has shown for the EIC then, the HBC was proficient at collecting commercial 
intelligence and actively used this information to direct its export procurement.225 
                                                 
219 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, pp. 96-103. 
220 Quimby, Indian Culture, p. 96; and HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fo. 82. 
221 Quimby, Indian Culture, p. 96. 
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IV.   Conclusion 
Unlike previous studies that have focused on the meanings that Aboriginal peoples in 
North America attached to certain commodities imported from Europe, this chapter has 
analysed how the discerning tastes of these communities shaped the HBC’s supply 
network. The Company’s search for high-quality commodity exports often led the 
Company to form close, long-lasting relationships with a wide range of tradespeople who 
proved themselves capable of meeting the intricate demands of the fur trade. In the case 
of the Company’s woollen cloth — the principal export to Hudson’s Bay — the Company 
relied upon the connections of London cloth factors to source high-quality textiles. In 
other cases, the Company moved beyond the capital and established direct connections 
with provincial manufacturers in Birmingham and Witney to ensure that its knives, silver 
ornaments, and blankets were suitable for the fur trade. The Company also established 
contacts with overseas merchants in Lisbon in order to guarantee a supply of high-quality 
Brazil tobacco. The Company’s guns, kettles, and other metal products seemingly came 
direct from manufacturers rather than intermediaries, which was in part necessitated by 
the need to adapt these goods to the challenging sub-arctic temperatures of Hudson’s Bay. 
For each of the Company’s exports, these commodity specifications were informed by 
market intelligence gathered in Hudson’s Bay and relayed to Fenchurch Street. While the 
Company continued to use London intermediaries to source is woollen broadcloth, 
whereas the Canada merchants were apparently more receptive to the new merchant-
manufacturers, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the Company did move away 
from the West Country textile industry at the beginning of the nineteenth century and 
towards the more innovative Yorkshire manufacturers. In contrast to the EIC, therefore, 
the HBC was not inclined to support ailing parts of the British textile industry after 1800, 
no doubt because the Company had no need for manufacturers to help defend the 
Company’s Charter or since the Yorkshire woollen industry — through its participation 
in the Anglo-American trade — was better placed to meet the exact specifications that 
the fur trade required than was the case in the trade to Asia. 
The reason why British merchants and manufacturers did not seek to end the HBC’s 
Charter in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was largely because the 
market that the fur trade provided for British manufactures was so small. Yet, the fact that 
the HBC and Canada merchants provided British merchants and manufacturers with 
effective access to the fur trade was another reason why these groups did not call for trade 
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reform. Indeed, in the early nineteenth century, British manufacturers challenged the 
EIC’s monopoly precisely because they believed that they could better access the Indian 
market through an open trade. In the case of the fur trade, therefore, there was an absence 
of a key agent of change that could have campaigned for an end of the HBC’s Charter, or 
against the emergence of monopoly in the trade in 1821. 
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4 
A Metropolitan Monopoly: Auctions and Re-exports 
 
This chapter shifts the analytical focus to the metropolitan auctions at which the HBC and 
the so-called ‘Canada merchants’ sold their furs and the impact of the auction sales on 
the fortunes of the HBC and NWC. British and foreign brokers, furriers, hatters, and other 
manufacturers gathered in these salerooms to bid on lots of the many different types of 
North Atlantic furs. The diverse and ever-changing fashions for fur-using apparel across 
Britain, Europe, and Asia, meant that each type of fur had its own distinct market. As was 
shown in chapter two, Britain’s colonies in North America supplied large volumes of furs 
that, for the most part, far surpassed domestic demand. In consequence, London was a 
major entrêpot for the fur trade. However, dependence on the re-export trade exposed the 
HBC and the Canada merchants to the dislocations that the French and Napoleonic Wars 
brought to international trade. 
Unfortunately, little is known about the distribution and sale of furs in London 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The most detailed exploration 
of this part of the commodity trade has been provided by E. E. Rich in his classic two-
volume history of the HBC. Despite the book’s focus on the HBC, Rich provides a more 
thorough discussion of the NWC’s fur sales, such as the closed private deals with German 
furriers and the so-called ‘Adventure to China’, whereby furs were clandestinely exported 
from Montreal to Canton via New York.1  While Rich’s study provides a wealth of 
information, the metropolitan aspect of the fur trade appears only as an appendage to the 
grand narrative of the struggle between the two companies in North America. Ann Carlos 
has also considered the two companies’ sales mechanisms and has provided a more 
extensive quantitative assessment of the revenues they provided. 2  Whereas Carlos’s 
analysis sheds much light on the HBC’s fur sales between 1804 and 1821, her hypothesis 
that the HBC’s contractual use of the London market placed it at a disadvantage to the 
                                                 
1 For instance, see Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 190-2, 201-2, 206-11. 
2 See Carlos, Duopoly, especially pp. 100-8. 
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NWC — whose trade was supposedly more flexible and depended upon a more diverse 
array of markets — is questionable.3 The extant literature has not considered in detail 
whether differences between the two companies’ sales network had any bearing upon the 
extension of the HBC’s Charter in 1821. Did the sales strategies pursued by the two 
companies, and the structure of the distribution networks established to enact these 
approaches, enable one concern to better navigate the wartime disruption to international 
markets? Were the buyers of the companies’ furs satisfied with the sales process and is 
there any evidence to suggest that they pressured the two establishments to cease their 
rivalry? Why, despite the rise of the British outports, did the fur trade remain a 
metropolitan monopoly? 
The chapter seeks an answer to these questions over three sections. The first uses 
re-export data in the British customs’ records to establish the scale and composition of 
the British re-export trade in furs, and these figures are combined with import data to 
ascertain the demand for furs in the British domestic market.4 This analysis shows that 
while the Napoleonic Wars set in motion a profound and enduring decline in the British 
re-export trade in furs, the Hudson’s Bay and Montreal fur trades were, at the very least, 
equally disadvantaged by the wartime disruption to European markets. In fact, due to the 
scale of its trade, and thus its dependence on the re-export trade, it is likely that the NWC 
was actually more exposed to market instability. The second section explores the sale and 
distribution networks established by the two companies. The HBC sold its furs solely on 
the London market in a routine way that was transparent to buyers. On the other hand, the 
London Houses that sold the NWC’s furs, while initially committed to the use of public 
sales, increasingly moved towards concluding private deals with large-scale furriers from 
the 1790s onwards. While the extant literature views the NWC’s loose and flexible 
business networks as a boon to the Company, it is argued here that this system, like the 
HBC’s open auctions, emerged because of the scale of the two concerns’ trade and did 
not necessarily reward either enterprise with a particular advantage. The final section 
sheds light on the metropolitan buyers of furs, primarily through the use of the HBC’s 
sales accounts.5 Analysis of these account books reveals that the re-export trade in furs 
                                                 
3 Ibid., p. 107. 
4 TNA, CUST 4/5-16, Ledgers of imports under countries, 1809-21; CUST 8/1-14, Ledgers of exports of 
British merchandise under countries, 1812-21; CUST 10/1-12, Ledgers of exports of foreign and 
colonial merchandise under countries, 1809-21; and CUST 17/8-30, States of navigation, commerce 
and revenue, 1783-1808. 
5 HBCA, A.48/6-7, Fur Sale Books, 1770-1810. 
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was dominated by a few large-scale German furriers. The role of two London livery 
companies — the Feltmakers’ Company and the Skinners’ Company — whose members 
were heavily involved in the treating of furs and the manufacture of fur-related apparel, 
is also examined. There is little evidence that any of these groups were dissatisfied with 
either the HBC’s or Canada merchants’ conduct of the fur trade. The absence of 
discontent amongst the companies’ buyers suggests that open competition on the London 
market between the Hudson’s Bay and Montreal fur trades helped the HBC to avoid 
criticism and thus helped facilitate the maintenance of the Company’s Charter.  
I.   The Re-Export Trade 
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was a volatile period for British 
overseas trade. War in Europe and America caused considerable distress for many firms 
involved in Atlantic commerce and the difficulties were probably greater for those 
merchants engaged in the Baltic, Mediterranean, and North Sea trades. The protracted 
conflict ruined many mercantile fortunes and, while overseas trade swiftly recovered 
following news of decisive military victories or the restoration of peace, two decades of 
near-perpetual warfare initiated a long-term increase in British domestic demand for 
particular types of furs. Many of the furs imported via Hudson’s Bay and Canada were 
largely destined for use in overseas markets. Usually furs were exported in their raw or 
‘undressed’ state, meaning that the skins had not yet been processed into a form that was 
suitable for manufacture into articles of apparel.6 From 1783 to 1821, the official value 
of foreign and colonial ‘undressed furs’ re-exported from Britain averaged £59,259 each 
year, whereas the value of the ‘dressed furs’ re-exported was only £2,666.7 In addition, 
the value of British ‘undressed furs’ annually re-exported was only £2,826.  
Figure 4.1 shows the annual official value of undressed furs re-exported from 
Britain to all parts of the world. The graph clearly shows that British fur re-exports 
declined over the period but the decrease in trade only became permanent after 1806. 
From 1783 to 1794 re-exports steadily increased and they were particularly high in 1792 
when they amounted to an official value of £123,000. 8  Between 1795 and 1806 
                                                 
6 Henry Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals in Nature and in Commerce (London: Gurney & Jackson, 1892), pp. 
xlv-xlvii. 
7 These figures discount livestock skins, swan skins, and dogfish. Calculated from TNA, CUST 10/1-12, 
Ledgers of exports of foreign and colonial merchandise under countries, 1809-21; and CUST 17/8-30, 
States of navigation, commerce and revenue, 1783-1808. 
8 See Figure 4.1. 
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fluctuations in re-exports were more pronounced but the volume of trade was usually 
around £60,000. Re-exports were especially low after 1806, when Napoleon’s 
Continental Blockade severely hampered British overseas trade, and the trade did not 
recover to pre-1806 levels following the signing of peace in 1815. Figure 4.1 also 
delineates the countries and regions to which the furs were re-exported. By far the most 
important market for re-exports was ‘Germany’. While Germany was yet to emerge as a 
nation state, the British customs’ records used this label to refer to the many territories of 
the Holy Roman Empire and, after the Congress of Vienna (1815), the German 
Confederation. When access to this principal market was impeded during the Napoleonic 
Wars, Poland, Prussia, and Sweden (referred to as the ‘Baltic’ in Figure 4.1), Denmark 
and Norway, and the small island of Heligoland in the North Sea were used as alternative 
routes through which to access blockaded markets. Re-exports to Russia remained 
important throughout the whole period, although they were much smaller than those to 
Germany. Asia (China) was also a major market in certain years, especially in 1788-95, 
1801, and 1812. France absorbed an official value of over £15,000 in 1785 and 1786, but 
re-exports did not return to these levels after the war.  
Overall averages of the annual official values which are contained in Table 4.1 show 
that Germany received 55 per cent (£31,952) of the total re-exports. Germany’s share of 
re-exports peaked at 85 per cent (£61,084) in 1798-1802 and they came close to this 
proportion again in 1818-21 when they comprised 76 per cent (£29,019). On average, 12 
per cent (£7,185) of re-exports were shipped to Russia. One quarter (£6,435) of the re-
exports went to Russia in 1814-7 and this was the largest share of re-exports to this market 
over the period. Around 5 per cent of re-exports were each sent to Asia, the Baltic, 
Denmark and Norway, France, and Ireland, although it was more often the case that very 
low volumes were conveyed to these destinations. Re-exports to the Low Countries and 
Mediterranean were exceptionally small.  
It is evident from this initial survey of the re-export data that German agents played 
a critical role in the British fur trade at this time. Several German towns performed key 
intermediary functions for the trade. Hamburg served as the main port through which furs 
were distributed to the inland commercial centres of Frankfurt and Leipzig and both of 
these interior cities hosted seasonal trade fairs where large volumes of furs were 
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exchanged. 9 With three rendezvous each year, the Leipzig Fair was the more important 
and these took place at New Year, Easter, and Michaelmas. 10  Indeed, Leipzig first 
developed into the European centre of the fur trade in the fifteenth century and retained 
this importance well into the twentieth century.11 With this well-established system of 
trade, German merchants would have had their own extensive European networks with 
which to subvert Napoleon’s Continental Blockade. At Leipzig, furs from North America 
were sold alongside those trapped in Siberia but by the end of the eighteenth century the 
Russian fur trade largely served the Chinese market.12 In effect, therefore, German and 
Russian intermediaries allowed the HBC and Canada merchants to bypass the EIC’s 
monopoly of the trade to Canton. In addition to Leipzig, Saxony was also home to the 
furriers of Weissenfels who were well-known for their skill in dressing beaver, cat, 
muskrat (known to contemporaries as musquash), and squirrel skins.13 There were no 
doubt several other German principalities that developed their own specialised 
manufacturing industries to process undressed furs.  
The customs’ ledgers individually recorded the re-export of each fur type, which 
allows for a more detailed analysis of market demand for furs. Figure 4.2 shows the 
annual official value of the principal furs re-exported from Britain to all parts of the world. 
The graph reveals that the decline in the trade of deer was the central reason for the fall 
in re-exports over the period.14 After 1783, deer re-exports increased substantially and 
routinely reached an official value of over £30,000 at the turn of the nineteenth century. 
Re-exports peaked at £45,456 in 1805 but in 1806 they totalled over £20,000 for the final 
time. Thereafter, British deer re-exports rapidly declined. US merchants may have 
expanded and carried on their own deer trade to Europe after this date but worsening 
Anglo-American relations and Napoleon’s Continental Blockade no doubt severely 
restricted such an endeavour. Decline in the re-export trade was not limited to deer 
however. Few beaver were re-exported after 1795 and the trade in bear dropped off 
around 1806. Marten and mink were always a major part of the re-export trade but there 
                                                 
9 A letter from McTavish, Fraser to McTavish, Frobisher specifically mentions the arranging of a public 
auction so that the furs would be able to make the ‘Leipzig Fair’. See ‘McTavish, Fraser & Co. to 
McTavish, Frobisher & Co.’ 1 February 1800, HBCA, F.3/2, North West Company — Correspondence 
etc., 1800-27, fos. 5-6. Also see Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals, pp. liv-lvi. 
10 Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals, p. liv. 
11 Fisher, Russian Fur Trade, pp. 15, 196-7. 
12  Ibid., pp. 208-9; and Alexander Etkind, Internal Colonization: Russia’s Imperial Experience 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), pp. 83-4. 
13 Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals, pp. xlvi-xlvii. 
14 See chapter two for a discussion of the decline of the deer trade. 
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was no notable increase in the volumes of the former at the end of the period, despite the 
growth in marten imports as was formerly documented in chapter two.  
The re-export data make clear that deer made up the largest share of the fur re-
exports (Table 4.2). On average each year, an official value of £17,364 deer was re-
exported, which accounted for 30 per cent of all undressed fur re-exports. Otter was the 
second highest at £7,327 (13 per cent), followed by beaver at £6,407 (11 per cent) and 
marten at £6,373 (11 per cent). The share of the re-export trade made up by beaver, deer, 
and marten varied most, and the others remained largely stable over the period.15 Despite 
the decline in trade, the share of deer in the fur re-export trade was always high. Deer 
composed around 40 per cent of re-exports between 1793 and 1807 before returning to 
pre-1793 levels in 1808-21 (around 20 per cent). Beaver’s share of the trade was around 
17 per cent between 1783 and 1797 before subsequently falling to around 4 per cent for 
the rest of the period, excepting a temporary improvement in 1814-7. In addition, re-
exports of marten became more important after 1808 and constituted over one-quarter of 
total re-exports in 1818-21.16 In fact marten, alongside the always small re-export of seal, 
were the only two furs that were re-exported in larger quantities at the end of the period 
than at the beginning. In 1783-7, the official value of the martens re-exported totalled 
£6,619. By the end of the period, the value was almost one-third higher at £9,776.17 All 
other fur re-exports decreased: musquash (by 96 per cent), beaver (89 per cent), bear (69 
per cent), deer (51 per cent), raccoon (46 per cent), wolf (44 per cent), other (23 per cent), 
mink (21 per cent), and otter (18 per cent).18 In essence, 1788-1802 were the peak years 
of the British re-export trade in furs and all but the trade in marten and seal declined over 
the period.  
Of course the re-export trade in undressed furs was heavily influenced by the 
demand for furs within the British home market, which helped to shape several of the key 
characteristics of the re-export trade. Table 4.3 shows the average annual number of the 
main furs that were imported into Britain and retained for domestic use. Analysis of these 
retained imports reveals new insights into the scale and scope of British domestic demand 
for furs. Of the 11 types of fur listed in Table 4.3, four were largely for use within Britain. 
These were seal, beaver, deer, and musquash. While the Hudson’s Bay and Montreal fur 
                                                 
15 See Table 4.2. 
16 See Table 4.2. 
17 See Table 4.2. 
18 Calculated from data contained in Table 4.2. 
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trades did not supply much seal to Britain, it is important to note that British demand for 
this fur was exceptionally high.19 95 per cent of the seal imported into Britain was retained 
for domestic use and the number of seal retained quadrupled over the period, rising from 
an annual average of 86,645 in 1783-7 to 348,000 in 1818-21.20 Newfoundland and the 
‘South Whale Fishery’ (the South Atlantic and Southern Pacific Oceans) supplied the vast 
majority of Britain’s seal imports. In 1821, 242,000 seal were imported into Britain from 
Newfoundland, which comprised 43 per cent of all seal imports, and the southern fisheries 
accounted for another 36 per cent (205,000).21 Considering that seals are larger in size 
than beavers and the fact that sealskin was so highly esteemed by furriers, seal was 
evidently a hugely important fur on the British market at this time.22 The seal trade also 
continued to expand at a time when the continental furs imported from North America 
were in decline.  
British demand for beaver was similarly high with over four-fifths used 
domestically. While the average annual quantity of retained beaver furs peaked in 1798-
1802 at 165,000, the volume dipped below 100,000 in 1814-21.23 From 1783 to 1797, 
around 70 per cent of the beaver was retained in Britain but after 1798 the share was 
routinely above 90 per cent. 24  This situation was in complete contrast to the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries when beaver imported into Britain was largely 
re-exported to Russia.25 Indeed, when British, French, and Dutch merchants first started 
to acquire beaver from North America their home countries did not contain tradespeople 
who possessed the knowledge of how to separate beaver wool from the pelts’ long guard 
hairs. A complex trading system thus emerged whereby beaver from the Atlantic trade 
was shipped to Russia for processing and then later exported back to Western Europe 
where the beaver wool was made into the latest fashions of beaver and felt hats. In the 
1720s, this multilateral trade slowly withered away as the art of ‘combing’ the beaver 
wool from the pelt was acquired by French and British hatters. 26  Alongside the 
                                                 
19 No seals were imported from Hudson’s Bay between 1783 and 1821, and for the same period, imports of 
seal from Canada only made up 3 per cent of the total quantity retained for domestic use. This percentage 
was calculated from data in TNA, CUST 4/5-16, Ledgers of imports under countries, 1809-21; TNA, 
CUST 10/1-12, Ledgers of exports of foreign and colonial merchandise under countries, 1809-1821; 
and CUST 17/8-30, States of navigation, commerce and revenue, 1783-1808. 
20 See Table 4.3. 
21 TNA, CUST 4/16, Ledgers of imports under countries, 1821. 
22 Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals, pp. 192-4. 
23 See Table 4.3. 
24 See Table 4.3. 
25 See Rich, ‘Russia’, pp. 307-28. 
26 Ibid., pp. 327-8. 
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technological innovation of ‘carroting’, which is discussed in the next chapter, the 
conquest of New France in 1763 greatly aided the manufacture of beaver and felt hats in 
Britain by providing the industry with a ready supply of beaver fur and by limiting that 
available to French hatters.27 The British hat industry was certainly a key reason why such 
a large share of British beaver imports were retained for domestic use.  
On average, 63 per cent of the imported deer were retained from 1783-1821, apart 
from the blockade years (1808-12) when the proportion reached 80 per cent.28 The total 
number of retained deer did fall over the period however. At their height in 1783-7, 
313,000 of the imported deer were annually used in Britain but by the end of the period 
it was only 54,474.29 Despite the fivefold reduction in the quantity retained, the fact that 
the proportion of deer used domestically did not generally change suggests that the 
demand for deerskin contracted not just in Britain but across Europe as a whole. This is 
probably because consumers began to favour cotton trousers over deerskin breeches after 
1800, and sealskin as a material for slippers and other footwear.30  
Musquash was the final fur that was predominately used within Britain (54 per 
cent).31 It is difficult to estimate retained imports for this fur, as well as for marten, mink, 
otter, and raccoon in that calculated figures are negative, meaning that more was re-
exported than was originally imported. There are several possible explanations. The first 
is that the customs’ data includes domestic sources of fur. This could not, however, 
account for the negative values for retained imports of musquash and raccoon as these 
were species that were exclusive to North America.32 Likewise, the European mink never 
colonised England.33 Pine martens, stone martens, and otters were present in eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century England but as the figures in question run into several thousand it 
is unlikely that domestic trapping would account for the discrepancy.34 For instance, the 
11 years of data collected by Murray Lawson between the years 1700 and 1775 suggests 
that very few, if any, martens were exported from England.35 Lawson’s data also shows 
that exports of English otter are unlikely to have distorted the figures as only 1,193 
                                                 
27 On the process of ‘carroting’ see Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, pp. 21-2. 
28 See Table 4.3. 
29 See Table 4.3. 
30 Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, pp. 87-8; and Styles, Dress of the People, pp. 39, 87-8. 
31 See Table 4.3. 
32 Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals, pp. 150, 259-62. 
33 Ibid., pp. 118-20. 
34 Ibid., pp. 104-7, 143. 
35 Out of the 11 years stated between 1700 and 1775, Lawson’s tabulations only show exports of English 
martens in 1700 (50 martens) and 1725 (89 martens). See Lawson, Fur, p. 95. 
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English otters were, on average, exported each year during the first three-quarters of the 
eighteenth century compared to 4,627 more otters being exported in 1803-7 than imported 
(Table 4.3).36 It is, unfortunately, unclear as to whether Lawson’s ‘English’ fur exports 
include Scottish exports. In the case of the small furs of marten, musquash, and mink, the 
discrepancy may be because of a private trade by the HBC’s servants and ship captains.37 
For instance, in 1786 the Committee discovered that Captain John Richards had been 
smuggling furs into England.38 Private trade by the HBC’s employees cannot explain why 
the customs’ data show that more raccoon was exported than imported however, as this 
trade was centred further south in the Great Lakes region. Considering that the Canadian 
fur trade was larger than the HBC’s trade between 1783 and 1821, it seems unlikely that 
private trade by HBC servants would alter the conclusions drawn here. 
These problems do not obscure the general pattern of trade for musquash furs. Prior 
to 1802, a maximum of 30 per cent of the imported furs were retained for domestic use. 
This changed after 1803 as both the share and volume of the retained musquash rose. By 
1818-21, 97 per cent of the imported musquash was used in Britain and an average of 
239,000 were retained each year as opposed to 40,861 in 1783-7.39 It seems that these 
furs were primarily used to make felt for the hatting industry, as according to Henry 
Poland’s late-nineteenth-century treatise on the furriers’ craft, the first individual to have 
used musquash in the dressing of garments was his namesake Sir William Henry Poland 
(1797-1884).40 Hatters in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries may therefore 
have used musquash as a substitute for the declining supply of beaver, an assumption that 
is tested in the next chapter through an analysis of the surviving records of hat 
manufacturers.  
In the case of the other furs, re-exports were greater than retained imports. None of 
these furs were used to make felt but were largely fashioned into other apparel such as 
boas, muffs, cloaks, and coats, or were used to trim the outer edges of garments or line 
their interiors. On average, around two-fifths of the fox and bear, and one-third of the 
                                                 
36 Ibid., p. 96. 
37 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 102-3. On private trade by the HBC’s servants also see Burley, 
Servants, pp. 144-51; and Gerhard Ens, ‘The Political Economy of the “Private Trade” on the Hudson 
Bay: The Example of Moose Factory, 1741-1744’, in Bruce G. Trigger, Toby Morantz, Lousie Dechene, 
eds., Le Castor Fait Tout: Selected Papers of the Fifth North American Fur Trade Conference, 1985 
(Montreal: Lake St. Louis Historical Society, 1987), pp. 382-410. 
38 Burley, Servants, pp. 144-5. 
39 See Table 4.3. 
40 Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals, pp. 261-2. 
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wolf were retained. In total, retained imports of marten (16 per cent), raccoon, (13 per 
cent), mink (7 per cent), and otter (4 per cent) comprised much smaller shares. While this 
was not the case for otter, more of the marten, mink, and raccoon was retained towards 
the end of the period. Only 13 per cent of the marten was retained in 1783-7 but just over 
half was in 1814-7 and more than a third was in 1818-21.41 By the end of the period, the 
total number of martens used domestically was around five times higher than it had been 
in 1783-7. British demand for mink followed a similar pattern. Three times as many mink 
were retained in 1818-21 (9,246) as were in 1783-7 (3,495). The proportions retained in 
1814-7 (22 per cent) and 1818-21 (31 per cent) were also greater than in 1783-7 (12 per 
cent). The trend for raccoon was near-identical to that of marten and mink. Most of the 
imported otter skins were re-exported elsewhere. Indeed, the peak in retained otter 
imports was in 1783-7 when they numbered 8,071. The beginning of the period was also 
when otter composed their greatest share of total imports (26 per cent).42  
Four key characteristics of the British demand for furs emerge from this survey of 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The first was the need for large volumes 
of beaver and musquash for the production of beaver and felt hats. Indeed, it is likely that 
Britain was the world’s principal producer of these manufactures. Second, there was a 
high demand for sealskin, an article whose use expanded over the period. Seal-dressers 
emerged to prepare the imported seal and the dyeing part of this process became a British 
speciality.43 Sealskin was used in the production of luxury clothing and accessories such 
as for slippers, muffs, and tippets. Beaver was also used in this way. Third, the British 
market used a great quantity of deerskin for the making of men’s breeches, although 
demand for this waned in the early nineteenth century. Finally, the demand for otter, 
marten, mink, and raccoon — all of which were used to make luxury accessories like 
muffs and tippets — was small, although the demand for the latter three increased towards 
the end of the period. 
It was, therefore, not only wartime disruption and the decline in the deer trade that 
resulted in the contraction of the re-export trade in furs. Rising British demand for 
particular types of fur reduced the number exported to foreign markets. But to which 
markets were the re-exported furs delivered to? Unsurprisingly Germany, as the principal 
intermediary market, took the largest proportion of most furs including three-quarters of 
                                                 
41 See Table 4.3. 
42 See Table 4.3. 
43 Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals, p. 178. 
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the re-exported deer, marten, mink, and wolf, as well as over half the fox, musquash, and 
otter (Table 4.4). Germany similarly took the majority of the re-exported bear (38 per 
cent) and raccoon (44 per cent).44 Beaver, however, was conspicuously absent from the 
German fur consignments. Only 2 per cent of beaver re-exports were destined for 
Germany. Rather almost half the beaver re-exports were directly sent to Russia, which 
also took a significant share of otter (26 per cent), raccoon (23 per cent), and bear (16 per 
cent) re-exports.45 Asia, through the Chinese port of Canton, accounted for a further 32 
per cent of beaver re-exports and took the greatest share of the re-exported seal (30 per 
cent).46  
Due to differences in each fur’s proportion of retained imports and re-exports, and 
the fact that the scale and scope of the furs imported from Hudson’s Bay and Canada 
varied, the HBC and NWC were not equally exposed to fluctuations in the re-export trade. 
The greater size of the Montreal fur trade and its more diverse array of furs actually made 
the Canada merchants more susceptible to such disturbances. Table 4.5 shows the extent 
to which the Canadian and Hudson’s Bay fur trades relied upon the re-export trade by 
showing the number of ‘surplus imports’ for each fur type. These surplus import values 
were calculated by subtracting the average annual quantity of each fur imported from 
either Hudson’s Bay or Canada from the average annual number of retained imports. 
Using the surplus percentages contained in Table 4.5, it is evident that the Canada 
merchants were more susceptible to instabilities in the re-export trade. For all ten of the 
furs, the HBC’s surplus percentages were lower than those for Canada, and the Company 
only generally imported more marten and otter than was absorbed by the domestic market. 
Leaving aside competition with the HBC or American traders, the Canada merchants’ 
imports of bear, marten, mink, musquash, otter, raccoon, and wolf exceeded British 
demand, often by a large margin. For example, their import of bear was 68 per cent higher 
than the number used in Britain and they imported twice as many martens, three times as 
many mink, and six times the number of raccoon.47 While this analysis of trade statistics 
is not a substitute for studying sales’ data, which can be used to establish the qualities and 
market value of imported furs, it does show that the Canada merchants relied upon the 
demand for furs in overseas markets to a much greater extent than did the HBC.  
                                                 
44 See Table 4.4. 
45 See Table 4.4. 
46 See Table 4.4. 
47 See Table 4.5. 
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The Canada merchants’ dependence upon the re-export trade casts doubt on 
Carlos’s assertion that the HBC was disadvantaged by its obligation to sell furs on the 
open London market.48 In actual fact, the HBC was under no such obligation. There was 
no clause in the Company’s Charter that required the contractual sale of furs in London, 
and the temporary parliamentary ratification of the Charter in 1690-7 only required the 
Company to conduct two public auctions a year and to offer moderately-sized lots that 
valued between £100 and £200.49 By the late eighteenth century, it is more accurate to 
say that there was an expectation that the Company would sell its fur at public auction in 
London. Indeed, from 1694 to 1713 the Company, in an attempt to break a close-knit 
buyers’ ring and increase sales, contracted agents to directly sell some of the Company’s 
furs in Amsterdam, Hamburg, Narva, and Archangel. 50  While the buyers’ ring was 
broken, the profits did not meet expectations and were abandoned after the Treaty of 
Utrecht (1713). From then on, the Company limited its sales to London.51 In contrast 
McTavish, Fraser, one of the London firms that sold the NWC’s furs, did not have to meet 
such expectations and therefore were at greater liberty to make private deals with buyers 
or could ship their furs to alternative markets. Of course such actions might upset London 
buyers and risked making them more amenable to the HBC, but did the Canada 
merchants’ greater flexibility actually give them an advantage over the chartered 
company?  
There were, as the re-export and retained import analysis showed, four key markets 
where furs were in high demand: Britain, Germany, Russia, and Asia (China). Since the 
Canada merchants supplied more than the British market could absorb, they relied heavily 
upon the re-export trade to Europe and China. The Napoleonic Wars limited re-exports 
to Germany and Russia. So, if, as Carlos maintains, the NWC had greater flexibility over 
where it sold its furs, it would be reasonable to assume that China could have operated as 
a substitute for European outlets. In practice, however, Canton did not usually serve as an 
alternative market for a number of reasons. First, the Chinese market was largely for 
                                                 
48 Carlos, Duopoly, pp. 100-8. 
49 See Anon., Charter and Supplemental Charter of the Hudson’s Bay Company (London: Printed by Sir 
Joseph Causton & Sons, 1884), pp. 1-29; and Rich, ‘Russia’, p. 322. 
50 Rich, ‘Russia’, pp. 321-8. 
51 Apart from two short-lived attempts to market furs in China, one in 1793 and the other in the early 1820s, 
both of which were arranged with the EIC. See Gough, ‘Adventure to China’, especially p. 314; and 
Gibson, Otter Skins, p. 28. 
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beaver, seal, and sea-otter.52 Apart from beaver, these were not furs that the Montreal fur 
trade provided in large quantities and the British demand for beaver was already high: 
what the NWC really needed was an alternative market for its copious volumes of marten, 
mink, and raccoon. Secondly, the EIC’s monopoly of the China trade imposed excessive 
barriers on the implementation of a fur trade to China. Whereas the United States’ 
merchants could trade freely to Canton, the licenses that the EIC granted to British 
subjects who wanted to export furs to the Celestial Empire contained multiple clauses that 
made such ventures unprofitable. Indeed, the NWC discovered this when it chartered, on 
its own account, the Isaac Todd, Columbia, and Colonel Allan to convey furs between 
Fort George (formerly Astoria) — the NWC’s newly acquired outpost on the Pacific 
north-west coast — and Canton in the years 1813 to 1817.53 The EIC’s insistence that the 
proceeds from the sale of the NWC’s furs in Canton had to be remitted using bills of 
exchange payable in London, rather than allow the fur-trading Company to purchase 
China goods, made a successful venture impossible.54  
The charting of the Pacific north-west coast of North America by James Cook’s 
third voyage (1776-80) and the sale of sea-otter skins in Canton during the expedition, 
alerted British and American merchants to the Chinese demand for fur. As a result of the 
EIC’s restrictions, the Canton-North-west coast trade soon fell into the hands of American 
merchants, a trade that became known as the ‘golden round’. 55 From 1788 to 1795, 
however, an average of 38,272 beaver and 4,382 otter were exported from London to 
China each year.56 Who exported these furs? Whereas the EIC purchased £500 worth of 
furs for its China trade from the HBC in 1793, there is no evidence that this joint-
                                                 
52 For instance, see Report [relative to the trade with the East Indies and China,] from the Select Committee 
of the House of Lords, appointed to inquire into the means of extending and securing the foreign trade 
of the country, and to report to the House; together with the minutes of evidence taken in sessions 1820 
and 1821, before the said committee (P.P. 1821, Vol.VII.1), especially p. 187; and Gibson, Otter Skins, 
especially p. 54. 
53 On the NWC’s ‘Adventure to China’ see O’Neil, ‘Maritime Activities’, pp. 243-67; Gough, ‘Adventure 
to China’, pp. 309-32; and Keith, ‘Isaac Todd’, pp. 566-97. 
54 Keith, ‘Isaac Todd’, p. 588. 
55 The ‘golden round’ usually started in Boston. From this port manufactures were shipped to the Pacific 
north-west coast of North America via Cape Horn where they were exchanged with Aboriginal peoples 
for furs. The voyage then navigated across the Pacific Ocean, stopping at the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii) 
to refuel and procure other commodities like sandalwood. The venture then proceeded to Canton, where 
the furs and other commodities were sold and chinoiserie and teas were purchased. Sailing via the Cape 
of Good Hope, the ship then made its way back to Boston where the China goods were sold for a 
handsome profit. See Gibson, Otter Skins, especially pp. 22-61. 
56 Calculated using export data contained in TNA, CUST 17/10-7, States of Navigation, Commerce and 
Revenue, 1788-95. 
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enterprise was successful or that it was commissioned for a second time.57 Indeed, the 
EIC’s export trade to China in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was 
largely limited to a few select commodities traded in bulk such as copper, cottons, iron, 
lead, tin, and woollens.58 Rather than the EIC’s own direct trade, it appears that much of 
the fur exported from London to Canton was undertaken by individuals whom the 
Company had permitted to carry on a ‘private trade’ to China, although one characteristic 
of this trade was that it was subject to wide fluctuations.59 It is also probable that Chinese 
and German merchants in London exported furs to Canton. Indeed, Rich noted that in 
1793 a ‘Mr Shyhingua’ purchased £33,000 worth of furs in London, although the source 
of this information is unclear.60 
With the exception of the years 1802 and 1803, it is known that the NWC sent some 
of its North American furs to Canton via American merchants between 1792 and 1808.61 
While details are scarce after 1797, it has been established that Reid & Hamilton served 
as the Company’s agents in New York and that Reid & Lennox acted as the Canton 
agents.62 The furs for this venture were smuggled from Montreal to New York with the 
assistance of John Jacob Astor, who is known to have purchased beaver from McTavish, 
Fraser on his visit to London in 1794.63 The NWC’s first venture into the China trade 
was, however, a dismal failure until at least 1794 if not thereafter. By this year the scheme, 
pushed solely by McTavish, Frobisher, had lost £23,000 and there were over 67,000 skins 
that remained unsold in Canton, a situation that was exacerbated by Chinese merchants 
buying on the London market as well as the German furriers Schneider & Co. placing an 
                                                 
57 Included in the consignment were: 120 beaver, 179 marten, 50 otter, 45 cat, 10 silver fox, 27 cross fox, 
50 red fox, 10 white fox, and 50 kitt fox. See HBCA, A.5/3, London Correspondence Book Outwards 
— General, 1788-96, fos. 166, 168-70. Also see HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fos. 2-
3, 15. 
58 See Earl H. Pritchard, ‘Private Trade between England and China in the Eighteenth Century (1680-
1833)’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1957), pp. 108-37; 
Earl H. Pritchard, ‘Private Trade between England and China in the Eighteenth Century’, Journal of the 
Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1958), pp. 221-56; Bowen, ‘Sinews’, pp. 
466-86; and Bowen, Business of Empire, pp. 246-52, 266. 
59 This included the Company’s supercargoes, commanders, officers, and crew members, as well as other 
licensed individuals that consisted of Company stockholders, active or retired Company servants, and 
the extended network of the Company’s shipping interest. See Pritchard, ‘Private Trade’ (1957), 
especially pp. 111-2, 130. 
60 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, p. 206. Unfortunately, there are no surviving sales books in the 
HBC archives for the years 1790-5. Shyhingua is mentioned in a letter from John Fraser to Simon 
McTavish. See ‘John Fraser to Simon McTavish’ 20 May 1795, HBCA, F.3/1, North West Company — 
Correspondence etc., 1791-9, fos. 229-30. 
61 Gibson, Otter Skins, p. 26. On the first voyage in 1792 see Campbell, North West Company, pp. 89-90. 
62 See Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, p. 206; and W. Kaye Lamb, ed., The Journals and Letters of 
Sir Alexander Mackenzie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 465. 
63 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 206, 210. 
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‘immense quantity of better skins’ on the Canton market.64 In London, John Fraser of 
McTavish, Fraser who had always been opposed to the venture was enraged by Simon 
McTavish’s risk-taking.65 Fraser later suspected that the best furs were being taken for 
the China venture, a decision that damaged the fortunes of the London house.66 Overall, 
Gibson states that the NWC’s shipments to China annually averaged 36,822 pelts in 1792-
6 and numbered between 20,000 and 25,000 in 1804-8.67 
While some of the furs procured on the eastern side of the Rocky Mountains were 
sent east to the Pacific rather than west towards the Atlantic, the quantity of furs diverted 
from the traditional Montreal route was likely small. Indeed, while David Thompson 
brought 3,570 lbs. of large and small beaver and $15,277 worth of miscellaneous furs 
across the Rockies for the Isaac Todd’s first voyage to China in 1813, 17,705 lbs. of 
parchment beaver and $39,173 of miscellaneous furs were apparently sourced from the 
more immediate vicinity of the north-west coast.68 While it is uncertain as to how many 
furs were sent over the Rockies, it is beyond doubt that furs were not shipped from 
London to the Pacific.69 Persistent losses led the NWC to discontinue chartering vessels 
on its own account in 1817, by which time they had begun to utilise the services of J. & 
T. H. Perkins of Boston, the most senior New England firm in the China trade, and their 
sister house in Canton, J. & J. N. Perkins.70 By using the American merchant firm as 
agents, the NWC was able to increase the viability of their fur trade to China as Perkins 
purchased return cargoes of tea and other China goods for resale in the United States and 
Europe; an arrangement that was far more profitable than the EIC’s remittances in the 
                                                 
64 Ibid., p. 207; and Rich, Montreal, pp. 90-1. Evidently the source of this information originates from a 
letter between John Fraser and Simon McTavish. See ‘John Fraser to Simon McTavish’ 20 May 1795, 
HBCA, F.3/1, North West Company — Correspondence etc., 1791-9, fos. 229-30. Earl H. Pritchard also 
noted that Canton became rapidly overstocked with furs. See Pritchard, ‘Private Trade’ (1957), p. 133. 
65 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 210-1; and ‘John Fraser to McTavish, Frobisher & Co.’ 14 
December 1799, HBCA, F.3/1, North West Company — Correspondence etc., 1791-9, fos. 344-5. 
66 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 207, 210-1. 
67 Gibson, Otter Skins, p. 26. 
68 Ibid., pp. 584-5. 
69 On the sending of furs from London to the north-west coast, O’Neil, Gough, and Keith do not mention 
such a trade taking place and the British customs’ records do not list any export of skins to ‘Nootka 
Sound’. See O’Neil, ‘Maritime Activities’, pp. 243-67; Gough, ‘Adventure to China’, pp. 309-32; Keith, 
‘Isaac Todd’; TNA, CUST 8/1-14, Ledgers of exports of British merchandise under countries, 1812-
21; and CUST 10/1-12, Ledgers of exports of foreign and colonial merchandise under countries, 1809-
21. 
70 By the late 1820s, Perkins’ & Co. was worth $3 million. See Gibson, Otter Skins, pp. 57-8. On the NWC 
and Perkins’ see Gough, ‘Adventure to China’, p. 329; Keith, ‘Isaac Todd’, pp. 588-9; and O’Neil, 
‘Maritime Activities’, p. 244.  
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form of bills of exchange and freight-money.71 However, due to the high charges imposed 
by the American firm, and the fact that the NWC did not include specie or other saleable 
commodities in its shipments to Canton, it is debatable that even this arrangement proved 
especially profitable for the Company.72  
In light of the difficulties that the NWC faced during the different incarnations of 
its ‘adventure to China’, it is doubtful that the Company derived notable advantages from 
its willingness to sell furs outside of the London market. The high prices that beaver, 
otter, and other types of furs could realise in Canton were a major motivating factor for 
the NWC’s preoccupation with the China trade. Yet exporting furs to China was as 
competitive as trade to Europe. American and German exporters provided stiff 
competition in Canton, and Russian merchants — trading furs from Siberia and the coast 
of Alaska — lowered demand in northern China through their trade at Kyakhta and 
Tsurukhaitu on the Mongolian-Russian border.73 Canton was therefore often overstocked 
with furs, and in several instances the realised prices did not cover the NWC’s import 
costs. But profit was not the only reason why the NWC was so fixated on the China trade. 
Establishing a fur trade to China was an intrinsic part of the NWC’s ambition of acquiring 
a Charter of its own; one that granted the Company exclusive rights to the Pacific north-
west coast. Adventures to China and the Columbia Enterprise were the culmination of the 
Company’s westward advance across the North American continent. Nonetheless, the 
Company’s final frontier did not obey the economic realities imposed by the British 
mercantilist system or the fact that the chief demand for the Company’s furs lay in Europe 
not China. While there were forays into the Pacific from the 1770s onwards, Britain’s fur 
                                                 
71 The NWC’s agreement with the Boston firm operated as follows: the NWC’s London supply Houses 
purchased and shipped British manufacturers to Boston, from which the American firm dispatched an 
annual ship to convey the goods to Fort George, and then the Columbia pelts on to Canton where they 
were sold and the returns remitted to Boston in the form of China goods. For this service, Perkins’ took 
one-quarter of the net proceeds and the NWC received the remaining share. See O’Neil, ‘Maritime 
Activities’, pp. 265-6. Also see Gough, ‘Adventure to China’, p. 329; and Keith, ‘Isaac Todd’, pp. 569-
70, 588.  
72 Prior to 1813, 75 per cent of the value of US imports into China was made up of specie and American 
merchants regularly augmented their trade with ginseng, sandalwood, and other commodities. See 
Keith, ‘Isaac Todd’, pp. 589-90. 
73 See James R. Gibson, ‘The Russian Fur Trade’, in Carol M. Judd and Arthur J. Ray, eds., Old Trails and 
New Directions: Papers of the Third North American Fur Trade Conference (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1980), pp. 217-30; and Gibson, Otter Skins, pp. 12-8. On the Russian Empire’s 
eighteenth-century fur trade with China also see Foust, Muscovite and Mandarin; and Gregory 
Afinogenov, ‘Jesuit Conspirators and Russia’s East Asian Fur Trade, 1791-1807’, Journal of Jesuit 
Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2015), pp. 56-76. 
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trade would predominantly remain an Atlantic affair, as in most cases the Pacific was no 
substitute for shipment via the St. Lawrence River or Hudson’s Bay.74 
II.   The Sales  
The extent to which the HBC and Canada merchants relied upon the re-export trade and 
their willingness to market their furs beyond the metropolitan economy was not the only 
difference between the two enterprises. The sale and distribution structures established 
by the two concerns varied. Whereas the HBC focused its efforts on the London market 
and remained committed to the use of public auctions, the Canada merchants were more 
inclined to bypass the capital entirely or to make private deals with furriers. Again, the 
Canada merchants’ greater flexibility in the sales and distribution process could be 
viewed as an advantage over the HBC. In his study of Britain’s eighteenth-century Levant 
trade, Ralph Davis concluded that when London merchants sold their return cargoes of 
silk outside of the open market by approaching potential purchasers they often achieved 
marginally higher prices.75 Rather than purely an attempt to maximise sale revenue, 
however, the distribution mechanisms used by the HBC and Canada merchants evolved 
as a means to either satisfy buyers or shift particularly large volumes of furs.  
 After the return of the Company’s ships between October and December each 
year, the HBC’s warehousemen set about sorting the fur returns from their factories into 
suitably sized lots that were ready for public auction.76 Apart from the occasional lot of 
sundry skins, each lot was made up of a single type of pelt and the total size of each lot 
varied according to the type of fur that was being sold. The largest lots were usually those 
for musquash, which ranged from 450 to 2,000 skins. Beaver was divided into three 
separate varieties: coat beaver, parchment beaver, and cub beaver. Coat beaver were 
beaver skins that had been softened through the addition of grease to the skin of the pelt, 
a process that was carried out in North America by Aboriginal peoples through their 
wearing of the skins.77 Parchment beaver were pelts that had only been dried in the sun 
— a process completed before they were traded — and cub beaver was used to describe 
the skins of juvenile beaver and particularly small pelts.78 Coat and cub beaver were sized 
                                                 
74 Gough, ‘Adventure to China’, p. 330. 
75 This is possibly because the approached buyers were more interested in purchasing small lots of silk at a 
time and not the large lots offered at public auctions. See Davis, Devonshire Square, pp. 170-1. 
76 HBCA, C.4/1, Ships’ Movements Book, 1719-1929, fos. 13-19. 
77 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, p. 20. 
78 Ibid., p. 20; and Lamb, Alexander McKenzie, p. 463. 
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into lots ranging from between 200 to 450 and 200 to 400 respectively, and those of 
parchment beaver were usually larger at between 200 and 600, although sometimes they 
totalled over 1,000. Marten ranged from 50 to 500 and kitt fox — one of the most common 
fox species — from 100 to 500. The lots of other furs were usually smaller and did not 
generally exceed a total of 220 skins.79 This analysis of lot sizes is derived from data 
contained in the Company’s sale books, which only provide a partial coverage of the 
period before 1810, but surviving auction catalogues for the 1821-2 sales show that the 
sizes did not change.80 In addition to different varieties of a specific fur, there were a 
number of terms used to denote the quality of the lot. These included ‘fine’, ‘heavy’, 
‘small’, ‘ordinary’, ‘low stage’, ‘damaged’, and ‘damaged and staged’.81  
Each year the Company sold its furs over the course of several auctions that took 
place between December and June. The majority of the sales were made in January and 
March. The former accounted for 26 per cent (£147,000) of the revenue listed in the sales 
books and the latter for 29 per cent (£168,000).82 Many sales were also conducted in 
February (£65,706), April (£74,348), and May (£68,175), whereas little was sold in 
December (£31,972) or June (£20,245). The sale year did not consist of monthly auctions, 
rather there were usually only three or four months in which they took place. For instance, 
in the 1799-1800 sale year, there were auctions in December, February, and April. There 
was no set rule for the month in which a particular fur was offered for sale. Instead, the 
HBC Committee determined the contents of their sales according to current market 
conditions. Once the Committee had decided upon a sale date, the auction was advertised 
in the London press, a notice was hung up at the Royal Exchange, and sale catalogues 
were drawn up, printed, and made available to interested buyers.83 Prior to the sale, the 
offered lots were made available for inspection at the Company’s warehouse.84  The 
                                                 
79 The lot sizes of the other main furs ranged between the following: black bear from 10 to 80, white bear 
(20 to 100), cat (30 to 110), cross fox (1 to 60), red fox (20 to 100), silver fox (5 to 50), white fox (15 
to 100), otter (30 to 160), and wolf (20 to 220). Compiled from HBCA, A.48/6-7, Fur Sale Books, 1770-
1810. 
80 HBCA, A.54/2-15, Auction Catalogues of Fur Trade Produce, 1821-2. 
81 All of these terms were listed in the sale books apart from ‘low stage’ and ‘heavy’. The latter two can be 
seen in the sale catalogues as handwritten additions that were presumably taken during the sale itself. 
For instance, see HBCA, A.54/5, Auction Catalogues of Fur Trade Produce, 1822. 
82 These values include the 5 or 2.5 per cent discounts offered for prompt payment. 
83 500 catalogues were usually printed. See HBCA, A.1/46, London Minute Book, 1783-8, fo. 15. On the 
use of the Royal Exchange see HBCA, A.1/46, London Minute Book, 1783-8, fo. 28. 
84 This is probably the ‘preamble’ mentioned in the Company’s minute books. See HBCA, A.1/46, London 
Minute Book, 1783-8, fo. 8. The Company’s advertisements in the London press also occasionally 
mentioned that the lots could ‘be seen at their warehouse till the time of sale’. See Morning Chronicle, 
25 February 1800. The Company sold its warehouse at Radcliffe Cross in 1806 on account of it being 
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auctions were conducted in the sale room of Hudson’s Bay House and were sold ‘by the 
candle’.85 In the initial years of the Company’s trade, sales were conducted at a London 
coffee house but from 1692 onwards the auctions were increasingly managed from the 
Company’s own premises.86 Buyers were, at least between 1783 and 1811, offered a 
discount for prompt payment and the deadline or so-called ‘Prompt Day’ was usually one 
month after the auction.87 Most purchasers took advantage of this discount and paid 
within the one month deadline. Until March 1787, the discount offered was 5 per cent but 
in this month the amount was reduced to 2.5 per cent.88 The Company did not offer credit 
to its buyers; furs remained in the Company’s warehouse until they were paid for.89 The 
Company did, however, extend the payment period upon request, although 5 per cent 
interest was charged for this service and the furs remained in the Company’s warehouse 
at the risk and hazard of the purchaser.90 The way in which the Company conducted its 
sales thus ensured a reliable income and minimised credit.  
Analysis of the data in the Company’s sale books show that the 1790s saw an 
increase in the Company’s sales revenue. From 1782-3 to 1785-6 the Company received 
an average of £24,500 each year from its auctions (Figure 4.3).91 By 1786-7 to 1787-8, 
the sales had increased to around £37,000. Sales were higher still between 1796-7 and 
1799-1800 when the average annual returns totalled £61,473.92 While there are few sale 
books after 1800, Carlos’s analysis of the sales revenue listed in the Company’s grand 
ledgers can be used as a measure of how the Company’s sales performed in the early 
                                                 
of ‘no further use to the Company’. This was the Company’s last warehouse outside of Fenchurch Street. 
See HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute Book, 1805-10, fos. 6, 23. 
85 Selling ‘by the candle’ was a routine way in which auctions were conducted in the eighteenth century. 
At the start of such an auction, a candle was lit upon the calling of the starting price for the lot. Bidding 
took place as the candle burned and the lot was sold to whoever held the highest bid when the candle 
snuffed out. See Rich, History of the Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol 1, p. 68. 
86 Ibid., p. 310. 
87 Analysis of the Company’s sale books for the period of this study show that discounts for prompt payment 
were offered between 1783 and 1810. The final reference to the setting of the ‘Prompt Day’ in the 
Company’s minute books was in 1811. See HBCA, A.1/50, London Minute Book, 1810-4, fo. 20. 
Unsold furs were put up for sale at a ‘Clearance Day’ a month after the prompt day. See HBCA, A.1/47, 
London Minute Book, 1792-9, fo. 120. 
88 HBCA, A.1/46, London Minute Book, 1783-8, fo. 116. 
89 It does appear, however, that the Company did extend at least some credit to its chief warehousemen, 
such as to John Peter Webber who was removed from his post in November 1795 after failing to pay 
his debts to the Company. See HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fo. 63. Webber was 
apparently later reinstated after repaying his debts. See HBCA, A.1/48, London Minute Book, 1799-
1805, fo. 128. For a reiteration that the Company did not deliver purchased lots before they were paid 
for see HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fo. 94. 
90 For example, see HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fos. 59, 61, 63, 79.  
91 Calculated from HBCA, A.48/6-7, Fur Sale Books, 1770-1810. 
92 See Figure 4.3. 
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nineteenth century.93 The 1803-4, 1804-5, and 1805-6 sales show a slight decline in sales 
revenue with an average annual of £58,182 returned.94 Data from the grand ledgers in 
Figure 4.3 show that the blockade years in 1806-7 (£21,796) and 1807-8 (£39,900) were 
particularly poor sale years on account of difficulties in the re-export trade to Europe. The 
furs offered for sale on 7 October 1807 were only furs that were in demand for home 
manufacture.95 In March 1809, the Company’s warehouse held three years’ worth of furs 
that were usually re-exported and, as a result, the Company paid no dividend to its 
stockholders in 1809.96 The situation temporarily improved, with a recovery in sales in 
1808-9 (£72,343) and 1810-11 (£63,212).97 The 1811-2 sale was another poor year with 
returns of only £37,854, which led to no dividends being paid in 1811 and 1812.98 Sales 
recovered well in 1812-3 (£84,715) and 1813-4 (£66,254) but these were followed by 
poor years in 1815-6 (£44,884) and 1816-7 (£32,059). 99  The period closed with 
particularly good returns. Indeed, the Company’s best sale year was in 1817-8 when 
revenue reached £94,943. Strong sales revenue at the end of the period was no doubt a 
result of the surge in the Company’s fur imports which, as chapter two discussed, was 
largely prompted by an increase in the number of procured marten. While the Company’s 
sales revenue show increasing returns in the late 1780s, 1790s, and after 1817, it is 
perhaps more notable that the sales during the blockade years held up as well as they did. 
Each of the lots sold at auction was of a specific type of fur and so it is possible to 
establish which furs provided the bulk of the Company’s revenue. Table 4.6 shows the 
average annual sale returns for the main types of furs and several other articles. Over half 
of the Company’s revenue came from the sale of beaver. An average of £13,570 (52 per 
cent) was returned from the sale of beaver in the 1780s and at £31,317 (56 per cent) the 
amount was almost two-and-a-half times higher in 1795-6 to 1809-10.100  Parchment 
beaver accounted for most of the beaver sales. In the first period, yearly returns of 
parchment beaver averaged £7,127 (63 per cent) and in the second they averaged £12,595 
(70 per cent). Cub beaver made up around one quarter of beaver sales; 24 per cent 
(£2,671) in the 1780s and 23 per cent in 1795-1810. Returns were lower for coat beaver 
                                                 
93 See Carlos, Duopoly, pp. 127, 204. 
94 Ibid., p. 127. Also see Figure 4.3. 
95 HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute Book, 1805-10, fo. 47. 
96 HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute Book, 1805-10, fo. 85. 
97 Carlos, Duopoly, p. 127. 
98 HBCA, A.1/50, London Minute Book, 1810-4, fos. 27, 58. 
99 Carlos, Duopoly, p. 204. 
100 See Table 4.6. 
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and its share of the beaver sales declined from 14 per cent (£1,560) to 7 per cent (£1,118). 
From 1783 to 1810 then, beaver was without question the principal source of the 
Company’s revenue. The second was the sale of marten, which returned an average of 
£5,729 (22 per cent) in the 1780s and £7,353 (13 per cent) from 1795-1810.101 If the sale 
books had continued into the 1810s then it is probable that marten would have at least 
returned to the proportion it held in the 1780s. Otter provided the third highest returns, 
                                                 
101 See Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6. HBC’s average annual sale revenue by commodity, 1783-1810 
(in £). 
 1782-3 to 1788-9 1795-6 to 1809-10 
Furs 
     Bear 
     Beaver 
     Cat 
     Deer 
     Fox 
     Marten 
     Musquash 
     Otter 
     Wolf 
     Wolverine 
     Other a 
     Total 
Other 
     Bed Feathers 
     Castoreum 
     Quills 
     Whale Bone 
     Whale Fins 
     Whale Oil 
 Other b 
 Total 
 
528 (2%) 
13,570 (52%) 
811 (3%) 
208 (1%) 
644 (2%) 
5,729 (22%) 
110 (0%) 
1,942 (7%) 
1,237 (5%) 
137 (1%) 
105 (0%) 
25,021 (95%) 
 
250 (1%) 
601 (2%) 
144 (1%) 
0  
139 (1%) 
49 (0%) 
30 (0%) 
1,213 (5%) 
 
1,549 (3%) 
31,317 (56%) 
1,759 (3%) 
470 (1%) 
2,066 (4%) 
7,353 (13%) 
928 (2%) 
4,283 (8%) 
3,423 (6%) 
280 (1%) 
955 (2%) 
54,382 (97%) 
  
453 (1%) 
423 (1%) 
235 (0%) 
43 (0%) 
44 (0%) 
125 (0%) 
203 (0%) 
1,526 (3%) 
Overall Average 26,233 55,907 
Notes: Due to the limited data for the 1806-7 and 1809-10 sales, the averages for 1795-6 
to 1809-10 were calculated by dividing by only seven years; 
a consists of badger, buffaloe, coney, elk, fawn, fisher, mink, rabbit, raccoon, skunk, and 
squirrel; 
b includes sundries and swan skins. 
Source: HBCA, A.48/6-7, Fur Sale Books, 1770-1810. 
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wolf the fourth highest, and fox, cat, and bear each accounted for around 3 per cent.102 
Sales of deer, musquash, wolverine, and other furs composed in total around 2 per cent 
in the 1780s and around 6 per cent from 1795-1810. Other commodities such as bed 
feathers and quills (by-products of the country provisions traded by Aboriginal peoples 
at the Company’s posts), castoreum (a secretion from the beavers’ urinary sacs which was 
used in medicine and perfumery), and whaling products did not supply the Company with 
much revenue. 103  While the marketing of these additional products shows that the 
Company did attempt to diversify its trade they failed to do so, and the Company’s 
experiment into harvesting timber for export met a similar fate.104  
Prior to 1800 the increase in beaver sales and of the Company’s revenue in general 
was largely the result of the growth in beaver imports from Hudson’s Bay and the fact 
that this growth did not significantly depreciate prices. Figure 4.4 shows that the average 
price that the Company received for one parchment beaver skin declined in the 1780s, 
from a high of 19s. to a low of 9s. 5d. in 1787-8.105 Even though twice as many beaver 
were imported in 1793-7 than in 1783-7, the price of parchment beaver recovered 
somewhat in the 1790s, averaging 12s. 5d. between 1795-6 and 1800-1.106 Both coat and 
cub beaver showed a different trend. Prices increased between 1782-3 and 1784-5 before 
falling to a low of 5s. 11d. and 8s. 2d. respectively in 1787-8. Prices generally increased 
in the late 1790s. The price of coat beaver peaked at 13s. 8d. in 1799-1800, and in the 
same sale year the price of cub beaver averaged 16s., both higher than the price of 
parchment beaver at that time (13s. 3d.). The Company’s sale books only provide 
sufficient data with which to calculate average prices for the 1807-8 sale but it is clear 
that the price of all three types of beaver had significantly advanced. Good quality coat 
beaver sold for an average of 18s. 2d., the same quality cub beaver sold for 22s. 7d., and 
parchment beaver sold at 22s. 1d.107 In February 1806, Frances Oakey, the Company’s 
Warehouse Keeper noted the ‘enormous price’ that beaver was then at and that the price 
would likely remain high due to depleting supplies in North America. 108  As was 
                                                 
102 See Table 4.6. 
103 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 1, pp. 153, 293, 313, 487. 
104 On the HBC’s harvesting of timber for export see Burley, Servants, pp. 46-7. 
105 All of the prices in Figure 4.4 were calculated by only using the prices for good quality beaver (those 
listed as ‘coat beaver’, ‘cub beaver’, or ‘parchment beaver’). ‘Fine beaver’ or ‘damaged and staged 
beaver’ were not included in the calculations.  
106 See Figures 2.4 and 4.4. 
107 HBCA, A.48/6-7, Fur Sale Books, 1770-1810. 
108 HBCA, A.10/1, London Inward Correspondence — General, 1712-1816, fos. 94-5. 
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Figure 4.4. Average price of beaver purchased at the HBC’s auctions, 1783-1810 
(in £). 
Notes: The price data from the 1807-8 sale were not plotted as the data for the 1806-7 and 1809-
10 sales is too limited. The average prices for the 1807-8 sale were: £0.907 (coat beaver), £1.130 
(cub beaver), and £1.104 (parchment beaver). Furs that were described as fine, damaged, or staged 
were not included in the averages. 
Source: HBCA, A.48/6-7, Fur Sale Books, 1770-1810. 
 
Figure 4.5. Average price of bear, cat, marten, otter, and wolf purchased at the 
HBC’s auctions, 1783-1810 (in £). 
Notes: No cat, marten, musquash, otter, or wolf was sold in the 1788-9 sale. Any price data from 
the 1807-8 sale were not plotted as the data for the 1806-7 and 1809-10 sales is too limited. 
Average prices available from the 1807-8 sale are: £0.207 (marten), £0.113 (musquash), and 
£0.820 (otter). Furs that were described as fine, damaged, or staged were not included in the 
averages. 
Source: HBCA, A.48/6-7, Fur Sale Books, 1770-1810. 
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previously shown in chapter two, beaver imports from Hudson’s Bay were 15 per cent 
lower in 1808-12 than they were in 1798-1802, so declining beaver imports raised beaver 
prices and may have helped to cushion problems in the re-export trade.109  
There was a pronounced decline in the price of furs which were principally re-
exported, no doubt because demand for luxury apparel evaporated across war-torn 
Europe. As is shown in Figure 4.5, from a peak of 12s. 8d. in 1784-5, the price of marten 
decreased by around 40 per cent in the late 1790s to an average of 7s. 9d., and was reduced 
by a further 46 per cent in 1807-8 (4s. 2d.). Otter prices also decreased, falling from an 
average of 30s. 2d. in the 1780s to 27s. 1d. in the late 1790s, to their lowest price of 16s. 
5d. in the 1807-8 sale.110 No wolf furs were sold during the 1807-8 sale year but Figure 
4.5 shows a similar trend of declining prices. Black and white bear skins show another 
trend of falling prices. The price at which black bear skins were sold declined from an 
average of 76s. 9d. during the 1780s, to 55s. 9d. in the late 1790s, to just 22s. 10d. in 
1808-9.111 The price of white bear likewise declined from 30s. 2d. in the 1780s to 24s. in 
the late 1790s.112 The prices of other furs show rather different trends. While no cat skins 
(lynx) were sold in 1807-8, during the 1780s and 1790s the price remained stable at 
around 22s.. Musquash were among the cheapest furs and they sold for around 1s. 3d. 
before 1800, although it appears that prices rose thereafter, selling for an average 4s. 2d. 
in 1807-8. Unfortunately, it is not possible to show how the price of the different varieties 
of fox changed over time as during the 1780s the listings in the sale books do not specify 
a type. Silver fox was the dearest fur, selling for an average of 74s. 9d. from 1795-6 to 
1800-1. Cross fox were the next highest at an average of 28s. 1d., followed by red fox at 
12s. 6d., white fox at 7s. 10d., and kitt fox at 3s. 4d.. 
The Company’s minute books allude to the fact that the Company’s sales method 
was not only responsive to the Company’s own needs but also to those of its buyers. For 
instance, in 1796 a number of buyers — several of whom were large-scale purchasers — 
had great difficulty in paying due to the ‘great scarcity of money’.113 While the Company 
charged interest for the privilege, it held furs in its warehouse for at least five separate 
buyers including Schneider & Co., T. C. Crane, Walduck & Co., Geledneki & Co., and 
                                                 
109 See Figure 2.4. In their letters to Inglis, Ellice in London, Alexander Mackenzie & Co. (Montreal) also 
identified high beaver prices as a key reason for the firm continuing to make ‘handsome profits’ in 1807 
and 1808. See Carlos, Duopoly, pp. 106-7. 
110 See Figure 4.5. 
111 Calculated from HBCA, A.48/6-7, Fur Sale Books, 1770-1810. 
112 No white bear were sold at the 1807/8 sale. 
113 HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fo. 73. 
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Borradaile & Co..114 Another way in which the Company assisted its buyers was by 
postponing the dates of its auctions and by extending the period for prompt payment. For 
instance, following the sale on 17 May 1797, the Company extended the Prompt Day to 
two months after the sale.115 Delayed arrival of the ‘Hamburg mails’ caused the Company 
to reschedule a number of auctions. The first instance noted in the minute books was on 
6 February 1799 when the sale of that day was postponed to 18 February.116 Come the 
time of the rearranged sale, the mails had still not arrived leading the Company to sell the 
domestic furs of coat and parchment beaver, and to postpone the selling of the re-export 
furs to 6 March 1799.117 Only part of the correspondences from the continent had arrived 
by 6 March so the sale was postponed again to 8 March.118  Further postponements 
occurred in March 1800, February and April 1805, and February 1806.119 Of course re-
arranging sales did not only allow London merchants to receive up to date instructions 
and market information from their correspondents on the continent; they also benefitted 
the Company by ensuring competitive bidding at the auctions.120 This also suggests that 
the HBC was actually very flexible in its selling practices. 
While it was in the Company’s interest to alter its sales pattern during the French 
wars, there is more direct evidence that the connections between the Company and its 
buyers were closer than is apparent at first sight. Following the dismissal of the Assistant 
Warehouseman on 6 August 1800, Frances Oakey was appointed to the role and, for the 
first time the HBC Committee decreed that Company warehousemen would have to 
provide securities from two or more sponsors in order to be eligible for the role.121 In 
                                                 
114 In November 1796, the Company received the following interest on held furs: £23 1s. 7d. from Schneider 
& Co., £4 17s. 6d. from Charles-T. Crane, £3 12s. 4d. from Walduck & Co., £24 6s. 9d. from Geledneki 
& Co., and in the following month, £56 6s. 1d. from Borradaile & Co.. who then also paid £1,412 1s. 
7d. for their purchased lots. See HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fos. 79, 83. Geledneki 
& Co. also paid £19 19s. 4d. in interest in March 1798 for furs kept in the Company’s warehouse. See 
HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fo. 108. The EIC also extended this practice to the buyers 
of tea at its auctions. Indeed, it was customary for London tea dealers to leave their purchases in the 
Company’s warehouses to be removed according to current demand. See Makepeace, Warehouse 
Labourers, p. 24.  
115 HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fo. 94. 
116 HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fos. 123-4. 
117 HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 1792-9, fos. 124-5. 
118 The furs sold at the sale on 8 March consisted of furs that were largely for re-export and included: 
marten, otter, cat, wolf, wolverine, bear, fisher, and mink. See HBCA, A.1/47, London Minute Book, 
1792-9, fo. 127.  
119 HBCA, A.1/48, London Minute Book, 1799-1805, fos. 17, 116, 119; and HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute 
Book, 1805-10, fo. 6. 
120 Rich appears to state that the Company postponed sales in 1799 in an effort to break a buyers’ ring. The 
evidence in the Company’s minute books, however, points towards the disturbances in the re-export 
trade as the deciding factor. Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, p. 211. 
121 HBCA, A.1/48, London Minute Book, 1799-1805, fo. 25. 
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October 1800, Frances Oakey provided securities totalling £1,000, the names of which 
included John Henry Schneider (£500), John Daniel Hose Senior (£150), Peter Raymond 
Poland (£150), Borradailes & Clark (£100), and John Ingles (£100).122 The first four of 
these were regular buyers at the Company’s auctions. In March 1806, by which time 
Oakey had advanced to become the Company’s Warehouse Keeper, William Hagel was 
appointed as the Assistant Warehouseman. Hagell provided securities from Peter 
Raymond Poland (£500) and Christian Schneider (£500), and Oakey’s securities derived 
from the aforementioned Poland (£500) and John Henry Schneider (£500).123 All of these 
named guarantors purchased furs from the Company. Clearly the Company derived its 
chief warehousemen from individuals whom had close connections to the Company’s 
buyers. Appointed warehousemen also likely had prior experience in the fur trade. Indeed, 
upon assuming the role of Warehouse Keeper in 1808, Hagell was obliged to liquidate 
his ‘private concerns in the fur trade’.124  
The way in which the HBC sold its furs was thus very transparent. The Company 
marketed its furs openly and circulated annual declarations of its imported produce among 
London fur dealers and other interested parties called ‘Cargoes of the Hudson’s Bay 
Company’s Ships’.125  Openness and the cultivation of trust amongst buyers was an 
integral part of the Company’s sales strategy. This system evolved over time as a means 
with which to preserve the Company’s Charter. From 1783 to 1821 there is only one 
occurrence in the Company’s minute books that suggests disquiet amongst buyers. 
Following the sale on 4 May 1807, the Company received letters from several buyers 
stating that they refused to complete their purchases on account of irregularities having 
occurred at the time of the sale.126 The Company investigated the claims but the minutes 
do not state the outcome of these investigations and it is unfortunate that none of the 
correspondence surrounding this incident has survived.127 Analysis of the records of the 
Feltmakers’ and Skinners’ Companies — principally the companies’ minute books — do 
                                                 
122  HBCA, A.1/48, London Minute Book, 1799-1805, fo. 26. Frances Oakey also provided the same 
securities in 1801. See HBCA, A.1/48, London Minute Book, 1799-1805, fo. 51. 
123 HBCA, A.1/48, London Minute Book, 1799-1805, fo. 90; and A.1/49, London Minute Book, 1805-10, 
fo. 11. 
124 HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute Book, 1805-10, fo. 70. 
125 HBCA, A.1/48, London Minute Book, 1799-1805, fos. 70, 90; HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute Book, 
1805-10, fo. 75; and HBCA, A.53/1, Fur Trade Importation Book, 1799-1912, fos. 1-12.  
126 Letters were received from Borradailes & Clark, Henshaw, Barker & Co., Miller & Christy, Wontner & 
Son, and Walduck & Sons. See HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute Book, 1805-10, fo. 32. 
127 No letters surrounding the incident are contained in the Company’s London correspondence. See HBCA, 
A.5/4, London Correspondence Book Outwards — General, 1796-1808; and A.10/1, London Inward 
Correspondence — General, 1712-1816. 
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not show any dissatisfaction with the HBC or, for that matter, the Canada merchants.128 
There is no indication that the Company’s buyers petitioned Parliament to protest against 
the Company’s Charter as the Feltmakers’ Company had previously done in 1690, and as 
both the Feltmakers’ and Skinners’ Companies had done in 1697.129 Rich claims that by 
around 1819 there was unrest amongst the wholesale fur-dealers in London because of 
price instabilities resulting from the clashes between the HBC and NWC in North 
America, and that they were ‘ready to offer their intervention or get the City members to 
make a stir in Parliament’ but he provides no reference for this assertion.130 By conducting 
an open trade solely on the London market, the HBC may well have foregone more 
advantageous commercial arrangements, but retaining respectability and the approval of 
its buyers was a more pressing concern. 
The NWC, on the other hand, did not have to satisfy comparable expectations and 
did not have chartered rights to defend, which allowed the Company’s London agents to 
pursue business associations that were loose, flexible, and more secretive. 131 
Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that the volume of the Company’s imports 
could easily glut the London market. While McTavish, Fraser solely managed the sale of 
the NWC’s furs prior to 1804, the re-organisation of the Company following the addition 
of former rival firms during the Company’s merger with the XYC altered the 
arrangement.132 The records of two court cases in the bankruptcy papers at The National 
Archives reveal that the Canada merchants, as they styled themselves, were composed of 
four London firms that included: Inglis, Ellice & Co., McTavish, Fraser & Co., 
Mackenzie, Gillespie & Parker, and Brickwood, Daniel & Co..133 The activities of these 
firms were described as importing ‘from Canada and elsewhere fur skins and other articles 
relating to the trade or business of [a] furrier’.134 During his cross-examination by the 
Chancery Court, John Fraser stated that the orator, Frederick Gottlieb Boccius (a German 
re-export furrier) owed, in total, £31,076 to these firms for ‘goods sold and delivered’ and 
                                                 
128 Guildhall Library, MS01570/5-6, Worshipful Company of Feltmakers, Court Minute Book, 1782-1825; 
and Guildhall Library, MS30708/17-20, Worshipful Company of Skinners, Court Book, 1800-25. 
129 Interestingly, both of these occurrences coincide with the Company attempting to acquire parliamentary 
ratification of its Charter. See Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 1, pp. 265-9, 276, 361. 
130 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, p. 385. 
131 For a recent although somewhat uncritical discussion of the NWC’s fluid business connections see 
MacQuarrie, ‘Transnational Dimensions’, pp. 231-68. 
132 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 191-2. 
133 The partners of these firms were previously stated in chapter one. See chapter one, footnote 125. 
134  TNA, C 13/150/1, Boccius v Steinberg, 1813. Fraser agreed with this description of the Canada 
merchants. See TNA, C 13/165/50, Boccius v Inglis, 1814. 
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for ‘money lent’.135 The principal creditor was Inglis, Ellice whom Fraser alleged was 
owed £11,840 for supplied merchandise and £2,096 in loans.136 While the four firms 
closely worked with one another when selling their furs, just as the Houses in Montreal 
did when preparing their annual ‘outfits’, each firm evidently received a share of the fur 
consignments that corresponded to the value of the manufactures that they had despatched 
to Montreal.  
McTavish, Fraser was, therefore, less dominant in the NWC’s London affairs after 
1804 than they had been in the previous two decades. While the turn of the century saw 
the London operations become increasingly decentralised, the sale of the NWC’s furs 
through closed private deals as opposed to public auctions had, since the early 1790s, 
increased. The majority of the furs imported from Canada ended up at a metropolitan 
auction and this appears to have remained the case even after private dealings became 
more common. Robinson, Goad, & Row of 23 Little St. Thomas Apostles, and its 
successor partnerships, served as the main brokers whom sold large volumes of the furs 
imported from the Americas.137 In 1783, Robinson, Goad & Row served as brokers for at 
least four fur auctions, all of which were held at the New York Coffee House on 
Sweeting’s Alley.138 The sales that occurred on 26-7 February, and 20-1 March included 
a great number and wide range of furs that could only have originated from the Canadian 
fur trade. For instance, the sale on 26-7 February included 87,000 raccoon, 26,705 marten, 
50,800 musquash, and the auction on 20-1 March consisted of 80,700 parchment beaver 
and 97,250 deer.139 As Figures 2.2 and 2.3 in chapter two showed, very little raccoon, 
marten, musquash, and beaver was imported into Britain from the United States whereas 
                                                 
135 TNA, C 13/165/50, Boccius v Inglis, 1814. 
136 The others sums that Fraser alleged Boccius owed to the other three firms were £8,494 (£7,240 for goods 
and £1,254 for loans) to McTavish, Fraser, £3,795 (£3,300 for goods and £495 for loans) to Mackenzie, 
Gillespie & Parker, and £4,851 (£4,100 for goods and £751 for loans) to Brickwood, Daniel. See TNA, 
C 13/165/50, Boccius v Inglis, 1814. Interestingly, while the amounts Fraser claimed were owed to 
McTavish, Fraser and Mackenzie, Gillespie were identical to the sums that Boccius maintained were 
asked of him when appearing before the Court in 1813, Boccius insisted that Inglis, Ellice (£19,364) 
and Brickwood, Daniel (£4,351) had asked for far more than they were owed. See TNA, C 13/150/1, 
Boccius v Steinberg, 1813. 
137 Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794). Between 1794 and 1796 the brokerage firm went by the name of 
Robinson, Row, Newby & Row, before changing to Row, Newby, Row & Goad in 1796-9. For instance, 
see The Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser, 22 February 1783; The Gazetteer and New Daily 
Advertiser, 19 November 1793; The Public Ledger, 28 January 1796; and Prince’s London Price 
Current, 14 December 1798. 
138 See The Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser, 20 January, 12 March, 12 April, and 5 August 1783.  
139 The Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser, 20 January and 12 March 1783. The 17 April sale was 
composed of 30,500 parchment beaver and around 3,500 deer, while the auction on 21 August was for 
22,000 deer and other sundry furs. See The Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser, 12 April and 5 
August 1783. 
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large volumes were imported from Canada. Furthermore, John Fraser routinely 
mentioned Row, Newby & Co. in his letters to Simon McTavish.140 Again, the quantities 
of furs sold by Row, Newby, Row, & Goad at auction on 11-2 March 1799 could only 
have originated from Canada — a sale that included 194,000 raccoon, 44,485 marten, and 
54,822 musquash — and 55,427 parchment and 31,920 cub beaver were sold at another 
auction on 4 April.141 Further advertisements in The London Gazette suggest that the use 
of public auctions continued into the early nineteenth century.142 It does seem, however, 
that the NWC’s London Houses were not as transparent in informing the London 
community about the volume of their imports. While Row & Co. informed Prince’s 
London Price Current of the ‘cargoes of sundry ships arrived from Canada’ on 20 
December 1799 and stated that they would be sold by a public sale on 6 February, 12-3 
March, and 3 April 1800, such notices do not appear to have been as regular as the 
comparable communications issued by the HBC.143  
In the 1790s, alongside the NWC’s adventures into the China trade, McTavish, 
Fraser began to make dealings with German re-export merchants active in the fur trade. 
One of the first of these appears to have been with the ‘great furrier’ John Henry Schneider 
in 1792.144 In 1794, Fraser offered all of the year’s beaver to a single buyer on the 
condition that the deal was not revealed to other purchasers or the brokers.145  Such 
arrangements enabled the London firm to quickly dispose of furs at fair prices, although 
Fraser did sometimes struggle to find suitable buyers, however, thus requiring the use of 
public auctions. 146  In the terms of these private dealings, McTavish, Fraser largely 
received payments in bills that were payable at future dates.147 Deals with Schneider 
continued into the late 1790s with Fraser noting in December 1799 that he would have to 
                                                 
140 For instance, see ‘John Fraser to Simon McTavish’ 14 May 1795, HBCA, F.3/1, North West Company 
— Correspondence, 1791-9, fo. 22; and ‘John Fraser to Simon McTavish 5 March 1800, HBCA, F.3/2, 
North West Company — Correspondence etc., 1800-27, fos. 11-2. 
141 The 11-2 March sale included a large volume of bear, cat, fox, and otter, and quoted quantities of beaver 
sold at the 4 April sale do not include fine parchment and fine cub beaver. See Prince’s London Price 
Current, 8 March 1799; and Prince’s London Price Current, 5 April 1799. 
142 For instance, see The London Gazette, 21 December 1805 and 24 December 1814. 
143 Prince’s London Price Current, 20 December 1799. The only other publications of ‘cargoes of sundry 
ships arrived from Canada’ appeared on 14 December 1798 and 2 December 1799. See Prince’s London 
Price Current, 14 December 1798 and 2 December 1799. 
144 See Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 191-2; and ‘John Fraser to Simon McTavish’ 9 April 
1792, HBCA, F.3/1, North West Company — Correspondence etc., 1791-9, fos. 51-7. 
145 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 191-2. 
146 Ibid., pp. 191-2, 211; and ‘John Fraser to Simon McTavish’ 14 May 1795, HBCA, F.3/1, North West 
Company — Correspondence etc., 1791-9, fo. 225. 
147 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 191-2. 
 
~182~ 
 
continue providing ‘very heavy advances’ to Schneider for the foreseeable future.148 
Agreements were also increasingly made with Boccius, although the extension of 
significant amounts of credit to the furrier by McTavish, Fraser proved disastrous when 
Boccius returned to London from the Continent in 1800 with news that his business had 
suffered ‘great losses’.149 Boccius owed £30,000 to the then three London Houses of the 
NWC, £12,655 of which was owed to McTavish, Fraser. 150  While Fraser expected 
Boccius would be able to return two-thirds of the amount within the year, he was again 
at a loss as to who would buy the Company’s furs as he was reluctant to extend more 
credit to the furrier.151 Fraser’s woes were further exacerbated with the news that the 
HBC’s latest sale had been an exceptional one. The buyers had been enthralled by the 
high quality of the Company’s lots and the care that had been taken during their sorting 
and grading, leading to a ‘very sharp competition’.152 Once more, the NWC’s furs for that 
season were of a much poorer quality and contained ‘a great deal of trash…particularly 
Bears and Raccoon which had much better been burnt in the country’.153 These ‘under-
the-counter’ deals attracted criticism. In 1791, John Brickwood, whom had previously 
supplied trade goods and purchased furs from McTavish, Fraser, urged the firm to stay 
loyal to the use of public auctions, citing the perils of giving a single buyer control over 
supply.154 The NWC’s London Houses did continue to conclude private agreements with 
buyers however. 
Another change came when Fraser scaled-back the extension of credit to buyers, 
except when it came to Boccius. The change in payments came from Fraser’s conclusion 
                                                 
148 While Aisling MacQuarrie states that relations between Schneider and McTavish, Fraser came to a 
discordant end in 1793, there is later correspondence that suggests deals were made after this year. See 
MacQuarrie, et al, ‘Transnational Dimensions’, p. 238; ‘John Fraser to Simon McTavish’ 13 May 1795 
and 14 December 1799, HBCA, F.3/1, North West Company — Correspondence etc., 1791-9, fos. 223-
4, 344-5; and ‘McTavish, Fraser to McTavish, Frobisher’ 5 March 1800, HBCA, F.3/2, North West 
Company — Correspondence etc., 1800-27, fo. 13. 
149 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, p. 211; and ‘John Fraser to McTavish, Frobisher’ 22 February 
1800, HBCA, F.3/2, North West Company — Correspondence etc., 1800-27, fo. 11. 
150  ‘John Fraser to McTavish, Frobisher’ 22 February 1800, HBCA, F.3/2, North West Company — 
Correspondence etc., 1800-27, fo. 11. 
151  ‘John Fraser to McTavish, Frobisher’ 22 February 1800, HBCA, F.3/2, North West Company — 
Correspondence etc., 1800-27, fo. 11. 
152 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, p. 211; and ‘John Fraser to McTavish, Frobisher’ 28 February 
1800, HBCA, F.3/2, North West Company — Correspondence etc., 1800-27, fo. 12. John Fraser kept a 
close eye on the HBC’s sales and regularly sent a copy of the Company’s sale catalogues to Montreal 
together with a summary of the prices realised. For example, see ‘John Fraser to McTavish, Frobisher’ 
14 December 1799, HBCA, F.3/1, North West Company — Correspondence etc., 1791-9, fo. 346. 
153 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, p. 211; and ‘McTavish, Fraser to McTavish, Frobisher’ 5 March 
1800, HBCA, F.3/2, North West Company — Correspondence etc., 1800-27, fo. 13. 
154 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 191-2. 
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that the extension of credit had ‘not only been harassing and hazardous to ourselves, but 
ruinous to them’.155 Indeed, Fraser estimated that through the speculations arising from 
such arrangements ‘our great Buyer has sunk half his fortune’.156 These speculations 
were, it seems, into ‘foreign circulations’ of commodities such as coffee, from which 
Fraser believed Boccius had lost no less than £14,000.157 Until at least 1807, Boccius & 
Steinberg dealt ‘very largely’ with the NWC’s London Houses, and in this year, facing 
the threat of bankruptcy, the firm’s property was placed into a trust managed by the 
Canada merchants and Boccius & Steinberg were employed to manage the trade and 
property of the trust.158 It is not clear how long Boccius and John Steinberg served the 
London Houses but by 1813, Boccius was at the Chancery Court accusing John Steinberg 
of poor management of the now dissolved partnership of Boccius & Steinberg, and the 
Canada merchants of manufacturing the firm’s distress in 1807.159  
One final aspect that distinguished how the NWC’s furs were sold in Europe was 
the use of American intermediaries to ship furs direct to Hamburg, thus bypassing the 
London market. While in New York in 1798, Alexander Mackenzie contracted John 
Murray & Son of New York to ship beaver and wolf skins to Hamburg.160 Presumably 
Astor assisted the smuggling of the furs from Montreal to New York but it has never been 
established how this illicit enterprise worked in practice.161 While the proceeds from the 
wolf skins were disappointing, it was hoped that the purchaser of the beaver would 
become a regular large-scale buyer.162 Through the use of American ships, the Company 
supposedly shipped furs direct from Quebec to Hamburg in 1804 and 1805, although it is 
not entirely clear how the Company circumvented the Navigation Acts or the restrictions 
                                                 
155 ‘John Fraser to Simon McTavish’ 12 May 1800, HBCA, F.3/2, North West Company — Correspondence 
etc., 1800-27, fos. 24-5. 
156 While it is not entirely clear who Fraser was referring to here, it is either Schneider or Boccius. See 
‘John Fraser to Simon McTavish’ 12 May 1800, HBCA, F.3/2, North West Company — 
Correspondence etc., 1800-27, fos. 24-5. 
157  See ‘John Fraser to Simon McTavish’ 12 May 1800, HBCA, F.3/2, North West Company — 
Correspondence etc., 1800-27, fos. 24-5. 
158 TNA, C 13/150/1, Boccius v Steinberg, 1813; and TNA, C 13/165/50, Boccius v Inglis, 1814. 
159 TNA, C 13/150/1, Boccius v Steinberg, 1813. 
160 ‘Alexander Mackenzie to McTavish, Fraser’ 29 January and 4 February 1798, in Lamb, Alexander 
Mackenzie, pp. 462-5. 
161 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, pp. 206, 249. In 1787, Astor began leasing a warehouse in 
Montreal to store purchased furs for later resale in New York. See Campbell, North West Company, p. 
57. 
162 The purchaser was not named. See ‘Alexander Mackenzie to McTavish, Frobisher’ 29 January and 4 
February 1798, in Lamb, Alexander Mackenzie, pp. 462-3, 466-7. 
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imposed by Jay’s Treaty (1794).163 In all likelihood, however, only small quantities of 
furs were conveyed through such illicit schemes.  
 Rich and Carlos have pointed towards the NWC’s fluid external business 
associations as evidence that the Company was better placed to navigate market distress 
during the French Wars than was the HBC. According to this argument, the NWC’s 
ability to diversify away from the London market and ship furs to New York, Hamburg, 
and Canton allowed the Company to effectively navigate wartime disruption.164 More 
recently, Aisling MacQuarrie has argued that the Company’s transnational network 
‘allowed the Company to be both pragmatic and expedient in its endeavours’.165 What 
these studies neglect, however, is that the Company’s flexible approach to business 
emerged because of the volume of the Company’s trade and the protracted period needed 
for their enterprise to yield a return on capital. These factors propelled the Company’s 
agents in both Montreal and London to pursue multiple sale strategies that included risky 
and sometimes unprofitable ventures within and beyond the North-Atlantic World, in 
addition to, extensive private dealings with a few buyers. It was, therefore, not so much 
a case of the Company being more adept at responding to trade dislocations but rather the 
absolute necessity that it did so. Furthermore, there is a need for a more critical appraisal 
of the Company’s ventures into the European market and its dealings with German re-
export merchants as little is currently known about how successful these ventures were. 
Indeed, the Company’s adventures to China have recently been cast in a less favourable 
light and the Company’s European dealings may well have similarly achieved mixed 
success.166 The HBC strictly adhered to the use of metropolitan auctions during this 
period, a decision that ensured that fur buyers did not mount a challenge to the Company’s 
Charter. In a similar vein, the NWC’s shift away from open sales on the London market 
would not have persuaded a united front of metropolitan buyers to use their political 
influence in support of the Canada merchants. On the one hand, the HBC had pacified a 
powerful interest group that had previously threatened the continuation of the Company’s 
Charter, while on the other, the NWC’s larger share of the fur trade and its use of private 
                                                 
163 Carlos, Duopoly, p. 107. Jay’s Treaty forbid American ships from anchoring at Quebec or another other 
sea-port in British North America. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between His 
Britannick Majesty and the United States of America (P.P. 1794, Vol. 1), p. 5. 
164 Carlos, Duopoly, p. 107. 
165 MacQuarrie, Transnational Dimensions, p. 240. 
166 See Keith, ‘Isaac Todd’, pp. 566-97. 
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sale agreements meant that the Company’s London Houses were not in a position to seek 
the assistance of these key agents of change. 
III.   The Buyers 
It is important to consider the composition of the metropolitan community of buyers at 
this time. Who were the key buyers? What roles did they play? How did they organise 
their lobbying activities? The best source available to begin such an analysis is the HBC’s 
sale books.167 As was previously shown, the HBC sold more than just furs. Merchants, 
furriers, skinners, hat makers, and brokers were the major buyers but it should be noted 
that the minor, miscellaneous articles put up for sale at the Company’s auctions attracted 
upholsterers, oil and colourmen, drug merchants, stationers, and whalebone cutters.168 
There were, in total, 230 individuals or partnerships listed in the Company’s sales books, 
158 of which purchased furs or castoreum.169 Table 4.7 shows the value distribution of 
the purchases made by the buyers of furs and castoreum at the auctions between 1783 and 
1810. While there is only 14 years of data, it is clear that a few buyers were predominant. 
There were six buyers who purchased over £30,000 worth of furs, and 13 who purchased 
over £10,000.170 There were also a large number of small buyers; 104 purchased furs or 
castoreum to a value of less than £999.171 
Through cross-referencing the Company’s account books with trade directories, it 
is apparent that merchants were the principal buyers. Of the 90 identified buyers in Table 
4.8, 25 were listed as ‘merchants’ and they accounted for 41 per cent of the purchases 
(£202,000). There were 22 Furriers and/or Skinners and at 27 per cent of the purchases 
(£135,000) they were the second most prominent group. 172  The terms ‘furrier’ and 
‘skinner’ were largely synonymous as although both terms were widely used in trade 
directories, the types of furs purchased by each group were identical. While trade 
directories referred to Frederick Peterstorf & Co. as ‘furriers and skinners’, John Fraser 
referred to them purely as ‘furriers’ in his testimony to the Chancery Court.173 On the 
other hand, a hide and skin broker was certainly a different profession, as the sale 
                                                 
167 HBCA, A.48/6-7, Fur Sale Books, 1770-1810. 
168 Colourmen traded in dyes and oilmen sold various forms of oils such as olive and whale oil. 
169  Castoreum refers to a secretion from the beavers’ urinary sacs which was used in medicine and 
perfumery.  
170 See Table 4.7. 
171 See Table 4.7. 
172 See Table 4.8. 
173 Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794); and TNA, C 13/165/50, Boccius v Inglis, 1814. 
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catalogues collected by Dyster, Nadler & Co. show that they were largely interested in 
livestock hides, seal, and deer.174 There was no doubt a considerable degree of overlap 
between the use of the term merchants and that of furriers/skinners. Those labelled as 
merchants in trade directories may have had dealings in other trades, whereas those 
described as furriers and/or skinners were probably solely active in the fur trade. When it 
came to describing themselves, however, those listed as merchants in trade directories 
often labelled themselves as furriers. For example, Schneider was described as a furrier 
at the Chancery Court but was listed as a merchant in trade directories.175 ‘Furrier’ was 
also used to describe those who ‘dressed’ furs, manufacturing them into coat trimmings, 
tippets, and other finished items.176 Occasionally, the term ‘manufacturing furrier’ was 
used to distinguish between the two groups but this label was not used in trade 
directories.177 
                                                 
174  For example, they do not appear to have collected many of the HBC’s catalogues. See LMA, 
CLC/B/72/MS10391/1, Dyster, Nadler and Company, 1802-16. 
175 Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794); TNA, C 13/150/1, Boccius v Steinberg, 1813; and TNA, C 
13/165/50, Boccius v Inglis, 1814. 
176 The dual use of the term ‘furrier’ is plainly evident in a petition sent by the ‘Furriers of London’ to the 
Board of Trade in 1814. While the petition was primarily concerned with removing restrictions that 
prevented the dyeing of coney and hare skins, the petition itself was signed by merchants such as 
Schneider and those who were more involved in the manufacturing process. See TNA, BT 1/89, 
‘Memorial of the Furriers of London’, Board of Trade; General In-letters and Files, 18 May 1814. 
177 TNA, C 13/150/1, Boccius v Steinberg, 1813. 
Table 4.7. Value distribution of the total 
purchases made by buyers of furs and 
castoreum at the HBC’s auctions, 1783-
1810 (in £). 
 No. of Buyers 
     30,000> 
     10,000-29,999 
     5,000-9,999 
     1,000-4,999 
     100-999 
     <100 
6 
7 
9 
32 
68 
36 
Notes: Out of the 230 buyers listed in the accounts 
only 158 purchased furs or castoreum.  
Source: HBCA, A.48/6-7, Fur Sale Books, 1770-
1810. 
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Focusing on the individual buyers shows how dominant a small group of purchasers 
were at the Company’s auctions. The five top buyers accounted for 42 per cent of the 
overall sales of furs and castoreum, and the highest 10 purchasers composed 61 per cent 
(Table 4.9). John Henry Schneider & Co., merchants at Bow Lane, was the Company’s 
most prolific buyer.178 They alone spent a total of £84,662 which made up 15 per cent of 
the purchases. There were many other prominent London merchants such as John 
Christian Schreiber (£39,985), Anthony Geledneki & Son (£27,975), and C. S. Geledneki 
& Son (£13,134). 179  With total purchases of £37,149, John & Benjamin Jowetts of 
Bermondsey Street were the largest furriers, although the ‘skinner and furrier’ John 
Daniel Hose at 19 Ludgate Hill was close behind with purchases of £32,665.180 Together 
the purchases made by Jowetts and Hose made up just over half of the payments made by 
                                                 
178 Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794). 
179 See Table 4.9. 
180 See Table 4.9. 
Table 4.8. Classification of the buyers of furs and castoreum at the 
HBC’s auctions, 1783-1810. 
 No. of Buyers Value of Purchases (£) 
     Merchants 
     Furriers and/or Skinners a 
     Hat-makers b 
     Brokers 
     Curriers c 
     Drug Merchants d 
     Other e 
25 
22 
19 
3 
8 
9 
4 
202,387 (41%) 
135,128 (27%) 
95,199 (19%) 
52,634 (11%) 
3,912 (1%) 
2,899 (1%) 
527 (0%) 
     Total 90 492,686 
Notes: Of the 158 buyers in the accounts who purchased furs or castoreum, 90 have 
been identified in London trade directories; 
a includes 12 Furriers (£50,371), 6 Skinners (£37,412), and 5 Skinners & Furriers 
(£47,545); 
b consists of 10 hat-makers (£63,987), 4 hatters (£8,417), and 4 hat-manufacturers 
(£6,734); 
c also includes 2 tanners (£203); 
d composed of 6 drug merchants (£2,222), 2 drug brokers (£645), and 1 chemist; 
e made up of 1 oil & colourman (£174), 1 glover (£160), 1 warehouseman (£171), and 
1 mercer (£22). 
Source: HBCA, A.48/6-7, Fur Sale Books, 1770-1810; Bailey’s Northern Directory 
(1781); Bailey’s British Directory, 1st Edition (1784); and Kent’s Directory, 62nd 
Edition (1794). 
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Table 4.9. Top buyers of furs and castoreum at the HBC’s auctions, 1783-1810. 
 Classification Location Purchases 
(£) 
1. John Henry Schneider & Co. 
2. Borradailes, Clark & Co. 
3. John Christian Schreiber 
4. John & Benjamin Jowetts 
5. Robinson, Goad, Row & Co. 
6. John Daniel Hose 
7. Anthony Geledneki & Son 
8. John Peter Webber 
XXXXXXX 
9. Chester & Walduck 
10. Barker, Henshaw & Co. 
11. C. S. Geledneki & Son 
12. Nicolay & Schindler 
13. John, Daniel & William 
Paul XX 
14. Henry Kellner 
15. Thomas Barker 
16. Charles Schreiber 
17. Thomas Philips & Co. 
18. Benjamin Kidney 
XXXXXXXXX 
19. John William Vogle 
20. Charles T Crane 
21. John Ponten 
22. Joseph Hull 
23. Boccius, Steinberg & Co. 
24. David Samuel 
25. Herman & Joseph Berens 
Merchants 
Hat-makers 
Merchant 
Furriers 
Brokers X 
Skinner & Furrier 
Merchants 
Broker 
XXXXXXX 
Skinners 
Hatters 
Merchants 
- 
Skinners & 
Furriers 
- 
Broker 
Merchant 
- 
Russia Merchant 
XX 
- 
Merchant 
Hat Manufacturer 
Skinner & Furrier 
Merchants 
Merchant 
- 
Bow Lane, Cheapside 
34 Fenchurch St. 
24 Budge Row 
Redlion Court, Bermondsey St. 
23 Little St. Thomas Apostles 
19 Ludgate Hill 
55 Queen Street, Cheapside 
21 Little Prescot St., Goodman’s 
Fields 
27 Bush Lane, Cannon St. 
Henshaw St., Oldham, Manchester 
78 Queen St., Cheapside 
- 
2 Mansion House St. 
XXXXXXXX 
- 
St. Catherine’s Square 
10 Labour-in-Vain Hill 
- 
6 Laurence Pountey Hill, Cannon 
St. 
- 
13 Bow Lane, Cheapside 
15 Stanhope St., Clare Market 
231 Bermondsey St. 
10 Labour-in-Vain Hill 
43 Mansel St., Goodman’s Fields 
- 
84,662 
48,900 
39,985 
37,149 
36,497 X 
32,665 
27,975 
19,370 
XXXXX 
15,937 
16,061 
13,134 
12,320 
9,689 
XXXXX 
8,271 
6,537 
6,201 
5,811 
5,414 
XXXX 
5,382 
5,284 
5,108 
4,833 
4,793 
4,735 
4,190 
Notes: Of the 158 buyers who purchased furs or castoreum only 90 have been identified in London trade 
directories. Including unidentified buyers, a total of £574,857 was spent on furs and castoreum. 
Source: HBCA, A.48/6-7, Fur Sale Books, 1770-1810; Bailey’s Northern Directory (1781); Bailey’s 
British Directory, 1st Edition (1784); Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794); and The Commercial 
Directory (1818). 
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furriers and skinners. The names and the extent of their purchases in the Company’s 
accounts show how German migrants, many of whom had been ‘naturalised’ as British 
citizens, dominated the purchasers made by merchants and furriers. In the eighteenth 
century, the German merchant community in London rapidly expanded as they 
established themselves as major agents of trade between the British, French, Spanish, and 
Russian empires.181 In London, much of this trade was initially in the form of importing 
German linens but their activities soon widened to include the export of tobacco, furs, 
and other colonial produce to Europe.182 German merchants present at the HBC’s sales 
included: John Henry Schneider, John Christian Schreiber, Charles Schreiber, Justus 
Blankenhagen, Retberg & Co., Spitta, Molling & Co., John Daniel Hose, John William 
and John Daniel Paul, John William Vogel, and Boccius, Steinberg.183 The purchases that 
are attributable to these names total £187,000 and makes up one third of the sales of furs 
and castoreum contained in the account books.184 
The third highest purchasers at the Company’s auctions were hat makers. 19 hat 
makers were identified and they accounted for 19 per cent (£95,199) of the purchases.185 
Hat makers Borradailes, Clark & Co. of 34 Fenchurch Street was the Company’s second 
best customer and they bought £48,900 worth of furs from the Company.186 This firm 
must have been one of London’s largest manufacturers of beaver and felt hats as they 
dwarfed the £5,108 spent by John Ponten, the next identified London ‘hat-
manufacturer’.187 There was one notable provincial buyer at the auctions. The hatters 
Barker, Henshaw & Co. of Oldham, Manchester purchased £16,061 worth of beaver furs 
from the Company, one third of the purchases of Borradailes, Clark & Co..188 While the 
craft of a furrier was largely confined to London, beaver and felt hats were manufactured 
in a number of provincial regions including Lancashire, Cheshire, Staffordshire, and 
                                                 
181  See Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, ‘German Merchants and the British Empire during the Eighteenth 
Century’, in John R. Davis, Stefan Manz and Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, eds., Transnational Networks: 
German Migrants in the British Empire, 1670-1914 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 39-57. 
182 Ibid., pp. 39-57. 
183 Ibid., pp. 39-57; Beerbühl, German Merchants in London, pp. 136, 138, 154, 178, 191; and TNA, C 
13/150/1, Boccius v Steinberg, 1813. 
184 Blankenhagen and Retberg only purchased castoreum.  
185 See Table 4.8. 
186 See Table 4.9 and Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794). 
187 Ponten was located at 15 Stanhope Street, Clare Market. See Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794) and 
Table 4.9. 
188 This connection was found as the Company’s sales books noted that the firm was located in Manchester. 
See HBCA, A.48/7, Fur Sale Book, 1796-1810, fo. 101. Also see Table 4.9; and The Commercial 
Directory (1818). 
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Gloucestershire.189  Provincial manufacturers of such articles either had to rely upon 
London intermediaries to source their beaver skins or — as in the likely exceptional case 
of Barker, Henshaw & Co. — purchase them directly from the London market on their 
own account.  
Unlike the dual use of the term furrier, hat maker solely referred to those who 
manufactured hats. The furrier and hatter communities were often opposed to one another 
when it came to influencing national commercial policy. Due to the greater number of 
people employed in the profession and its country-wide distribution, the hat 
manufacturers were the more influential of the two.190 The eighteenth-century hatting 
industry had much success in lobbying government for restrictions on the exportation of 
felting furs and the importation of foreign hats. Indeed, when the ‘Furriers of London’ 
petitioned for the repeal of legislation that prohibited the dyeing of coney and hare skins 
following the appearance of a copy of the clause ‘all over London with an anonymous 
threat to put it in force’, the Board of Trade solicited the advice of Borradailes & Co. who 
quickly convened a Committee of the ‘Hat Manufacturers of London and Southwark’ to 
draw up a scathing response to the furriers request.191 The reply of the hatter’s six-strong 
committee succeeded in having the furriers’ plea, which was signed by 43 petitioners, 
disregarded. 192  While on this occasion the Feltmakers’ Company was not involved, 
before 1800 at least, this institution was a focal point for the advancing the interests of 
the London and wider British hatting industry.193 For instance, when William Pitt, then 
Lord Treasurer, was negotiating a commercial treaty with Portugal in the spring of 1787, 
the Feltmaker’s Company had a City MP deliver a memorial to Pitt that called for the 
                                                 
189 TNA, BT 1/89, ‘Answer of the Hat Manufacturers of London to the application of the Furriers’, Board 
of Trade; General In-letters and Files, 24 June 1814. 
190 TNA, BT 1/89, ‘Answer of the Hat Manufacturers of London to the application of the Furriers’, Board 
of Trade; General In-letters and Files, 24 June 1814. 
191 TNA, BT 1/89, ‘Memorial of the Furriers of London’, Board of Trade; General In-letters and Files, 18 
May 1814; and BT 1/89, ‘Answer of the Hat Manufacturers of London to the application of the Furriers’, 
Board of Trade; General In-letters and Files, 24 June 1814. 
192 The conveyed committee of hat manufacturers included George Ravenhill (of William Borradaile, Sons 
& Ravenhill), Thomas Christy (of J. W. & J. Christy), John Oakey (of John Oakey & Co.), John Plank 
(of Vaughan & Plank), Thomas Taylor (of Saxton, Taylor & Saxton), and John R. Harris (of John Harris 
& Son). 
193  The influence of the Feltmakers’ Company even extended beyond Britain. In October 1814 the 
Feltmakers’ Court received a petition for relief from Johann Carl Fredrich Toppel, a ‘Master Hatter and 
Manufacturer’ of Colditz in Leipzic, Germany. Mr Wontner Senr, probably the hat maker Thomas 
Wontner who was a mid-sized buyer of beaver and otter at the HBC’s auctions (£3,757), was asked by 
the Court to make enquiries on the subject. See Guildhall Library, MS01570/5, Worshipful Company of 
Feltmakers, Court Minute Book, 1782-90, p. 678; Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794); and HBCA, 
A.48/6-7, Fur Sale Books, 1770-1810. 
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interests of the hat manufactories to be considered.194 In addition, the Company sent 
letters to the principal hat manufacturers of Bristol, Manchester, and Newcastle-under-
Lyme asking them to issue their own memorials on the matter and these requests were 
warmly received and complied with.195 In contrast, the Skinners’ Company does not 
appear to have advanced the interests of the furriers or skinners craft with the same zeal 
as that of the Feltmakers’ Company. It seems that furriers were seldom involved with the 
Skinners’ Company by and after 1800, as only the brokers William Row, William Row 
Junior, and William Thomas Goad are listed as Assistants in the Company’s minute 
books.196 
Brokers — who served as intermediaries between importers and furriers or hat 
makers — composed 11 per cent (£52,634) of the purchases of furs and castoreum at the 
HBC’s auctions, but there were only three such tradesmen found in the search of trade 
directories.197 Of course the analysis has its limitations. A search of more trade directories, 
especially around 1800, would no doubt lead to further identifications but it seems 
unlikely that this would significantly change the findings. The top broker was Robinson, 
Goad, Row & Co. and its various successor firms who were the Company’s fifth best 
customer, purchasing a total of £36,497.198 Although there were eight different curriers 
and nine drug merchants identified, they only each made up 1 per cent of the purchases.199 
A single glover and one mercer were also located in trade directories but their purchasers 
were exceptionally small, suggesting that it was not typical for these sorts of tradespeople 
to purchase furs from public auctions.200  
Considering the strength of the hatting lobby over the merchants and furriers, the 
NWC’s London Houses played a risky game by circumventing the London market or by 
concluding private agreements with German furriers; the risk was decidedly less if deals 
were also made with hat manufacturers, although there is no evidence of such 
                                                 
194 Guildhall Library, MS01570/5, Worshipful Company of Feltmakers, Court Minute Book, 1782-90, pp. 
235-7. 
195 Apart from the response of the Bristol hatters of which no reply is mentioned in the Company’s minute 
books. See Guildhall Library, MS01570/5, Worshipful Company of Feltmakers, Court Minute Book, 
1782-90, pp. 235-7. Another example of the Feltmakers’ Company acting as a defender of the hatter’s 
interests can be seen in November 1785 when the Company attempted to stamp out many ‘pedlers and 
hawkers’ evasion of the government’s new duty on hats. See Guildhall Library, MS01570/5, Worshipful 
Company of Feltmakers, Court Minute Book, 1782-90, p. 164. 
196 These three names appear regularly in the Company’s minute books between 1800 and 1821. See 
Guildhall Library, MS30708/17-20, Worshipful Company of Skinners, Court Book, 1800-25. 
197 See Table 4.8. 
198 See Table 4.9. 
199 See Table 4.8. 
200 See the ‘other’ category in Table 4.8. 
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arrangements. British furriers and hatters were not motivated to intervene in the conflict 
between the Hudson’s Bay and Montreal fur trades except perhaps, as Rich suggests, in 
the immediate years prior to the merger between the two companies. In fact, the existence 
of the two concerns ensured neither could monopolise the London market and force up 
prices. The more pertinent question is why the London merchants and furriers, and the 
hat manufacturers in particular, allowed the merger of the two Companies to go ahead 
without much comment, allowing the HBC a de facto monopoly of the fur trade. In the 
end, the dwindling supply of beaver to the British market, partly a consequence of the 
clashes between the two companies but principally from North America’s declining 
beaver population, probably made monopoly preferable to the ruinous effects of open 
competition in the trade. Metropolitan agents evidently thought that a single supplier was 
the preferable way forward and that they would be able to prevent the chartered Company 
from over-capitalising on its privileged position. 
IV.   Conclusion 
Between 1783 and 1821 the London fur market underwent a number of significant 
changes. The British re-export trade in furs boomed during the 1790s but the Napoleonic 
Wars contributed to a long-term decline in the trade, and bankrupted several of the 
German merchants who had been principal agents of the exchange. The price of many of 
the non-felting furs collapsed as the demand for luxury furs in war-ridden Europe 
evaporated. British domestic consumption of a number of furs increased but the home 
market could not cushion all of the distresses in international trade. Beaver and musquash, 
both of which were used in the making of felt hats, bucked this trend, however, and British 
demand for these furs blossomed and prices rose accordingly. The exhaustion of the 
beaver population in North America led to falling beaver imports into Britain and prices 
increased further. The escalating conflict between the HBC and NWC on the frozen 
frontiers of the British North American Empire, ratcheted up political scrutiny of the fur 
trade, and led a diverse body of City interests to conclude that a single Company with a 
monopoly of the fur trade was preferable to the injurious effects of unrestrained free 
market competition.  
The Company’s competition with the Canada merchants, however, helped to 
insulate the HBC from accusations of market manipulation as it denied the Company a 
monopoly of the metropolitan market. The Company’s firm commitment to the use of 
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public auctions and the transparency with which it declared the volume of its imports 
arose as a convenient way in which to abate criticism. The NWC, and its corresponding 
Houses in London, had greater liberty to conduct private sale agreements with fur buyers. 
Such arrangements likely did increase the profits of the Canada merchants, although it is 
debateable as to the extent to which they did so in light of the increased risk afforded by 
the extension of credit to key purchasers and the mixed success of the Company’s 
adventures to China. Ultimately, the differences between the two companies’ method of 
sales arose because of the distinct environments that the two concerns operated within; 
the HBC had a strong motivation for acting transparently in an effort to maintain its 
Charter, whereas the volume of the NWC’s trade promoted the use of closed private deals 
and ventures into the China trade. It is perhaps surprising that the hat manufacturers of a 
growing number of provincial regions did not express dissatisfaction with London’s 
monopoly of the fur trade. In order to explore this aspect further, the next chapter takes a 
closer look at the British manufacture of hats and other fur-related apparel, alongside the 
trade and distribution of these products to consumers in Britain and beyond. 
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5 
Hats, Muffs, and Tippets: The demand for fur-related 
apparel in Britain and beyond 
 
At the Coronation of King William and Queen Mary, ‘the champion of England’, dressed 
in ‘armour of complete and glittering steel’ and a ‘beaver finely capped with plumes of 
feathers’, flung down his gauntlet on the floor of Westminster Hall and so issued the 
customary challenge to any who would dispute the rights of their Majesties to the crown 
of England, or so The Morning Herald mused in an anecdote published on 9 August 
1783.1 While this reflection on the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 contained an imaginary 
tale of a seemingly old woman entering the Hall and accepting the Champion’s challenge, 
only to be disappointed at the Champion never making his appearance at Hyde Park on 
account of his refusal to duel with the ‘fair sex’, the Champion’s regalia signifies the 
illustrious status of the beaver hat in eighteenth-century Britain. Had the duel in this 
fanciful tale taken place then, in the cool air of April, the noblewomen in attendance 
would no doubt have been draped in a fur-lined cloak with a tippet about their shoulders 
and a matching muff clasped in their hands.  
This chapter aims to shed light on the making of fur-garments and accessories and 
their distribution to consumers in Britain and abroad. The extant literature on the fur trade 
has seldom examined the manufacture and retail of fur garments and accessories to 
consumers. Some attention has been paid to the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century trade 
in beaver hats but the scope and coverage of these studies is limited.2 Indeed, the role of 
the furrier in crafting furs into wearing apparel remains obscure and there has been no 
attempt to understand how their profession fitted into the wider British economy during 
                                                 
1 The Morning Herald and Daily Advertiser, 9 August 1783. 
2 See Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, pp. 15-35; J. F. Crean, ‘Hats and the Fur Trade’, Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1962), pp. 373-86; and Murray G. Lawson, ‘The 
Beaver Hat and the North American Fur Trade’, in Malvina Bolus, ed., People and Pelts: Selected 
Papers of the Second North American Fur Trade Conference (Winnipeg: Peguis Publishers, 1972), pp. 
27-37. 
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the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.3 What did a ‘manufacturing furrier’ 
actually do? How did British beaver hats perform in global markets after 1783? Did the 
way in which fur garments and accessories were manufactured and the means through 
which they were retailed to consumers encourage monopoly within the fur trade?  
The chapter is structured in three parts. The first explores the manufacture and sale 
of beaver hats in Britain. It examines the spatial distribution of production between 
London and provincial regions, as well as the retail trade in beaver hats, identifying 
patterns of consumer demand for the ever-changing styles of beaver hats. The second part 
offers a detailed analysis of the British overseas trade in beaver hats, highlighting the 
impact of high beaver prices and the division of exports between London and the outports. 
The final section examines the making of muffs, tippets, and other garments by 
metropolitan furriers, showing that London remained the nation’s manufacturing centre 
for fine fur-related apparel, in addition to the increasingly sophisticated network of 
retailers that marketed these products to provincial consumers, especially to the country’s 
emergent ‘middling sorts’. 
I.   ‘A Trade of Great National Importance’: The manufacture and retail of beaver hats 
in Britain 
Over the course of the eighteenth century there was a considerable growth in the 
manufacture of beaver hats in Britain. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 by 
Louis XIV of France led to an exodus of French Huguenots from Normandy to England, 
Holland, and Germany, which included numerous experienced hat makers.4 By the late 
seventeenth century there was already a well-established hatting industry in London that 
was concentrated in Southwark, and the newly arrived Huguenot refugees brought an 
influx of skills and experience to the borough.5 Southwark was thus well-placed to supply 
the rising demand for beaver hats in Britain, Europe, and the rapidly expanding European 
colonies across the Atlantic rim. While beaver hats were the most fashionable hats to be 
worn by the aristocracy and ‘middling sorts’ at this time — a position that they were to 
retain until the demand for silk hats seriously began to capture their consumer base from 
                                                 
3 For instance, Lawson states that the decline in the use of the beaver hat in the 1840s saw ‘shortly thereafter, 
a new combination… arise to pick up their fallen sceptre — fancy fur and the fur coat, the new 
fashionable mode of fur adornment’. Clearly there is little acknowledgement in the existing 
historiography of the use of fur outside of the hatting industry prior to the rise of the nineteenth-century 
fur coat. See Lawson, ‘Beaver Hat’, p. 36. 
4 Madeleine Ginsburg, The Hat: Trends and Traditions (London: Studio, 1990), p. 45. 
5 Ibid., p. 32. 
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the 1830s onwards — their high price limited their usage.6 Beaver was especially suited 
to the making of hats as it was water-repellent and retailers eagerly pointed out the 
‘weatherproof’ nature of their hats to consumers.7 However, it should be noted that beaver 
hats also contained wool, and those referred to as ‘castor’ hats were made from a 
combination of sheep’s wool and either coney or beaver.8 Felt hats, on the other hand, 
were much cheaper than those that contained beaver, largely because they were made 
from a mix of coney and lambswool.9 By 1791, but probably earlier, musquash was also 
used in the making of beaver or castor hats, a development that was likely stimulated by 
the high price of beaver.10 While it is difficult to determine the number of beaver and felt 
hats produced in Britain each year, one official estimate in 1784 placed the figure at 4 
million and 750,000 of these were exported.11 Of the hats retained for domestic use, one-
third were thought to be felt hats and the other two-thirds so-called ‘mixed’ hats or those 
that contained beaver or another type of fur.12 As the prominent hat manufacturers of 
London and Southwark argued to the Board of Trade in June 1814, hatting was indeed ‘a 
trade of great national importance’.13 
The quality of a beaver hat was largely dictated by its beaver content and the quality 
of the beaver itself. By 1783, the technique of ‘carroting’, so-called because of the colour 
that the process turned the pelts, was widely used to maximise the amount of beaver wool 
produced.14 The technique was pioneered in London at some point during the 1720s and 
involved immersing parchment beaver in a solution of mercuric nitrate.15 The treatment 
softened the pelts by breaking down the amino-acid chains of the hairs so that they 
became limp, twisted, and rough. 16  This made the felting process easier and more 
effective. Carroting increased the volume of beaver hats that could be produced but the 
technique did not entirely displace the use of coat beaver. As pelts that had been softened 
more gradually through their wearing by Aboriginal peoples, coat beaver was superior in 
                                                 
6 On silk hats see Hanson, ‘The Myth of the Silk Hat’, pp. 420-35; and Ginsburg, The Hat, p. 86. 
7 For instance, see The Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser, 7 January 1783. 
8 David Corner, ‘The Tyranny of Fashion: The Case of the Felt-Hatting Trade in the Late Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries’, Textile History, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1991), p. 155. 
9 Ibid., p. 155. 
10 See ‘George Martin to Davies & Co.’ 30 April and 2 July 1791, TNA, C 107/104, ‘Loose Letters’, 
Thomas Davies & Co., hatters of Stockport and London, 1791-5. 
11 Debates; Day; Day, 30 June 1784 (P.P. 1784, Vol. 15), p. 281. 
12 Debates; Day; Day, 30 June 1784 (P.P. 1784, Vol. 15), p. 281. 
13 BT 1/89, ‘Answer of the Hat Manufacturers of London to the application of the Furriers’, Board of Trade; 
General In-letters and Files, 24 June 1814. 
14 Ginsburg, The Hat, p. 69. 
15 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, p. 21. 
16 Ibid., p. 21; and Ginsburg, The Hat, pp. 69, 89. 
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quality to ‘carroted’ parchment beaver. 17  A small quantity of coat beaver therefore 
continued to be added to top-quality felt. 
Alongside the implementation of new techniques into the hat-making process, 
further changes came in the organisation and geographic spread of the industry. There 
was a clear differentiation between metropolitan and provincial hat production in the first 
half of the eighteenth century. London dominated the manufacture of fine hats due to its 
skilled workforce and access to imported raw materials.18 Conversely, the provincial 
centres of Chester, Stockport, Manchester, Bristol, and Newcastle-Under-Lyme had a 
long tradition of making cheap and coarse felt hats.19 After 1750, the hats produced by 
these provincial centres were increasingly exported to the Americas as the colonies’ 
demand for cheap hats expanded. In order to make their hats cheaper and thus more 
effectively compete in Atlantic trade, London hatters began to establish links and bases 
in and around the borderlands of Lancashire and Cheshire in an effort to reduce labour 
costs, and so metropolitan hat production increasingly shifted to provincial regions.20 As 
in the expansion of textile production in and around Manchester in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, the dual nature of the occupational activities of small farmers, whom 
often complemented agriculture with weaving or hatting, facilitated the provinces’ 
competitive advantage.21 London did, however, continue to excel in the making of the 
finest hats for domestic consumption and the higher-quality goods destined for the 
European export trade, although its role in the manufacturing of the cheaper varieties for 
the southern counties was gradually reduced to the finishing stages of production.22 In 
contrast, Stockport produced cheaper hats for domestic and foreign markets but its 
manufacture of finer hats was confined to the markets north of Manchester.23  
Increased hat production in and around Manchester in the second half of the 
eighteenth century was, therefore, intimately connected to metropolitan hat-making.24 At 
first, these ties were in the form of agreements between London and provincial hatters, 
with the metropolitan firm extending raw materials on 12 months’ credit. While 
provincial manufactures were able to pay off a proportion of the credit by supplying hats, 
                                                 
17 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, p. 21. 
18 Corner, ‘Tyranny of Fashion’, p. 164. 
19 Ibid., p. 164. 
20 Ibid., p. 164. 
21 Ibid., p. 165. 
22 Ibid., pp. 169-70. 
23 Ibid., pp. 169-70. 
24 Ibid., especially pp. 164-75. 
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they struggled to meet the requirement to make part of the return in cash.25 London hatters 
looked to overcome such limitations by establishing their own provincial operations. 
Thomas Davies & Co., hatters of London and Stockport were one of the pioneers of this 
new form of organisation and their involvement in provincial hat manufacturing began in 
1767 at Stockport.26 In London, Davies & Co. managed their trade from a wholesale 
warehouse at Nicholas Lane and operated a manufactory on Tooley Street in 
Southwark.27The manufacturing was undertaken through several methods of production. 
The first was the use, by a few wealthy entrepreneurs, of centralised workshops that 
employed large numbers of workmen. 28  Finishing and dyeing were the main tasks 
undertaken by these large manufactories. For the less critical processes, the centralised 
workshops often put out materials on credit to smaller producers who performed the less 
critical processes.29 Davies & Co.’s provincial manufacturing was conducted in a similar 
way and operated from High Street in Stockport, and the required beaver and musquash 
skins were delivered by sea via Liverpool. 30 While the sub-contracting of work to small 
farmers reduced labour costs, it reduced the firm’s ability to respond rapidly to changing 
patterns of demand.31 
The implementation of new techniques and the division of production between 
London and the provinces reduced costs. These developments became even more 
important as the price of beaver skins continued to rise at the end of the eighteenth 
century. Surviving correspondence between Davies & Co.’s London and Stockport 
operations shows that the high price of beaver was a constant concern. Writing from 
London in October 1784, J. Davis informed Thomas Evans in Stockport that ‘you must 
be very sparing of your beaver it is so scarce and dear, there is not enough in the trade to 
serve till the importation comes’. 32  Further letters in 1784, 1785, and 1791 again 
expressed dismay at the scarcity of beaver in the capital and urged the Stockport 
manufactory to be as prudent as possible in its use.33  
                                                 
25 Ibid., p. 165.  
26 Ibid., p. 167. 
27 Ibid., p. 166. 
28 Ibid., pp. 159-60. 
29 Ibid., pp. 159-60. 
30 Ibid., p. 167; and Bailey’s British Directory, 1st Edition (1784). 
31 Corner, ‘Tyranny of Fashion’, pp. 172-3. 
32 ‘J. Davis to Thomas Evans’ 5 October 1784, TNA, C 107/104, ‘Domestic Letter Book’, Thomas Davies 
& Co., hatters of Stockport and London, 1781-7. 
33 ‘J. Davis to Thomas Evans’ 9 November 1784 and 9 February 1785, TNA, C 107/104, ‘Domestic Letter 
Book’, Thomas Davies & Co., hatters of Stockport and London, 1781-7; and ‘George Martin to Davies 
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The introduction of a duty on the retailing of hats in 1784 — just one of a series of 
taxes on a wide array of consumer items levied by William Pitt the Younger — brought 
further challenges to the hat trade by increasing the price of hats. As well as requiring 
retailers to purchase an annual license to enable them to vend hats legally, the Act 
determined that the rate of Stamp duty to be paid was dependent upon the hat’s value.34 
Charges ranged from 3d. per hat for hats worth less than 4s. and for those worth over 12s. 
the rate was 2s. per hat. 35 It was assumed that the tax would principally fall upon ‘the 
opulent’ as they used the greatest number of hats each year, while the poor wore cheaper 
hats and seldom purchased more than one every two years.36 While Pitt supposed that the 
tax would return £150,000 a year to the Treasury, the actual proceeds were far below this 
amount. 37  From April 1786 to April 1787, the duties only generated revenues of 
£40,183.38 Tax evasion by retailers was the main reason for these disappointing returns. 
By November 1785, the Feltmakers’ Company moved to prosecute ‘the many’ offenders 
who were evading paying the hat duties as this practice was ‘highly injurious to the fair 
Traders’.39 A decade later, a reform was introduced that was intended to improve the 
collection of the duties by ending the use of stamped paper tickets and instead requiring 
that the actual paid duty was stamped onto the hats themselves.40 The duty remained in 
place until 1811.41 
When it came to selling their manufactured hats, Davies & Co. sold very few of 
them directly to consumers. Instead, they largely sold their hats to retailers either via their 
showroom at Nicholas Lane or through the use of salesmen who travelled on horseback 
around well-planned regional circuits to solicit provincial orders and collect bills.42 Other 
                                                 
& Co.’ 5 April and 3 June 1791, TNA, C 107/104, ‘Loose Letters’, Thomas Davies & Co., hatters of 
Stockport and London, 1791-5. 
34 An Act for granting to His Majesty certain Duties on Licences, to be taken out by Persons vending Hats 
by Retail; and also certain Duties on Hats sold under such Licences; and for laying additional Duties 
on all Hats and Caps imported into this Kingdom (P.P. 1784, C. 51), pp. 823-35. 
35 The imposed Stamp duties and the range of values that they applied to were as follows: 3.d. per hat for 
those worth below 4s., 4s. per hat for those valued between 4s. and 7s., 1s. for those worth between 7s. 
and 12s., and 2s. for hats worth over 12s.. See An Act for granting to His Majesty certain Duties on 
Licences, to be taken out by Persons vending Hats by Retail; and also certain Duties on Hats sold under 
such Licences; and for laying additional Duties on all Hats and Caps imported into this Kingdom (P.P. 
1784, C. 51), pp. 824-5. 
36 Debates; Day; Day, 30 June 1784 (P.P. 1784, Vol. 15), p. 281. 
37 Debates; Day; Day, 30 June 1784 (P.P. 1784, Vol. 15), p. 281. 
38 An account of the total sums paid into the Exchequer, between the 5th April 1786 and the 5th April 1787 
(P.P. 1787, Vol. 50), p. 405. 
39 Guildhall Library, MS01570/5, Worshipful Company of Feltmakers, Court Minute Book, 1782-90, p. 164. 
40 A bill for the better collection of the duty on hats (P.P. 1795, Vol. 97), pp. 399-401. 
41 An Act for repealing the Hat Duty in Great Britain (P.P. 1811, C. 70), pp. 408-9. 
42 Corner, ‘Tyranny of Fashion’, pp. 167-8. 
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hat manufacturers such as Borradailes & Clark of London, who were often mentioned in 
Davies’ correspondence, probably constructed their trade along similar lines. In the spring 
of 1784, for instance, Davies learned that Borradailes was monopolising orders from 
Edinburgh as a result of a new style and shape of hat invented by the rival firm.43 Retailers 
in London and other large urban centres were more specialist than those in small towns 
and rural areas. It is clear from the surviving sales books of Francis Mouys & George 
Jarritt, hatters at 54 Pall Mall, and those of James Lock & Co., hatters at 6 St. James 
Street, that they exclusively sold hats.44 For retailers in more isolated areas, hats were just 
one part of their inventory. In a letter to Davies in September 1791, John Sizer of 
Manningtree in Essex expressed his anxiety that the hats he had ordered may not arrive 
in time to replenish his stock and without them he feared that his trade would be greatly 
injured as his customers often purchased hats together with other items.45  
In the eighteenth century, hats were not merely an accessory but a staple of 
everyday dress.46 Provincial consumers, particularly the more affluent ones, likely often 
purchased whole outfits at a time and a hat was an indispensable part of such transactions. 
It was, therefore, more expedient for rural retailers to stock a range of other wares 
alongside their hats than it was for their urban counterparts, the latter of whom were more 
likely to specialise in one particular item over diversifying their inventories. Abraham 
Dent, a grocer, mercer, and stationer in the small market town of Kirkby Stephen in 
Cumberland rarely sold hats but the ones that he did were either made out of cotton or 
satin.47 This is significant as it suggests that it might be unusual for shopkeepers in rural 
market towns to stock expensive beaver hats and that the sale of such hats was the domain 
of London and large provincial towns. In London alone, Kent’s Directory (1794) lists 178 
tradespeople as being involved in the hat trade.48 Almost one-third of these enterprises 
were described as ‘hatters and hosiers’ suggesting that in the capital it was just as likely 
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. 169. 
44 TNA, C 103/191, Mouys v Jarritt, 1802-7; LMA, B/LK/350/A, ‘Day Book’, Lock, James and Company, 
1783; and Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794). 
45 ‘John Sizer to Thomas Davies & Co.’ 18 September 1791, TNA, C 107/104, ‘Loose Letters’, Thomas 
Davies & Co., hatters of Stockport and London, 1791-5. 
46 Corner, ‘Tyranny of Fashion’, p. 153. 
47  T. S. Willan, An Eighteenth Century Shopkeeper: Abraham Dent of Kirkby Stephen (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1970), pp. 9, 13. While Dent sold groceries and stationary his business 
was never described as such in contemporary trade directories. See Ibid., p. 9. 
48 Of the 178 tradespeople: 55 (31 per cent) were listed as ‘hatter and hosiers’, 41 (23 per cent) as ‘hatters’, 
35 (20 per cent) as ‘hat-makers’, 30 (17 per cent) as ‘hat manufacturers’, 7 (4 per cent) as particular 
kinds of ‘hat warehouses’, 5 (3 per cent) as ‘hatters’ and another trade, 3 (2 per cent) as ‘makers of 
hosiery and hats’, and 2 (1 per cent) as various kinds of ‘hat pressers’. See Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition 
(1794). 
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for hats to be sold alongside stockings as they were to be sold in specialist hat shops. 
While 23 per cent of the tradespeople were listed as ‘hatters’, a term that refers to the 
retailers of hats. James Lock & Co. were described as hatters in trade directories but from 
their records it does not appear that they directly made the hats they sold to their elite 
clientele, which included the likes of Lord Bathurst, William Wilberforce, the Duke of 
Marlborough, and many other high profile individuals.49 The terms ‘hat-maker’ and ‘hat-
manufacturer’ were also prolific and together they composed 37 per cent of the 178 
tradespeople, which demonstrates London’s continued role as a major centre of hat 
production.50  
The Directory of Newcastle upon Tyne and Gateshead (1801) suggests that the 
combination of ‘hatter and hosier’ was similarly visible in provincial urban centres. A 
total of 17 tradespeople listed in the directory were connected to the hatting industry in 
one form or another.51 Four were described as ‘hatters and hosiers’, which accounts for 
almost one-quarter of the firms. ‘Hatters’ were more prevalent, however, with a total of 
nine (53 per cent) tradespeople described as such.52 While a degree of caution needs to 
be taken with these findings due to the different authors of the directories and the possible 
selective nature of the entries contained therein, it appears to have been the case that hat 
retailers in Newcastle and Gateshead were more specialised than their average 
metropolitan counterpart. On the other hand, there were very few hat manufacturers in 
Newcastle and Gateshead; only two tradespeople were listed as ‘hat-manufacturers’ and 
one as a ‘hat-maker’.53  
As in other high-end luxury trades, London dominated the retail trade in beaver hats. 
This was not primarily because of the capital’s easy access to imported beaver or a result 
of the city’s large population but rather the enduring tendency for elite consumers to 
conduct much of their shopping during ‘the season’ (from winter to early spring) when 
they left their country estates and converged on the metropolis in their thousands.54 
Indeed, the principal market for beaver hats was amongst the aristocracy, military, and 
                                                 
49 LMA, B/LK/350/A, ‘Day Book’, Lock, James and Company, 1783, fos. 18, 37, 99; and Kent’s Directory, 
62nd Edition (1794). Lock & Co. would later introduce the ‘Bowler’ hat which became a hallmark of 
Victorian Britain. See Ginsburg, The Hat, pp. 86-7. 
50 Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794). 
51 Directory of Newcastle upon Tyne and Gateshead (Newcastle upon Tyne: Printed and sold by J. Mitchell, 
Dean Street, 1801). 
52 This does not include one ‘hatter and furrier’.  
53 Directory of Newcastle upon Tyne and Gateshead (Newcastle upon Tyne: Printed and sold by J. Mitchell, 
Dean Street, 1801). 
54 Berg, Luxury and Pleasure, p. 263. 
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emergent middling sorts. In January 1783, Lock & Co. sold a fine beaver hat with a silver 
band and decorated with silver lace to Lieutenant Watson of the 52nd Regiment at 
Chatham Barracks for £2 9s..55 In that same month a fine beaver hat worth £1 1s. was 
sold to the Duke of Manchester and another was sold to the Reverend Holcomb of 
Parliament Square.56 While the Duke of Manchester certainly would have been an elite 
provincial who had come to London for ‘the season’, plenty of elite consumers remained 
in London throughout the year. Analysis of the only surviving customer account book of 
the Pall Mall hatters Mouys & Jarritt which covers the years 1802-7, reveals the similar 
mass of landed gentry, military officers, parliamentarians, esquires, and religious 
leaders. 57  Since the account book covers several years, it can be used to track the 
frequency with which regular patrons purchased beaver hats. Lord Morpeth was Mouys 
& Jarritt’s most fervent customer of beaver hats. In May 1803, Morpeth purchased ‘a 
black beaver bonnett trimmed with ostrich feather[,] band and ribbon [and a] box’. for £1 
1s..58 Morpeth purchased similarly decorated beaver hats in July 1803, in April, July, 
August, and September the following year, and in April and September 1806.59 Morpeth 
purchased many of his hats outside of ‘the season’, so it is apparent that he was a 
permanent resident in London at this time. In all, during the six years covered by the 
accounts, Morpeth purchased 10 beaver hats from Mouys & Jarritt.60 While it cannot be 
said with certainty as to whether each of these hats was for Morpeth’s personal use, it is 
probable that most of them were and that his purchases reflect the high turnover of luxury 
apparel amongst elite consumers.  
Changes in fashion became more rapid as the eighteenth century progressed. In 
Victorian Britain, it was the finishes applied to men’s hats — namely top hats — that 
varied most, whereas in the eighteenth century it was the actual style of hat that was ever-
changing.61 Men’s hat fashions in the early to mid-eighteenth century were dominated by 
three- and two-cornered hats, more commonly known today as ‘tricorne’ and ‘bicorne’ 
hats.62 There were many different styles of tricorne hats over the century but after 1780 it 
                                                 
55 LMA, B/LK/350/A, ‘Day Book’, Lock, James and Company, 1783, fo. 2. 
56 LMA, B/LK/350/A, ‘Day Book’, Lock, James and Company, 1783, fos. 3, 25. 
57 See TNA, C/103/191, Mouys v Jarritt, 1802-7; and Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794). 
58 TNA, C/103/191, Mouys v Jarritt, 1802-7, fo. 5. 
59 TNA, C/103/191, Mouys v Jarritt, 1802-7, fos. 5, 117. 
60 This discounts one beaver hat that was expressly stated as being purchased by Lord Morpeth for another 
gentleman. See TNA, C/103/191, Mouys v Jarritt, 1802-7, fo. 5. 
61 Ginsburg, The Hat, pp. 57, 74, 76, 85. 
62 C. Willett Cunnington and Phillis Cunnington, Handbook of English Costume in the Eighteenth Century 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1957), pp. 234-7. 
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was the ‘fantail’ hat that was the more fashionable, two examples of which are shown in 
Figure 5.1.63 The more well-known Bicorne or ‘cocked’ hats were widely used in the 
military and for use on horseback.64 By the end of the century, tricorne hats hat fallen out 
of favour and were largely replaced by the so-called ‘round’ hat, which was a style that 
                                                 
63 Ibid., p. 236. 
64 Ibid., p. 237. For an example of a cocked hat used by officers in the Royal Navy see Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1. Men’s hat styles, c.1780-1820. 
 
 
 
Notes: The hats pictured in the top left corner includes: a) Fantail hat; b) Round hat and queue turned 
up; c) Round hat with hatband and buckles; d) Fantail hat, wig with catogan queue (all 1786). The 
hats shown in the bottom left corner are various shapes of round hats (1790s). On the right are 
several styles of eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century beaver hats. 
Source: Cunnington and Cunnington, English Costume in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 235, 238; and 
Horace T. Martin, Castorologia or the History and Traditions of the Canadian Beaver (London: 
Edward Standford, 1892), p. 125. 
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first came into fashion as a riding hat during the 1770s.65 Figure 5.1 shows several 
different forms of round hat but they all shared a round, flat-topped crown, and a flat, un-
cocked brim, and were usually made out of black beaver, although white beaver was 
sometimes used.66 Indeed, in the early nineteenth century, Mouys & Jarritt sold far more 
round hats than they did pure ‘beaver’ hats but it is clear that at over £1 per hat, round 
hats contained a significant amount of beaver.67 After 1800, top hats (a form of round hat) 
gradually emerged as the predominant fashion in male headwear and their popularity 
would continue well into the early twentieth century.68  
Beaver hats were not only worn by men, however. Women were important 
consumers as well and it is unfortunate that the existing historiography of the fur trade 
has ignored this fact.69 It is true to say that, for women, the demand for beaver hats was 
decidedly less than it was for men, a circumstance that arose from the strong demand for 
hats amongst the military and the wider range of materials used in the making of women’s 
hats. All three of the hatters’ records used in this study show a significant trade in 
women’s hats. In November 1785, Davies & Co. sent six fancy ‘ladies hats’ that were 
‘trimmed in the most fashionable taste’ to the Barbados merchants George Henry and 
William Thompson Armstrong.70 Lock & Co. sold a fine beaver hat worth £1 1s. to Lady 
Morton at Parke Square in February 1787.71 A Miss Flint who was resident at the Earl of 
Dartmouth’s property at Berkeley Square ordered ‘a lady’s black beaver bonnet trimmed 
with ribbon’ for 13s. from Mouys & Jarritt in February 1803, and there were many more 
instances of men ordering women’s beaver hats from the Pall Mall hatters, presumably 
as a gift for their loved ones.72  
At the close of the eighteenth century, fashionable women’s hats generally had large 
or tall crowns, but the vogue began to shift to styles that were smaller after 1795 (See 
                                                 
65 Ibid., p. 238. 
66 Ibid., pp. 87, 238. 
67 For instance, in December 1802 General Horneck at Warrens Hotel purchased ‘a fine round hat and 
stamp’ for £1 6s. and did so again in the same month of the following year. See TNA, C/103/191, Mouys 
v Jarritt, 1802-7, fo. 7. 
68 Ginsburg, The Hat, p. 85; and C. Willett Cunnington and Phillis Cunnington, Handbook of English 
Costume in the Nineteenth Century (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), pp. 60, 70, 74. Also see Figure 
5.1. 
69 For example, see Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, pp. 15-6. 
70 ‘Thomas Davies & Co. to George Henry Thompson and William Thompson Armstrong’ 12 November 
1785, TNA, C 107/104, ‘Foreign Letter Book’, Thomas Davies & Co., hatters of Stockport and London, 
1771-92. 
71 LMA, B/LK/350/A, ‘Day Book’, Lock, James and Company, 1783, fo. 46. 
72 TNA, C/103/191, Mouys v Jarritt, 1802-7, fo. 29. 
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Figure 5.2).73 The most prolific hats for women made from beaver were so-called ‘riding 
hats’ that formed an essential part of the ‘riding habit’ that was a key feature of the elite 
female wardrobe at this time.74 Indeed, metropolitan retailers often directly addressed the 
                                                 
73 Cunnington, English Costume in the Eighteenth Century, p. 364. 
74 Ibid., pp. 366-8. On the ‘riding habit’ specifically see Ibid., pp. 304-10. 
Figure 5.2. Women’s hat styles, c.1780-1820 
 
 
  
 
Notes: Top left is a cocked riding hat (1787). Bottom left is a large cocked riding hat (1787). The 
middle image is an example of walking attire that consists of a stone-coloured habit trimmed with 
swansdown, a black beaver or sealskin hat, a large bear or sealskin muff, a pair of black kid sandals, 
and white stockings (1813). On the right is a riding dress composed of a bright green habit with 
military trimming, a small black beaver riding hat, a pair of black half-boots laced with green, and 
a pair of York tan gloves (1812). 
Source: Cunnington and Cunnington, English Costume in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 358-9; and 
Cunnington and Cunnington, English Costume in the Nineteenth Century, p. 382. 
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‘nobility and gentry’ when advertising the sale of riding habits and hats.75 Despite its 
name, riding habits and their associated hats were used as much for morning walks and 
other occasions as they were for riding.76 Like they were for men, cocked styles of 
women’s riding hats were very popular from 1777 to 1790, and women also commonly 
wore round hats after 1800.77 The range of materials used in the production of women’s 
hats does appear to have been broader than was the case for men’s hats. Materials 
included beaver, felt, straw, leghorn, chip, silk, satin, and velvet, although it has been 
suggested that beaver was less frequently used after 1820.78  
The wearing of beaver hats by women did, in certain circumstances, attract criticism. 
On 1 January 1783, a correspondent for The Morning Herald argued that it was ridiculous 
for the prevailing fashion amongst young women to be the wearing of riding habits and 
hats on the streets of London and in the playhouses.79The correspondent maintained that 
the wearing of them to church was, however, wholly ‘irreverent and indecent’ and that it 
was particularly shocking for a Lady to wear a slouch beaver hat in the House of God, 
and contended that the clergy ought to insist that the hats were removed.80 It was, at this 
time, traditional for women in Christian societies to cover their heads upon entering a 
church, yet there was clearly an etiquette about the style of such headwear. 81  The 
commentary generated a pointed discussion that later expanded to include whether it was 
proper for men to wear their boots to church. A mocking reply from ‘A Soldier I am for 
the Ladies’ at ‘Riding-Hat-Lane’ did not ‘pretend to determine whether ladies pray best 
in beaver or chip hats’ and proposed that the correspondent could bring into fashion a 
dedicated church hat.82 Maria, another reader who wrote to the paper, dismissed the 
nonsense espoused by the supposed ‘soldier’ accusing them of being a hatter and stating 
that she would never be ‘guilty of the gay decorum’ of wearing a habit or a slouch beaver 
to church nor her husband of wearing his boots.83 This barbed conversation in the national 
                                                 
75 For instance, see The Morning Herald and Daily Advertiser, 26 April 1783; and The Morning Post and 
Daily Advertiser, 19 May 1783. 
76 Cunnington, English Costume in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 366-8. 
77 Cunnington, English Costume in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 364-5. 
78 Ibid., pp. 364-5, 382, 396. 
79 The Morning Herald and Daily Advertiser, 1 January 1783. 
80 The Morning Herald and Daily Advertiser, 1 January 1783. 
81 Ginsburg, The Hat, p. 10. 
82 The Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser, 2 January 1783. 
83 The Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser, 7 January 1783. 
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press reveals a distain and mistrust of shopkeepers, and echoes earlier debates about the 
corrupting influence of luxury on the nation’s morals.84  
Beaver hats were also worn by the children of affluent families. Children as young 
as four years old were often dressed in a similar way to their father or mother.85 Thomas 
Davies & Co. produced ‘black mock beaver’ hats in a number of different age ranges, 
such as four to five and six to eight years old.86 Children’s beaver hats were a regular item 
sold by Mouys & Jarritt. For instance, in April 1805 the Pall Mall hatters sold two black 
beaver hats for the daughters of Mrs Duffield of Mount Street, Mayfair.87 
Demand for beaver hats amongst men, women, and children from the upper and 
middling sorts was largely sustained during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries; silk hats did not seriously begin to supplant the use of beaver hats until after 
1830. The high price of beaver presented British hat manufacturers with challenges, and 
these difficulties were evident in the 1780s and continued into the 1790s, although 
innovation within the industry and the use of musquash skins as a substitute for beaver 
brought some relief. Certainly, in the early nineteenth century, London and Southwark 
hat manufacturers demonstrated their sensitivity to the price of coney and hare skins, as 
is evident in their criticism of the metropolitan furriers’ attempts to have the ban on the 
dyeing of coney and hare skins lifted.88 While it is possible that wholesale fur-dealers 
made an intervention to help bring about a merger between the Hudson’s Bay and North 
West Companies as E. E. Rich suggests, no evidence of such a move has been found 
during the course of this study.89 A union between the two companies would, however, 
have stabilised beaver imports by reducing the over-trapping of beaver in North America, 
and London’s hat manufacturers zealously defended their own interests. In the fur trade 
— unlike in the debate over the EIC’s Charter in 1812-3 — provincial ports or 
manufacturers did not seek easier access to supplies of raw materials. Provincial and 
metropolitan hat makers had common interests and there were close links between the 
                                                 
84 On the eighteenth-century luxury debates see Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger, ‘The Rise and Fall of the 
Luxury Debates’, in Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger, eds., Luxury in the Eighteenth Century: Debates 
and Desires and Delectable Goods (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 7-27. 
85 Cunnington, English Costume in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 410-5. 
86 ‘Richard Simpson to Thomas Davies & Co.’ 21 November 1791, TNA, C 107/104, ‘Loose Letters’, 
Thomas Davies & Co., hatters of Stockport and London, 1791-5. 
87 TNA, C/103/191, Mouys v Jarritt, 1802-7, fo. 13. 
88 The hatters maintained that since 1 January 1814 they had been forced to import 20,000 lbs. of coney 
and hare wool from Holland even though it was inferior in quality to that made in England. See BT 
1/89, ‘Answer of the Hat Manufacturers of London to the application of the Furriers’, Board of Trade; 
General In-letters and Files, 24 June 1814. 
89 Rich, Hudson’s Bay Company, Vol. 2, p. 385. 
 
~208~ 
 
two groups, as show in the expansion of hat production in and around Manchester and 
much of this investment was supplied by London hat manufacturers. There was no 
opposition to the continuation of the HBC’s monopoly from provincial regions and the 
de facto extension of the Company’s monopoly in 1821 was left entirely to the discretion 
of metropolitan forces.  
II.   The Global Trade in British Hats  
By 1780 the number of British settlers and their descendants in the Americas totalled 
around 2.3 million.90 This was a substantial export market for British manufacturers of 
beaver hats and it was one that was protected by mercantilist regulations that restricted 
colonial production and exportation of felt and hats. Such legislation ensured that the 
colonies’ demand for British produced hats remained high.91 Overseas demand for beaver 
hats was not, however, solely confined to the British Atlantic or the British in the Orient. 
From the shores of West Africa, to Spanish Valparaiso, to Portuguese Brazil, British 
beaver hats were exported to markets across the world. While the beaver hat was the 
height of fashion amongst Britain’s ruling elite, its appeal spread far beyond the upper 
echelons of British society. The beaver hat was a symbol of distinction and respectability 
but it was also an emblem of authority that was much desired by the ruling and mercantile 
classes of colonial plantation economies. 
During the mid-eighteenth century the British export trade in beaver and felt hats 
underwent a number of significant changes. The first was the decline in exports of beaver 
hats. From the 1740s through to early 1760s around half a million beaver hats were 
exported from Britain each year.92 After 1762 the volume of the trade sharply decreased 
however, and in 1772 only 250,000 beaver hats were exported.93 In contrast, exports of 
felt hats gradually increased, rising from 200,000 a year in 1740 to around 300,000 in 
1760.94 Exports of felt hats continued to rise until their peak in 1772 when 650,000 were 
exported.95 In the case of both beaver and felt hats, the changes in their export trades 
occurred as British hat production shifted from London to provincial regions. It was not 
                                                 
90 James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-
1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 36. 
91 Carlos and Lewis, Frozen Sea, p. 28; and Lawson, ‘Beaver Hat’, p. 34. 
92 Corner, ‘Tyranny of Fashion’, p. 156. 
93 Ibid., p. 156. 
94 Ibid., p. 156. 
95 Ibid., p. 156. 
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until after 1783 that the British export of beaver hats began to recover. Figure 5.3 shows 
the annual number of hats that were exported from Britain to all parts of the world 
delineated by type of hat. Prior to 1806, only ‘beaver’ and ‘felt’ hats were listed in the 
British customs’ records. In this year silk hats were listed for the first time and, in the 
following years, castor, chip, leather, straw, and willow hats were added to the listings. 
While exports of beaver hats increased after 1783, this recovery was not a smooth one. 
Only between 1788 and 1792 did beaver hat exports increase year on year. This was 
followed by a largely stagnant period in 1793-8 but exports sharply rose in 1799 to reach 
a high point of 820,000 hats.96 This year was also the peak year for exports of felt hats, 
with just over 1.5 million exported in that year. In total, 2.3 million hats were exported 
from Britain at the close of the eighteenth century and exports in the early nineteenth 
century did not exceed this number.  
From 1800 onwards the trade in beaver hats gradually declined once again, although 
if castor hats are included alongside beaver hats there was a slight reversal of this trend 
after 1815. More striking during the period of this study was the surge in felt hat exports. 
From 1789 through to 1804, exports of felt hats were never below 760,000 and were 
routinely above 1.1 million. While the worst years of warfare in Europe and North 
America brought about a decline, up to 1821 the number of felt hats exported each year 
remained around 1 million. Between 1783 and 1821, therefore, British exports of felt hats 
saw their largest period of growth and this increased volume of trade was largely 
sustained throughout the period. In contrast, exports of beaver and castor hats were more 
erratic and although there was a recovery in exports to a volume in excess of that exported 
in the mid-eighteenth century, this revival was temporary. The exports of other sorts of 
hats that were added to the customs’ records in the first two decades of the nineteenth 
century were usually small and irregular. The most important of these minor exports were 
silk hats. In 1806, just over 230,000 silk hats were exported from Britain and this was 
their peak export year. Well over 100,000 silk hats were exported in 1814 and 1815 but 
the number declined thereafter so that only 12,471 were exported in 1821. In the case of 
the other hats, for the nine years after 1812 when they were listed in the customs’ records, 
an average 2,714 chip, 7,888 leather, 29,550 straw, and 58,171 willow hats were exported 
                                                 
96 Figure 5.3. 
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each year.97 From this initial survey of British hat exports it is apparent that it was felt 
rather than silk hats that provided the main competition for beaver hats in foreign markets.  
In terms of the geographic distribution of exports, the Americas were by far the 
leading market. As is shown in Table 5.1, an overall annual average of 270,000 beaver 
and castor hats were exported to the Americas each year and this accounted for 70 per 
cent of all British exports of these sorts of hats. With a share of 82 per cent, the Americas 
took an even greater proportion of British felt hat exports. For beaver and castor hats, the 
second most important export destination was ‘Asia’, namely India. On average each year 
62,799 beaver and castor hats were exported to Asia, a figure that accounts for 16 per cent 
of such exports. At only 4 per cent, however, Asia took the lowest share of felt hats. 
Europe was the third highest market for beaver and castor hats, with 12 per cent of such 
exports going to Continental Europe over the period or an annual average of 44,535.98 
With regard to felt hats, Europe accounted for 8 per cent of total exports and was the 
second highest market after the Americas. The third largest market for felt hats was 
Africa, although only 5 per cent were exported to this market, and the continent took a 
lower share of the exported beaver and castor hats (3 per cent). Australia or more 
specifically the colony of New South Wales — referred to as ‘New Holland’ in the 
customs’ records — did not become a significant market for beaver or felt hats until after 
1830.99 
Throughout the period there were a number of key changes in the composition of 
the British hat export trade to each of the four major continents. The Americas was always 
the principal market for British exports of beaver and castor hats. As is shown in Table 
5.2, exports of such hats expanded from an average of 177,000 each year in 1783-7 to 
456,000 in 1798-1802. While exports declined to an annual average of 141,000 in 1808-
12 they subsequently increased once more, reaching 242,000 by 1818-21.100 As is shown 
in Figure 5.4, between 1783 and 1792 the majority of beaver and castor hats exported to 
the Americas went to the United States. The new republic took over 60 per cent of British 
beaver hat exports to the Americas and this trade was increasing, rising from an annual 
average of 110,000 hats in 1783-7 to 167,000 hats in 1787-92.101 Exports of beaver hats 
                                                 
97 Excluding 1813 as the records were destroyed in a fire at the Customs’ House.   
98 Includes exports to Turkey. 
99 See the ‘hats, haberdashery, garments etc.’ category in the tables of British exports contained in Davis, 
British Overseas Trade, pp. 94-101. 
100 See Table 5.2. 
101 See Figure 5.4. 
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to the United States increased further in the final years of the eighteenth century, reaching 
an average of 217,000 hats a year in 1798-1802. The number of beaver and castor hats 
exported to the United States rapidly declined in the initial decades of the nineteenth 
century however. Only an average of 5,058 beaver and castor hats were exported to the 
republic each year in 1803-7 and even with the improvement of Anglo-American relations 
after 1815, the average number exported in 1818-21 was only 9,253; a mere 4 per cent of 
total beaver hat exports to the Americas. Further analysis into the individual states to 
which beaver hats were exported reveals that the principal demand for such apparel was 
in more rural regions where country plantations predominated. As Figure 5.5 shows, 
Virginia (34 per cent) and the Carolinas (34 per cent) accounted for well over half of the 
beaver hats exported to the United States over the entire period.102 Felt hat exports also 
declined. An average of 451,000 felt hats were annually exported from Britain to the 
United States in 1798-1802 but the averages were only 18,173 in 1808-12, 46,605 in 
1813-7, and 24,894 in 1818-21. 
There was, therefore, a major shift in the British export trade in beaver and castor 
hats to the Americas over the period of this study. While the United States took the vast 
majority of British beaver hat exports in the late eighteenth century, in the early nineteenth 
century it accounted for very few. Ultimately, this shift was the result of the development 
of hat manufacturing within the United States following the Declaration of Independence. 
Danbury, Connecticut, quickly became a hub of hat production within the new republic 
and one of its first felt hat manufactories was established by Zadoc Benedict in 1780.103 
By 1800, Philadelphia had emerged as a major hat-producing centre, the output from 
which was valued at $1 million a year.104 The decline in trade between Britain and the 
United States prior to and during the War of 1812 enabled these emergent industries to 
capture the US market at the expense of British hat manufacturers. Indeed, this decline 
mirrors that seen in other commodity trades and supports the view that significant changes 
in Anglo-American trade occurred in the early nineteenth century rather than immediately 
after the independence of the United States.105 George William Wood of the Manchester 
merchant firm Thomas, Phillips & Co., which was probably the major exporter of hats to 
New York and Philadelphia, stated to a Parliamentary Committee in 1808 that the firms’ 
                                                 
102 Very few beaver and castor hats were exported to North Carolina. Over the whole period only 24,440 
beaver and castor hats were recorded as being exported to this State. 
103 Ginsburg, The Hat, p. 68. 
104 Ibid., p. 69. 
105 Haggerty, British-Atlantic Trading Community, pp. 10, 243, 249. 
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hat exports to the United States were in decline as a result of the growth in American hat 
manufacturing.106  
In the case of the West Indies, the pattern of trade was somewhat different. The 
number of beaver hats exported to the West Indies increased by two-thirds between 1783-
7 and 1788-92, rising from an annual average of 64,650 to 107,000 hats. At this time the 
West Indies share of the British export trade in beaver hats accounted for just under 40 
per cent of the total number exported to the Americas. Exports of beaver hats to the 
Caribbean were almost one-and-a-half times greater in 1792-7 and they stayed at an 
annual average of around 165,000 between 1792 through to 1807. As a result of the 
troubles in the export trade to the United States, from 1803-12, the West Indies took 
nearly 65 per cent of the beaver hats exported to the Americas. This increased significance 
did not last. By the end of the period, the volume of the trade had returned to that of the 
1780s, so that the number of beaver and castor hats exported to the West Indies now 
averaged 91,658 each year. Some of this decline in hat exports may be attributable to the 
long-term deterioration in the British West Indian economy following the abolition of the 
slave trade in 1807. The extent and timing of this decline is, however, a deeply contested 
issue. Some historians situate the start of the decline in 1775 with the outbreak of the 
American War of Independence, while others argue that the decline began in 1800, 1807, 
or even 1815.107 Even so, the decline in hat exports to the West Indies at this time was 
primarily because the British West Indies ceased to function as a way for British 
manufactures to access South American markets. 
Iberian America was a large market for fashionable European textiles and clothing, 
which was not only on account of its large population (around 17.5 million in 1785) but 
the fact that in places such as Mexico City and Lima the demand for such manufactures 
                                                 
106  Minutes of evidence, upon taking into consideration several petitions, presented to the House of 
Commons, respecting the orders in council (P.P. 1808, Vol. X.81), pp. 1-9. 
107 On the so-called ‘decline thesis’ see in particular Seymour Drescher, Econocide: British Slavery in the 
Era of Abolition, Second Edition (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010); J. 
J. McCusker, ‘The Economy of the British West Indies, 1763-1790: Growth, Stagnation, or Decline?’ 
in J. J. McCusker, Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic World (London: Routledge, 1997), 
pp. 310-30; Lowell J. Ragatz, Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean 1763-1833: A Study in 
Social and Economy History (London: The Century Co., 1928); David Beck Ryden, ‘Does Decline 
Make Sense? The West Indian Economy and the Abolition of the Slave Trade’, Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2001), pp. 347-74; J. R. Ward, ‘The Profitability of Sugar 
Planting in the British West Indies, 1650-1834’, The Economic History Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1978), 
pp. 197-213; and J. R. Ward, British West Indian Slavery, 1750-1834: The Process of Amelioration 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 
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was present amongst non-whites and the less affluent.108 This demand extended to beaver 
and felt hats.109 In the late eighteenth century, British hat manufacturers continued to try 
and maintain markets for their products within Spanish and Portuguese America, as can 
be seen in their attempts to have their interests considered during the negotiation of a 
commercial treaty with Portugal in 1787.110 With the establishment of a number of ‘free 
ports’ in the British West Indies from 1766 onwards, British hats could — in the eyes of 
the British legislature — be legally exported to the West Indies and thence shipped to 
Spanish colonies in the Americas, usually by way of Spanish ships. 111  Despite the 
liberalisation of Spanish Atlantic trade during the second half of the eighteenth century, 
Spain refused to allow foreign merchants to travel to its overseas colonies and continued 
to prohibit trade between Spanish America and the British West Indies into the nineteenth 
century.112 After 1800, however, there was less need for the British West Indies to serve 
as a gateway to Spanish America as some, albeit temporary, direct trade was made 
possible by Spanish colonial revolutionaries opening their ports to foreign merchants.113 
Furthermore, there was a permanent Anglo-Brazilian trade from 1808, the year in which 
the Portuguese crown opened the Brazil trade to British merchants. In 1808, Thomas, 
Phillips & Co. was preparing to export hats to Brazil, and had already sent a consignment 
to Lima.114 Indeed, the customs’ records first list exports of British hats to Buenos Ayres, 
Lima, and Vera Cruz in 1807, to the ‘Brazils’ in 1808, to Monte Video in 1812, and to 
Valparaiso in 1817. In 1798-1802, 20,895 beaver hats were on average directly exported 
to South America each year, although these hats exclusively went to Berbice and 
Demerara (both part of present day Guiana) and Surinam, all of which were occupied by 
the British at this time.  
                                                 
108 Belich, Settler Revolution, pp. 32, 34; Rebecca Earle, ‘Luxury, Clothing and Race in Colonial Spanish 
America’, in Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger, eds., Luxury in the Eighteenth Century: Debates and 
Desires and Delectable Goods (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 219-27; and Lamikiz, 
Spanish Merchants, pp. 108-9. 
109 Lamikiz suggests that Lima merchants did not have non-whites in mind when they placed their orders 
for ‘fur hats’ but this seems at odds with the contemporary commentator that he earlier quotes who, 
writing in 1784, stressed that the ‘craftsmen, Indians and black peoples dress splendidly’ in Lima. See 
Lamikiz, Spanish Merchants, pp. 108-9, 111. 
110 Guildhall Library, MS01570/5, Worshipful Company of Feltmakers, Court Minute Book, 1782-90, pp. 
235-7. 
111 Frances Armytage, The Free Port System in the British West Indies: A Study in Commercial Policy, 
1766-1822 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1953), pp. 22-4, 42, 64, 70, 93, 112. 
112 Ibid., pp. 114-6, 119; and Lamikiz, Spanish Merchants, pp. 19, 133. 
113 Armytage, Free Port System, p. 114. 
114  Minutes of evidence, upon taking into consideration several petitions, presented to the House of 
Commons, respecting the orders in council (P.P. 1808, Vol. X.81), p. 9. 
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With the advent of direct trade to Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the Americas, 
exports of beaver and castor hats to South America increased further, a trend that is clearly 
evident in Figure 5.4. The annual average number of beaver hats exported to South 
America rose to 40,362 in 1808-12, increased by two-thirds to 71,514 in 1814-7, and by 
a further two-thirds to reach 119,000 in 1818-21. It is clear from the export data for 1818-
21 that the growth in beaver hat exports to South America was not only because of a 
decline in the use of the West Indies as a transhipment point but that the demand for 
beaver hats within South America was increasing. Indeed, when the annual average 
number of beaver hats exported to the West Indies and South America for 1818-21 
(211,000) are combined, the quantity surpasses the peak number of such exports to the 
West Indies in 1798-1802 (170,000). As the demand for imported British beaver hats in 
the United States declined and the British West Indian economy waned, the demand for 
beaver hats in South America expanded. However, Table 5.2 shows that the southward 
swing to Spanish and Portuguese America did not make up for the fall in British beaver 
hat exports to the United States as the average 242,000 beaver hats that were annually 
exported to the Americas in 1818-21 was lower than the 311,000 exported in 1788-92, 
the 376,000 in 1793-7, and the 456,000 in 1798-1802.115  
Figure 5.6 gives more depth on the specific regions to which beaver and castor hats 
were exported from Britain to the West Indies and South America. It shows that Jamaica 
accounted for one half of the beaver and castor hat exports to the foreign and British 
Caribbean, with an annual average of 55,378 such hats exported to the island over the 
period. Jamaica had four designated free ports and around 1815 its white population was 
only about 27,900, and so it is clear that a significant number of the hats exported to the 
island were sent on to other destinations, including, no doubt, to Spanish America.116 The 
British Leeward Islands — which included Antigua, Dominica, Montserrat, Nevis, St. 
Kitts, and Tortola — took around 11 per cent, and the British Windward Islands 
accounted for a further 14 per cent.117 Figure 5.6 also shows that the surge in beaver hat 
exports to South America at the end of the period was largely comprised of increased 
exports to Brazil. In 1818, 129,000 beaver and castor hats were exported to Brazil alone, 
                                                 
115 See Table 5.2. 
116 See Table 19.2 in J. R. Ward, ‘The British West Indies in the Age of Abolition, 1748-1815’, in P. J. 
Marshall, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire: Vol. 2. The Eighteenth Century (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 415-39. Jamaica’s free ports consisted of Kingston, Savanna la 
Mar, Montego Bay, and Santa Lucea. See Armytage, Free Port System, p. 42. 
117 Included in the British Windward Islands were Barbados, Grenada, St. Lucia (after 1815), St. Vincent, 
Tobago, and Trinidad. 
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although this number is somewhat short of the 175,000 beaver hats exported to Portugal 
in 1750.118 
British exports of felt hats to the United States, West Indies, and South America 
were always higher than the number of beaver and castor hats exported. For all three of 
these regions, felt hat exports usually exceeded the volume of beaver and castor hats 
traded by around two-and-a-half times. There was, however, one notable exception. After 
1807, the quantity of felt hats exported to the West Indies were more than five times 
greater than exports of beaver and castor hats. Whereas imports of British beaver and 
castor hats into the Caribbean substantially declined following the abolition of the slave 
trade, imports of felt hats were sustained. From 1793 through to 1821, the average number 
of felt hats exported to the West Indies each year ranged between 428,000 and 504,000, 
the latter of which relates to the years 1814-7 and was the peak period for British felt hat 
exports to the Caribbean. Why did cheap felt hat exports to the West Indies remain 
buoyant at the same time as more expensive beaver and castor hat exports dwindled? This 
shift towards cheaper felt hats may well signal the decline of British West Indies’ ‘planter 
class’, a hypothesis that was first proposed by Lowell Ragatz in the early twentieth 
century.119 
Europe was a far smaller export market for British beaver and castor hats than were 
the Americas. On average each year, only 44,535 of such hats were exported to Europe.120 
From 1783 to 1792, exports of beaver and castor hats to Europe were higher than exports 
of felt hats. In 1783-7 an average of 36,945 beaver and castor hats were exported to 
Europe each year as opposed to an average of 23,146 felt hats (Table 5.2). After 1793, 
the division of trade between the two types of hat switched as the trade in felt hats rapidly 
expanded from an annual average of 36,600 in 1793-7, to 93,807 in 1798-1802, and to 
125,000 in 1803-7.121 This growth in trade occurred at the same time as the surge in 
British exports of cottons to the continent and it has been argued that the reason for this 
expansion was that it proved easier to get British manufacturers around French 
prohibitions and embargoes than to bring in raw cotton. 122  It is probable that this 
explanation is equally applicable to felt hats. The European markets to which British 
beaver and castor hats were exported were diverse and ever-changing, a consequence of 
                                                 
118 See Figure 5.6; and Lawson, Fur, p. 116. 
119 See Ragatz, Planter Class. 
120 See Table 5.1. 
121 See Table 5.2. 
122 Davis, British Overseas Trade, p. 16. 
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the volatility created by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. As is evident in Figure 
5.7, between 1783 and 1792 the Low Countries made up the majority of British beaver 
and castor hat exports to Europe. Indeed, Thomas Davies & Co. had regular 
correspondence with a merchant firm in Amsterdam whom to which they sold hats during 
at least the 1780s.123 As conflict engulfed the Low Countries in 1792-7 and beyond, 
beaver and castor hat exports shifted to Portugal (23 per cent), the British Mediterranean 
(21 per cent), Germany (17 per cent), and Spain (14 per cent). This trend continued into 
the nineteenth century but it was Portugal that was the most significant in the long run. In 
total, Portugal accounted for 18 per cent of the beaver and castor hat exports to Europe 
during the period, which was just short of the 19 per cent attributable to the Low 
Countries. An especially large number of beaver and castor hats were exported to Portugal 
in 1814-7 (20,597), and in 1808-12 Spain received 16,041. While these volumes were a 
fraction of the 285,000 beaver hats that were exported to Iberia in 1750, the fact that 1814-
7 and 1808-12 were peak export years for their respective countries makes it clear that 
relatively few British hats were sent to Spanish and Portuguese America by way of Spain 
or Portugal in the early nineteenth century.124 It seems, therefore, that the increase in 
direct British hat exports to South America resulted from a resurgence in demand for fine 
hats in Portuguese Brazil rather than from a mere shift in established trade flows that 
shipped hats via intermediary ports in Europe or the West Indies. 
For most of the period, the British customs’ records listed the exports carried on the 
ships of the EIC under the broad heading of ‘Asia’ or ‘East Indies and China’. The ledgers 
continued to use this classification up to and beyond 1821, with new entries only added 
for the various places occupied by the British during the Napoleonic Wars such as 
Batavia, Ceylon, and Mauritius. While the records themselves do not distinguish between 
India and China, it is clear that the vast majority of beaver, castor, and felt hats exported 
in the EIC’s ships were destined for British India. 125  Earl H. Pritchard’s detailed 
exploration of the ‘private trade’ between England and China did not find beaver or felt 
hats to be a significant export article. Indeed, Pritchard’s sole mention of hats was when 
he listed the goods exported from London on the True Briton by Captain Broadley in 
                                                 
123 ‘J. Davis to Thomas Evans’ 14 June 1782, ‘Thomas Davies & Co. to William Box and David Bain’, 13 
June 1783, and ‘Thomas Davies & Co. to Coenraad Linckers’ 5 April 1784, TNA, C 107/104, ‘Foreign 
Letter Book’, Thomas Davies & Co., hatters of Stockport and London, 1771-92. 
124 See Figure 5.7. In 1750, 175,000 beaver hats were exported to Portugal and 110,000 were exported to 
Spain. See Lawson, Fur, pp. 116-7. 
125 Pritchard, ‘Private Trade’ (1957), pp. 108-37; and Pritchard, ‘Private Trade’ (1958), pp. 221-56. 
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1773-4, a consignment that included one case of hats valued at £20 and from this 
valuation were evidently made from beaver.126 Again, it is only in 1812 that the customs’ 
records delineate between exports sent to the ‘East Indies and China’ on the Company’s 
own account or private trade in the Company’s ships. In 1812, 240 beaver and 6,150 felt 
hats were exported to India as part of the Company’s own trade, while 17,730 beaver and 
62,184 felt hats were exported by way of the ‘privilege trade’.127 It seems, therefore, that 
even before the Company lost its monopoly of the India trade in 1813, the export of beaver 
hats to India was primarily undertaken by private traders rather than the Company itself. 
In 1821, the Company exported 15,204 felt hats, while private trade in the Company’s 
ships included 3,240 beaver, 984 castor, and 1,680 felt hats. By this year the India trade 
was open to non-EIC traders so that the customs’ records also listed 4,570 beaver, 2,220 
castor, and 1,620 felt hats as being exported to India by way of private trade in non-
Company ships.128 
Around 16 per cent of Britain’s beaver and castor hat exports went to ‘Asia’ 
between 1783 and 1821.129 From an annual average of 64,458 beaver hats in 1783-7, 
exports rose to an average of 116,000 in 1798-1802.130  Thereafter the trade sharply 
contracted. Exports halved to 56,288 in 1803-7 and the trade continued to decline, 
reaching an annual average of 11,268 beaver and castor hats by 1818-21.131 Prior to 1808-
12, exports of felt hats were around three-fifths the size of beaver and castor hat exports 
to the East Indies and China.132 While the number of felt hats exported declined after 
1808, the decrease was less marked than was the case for beaver and castor hats. By 1818-
21 the proportions between the two sorts of hats had reversed so that the number of felt 
hats exported was around two-and-a-half times higher than the number of beaver and 
castor hats.133 Overall, the number of beaver, castor, and felt hats exported to ‘Asia’ 
declined from a peak of 187,000 in 1798-1802 to 38,421 in 1818-21.134 What was the 
reason for this decline and, in particular, the contraction in beaver and castor hat exports? 
Changes in demand amongst the ‘British in the Orient’ likely accounts for such a drastic 
                                                 
126 Pritchard, ‘Private Trade’ (1958), p. 251. 
127 TNA, CUST 8/1, Ledgers of exports of British merchandise under countries, 1812. 
128 TNA, CUST 8/13, Ledgers of exports of British merchandise under countries, 1821. 
129 See Table 5.1. 
130 See Table 5.2. 
131 See Table 5.2. 
132 See Table 5.2. 
133 See Table 5.2. 
134 See Table 5.2. 
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reduction in trade. The black suit and the accompanying top hat were completely 
impracticable forms of attire in India’s warm and humid climate, yet they continued to be 
worn by the British during the Raj. As E. M. Collingham argues, it was precisely because 
of their unsuitability that the suit and top hat were so important to the British community 
in India as they symbolised the idea that the British made no concessions to the colonial 
environment, thus excluding the Orient at the same time as enveloping the Anglo-Indian 
body in Britishness.135 Nevertheless, it does seem that in the case of beaver and felt hats, 
the Anglo-Indian community did compromise to a degree. Perhaps the British limited 
their wearing of beaver and felt hats to formal occasions rather than everyday use. Indeed, 
there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that topis were widely worn by the 1830s and it is 
possible that they started to be worn much earlier in the century.136 There certainly was a 
change in the hats worn by British soldiers in India. Whereas beaver and felt hats were 
widely worn in the eighteenth century, after 1800 they moved to wearing forage caps that 
were ‘covered in white cloth with a piece of cotton attached to the back in the manner of 
the Indian pugri to protect the back of the neck from the sun’.137  
Beaver and castor hat exports to Africa, increased after 1793, rising from an annual 
average of 1,673 in 1783-7 to 6,636 in 1793-7 and then to a peak of 15,255 in 1798-1802 
(Table 5.2). Exports decreased somewhat after 1802 but they were always at least four 
times as high as they had been in 1783-7 in the years before 1821.138 The reason for the 
growth in the number of beaver and castor hats exported to Africa was not as much a 
result of changes in the slave trade but rather the expansion of the Cape Colony. The first 
entry in the customs’ records that denotes the export of beaver hats to the Cape was in 
1796 (the second year of the first British occupation of the territory) when 600 hats were 
exported. In 1798-1802, an annual average of 9,784 beaver hats was exported to the 
colony. Exports decreased in 1803-7 following the British withdrawal from the territory 
but once the colony was conquered again in 1806, exports increased and averaged 7,424 
beaver and castor hats each year in 1808-12, 8,728 in 1813-7, and 9,315 in 1818-21. In 
all, the Cape Colony accounted for 63 per cent of the beaver and castor hats exported to 
Africa between 1783 and 1821. British exports of beaver and castor hats to other parts of 
                                                 
135 E. M. Collingham, Imperial Bodies: The Physical Experience of the Raj, c.1800-1947 (Oxford: Polity 
Press, 2001), p. 65. 
136 A topi was made out of wicker frame and was covered with quilted cotton with a pugri at the back. See 
Ibid., p. 89. 
137 Ibid., pp. 88-9. 
138 See Table 5.2. 
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Africa, principally the West African Coast, were smaller in comparison. While there was 
a growth in the number of hats exported to the West Coast of Africa up to the turn of the 
nineteenth century, exports collapsed following the abolition of the slave trade in 1807.139 
For instance, whereas an average of 5,471 beaver and castor hats were exported to the 
West African Coast in 1798-1802, they numbered an average of only 1,684 in 1808-12, 
1,369 in 1813-7, and 2,330 in 1818-21.  
The British export of felt hats to Africa was a much larger trade than that in beaver 
and castor hats. As is shown in Table 5.2, felt hat exports to the whole of Africa were 
always at least 40 per cent higher than exports of beaver and castor hats. In contrast to the 
latter trade, however, the number of felt hats exported to West Africa noticeably declined 
over the period as increased demand from the Cape Colony could not keep pace with the 
deterioration in the trade to West Africa following the abolition of the slave trade. In 
1783-7, an average of 52,684 felt hats were exported to the West Coast of Africa each 
year and although the annual average dropped to 28,368 in 1793-7, the number was well 
over 60,000 in 1788-92 and 1798-1802.140 By 1808-12, felt hat exports were more than 
10 times smaller at an average of only 6,981 but they did slightly recover afterwards with 
12,096 exported each year in 1818-21. While the number of felt hats exported to the Cape 
Colony increased after 1807, this growth was limited. From an annual average of 2,345 
felt hats in 1793-7, exports rose to a peak of 19,534 felt hats in 1813-7. 
Contemporary commentators writing in the early eighteenth century noted that 
nine-tenths of British beaver and felt hat exports were shipped to overseas markets from 
London and that the majority of these hats were manufactured in and around the City.141 
100 years later, the metropolis still handled the majority of British beaver and felt hat 
exports, although it was no longer quite so dominant. For most of the period of this study, 
the customs’ records do not distinguish between exports from London or provincial ports. 
However, from 1812 onwards, the ledgers list exports from ‘London’ and the provincial 
‘outports’ of England and Wales in two separate series. Between 1812 and 1817, an 
                                                 
139 Excepting Morocco and the Barbary States (to which never more than 10 beaver hats were exported), it 
was not until after 1795 that the customs’ records started to delineate between different regions of 
‘Africa’. The ‘Cape of Good Hope’ was first listed in 1796, followed by Sierra Leone between 1798 
and 1808, Senegal from 1808 to 1812, and the Island of St. Helena from 1817 to 1821. Even with the 
introduction of these new categories, the customs’ records continued to use a more fluid term to refer 
to the West Coast of Africa such as ‘Africa in General’ (1808-12), ‘Other Parts of Africa’ (1815-6), and 
‘Coast of Africa’ (1817-21). 
140 Calculated from TNA, CUST 17/8-30, States of navigation, commerce and revenue, 1783-1808; and 
TNA, CUST 8/1-14, Ledgers of exports of British merchandise under countries, 1812-21. 
141 Corner, ‘Tyranny of Fashion’, p. 155. 
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average of 213,000 (81 per cent) beaver and castor hats were exported from London each 
year as compared to 49,385 (19 per cent) from the outports (Table 5.3). In 1818-21 
exports from the outports rose to an annual average of 86,586 (30 per cent).142 This 
increase was due to the growth in British trade to Brazil and the fact that provincial ports 
were very active in this expanding trade. Indeed, while only 13 per cent (6,492) of British 
beaver and castor hat exports were shipped from the outports to Brazil in 1814, 59 per 
cent (66,577) were by 1820. Table 5.3 also shows that the trade in felt hats was less 
centred on London than the trade in beaver and castor hats, a feature that reflects the 
expansion in production of felt hats in provincial regions by this time. Clearly many of 
the felt hats manufactured in the provinces were still sent to London for overseas export. 
The customs’ records only list Scottish exports in 1783-9 and 1812-21 but analysis of this 
data shows that very few beaver, castor, or felt hats were exported from the country. No 
beaver and castor hats were exported from Scotland in 1783-9 and in 1812-21 they only 
accounted for 1 per cent of British exports. A greater number of felt hats were exported 
from Scotland but their share was small at only 7 per cent in 1783-9 and 6 per cent in 
1812-21.  
In essence, the British export trade in beaver hats between 1783 and 1821 was a tale 
of two periods. The final decades of the eighteenth century saw beaver hat exports reach 
their highest point within the century. This resurgence abruptly ended in the early 
nineteenth century as the demand for beaver and castor hats in the United States, India, 
and to a lesser extent the West Indies, declined. Despite the dawn of direct British trade 
                                                 
142 See Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3. Annual average number of beaver, castor, and felt hats exported from 
London and the provincial outports, 1812-21. 
 Beaver & Castor   Felt 
 London Outports  London Outports 
1812-7 
1818-21 
212,822 (81%) 
203,674 (70%) 
49,385 (19%) 
86,586 (30%) 
 594,723 (64%) 
541,869 (57%) 
330,788 (36%) 
402,879 (43%) 
Overall 132,137 (76%) 31,694 (24%)  571,233 (61%) 362,829 (39%) 
Notes: As there is no data for 1813 because of the fire at the Customs’ House in February 1814, the 
average for 1812-7 is a five-year average. 
Source: TNA, CUST 8/1-14, Ledgers of exports of British merchandise under countries, 1812-21. 
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to South America, exports to Brazil were not sufficient to counteract the troubles in these 
three key markets. In contrast, the growth that occurred in the British trade in felt hats 
during the 1790s was largely maintained in the two decades after 1800. London continued 
to dominate British overseas trade of beaver and felt hats, although competition from 
provincial ports in England intensified. The export trade in beaver and castor hats ran into 
difficulties in the early nineteenth century as traditional markets like the United States 
developed their own hatting industry and as consumers in British India and elsewhere 
shifted their preferences to forms of everyday headwear that better suited their colonial 
environment. Increasingly, cheap felt hats offered stiff competition to more expensive 
beaver and castor hats and high beaver prices made the latter less able to respond 
effectively to this challenge. The increase in the share of beaver hats exported from the 
outports in the 1810s perhaps indicates that provincial hat manufacturers were better 
placed to navigate such problems through driving down costs. The fall in British beaver 
and castor hat exports in the early nineteenth century and the sustained high price of 
beaver skins could certainly have propelled Rich’s ‘City forces’ to push for the HBC and 
NWC to cease their rivalry.   
III.   Winter Wardrobes: Furriers and their craft 
Beaver was, as the previous chapter demonstrated, the mainstay of the HBC’s income. 
The Company traded in many other types of furs and while these were a smaller part of 
the Company’s dealings it is important to establish the articles that they were made into 
and how these items were retailed to consumers. Such an analysis moves the present focus 
of the fur trade literature beyond its exclusive focus on hats and towards a more inclusive 
understanding of British consumer demand for fur-related apparel. The surviving stock-
books of the metropolitan furriers Brunswick & Co. provides a rare insight into the trade 
of a furrier in the early nineteenth century, and this source underpins much of the analysis 
of the furrier’s craft presented here.143 
Henry Poland’s late-nineteenth-century guide to the furrier’s trade is a good starting 
point from which to survey the uses for the many different sorts of furs imported into 
Britain. 144  Of course, a degree of caution is needed when applying the contents of 
                                                 
143 LMA, CLC/439/MS11553/1, ‘Stock Book’, Brunswick & Co., Furriers, of 2 Mansion House Street, 
1813. 
144 See Henry Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals in Nature and in Commerce (London: Gurney & Jackson, 
1892). 
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Poland’s manual to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Table 5.4 divides 
Poland’s observations of the uses of the major furs imported into Britain into ‘luxury 
apparel’ and ‘other uses’. Items of luxury apparel included: boas or tippets (as they were 
more commonly known in the eighteenth century), bags, capes and cloaks, coats and 
jackets, coat linings, cuffs and collars, gloves, muffs, and trimmings. The making of 
tippets and muffs involved the largest number of fur types, with seven of the 11 major fur 
imports listed as being used in the making of them. For tippets the materials included 
bear, fox, marten, musquash, raccoon, seal, and wolf, and muffs were made out of a near-
identical range with the exception of wolf but the inclusion of beaver.145 Many types of 
                                                 
145 See Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4. Uses of the major furs imported into Britain. 
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a including bear caps for the Grenadier regiments of the British Army, as well as for the Belgian and 
French Imperial Guards and Bavarian regiments; 
b the heads were used to ornament foot-muffs. 
Source: Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals, pp. 68-71, 80-1, 88, 90, 98, 108, 119, 147-8, 150, 163-4, 168-
9, 192, 194, 252, 261, 348-9; and The Morning Post, 5 January 1805 and 5 January 1814. 
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fur were also seemingly used to make capes and cloaks with Poland listing a total of six 
such furs. While Poland stated that musquash was used in the making of tippets, bags, 
gloves, and many other luxury items this is unlikely to have been the case earlier in the 
century as it was supposedly Sir William Henry Poland who initiated the use of musquash 
in the dressing of garments and he was only 24 years old in 1821.146 Other uses of course 
included beaver and musquash in the making of felt, although Poland also notes seal as 
being used for this purpose. Bear was used in the making of bear caps for the military 
such as the Grenadier regiments of the British Army and in addition to raccoon, bear was 
also used for rugs.147 Bear, fox, and marten were apparently well-suited for use as paint 
brushes. Deer and seal were used to make leather. Poland does not specifically mention 
what sealskin was used for but contemporary newspapers reveal that walking shoes, 
pumps, shoe soles, boots, sandals, slippers, tobacco pouches, and pocket books could all 
be made out of sealskin.148 Similarly, deerskin was used in the making of doe-skin and 
buck-skin breeches and shoes. 149  Finally, beaver, mink, musquash, and otter were 
apparently pulled and dyed to imitate sealskin.150 Poland’s treatise and contemporary 
newspapers can provide indications as to the articles that were made from the different 
sorts of furs but neither can be used to indicate the prevalence of their usage.  
While such sources are especially rare, analysing the business records of a furrier 
provides a more precise indication of the domestic demand for luxury fur apparel than 
can be gleamed from retained imports, trade manuals, or newspapers. A stock book of 
Brunswick & Co., furriers of 2 Mansion House Street, reveals a number of intriguing 
insights into the activities of a ‘manufacturing’ furrier in the second decade of the 
nineteenth century. By 1820 the firm’s capital was provided by three individuals; Joseph 
Dickenson Croskey and a ‘Mr Pook’ each provided 43 per cent (£5,850) and the 
remaining 14 per cent (£1,950) was provided by Charles Brunswick.151 The stock book 
pertains to the year 1813 and lists stock to the value of £8,540, with the value of stock 
                                                 
146 See Table 5.4; and Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals, pp. 261-2. 
147 See Table 5.4. 
148 Jackson’s Oxford Journal, 27 October 1804; The Caledonian Mercury, 30 October 1806 and 21 July 
1808; The Newcastle Courant, 10 January 1807; Trewman’s Exeter Flying Post, 13 October 1808; The 
Leeds Mercury, 24 November 1810; and Cunnington, English Costume in the Nineteenth Century, p. 
73. 
149 The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, 24 February 1784; and Cunnington, English Costume in the 
Eighteenth Century, p. 219. 
150 See Table 5.4. 
151 See the 1820 balance sheet in LMA, CLC/439/MS11556, ‘Annual balance sheets of Croskey, Pook, and 
Brunswick’, Brunswick & Co., Furriers, of 2 Mansion House Street, 1820-9. 
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detailed room by room.152 Table 5.5 shows the value of Brunswick & Co.’s stock-in-trade 
arranged by fur type. The majority of their stock was in the form of dressed and undressed 
bear, which accounted for 28 per cent of the total value of the identifiable furs and 
correlates well with the high proportion of retained bear imports found in the previous 
chapter.153  The other notable furs listed in the stock books were fox (12 per cent), 
                                                 
152 The rooms in their premises included a showroom, first floor, third floor, a ‘room next to workshop’, 
and cellar. It is also stated that furs were kept at the premises of the person they were originally 
purchased from. See LMA, CLC/439/MS11553/1, ‘Stock Book’, Brunswick & Co., Furriers, of 2 
Mansion House Street, 1813. 
153 £7,852 of the £8,540 listed in the stock book was identified as a specific type of fur. See Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5. Value of the stock-in-trade of 
Brunswick & Co. by fur type, 1813. 
 Value (£) Percentage (%) 
Angola 
Badger 
Bear  
Cat 
Chinchilla 
Ermine 
Fox 
Hare 
Leopard 
Lynx 
Marten 
Mink 
Mouse 
Otter 
Rabbit 
Raccoon 
Sable 
Seal 
Skunk 
Squirrel 
Swan 
Wolf 
Other a 
25 
55 
2,243 
347 
679 
597 
974 
415 
85 
232 
492 
13 
34 
76 
142 
17 
332 
41 
62 
73 
908 
26 
14 
 
1 
28 
4 
9 
8 
12 
5 
1 
3 
6 
 
 
1 
2 
 
4 
1 
1 
1 
12 
 
Total 7,882  
Notes: 
a includes lamb, monkey, musquash, and wolverine. 
Source: LMA, CLC/439/MS11553/1, Stock Books of 
Brunswick & Co., Furriers, of 2 Mansion House Street, 
1813. 
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chinchilla (9 per cent), ermine (8 per cent), marten (6 per cent), and hare (5 per cent), 
although it should also be noted that swansdown (made from swan feathers) made up 12 
per cent of the overall value.154 Overall, the stock book shows how a metropolitan furrier 
stocked a very broad range of furs. Crucially, however, the stock book does not contain 
any mention of beaver or musquash, either in dressed or undressed form. This lends 
support to the view that musquash was not used in the making of luxury fur garments and 
accessories until later in the nineteenth century. Contemporary newspapers do note sales 
of beaver cloaks, and ‘beaver and scarlet knap cardinals’ so it is somewhat surprising that 
the firm did not stock any beaver.155 These newspaper advertisements are from the late 
eighteenth century however, so it is possible that the use of beaver became increasingly 
limited to the hatting industry as imports declined and prices rose from the 1790s onwards. 
Even so the evidence provided by Brunswick & Co.’s stock-in-trade casts doubt on J. F. 
Crean’s assertion that from the mid-eighteenth century onwards furriers and hat 
manufacturers began to compete with each other over beaver imports.156 
Table 5.6 shows that undressed furs amounted to half the value of Brunswick & 
Co.’s stock-in-trade. It is to be expected that the raw materials of a furrier’s trade would 
comprise a large proportion of their stock. In terms of manufactured garments and 
accessories, tippets were the most valuable. There were 631 tippets listed in the stock 
book and they valued £1,206 (14 per cent).157 A tippet was a long fur scarf or shawl that 
was worn about the neck and shoulders and they had first come into fashion in the late 
fifteenth century.158 While they were no longer as exquisitely bejewelled or were used to 
collect and shake out fleas, tippets in the eighteenth century were generally used outdoors 
— especially during the winter months — as a fashionable way to keep warm.159 Bear 
appears to have been the main fur used for tippets. A total of 382 tippets were made out 
                                                 
154 See Table 5.5. 
155 Felix Farley's Bristol Journal, 28 February and 21 August 1784; The Whitehall Evening Post, 5 June 
1784. A ‘cardinal’ was a hooded cloak worn in winter that was usually made out of scarlet cloth or 
duffel. See Cunnington, English Costume in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 338-9. There was a type of 
woollen cloth made in Bath that was made into great coats and was commonly referred to as ‘bath 
beaver’. It is not clear why the cloth was referred to as ‘beaver’ however. See Rowland Mainwaring, 
Annals of Bath, from the year 1800 to the passing of the New Municipal Act (Bath: Printed by Mary 
Meyler & Son, 1838), p. xxvii; The Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser, 15 March 1783; and 
Parker’s General Advertiser and Morning Intelligencer, 8 May 1783.  
156 Crean, ‘Hats’, p. 385. 
157 See Table 5.6. 
158 Francis Weiss, ‘Bejewelled Fur Tippets - and the Palatine Fashion’, Costume, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1970), pp. 
37-43. 
159 Ibid., pp. 37-9; and Cunnington, English Costume in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 398-9; and Cunnington, 
English Costume in the Nineteenth Century, p. 392.  
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of bear, 92 from fox, and 78 from swansdown. Tippets were usually accompanied with a 
matching muff: Brunswick & Co. stocked 288 muffs at a total value of £985 (12 per 
cent).160 Like tippets, muffs first appeared as a fashionable accessory in the Renaissance 
                                                 
160 See Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6. Stock-in-trade of Brunswick & Co. by item type, 1813. 
 Value (£) Quantity Types of Fur 
Caps 
Cuffs & Collars 
Edging 
XXXXXXXX 
Flounces 
Helmets 
Linings 
Muffs a 
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXX 
Pelerines b 
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXX 
Rugs 
Spencers 
XXXXXXXX 
Tippets 
XXXXXXX 
Trimmings 
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXX 
Undressed Furs 
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX
X 
Other c 
83 (1%) 
2 (0%) 
36 (0%) 
XXXXX 
58 (1%) 
10 (0%) 
94 (1%) 
985 (12%) 
XXXXXXX
XXX 
621 (7%) 
XXXXXXX
XXX 
21 (0%) 
394 (5%) 
XXXXX 
1,206 (14%) 
XXXXXX 
536 (6%) 
XXXXXXX
XXXXX 
3,898 (46%) 
XXXXXXX
XXXXXXX
XXXXXXX
X 
553 (7%) 
54 
5 
1,416 
XXXXXXX 
85 
92 
87 & 68 yards 
288XXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX
XXX 
662 
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXX 
25 
357 
XXXXXXXX 
631 
XXXXXXXX 
2,268 & 280 
yards 
XXXXXXX 
14,636, 15 yards 
& 20 lbs. 
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXX
X 
N/A 
sable, seal 
rabbit, sable 
badger, bear, cat, ermine, otter, rabbit, 
sable 
bear 
bear 
ermine, mouse, squirrel 
angola, badger, bear, chinchilla, ermine, 
fox, hare, lynx, marten, mouse, sable, 
squirrel, swan 
badger, bear, cat, chinchilla, ermine, fox, 
hare, leopard, lynx, marten, mink, mouse, 
rabbit, sable, seal, skunk, squirrel, swan 
leopard 
bear, cat, chinchilla, ermine, fox, hare, 
sable, seal, squirrel, swan 
angola, badger, bear, chinchilla, ermine, 
fox, hare, lynx, sable, swan 
bear, cat, chinchilla, ermine, fox, leopard, 
marten, mink, rabbit, sable, seal, skunk, 
squirrel, swan 
angola, badger, bear, cat, chinchilla, 
ermine, fox, hare, lamb, leopard, lynx, 
marten, mink, monkey, musquash, otter, 
rabbit, raccoon, sable, seal, skunk, 
squirrel, swan, wolf, wolverine 
N/A 
Total 8,497   
Notes: 
a includes muff borders; 
b in the stock book pelerines were listed as ‘pilgrims’, a term that derives from the French pèlerin 
meaning pilgrim; 
c consists of baskets, cases, hats, remnants, ribbon, tape, thread, wool, 230 ‘operas’ to the value of 
£20, and several other miscellaneous items.  
Source: LMA, CLC/439/MS11553/1, Stock Books of Brunswick & Co., Furriers, of 2 Mansion 
House Street, 1813. On pelerines being referred to as ‘pilgrims’ see Doreen Yarwood, Illustrated 
Encyclopedia of World Costume (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1978), p. 318. 
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during which they were worn by both men and women.161 By the eighteenth century it 
was rare for men to wear muffs but there are a number of such examples.162 As Laura 
Engel has convincingly argued, muffs were complex objects. In some contemporary 
portraits, muffs served as a symbol of glamour and of the aristocracy, but in others they 
represented crass accumulation and overt sexuality.163 Indeed, the hidden function of the 
muff was to keep hands warm which easily conjured up sexual analogies.164 Muffs were 
thus a prime target of contemporary satire, an example of which is shown in Figure 5.8. 
Caricatures of women holding excessively large muffs were particularly common in the 
late eighteenth century, and they played on contemporary anxieties over the female 
                                                 
161 Laura Engel, ‘The Muff Affair: Fashioning Celebrity in the Portraits of Late-eighteenth-century British 
Actresses’, Fashion Theory, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2009), p. 285. 
162 Ibid., pp. 285-6; and Cunnington, English Costume in the Eighteenth Century, p. 262. 
163 See Engel, ‘The Muff Affair’, pp. 279-98. 
164 Ibid., p. 281. 
Figure 5.8. Caricature of a woman wearing an excessively large muff and tippet, 
c.1800.   
 
Source: Derbyshire Record Office, D5459/3/37, Comfort for an Old Maid by George Murgatroyd 
Woodward, c.1800-20. 
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body.165 However, a number of eighteenth-century actresses such as Elizabeth Faren 
(pictured in Figure 5.9) and Sarah Siddons skilfully used the muff as a tool in which to 
promote an image of quality and grace.166 Perhaps it is because the muff portrayed an 
                                                 
165 Ibid., pp. 281, 292. 
166 Ibid., pp. 280, 288-9. 
Figure 5.9. Women’s styles of fur apparel, c.1780-1820. 
 
XXX 
 
 
Notes: Top left is a pelisse edged with fur and a large embroidered muff (1786). Bottom left is a 
pelisse of green satin with a vandyked double pelerine, chinchilla border, and chinchilla muff (1826). 
On the right is a portrait of the eighteenth-century actress Elizabeth Faren by Sir Thomas Lawrence. 
Faren wears a fur-lined cloak and holds a tippet with her right hand and a large muff with her left.  
Source: Cunnington, English Costume in the Eighteenth Century, p. 338; Cunnington, English 
Costume in the Nineteenth Century, p. 393; and The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 
Accession No. 50.135.5, ‘Elizabeth Farren by Sir Thomas Lawrence’, 1790. 
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image of urbanity over domesticity that there are so few portraits of gentlewomen wearing 
these items as they did wear them.167 Bear was once again top when it came to muffs; 159 
of them were made from bear, 47 from swansdown, and 26 from fox. Both muffs and 
tippets were highly expensive items; a tippet was about double the price of a fine beaver 
hat and muff was over triple.168  
In addition to muffs and tippets, Brunswick & Co. stocked a number of other ready-
made garments. The furriers’ held 621 pelerines to the value of £622 and 394 spencers 
worth £357.169 In the early nineteenth century, a pelerine was a wide flat collar worn by 
women that spread to the shoulders and chest (see Figure 5.9), although for much of the 
eighteenth century this name was given to a short cape with long, pendant ends at the 
front.170 A spencer (worn by men and women) was a short-waist jacket with a stand-fall 
collar, cuffed sleeves, and few buttons down the front that became fashionable in the 
1790s.171 The majority of the pelerines were made out of hare (183), bear (78), and fox 
(50), while most of the spencers were made from hare (239), swansdown (57), and fox 
(23). A large quantity of trimmings that were used to line the edges of cloaks and other 
garments were also kept on hand.172 The pelisse, as pictured in Figure 5.9, was perhaps 
the most popular three-quarter length cloak at this time and they were often trimmed with 
fur.173 Two different measurements were used to record the volume of trimmings which 
makes it difficult to determine which fur was the most prominent but suffice to say that 
swansdown, sable, bear, and fox were more commonly stocked.174 The low number of 
caps, cuffs and collars, edging, helmets, linings, and flounces — the latter of which was 
a frill used to trim the sleeves of women’s garments — suggests that it was more usual 
for these items to be made on demand.175 Conversely, since the stock book captured a 
fixed point in time, if these items had a higher turnover of stock than the other ready-
                                                 
167 Ibid., p. 289. 
168 Calculated by using the total number of tippets and muffs in Brunswick & Co.’s possession and the 
overall value of them. See Table 5.6. 
169 See Table 5.6. 
170  See definition of ‘pelerine’ in Valerie Cumming, C. W. Cunnington, and P. E Cunnington, The 
Dictionary of Fashion History (Oxford: Berg, 2010). 
171 Cunnington, English Costume in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 225-7, 343; and Cunnington, English 
Costume in the Nineteenth Century, p. 392. 
172 See Table 5.6.  
173 Cunnington, English Costume in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 338-40. 
174 Of these four furs, there was a total of 672 pieces and 24 yards of swansdown trimming, 348 pieces and 
47 yards of sable trimming, 336 pieces of bear trimming, and 264 pieces and 62 yards of fox trimming. 
175 See definition of ‘flounce’ in Cumming and Cunnington, Fashion History. It was common for flounces 
to be made from the same material as the garment to which they were attached. See Cunnington, English 
Costume in the Eighteenth Century, p. 270. 
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made goods then the stock book would underestimate their usage. It is not possible to 
discern how representative Brunswick & Co. were amongst London’s furriers but it is 
apparent that while they stocked a wide range of furs to meet the requests of their 
customers, the bulk of their trade was in the form of wearing apparel that was either made 
from bear, fox, swansdown, hare, or sable. Indeed, while 6 per cent of the value of 
Brunswick & Co.’s stock was in the form of marten, over nine-tenths of them were in an 
undressed form compared to only one-third in the case of bear.176 
Little is known about how furriers in this period made the articles of their trade. 
Brunswick & Co.’s records do not explain their methods of production and Poland’s 
treatise concentrates on the specialities of particular countries in the dressing and dyeing 
of the different sorts of furs.177 The London furriers’ petition to the Board of Trade on the 
issue of revoking the ban on the dyeing of coney and hare skins sheds some much needed 
light on the furrier’s craft. In the memorial the furriers maintained that ‘many men’ were 
employed in the dyeing of the furs and that ‘hundreds of women’ depended upon their 
working of the dyed skins into trimmings.178 There was, therefore, at least two distinct 
phases in the making of fur-related apparel and these were divided along gendered lines: 
the dyeing of the furs and the fashioning of them into finished products. Like the use of 
mercuric nitrate in the hatting industry, the dyeing process was also a hazardous one. 
Poland notes that beaver and otter skins were ‘silvered’ by passing them over a solution 
of sulphuric acid.179 In addition, the furriers’ petition alludes to the state of the British fur 
trade. It claimed that the since 1784 dyed fancy trimmings had ornamented thousands of 
scarlet cloaks for foreign markets and that since 1808 they had ‘greatly contributed to 
uphold and revive’ the nation’s fur trade.180  
Included within Brunswick & Co.’s stock book is a series of ‘retail accounts’ that 
list the customers to which the firm supplied goods. Although they do not detail the goods 
sold, the accounts enumerate the debts owed to the furriers and the payments made against 
this debt. Of the 124 names mentioned in the accounts, 100 were women. Considering 
                                                 
176 Out of a total value of £492, £41 of the marten was some sort of ready-made item while £451 were in 
an undressed form. The total value of bear was £2,243, £1,470 of which was in a ready-made form and 
£773 was in an undressed state. See LMA, CLC/439/MS11553/1, ‘Stock Book’, Brunswick & Co., 
Furriers, of 2 Mansion House Street, 1813. 
177 Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals, pp. xlv-xlix. 
178 TNA, BT 1/89, ‘Memorial of the Furriers of London’, Board of Trade; General In-letters and Files, 18 
May 1814.  
179 Poland, Fur-Bearing Animals, p. xlviii. 
180 TNA, BT 1/89, ‘Memorial of the Furriers of London’, Board of Trade; General In-letters and Files, 18 
May 1814. 
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that most of the items made by Brunswick & Co. were used by women this is perhaps 
expected. More interesting is that the 24 men accounted for 40 per cent (£149) of the 
listed debts. The Earl of Aylesford owed the firm £26 5s., J. Blades Esq. £15 15s., G. 
Savie Esq. £13 1s., and J. Forer Esq. £10 10s..181 Since so many of the men’s debts were 
attributable to ‘gentlemen’ it does seem that Brunswick & Co. primarily sold their 
produced wares direct to customers and that sales to retailers were uncommon. If other 
London-based furriers operated in a similar way then the retailing of tippets, muffs, and 
other fur-related apparel was largely confined to the metropolis and elite consumers 
continued to purchase these items during the London season. Alternatively, provincial 
furriers perhaps made their own tippets, muffs, and other fur-related apparel rather than 
purchasing these articles from their counterparts in the capital. It does seem unlikely that 
imported furs were fashioned into apparel in Newcastle upon Tyne and Gateshead at the 
turn of the nineteenth century however. A 1801 directory for the two towns lists only John 
Young as a furrier but even he was described as a ‘hatter and furrier’.182  On the other 
hand, London boasted 13 furriers, seven skinners and furriers, seven skinners, two 
skinners and another craft, and three furriers and another craft.183 In their response to the 
Board of Trade, the hat manufacturers of London and Southwark maintained that the 
dyeing, staining, and working of furs into trimmings was solely confined to the 
metropolis.184 Of course, at least some of the London furriers may have resold undressed 
furs. Indeed, there is another series in the stock book that lists ‘debts to be paid’ to 
creditors which includes at least three firms whom purchased furs from the HBC’s 
auctions; Wontner & Son (who were owed £30), C. Schindler presumably of Nicolay & 
Schindler (£150), Peter Raymond Poland (£1,294), and another ‘Poland’ which probably 
refers to John George Poland (£490).185 Brunswick & Co. also purchased furs from the 
HBC’s auctions between 1798 and 1801.186 
                                                 
181 LMA, CLC/439/MS11553/1, ‘Stock Book’, Brunswick & Co., Furriers, of 2 Mansion House Street, 
1813. 
182 It is unlikely that William Bell (skinner and leather-dresser), John Errington (glover and skinner), and 
John Leighton (rabbit dealer) were involved in the manufacture of fine fur garments and accessories. 
See Directory of Newcastle upon Tyne and Gateshead (1801). 
183 Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794). 
184 BT 1/89, ‘Answer of the Hat Manufacturers of London to the application of the Furriers’, Board of 
Trade; General In-letters and Files, 24 June 1814. 
185 LMA, CLC/439/MS11553/1, ‘Stock Book’, Brunswick & Co., Furriers, of 2 Mansion House Street, 
1813; and HBCA, A.48/7, Fur Sale Book, 1796-1810. 
186 HBCA, A.48/7, Fur Sale Book, 1796-1810, fos. 46, 61-2, 69, 87, 94-5, 110-1. 
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Figure 5.10. Trade cards of John Nicholas Schneider and Peter Raymond 
Poland, furriers. 
 
 
Notes: The top trade card relates to John Nicholas Schneider rather than John Henry Schneider 
as the former was listed in Kent’s Directory (1794) as a furrier and skinner at 4 Holborn Bars. 
The bottom trade card is of Peter Raymond Poland rather than John George Poland as the 
former was listed as a furrier at 351 Strand in Kent’s Directory (1794).  
Source: The British Museum, Heal 65.20, Trade card for Poland & Co., furriers, c.1800; Heal 
65.28, Trade card for Schneider, furrier, c.1794; and Kent’s Directory, 62nd Edition (1794). 
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Beyond the use of a showroom at their premises on Mansion House Street, the 
surviving papers and accounts of Brunswick & Co. do not explain how they retailed their 
produced tippets, muffs, and other fur garments to consumers. No newspaper 
advertisements issued by the firm have been found, although this is not particularly 
unusual as there is also no evidence that John George Poland, Peter Raymond Poland, 
Figure 5.11. Trade card of Tobias Kleinert, furrier.  
 
Source: The British Museum, Heal 65.13, Trade card for Tobias Kleinert, furrier, c.1770. 
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Wontner & Son, and Nicolay & Schindler placed adverts in the press.187  It became 
increasingly common for tradespeople to advertise their business in metropolitan and 
provincial newspapers during the second half of the eighteenth century as the number and 
circulation of newspapers expanded.188 Whether tradespeople touted for custom in the 
press was, however, rather dependent upon the clientele that they wished to cater for, and 
the tradesperson’s own perception of how advertising in newspapers would affect their 
reputation.189 Evidently, the aforementioned furriers were among those who disdained the 
newspaper advert or thought that such sales techniques would not attract greater custom. 
It seems that at least some of these furriers were more inclined to make use of trade cards, 
a visual form of advertising that was popular in the eighteenth century.190 The trade cards 
of two metropolitan furriers, John Nicholas Schneider and Peter Raymond Poland, are 
shown in Figure 5.10.191 Both Schneider’s and Poland’s cards were elegantly illustrated 
and contained depictions of a bear, leopard, and lion to represent the furrier’s trade. The 
wording in the cards emphases how ‘fashionable’ their produced garments and 
accessories were, and makes clear that they operated as retailers and wholesalers.192 
Royal patronage was another way to attract custom and was a technique that was 
extensively used by Josiah Wedgewood.193 Schneider’s trade card prominently displays 
that he was the King’s furrier, showing how he hoped to bolster his sales to the aristocracy 
by presenting himself as the nations most skilled and respected furrier.194 This was an 
accolade that Schneider inherited from Tobias Kleinert in 1794. It is particularly fortunate 
that one of Kleinert’s trade cards has survived as it was one of the most lavish designs 
used by a furrier in the eighteenth century (Figure 5.11).  
Not all London furriers rejected the use of newspaper advertisements. In November 
1783, Hartshorn & Dyde’s of Wigmore Street, Cavendish Square advertised their stock 
of muffs, tippets, autumn cloaks, and satin pelisses trimmed with fur.195 Dyde and Scribe 
                                                 
187  A conclusion drawn from searches for these individuals in Gale’s digitised collection of British 
newspapers.  
188 Hoh-cheung Mui and Lorna H. Mui, Lorna H., Shops and Shopkeeping in Eighteenth Century England 
(London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 226, 237. 
189 Ibid., pp. 226, 234-5. 
190 See Ibid., pp. 225-6; and Berg, Luxury and Pleasure, especially pp. 272-7. 
191 The British Museum’s collection of trade cards also includes a trade card and headed bill of the furrier 
John George Poland. See The British Museum, Heal 65.21, Trade card for J. G. Poland, furrier, 1799; 
and Heal 65.22, Trade card for George Poland, furrier, c.1823. 
192 See Figure 5.10. 
193 Mui and Mui, Shopkeepers, p, 226. 
194 See Figure 5.10. 
195 The Morning Herald, 11 November 1783. 
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of 89 Pall Mall marketed their selection of muffs, tippets, and trimmings in December 
1792 and proudly proclaimed that they were fur merchants to the Prince of Wales and 
Duke and Duchess of York.196 It was common for London furriers to directly address 
specific demographics. Smith & Co. at 173 Fleet Street addressed ‘the ladies’ in January 
1785 when advertising their range of winter cloaks, muffs, and fur trimmings, and Eden 
Deacon of 32 Bond Street targeted their advert towards the ‘nobility and ladies in general’ 
in October 1800.197 Rather than the public, in December 1818 Messers Robins addressed 
their sale of fashionable and expensive muffs and tippets at their spacious rooms in the 
Piazza at Covent Garden to ‘private purchasers’.198  
Robins’ advert shows that by the second decade of the nineteenth century, 
metropolitan furriers were actively supplying provincial retailers with fur garments and 
accessories. There are, however, much earlier examples to be found in provincial 
newspapers. Indeed, James Underwood at his shop on 6 Castle Street, Bristol advertised 
his sale of ‘ladies beaver cardinals’ in August 1784.199 In November 1798, Mackie & 
Mackenzie of Aberdeen informed the public that they had just received a valuable and 
elegant assortment of furriery, and in November 1806 the glovers James Miller & Son of 
Edinburgh issued a similar advertisement.200 Undoubtedly, it was the furriers of London 
that supplied these provincial retailers with their furriery. In November 1806 a Mrs 
Williams noted in The Ipswich Journal that she had returned from London with an 
assortment of pelisses, spencers, muffs, tippets, and winter prints, and in October 1807 
Roy & Spalding of Aberdeen declared that they had been appointed agents for a top 
London furrier.201 William Hall of Leeds and Conway’s warehouse at 24 Lord Street, 
Liverpool also clearly stated the London origins of their muffs, tippets, trimmings, and 
fur shoes in their adverts.202 Hall’s advertisement is of particular interest as it shows that 
he distributed knowledge of the latest fashions to country dealers and that he offered his 
customers the option to part exchange their old muffs and tippets for new ones.203 Indeed, 
this analysis of the retailing of fur garments and accessories reaffirms the view that during 
                                                 
196 Star and Evening Advertiser, 15 December 1792. 
197 Oracle and Daily Advertiser, 30 October 1800. 
198 The Morning Chronicle, 8 December 1818. 
199 A cardinal was a women’s three-quarter length winter cloak with a hood. See Cunnington, English 
Costume in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 338-9; and Felix Farley's Bristol Journal, 21 August 1784. 
200 The Aberdeen Journal, 22 November 1798; and The Caledonian Mercury, 1 November 1806. 
201 The Ipswich Journal, 15 November 1806; and The Aberdeen Journal, 14 October 1807. 
202 The Leeds Mercury, 28 November 1807; and The Liverpool Mercury, 30 October 1818. 
203 The Leeds Mercury, 28 November 1807. 
 
~243~ 
 
the eighteenth century a growing and increasingly intricate network of shops emerged 
across Britain, and that these shopkeepers pioneered many new marketing techniques to 
increase their sales.204 If the newspaper advertisements are an accurate guide, then it does 
appear that after 1800 it became more common for provincial retailers to stock fur 
garments and accessories. Of course this may be due to the growing sophistication of the 
provincial press and the fact that more post-1800 newspapers have survived, but surely it 
is more than a coincidence that such a development occurred at the same time as the 
problems in the re-export trade lowered the price of several varieties of furs. 
 The production of fine fur garments and accessories remained the exclusive 
preserve of London furriers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Apparel 
made from imported furs was, on the whole, very expensive and this limited demand to 
the aristocracy and middling sorts. As a luxury trade that did not have significant growth 
potential there was little advantage for provincial ports to seek easier access to overseas 
fur imports unlike in the case of tea or raw cotton. While the provincial manufacture of 
beaver hats increased during this period, the furrier’s craft remained a metropolitan 
monopoly. Provincial shopkeepers did, however, take an active role in retailing muffs, 
tippets, pelerines, and fur-lined pelisses to consumers and their apparent greater 
involvement in this part of the trade after 1800 did perhaps increase the British 
consumption of these articles during a time of considerable distress in the re-export trade. 
It is unlikely that provincial shopkeepers did or could afford to limit their sales to 
metropolitan produced fur-garments and accessories; it was only the London furriers that 
could afford to specialise in the making and selling of fur-related apparel. Suffice to say 
that mercantilism did not just re-materialise with the HBC’s acquisition of a monopoly of 
the British fur trade in 1821. London had, since the rise of the British Atlantic, 
monopolised the British fur trade, and the city continued to do so well into the nineteenth 
century.205 
                                                 
204 Mui and Mui’s study was the first to backdate many of the developments in the retail trade that were 
thought to have first emerged in the mid-nineteenth century to the eighteenth century. See Mui and Mui, 
Shopkeeping. 
205 This reaffirms Nash’s view that it was the non-commission colonial trades that gravitated towards the 
British outports in the eighteenth century, as these trades (fish, Irish provisions, rice, slaves, and 
tobacco) were all long-distance bulk trades. These trades involved high port and shipping charges and 
so British provincial ports were able to use their comparatively cheaper shipping and port facilities to 
wrestle these transatlantic bulk trades away from London. See Nash, ‘British Atlantic Economy’, p. 
111. 
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IV.   Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the manufacture of fur clothing and accessories in Britain, the 
sale of these articles to British consumers, and the global trade in British beaver hats in 
order to establish if these parts of the fur trade promoted the persistence of monopoly. As 
the analysis has shown, there were indeed several factors which ensured that London 
continued to dominate the luxury trade in fur apparel and beaver hats and which 
encouraged control of the British fur trade to be placed in the hands of a single trading 
company. While silk hats did not strongly compete with beaver hats until after the period 
of this study, the increasingly popularity of felt hats — largely due to their low cost — 
certainly did impede the beaver hat trade in overseas markets. The decline in the volume 
of beaver imports, especially after 1800, kept beaver prices high and allowed felt hats to 
impinge upon their market share. There was, therefore, a clear motivation for 
metropolitan hat manufacturers and wholesale fur dealers to agitate for an end to the 
ruinous competition between the HBC and NWC. High beaver prices encouraged more 
production to shift from London to provincial regions in an attempt to lower costs, but as 
a consequence of the close links between metropolitan and provincial hat manufacturers, 
both of these two groups shared common interests. Greater provincial involvement also 
intensified the role of the outports in the export of beaver hats abroad. After 1800, country 
shopkeepers did become more prominent in the distribution of muffs, tippets, trimmings, 
and other fur garments to consumers. However, metropolitan furriers retained their 
monopoly over the making of these articles and controlled their distribution to provincial 
retailers.   
In the aftermath of the violent events in the fur trade in the second decade of the 
nineteenth century, the future direction of the trade was a decision that was largely left in 
the hands of metropolitan forces. For provincial participants in the manufacturing of 
beaver hats or in the retailing of fur garments and accessories, there was little to be gained 
from a more open fur trade. As a luxury trade, the fur trade was inevitably dominated by 
the capital and the products of the trade were not items of mass consumption that could 
drive economic growth. It was thus left to London’s gentlemanly capitalists to determine 
the future of the British fur trade. 
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6 
Consumers on the Frontiers of Empire:                  
The Hudson’s Bay Company’s overseas servants 
 
The eighteenth century saw profound changes in the dress, diet, and homes of consumers 
across the Atlantic World. In The Birth of a Consumer Society (1982), Neil McKendrick 
broke with the established orthodoxy that demand was dictated by factors of production 
and technological change — an approach that is rooted in neoclassical economic theory 
which prioritises supply over demand — and instead argued that the British industrial 
revolution was accompanied by a comparable ‘consumer revolution’. 1  While 
McKendrick argued that it was primarily in the second half of the eighteenth century that 
British consumers embraced a whole host of new material goods, subsequent research has 
found that many of these changes began in the late seventeenth century and that similar 
transformations occurred in Western Europe and North America. There were two major 
changes. First, consumers started to use semi-durable items of clothing and household 
possessions instead of more traditional durable objects.2 These ‘semi-durables’ (glass, 
paper products, earthenware, linens, and lightweight cottons) were considerably cheaper 
and less cumbersome than their more durable alternatives (wood, brass, pewter, and 
heavy-duty woollens), and they could often be finished with attractive glazes, styles or 
patterns.3 Second, a number of imported groceries, namely tobacco, sugar, and tea, were 
                                                 
1 Neil McKendrick, ‘The Consumer Revolution of Eighteenth-Century England’, in Neil McKendrick, John 
Brewer, and J. H. Plumb, The Birth of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth-
Century England (London: Europa Publications, 1982), pp. 9-33; and Joel Mokyr, ‘Demand vs. Supply 
in the Industrial Revolution’, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1977), pp. 981-1008. 
2 See Carole Shammas, The Pre-Industrial Consumer in England and America (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990); Carole Shammas, ‘Changes in English and Anglo-American Consumption from 1550-1800’, in 
John Brewer and Roy Porter, eds., Consumption and the World of Goods (London: Routledge, 1993), 
pp. 177-205; DuPlessis, The Material Atlantic, pp. 66-7, 99, 114, 227; R. C. Nash, ‘Domestic Material 
Culture and Consumer Demand in the British-Atlantic World: Colonial South Carolina, 1670-1770’, 
Manchester Papers in Economic and Social History, No. 59 (2007), especially p. 7; and Lorna 
Weatherill, Consumer Behaviour and Material Culture in Britain, 1660-1760, Second Edition (London: 
Routledge, 1996), especially pp. 28, 31. 
3 Berg, Luxury and Pleasure, especially pp. 85-192; Berg, ‘In Pursuit of Luxury’, pp. 85-142; Berg, ‘From 
Imitation to Invention’, pp. 1-30; Nash, ‘Domestic Material Culture’, p. 7; Shammas, Pre-Industrial 
Consumer, pp. 76-7, 95-100, 292-3. Also see Weatherill, Consumer Behaviour, especially pp. 28, 31. 
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added to consumers’ diets, and there was a significant increase in the per capita 
consumption of these articles from the late seventeenth century onwards.4 Many of these 
new consumer goods, particularly for the elite and ‘middling sorts’, also became entwined 
with the concept of politeness, which saw the emergence of tea-drinking, manners 
(including a strict adherence to timekeeping), and dictated that parts of the home that were 
used for food preparation, work, or basic needs, should not be readily observable to 
visitors.5 While working in the isolated, sub-arctic climes of North America, fur trade 
employees sought and expected access to many of these new material goods.  
This chapter seeks to uncover how the HBC’s servants satisfied their demand for 
imported articles of dress, foodstuffs, and other goods while they laboured overseas, and 
to identify patterns in the types of commodities that the servants desired. Particular 
attention is paid to a series of account books that detail the commodities that the Company 
purchased on behalf of its overseas servants, which were then debited to the servants’ 
accounts. 6  Satisfying its servants’ requests for imported consumer goods was an 
important way in which the Company attempted to maintain the loyalty of its servants. 
This was particularly important during a period when the Company needed to retain its 
existing employees so that it could acquire a workforce with the skills required to expand 
the Company’s inland trade. An analysis of the goods purchased by the HBC’s servants 
(mercantile sources) moves away from the use of probate inventories and court records, 
two sources that have underpinned several studies of eighteenth-century material culture.7 
Indeed, as R. C. Nash has argued, one of the key problems with the use of probate 
inventories is that they provide a static depiction of consumption as they relate to the end 
of the life-cycle and so overemphasise consumer durables over more perishable items, 
especially groceries, textiles, and clothing.8 Mercantile sources, on the other hand, have 
been subject to less systematic analysis, despite the fact that such records show flows of 
                                                 
4 Shammas, Pre-Industrial Consumer, pp. 112, 292-3.  
5 Berg, Luxury and Pleasure, pp. 227-34; Lawrence E. Klein, ‘Politeness and the Interpretation of the 
British Eighteenth Century’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 45, No. 4 (2002), pp. 869-98; and Weatherill, 
Consumer Behaviour, pp. 145, 151, 155-6, 165. The ‘middling sorts’ generally refers to urban 
professionals, merchants, industrialists, tradesmen, and artisans, although some wealthy farmers and 
yeomen could also be included in this group. See Berg, Luxury and Pleasure, pp. 5, 15; and Weatherill, 
Consumer Behaviour, p. 13. 
6 See HBCA, A.16/111-3, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1897. 
7 For three studies that have made extensive use of probate inventories see David Hussey and Margaret 
Ponsonby, The Single Homemaker and Material Culture in the Long Eighteenth Century (Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate, 2012); Shammas, Pre-Industrial Consumer; and Weatherill, Consumer Behaviour. John 
Styles has used English court records to establish the everyday dress worn by the ‘lower orders’ during 
the eighteenth century. See Styles, Dress of the People. 
8 Nash, ‘Domestic Material Culture’, p. 26. 
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commodities and consumer spending during the life-cycle, and so provide a more accurate 
insight into what people spent their money on.9 Furthermore, while probate inventories 
under-represent wage-earners, particularly those on the lowest incomes, mercantile 
sources encompass all types of consumers. 10  Mercantile records inevitably have 
limitations. They are often hampered by their fragmentary nature, as it is uncommon for 
merchant sale books and inventories to span more than one or two years, and they seldom 
contain details about the actual purchasers of the merchants’ goods.11 The HBC’s records 
preclude a number of these problems, not least because they span a period of 27 years 
between 1787 and 1813. In addition, since there are a number of surviving employee 
records in the Company’s archives, the wage, occupation, and origin of the individuals 
who placed the orders can be established.12 They also include the transactions of low-
earning labourers and high-earning post masters, and, since all of the Company’s servants 
were men, a study of these records helps to address the disproportionate focus on women 
in eighteenth-century studies of material culture.13 
The chapter is divided into five sections. First, the society of the Company’s posts 
in Hudson’s Bay is outlined, including the provisions and goods that the Company 
supplied to its servants as part of their employment. Second, the types of consumers that 
are contained in the Company’s accounts are explored, as are the other ways in which the 
Company’s servants accessed imported goods. Third, the commodities that the servants 
ordered from the Company are grouped into ‘consumer’ and ‘producer’ goods, and this 
information is combined with details about the servants’ origins, wages, and occupations 
in order to determine how these factors influenced the commodities that the servants 
requested. Fourth, as the servants’ most frequent purchase, the servants’ spending on 
articles of dress (textiles, clothing, and personal adornments) is analysed. Fifth and 
finally, as the servants’ second-highest purchase, the servants’ orders of imported 
groceries are explored. 
                                                 
9 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
10 Ibid., p. 30. 
11  Mercantile sources are also not as effective as probate inventories are in constructing an overall 
representation of a household’s durable contents as these possessions are usually accumulated over a 
far greater period of time than more perishable items. Ibid., p. 31. 
12 The employee records used in this chapter include: HBCA, A.30/3-16, Names &c of the Company’s 
Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1785-1819; and HBCA, A.32/1-19, Servants’ Contracts, 1783-1818. 
13 For instance, see Margot Finn, ‘Women, Consumption and Coverture in England, c.1760-1860’, The 
Historical Journal, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1996), pp. 703-22; and Helen Hartigan-O’Connor, The Ties that 
Buy: Women and Commerce in Revolutionary America (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2009). 
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I.   Life and Society in Hudson’s Bay 
As discussed in chapter one, the HBC largely employed sojourning British servants to 
conduct its trade in North America. The Company provided its servants with 
accommodation as part of their contractual arrangement, and these spaces were organised 
according to a strict social hierarchy. The Company’s officers were granted spacious 
living quarters and they ate, together with the Company’s clerks, in the dining room of 
the master’s or chief’s residence, during which they were seated by rank.14 The rest of the 
men lived in barracks, with several men sharing a single room unless they resided with 
indigenous women, in which case they were granted a small room of their own. 15 
Relationships between the Company’s servants and indigenous women were uncommon 
before 1770.16 The Company did not allow British women to emigrate to Hudson’s Bay 
and so, as servants spent several years, or even decades in North America, loneliness was 
probably one of the main reasons why these bonds were established.17 ‘Wife-lending’ 
was a customary practice of many of the Aboriginal communities in Hudson’s Bay and 
was used to forge trade agreements.18 The need to cement trading ties through ‘marriage’ 
was, however, becoming increasingly obsolete by 1800, especially in well-established 
areas of the trade.19 Between 1783 and 1821, intimacy between Company servants and 
indigenous women became more conventional, although they were now more likely to 
involve ‘native daughters’ of the Company’s servants rather than Aboriginal women.20 
At first, the London Committee forbade its servants from forming these relationships but, 
following the protestations of its servants, eventually realised that it could not effectively 
prevent them from establishing such ties.21 As discussed in chapter one, by the turn of the 
nineteenth century, the Company had begun to employ the ‘native sons’ of the Company’s 
servants as this helped the Company to keep its existing workforce happy and, in time, to 
acquire a workforce well equipped with the skills required to survive in the challenging 
local environment. Therefore, like Eurasians in British India, in the late eighteenth and 
                                                 
14 Rigg, Men of Spirit, p. 148. 
15 Ibid., p. 148. 
16 Brown, Strangers in Blood, p. 52. For a detailed discussion of the relationships established between the 
HBC’s servants and indigenous women see Ibid., pp. 64-80. 
17 Ibid., pp. 59. 
18 Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
19 Virk, Many Tender Ties, pp. 92-3. 
20 On ‘native daughters’ see Ibid., pp. 95-122. 
21 Ibid., pp. 52, 76-7. 
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early nineteenth centuries the servants’ indigenous children were well integrated into the 
British society of Hudson’s Bay.22  
As will be shown below, the emergence of these family units did, of course, affect 
the commodities ordered by the Company’s servants. For instance, in May 1801, John 
Hodgson, second in command at Albany House, noted in a letter to the inland trader 
Robert Goodwin that he had delivered half a dozen gingerbread cakes to Goodwin’s 
daughter at various times, and it is clear that Goodwin had ordered these cakes from 
Britain. 23  Together with a Cree woman named Mistigoose (also known as Jenny), 
Goodwin is known to have fathered four children while he worked in Hudson’s Bay, and 
they included three daughters (Caroline, Nancy, and Peggy) and one son (William 
Adolphus Barmby Goodwin).24 In 1796, Goodwin sent his son to England so that he could 
be educated but his daughters remained in North America.25 While in England, John 
Barmby and his wife in the village of Yoxford, Surrey, looked after Goodwin’s son as he 
attended school, and Goodwin supported his son’s upkeep and education by leasing out 
the pastoral land that he owned near the village.26 Mistigoose died sometime in 1798, and 
Caroline, Nancy, and Peggy subsequently lived with their grandmother Puckethwanisk.27 
In effect, therefore, Goodwin had three households to support, his son in England, his 
daughters in Hudson’s Bay, and himself. While it was common for a servant’s indigenous 
wife and children to accompany them in Hudson’s Bay, it was just as common for them 
to reside outside of the Company’s posts.28 The servants’ wives and daughters generally 
performed household duties, and also made and mended clothes.29 For instance, in May 
                                                 
22 Collingham, Imperial Bodies, especially pp. 76-7. 
23 ‘John Hodgson to Robert Goodwin’ 12 May 1801, LMA, CLC/453/MS06481/002, Business and Private 
Correspondence of Robert Goodwin, 1797-1801, p. 84; and HBCA, A.30/10, Names &c of the 
Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1800, fos. 6-7. 
24 HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘Robert Goodwin’. 
25 HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘Robert Goodwin’. The Company charged Goodwin £10 10s. for his son’s 
passage to England. See LMA, CLC/453/MS06481/001, Business and private correspondence of 
Robert Goodwin, 1776-97, p. 88. 
26 ‘John Barmby to Robert Goodwin’ 13 November 1796, LMA, CLC/453/MS06481/001, Business and 
private correspondence of Robert Goodwin, 1776-97, p. 86; and ‘John Barmby to Robert Goodwin’ 25 
May 1799, LMA, CLC/453/MS06481/002, Business and private correspondence of Robert Goodwin, 
1797-1801, p. 45; and ‘John Barmby to Robert Goodwin’ 15 May 1802, LMA, CLC/453/MS06481/003, 
Business and private correspondence of Robert Goodwin, 1801-4, p. 35. 
27 ‘John Barmby to Robert Goodwin’ 25 May 1799, LMA, CLC/453/MS06481/002, Business and private 
correspondence of Robert Goodwin, 1797-1801, p. 45. In Goodwin’s will it is stated that his daughters 
cohabited with Puckethwanisk and that she was the mother of Mistigoose. See TNA, PROB 
11/1441/141/2, ‘Will of Robert Goodwin, Gentleman of Yoxford, Suffolk’, Records of the Prerogative 
Court of Canterbury, 14 April 1806. 
28 Bayley, Londoner in Rupert’s Land, p. 14. 
29 Ibid., pp. 14, 18. 
 
~250~ 
 
1783, Edward Jarvis in London sent Goodwin a few coat and waistcoat buttons for 
Goodwin’s use ‘and a few needles for Mistigoose’.30 
The fact that many of the Company’s servants were single upon entering the 
Company is probably another reason why they formed relationships with indigenous 
women in Hudson’s Bay. Indeed, the average age of marriage in England at the turn of 
the nineteenth century was around 26 years, while the age at which men entered the 
Company’s service was about 20 years.31 Goodwin was aged 20 when he joined the 
Company in May 1781, and it is clear that he was unmarried at the time, although it does 
appear that he had an intimate relationship with a Mary Hunter who resided in Suffolk.32 
This connection did not last however, as in May 1799, John Barmby mentioned that he 
had seen Goodwin’s ‘old flame’ in a letter to Hudson’s Bay.33 Yet it seems the case that 
the majority of the Company’s servants did not form lasting relationships with indigenous 
women in Hudson’s Bay, and actually used their employment in the Company as a means 
through which to save money, which was one of the benefits that the Company used to 
recruit servants.34  
In addition to accommodation, the Company supplied its servants with basic 
provisions, which included grain, flour, beef, poultry, butter, cheese, hams, vegetables, 
port, and scotch.35 Analysing the Company’s purchases of provisions from suppliers in 
London provides a useful way in which to compare how the diet of the Company’s 
servants compares to estimated working-class purchases of foodstuffs in the late 
eighteenth century. At this time, almost two-thirds of working-class purchases on 
foodstuffs was made up of grains, while purchases of meat, diary, and groceries 
respectively made up 14, 13, and 10 per cent (Figure 6.1).36 In contrast, at only 37 per 
cent, grains made up a much smaller proportion of the HBC’s provisioning costs (Figure 
6.2). The Company’s meat purchases were far greater than was the norm for 
                                                 
30 ‘Edward Jarvis to Robert Goodwin’ 17 May 1783, LMA, CLC/453/MS06481/001, Business and private 
correspondence of Robert Goodwin, 1776-97, p. 14. 
31 Hussey and Ponsonby, Single Homemaker, p. 12; and Nicks, ‘Orkneymen in the HBC’, p. 112. 
32  HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘Robert Goodwin’; ‘Mary Hunter to Robert Goodwin’ c.1776 and 30 
December 1776, LMA, CLC/453/MS06481/001, Business and private correspondence of Robert 
Goodwin, 1776-97, pp. 3, 7. 
33 ‘John Barmby to Robert Goodwin’ 12 May 1799, LMA, CLC/453/MS06481/002, Business and private 
correspondence of Robert Goodwin, 1797-1801, p. 46; and HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘Robert 
Goodwin’. 
34 Rigg, Men of Spirit, pp. 41, 43, 157. 
35 Ibid., pp. 84, 138. 
36 Calculated from data contained in Hans-Joachim Voth, ‘Living Standards and the Urban Environment’, 
in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Vol. 
1: Industrialisation, 1700-1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 282. 
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Figure 6.1. Composition of estimated working-class purchases of foodstuffs, 
1788/92. 
Notes: For the purpose of comparison potatoes were discounted and bread, wheat flour, and 
oatmeal were listed as grains. 
Source: Voth, ‘Living Standards’, p. 282. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Composition of the HBC’s purchases of provisions from London 
suppliers, 1783-1821. 
Notes: For the purpose of comparison Irish provisions and meat were included in the ‘meat’ 
category and the alcohol, drugs, and other categories listed in the Company’s accounts with 
its suppliers were discounted.  
Source: HBCA, A.25/3-5, Merchandise Exported, 1778-1823. 
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working-class diets however. At 35 per cent, the Company seemingly provided its 
servants with a much more intensive diet of meat than most would have been accustomed 
to before joining the Company’s employment.37 The types of meat that the Company 
exported to Hudson’s Bay for its servants mainly consisted of beef, pork, and bacon, 
although veal and mutton were also occasionally sent out.38 While it is the case that the 
Company’s purchases include those for officers as well as for low-ranking labourers and 
canoe-men, the discrepancy is too large to not suggest that the Company provided all its 
employees with substantial quantities of meat. Furthermore, while it was the case that 
some grains or vegetables were grown in Hudson’s Bay or supplied from the Red River 
Settlement, the Company also acquired notable amounts of geese, wild fowl, deer, moose, 
and pemmican from many different bands of Cree, Chipewyan, and Assiniboine peoples, 
which were exchanged for trading commodities.39 Indeed, as the lands that lay to the east 
of Lake Winnipeg became increasing devoid of fur-bearing animals, many Aboriginal 
communities switched from specialising in the trapping or trading of furs, to the sourcing 
of provisions for the fur-trading companies.40 The cultivation of grains and vegetables at 
the Company’s posts was far overshadowed by the protein-rich provisions supplied by 
Cree, Chipewyan, and Assiniboine peoples. From the Company’s focus on high-quality 
provisions, as discussed in chapter three, it is apparent that one of the reasons why the 
Company provided its servants with a higher than average diet of meat was an attempt to 
keep its workforce happy. 
II.   Accessing Imported Goods 
Beyond basic accommodation and provisions, the Company’s servants had to rely on 
other methods by which to access any other items that they wanted while in Hudson’s 
Bay. This was especially the case for clothing as the Company did not include clothes in 
the list of items that it provided its servants with.41 The servants had a number of ways in 
which to acquire additional goods. First, the servants could procure such items before 
they embarked on an outbound ship to the Bay. Second, they could purchase them from 
the Company’s posts if such supplies were readily available. Indeed, this method no doubt 
became increasingly common in the early nineteenth century as the number of servants 
                                                 
37 See Figure 6.2. 
38 See HBCA, A.1/49, London Minute Book, 1805-10, fos. 57-8. 
39 Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade, especially pp. 123-35; and Rigg, Men of Spirit, pp. 67-8. 
40 See Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade, especially pp. 123-35. 
41 Burley, Servants, pp. 26-7; and Rigg, Men of Spirit, p. 140. 
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with families in Hudson’s Bay increased. In his will, Goodwin left £500 in 3 per cent 
consuls in trust to the HBC for the use of his three daughters who were to be paid in goods 
out of the Company’s warehouse at Albany House.42 Third, the Company’s servants 
could ask their friends and family in Britain to deliver goods to the Company’s London 
warehouse in time for the annual shipment to Hudson’s Bay. Alternatively, sometimes 
the servants’ associates in Britain sent gifts on the annual shipments.43 For instance, 
Goodwin received hams, pots of preserves, pickles, and butter from his friends in Surrey 
and in May 1793, Charlotte Barmby, together with her sister and mother, sent Goodwin 
handmade shirts and handkerchiefs.44 Fourth and finally, the servants could ask others to 
purchase goods on their behalf. One way was, of course, to ask the Company to fulfil 
their orders for imported commodities but Goodwin’s surviving correspondence makes 
clear that John Louttit in Stromness also offered such services to the Company’s servants. 
In June 1796, Louttit fulfilled an order for Goodwin to the value of £6 10s. 6d. which 
included: three flowered quart mugs, three flowered one-pint quart mugs, three men’s 
hats, one 1½ gallon tea kettle with a folding handle, one hat for a boy of eight years, six 
plated table spoons, six plated tea spoons, six fine ginger cakes, six fine spiced ginger 
cakes, one pair of shoes for a boy of eight years, three chest locks with screws for a boy 
of eight years, three pairs of hinges, three pairs of strong brass lifting handles, and a box 
to hold the items.45 As is shown below, the range of items included in Goodwin’s order 
was very similar to those fulfilled by the Company. 
One reason why the EIC lost its monopoly of the India trade in 1813 was because 
the East India Agency Houses — which emerged on the back of the EIC’s servants need 
for banking and related financial services — opposed the renewal of the Company’s 
Charter.46 The HBC’s servants, particularly the Scots and Orkneymen employed by the 
Company, needed their earnings to be transferred to their families in Scotland. Initially, 
the Company’s servants endorsed bills that were payable to the Company’s ship captains 
                                                 
42 TNA, PROB 11/1441/141/2, ‘Will of Robert Goodwin, Gentleman of Yoxford, Suffolk’, Records of the 
Prerogative Court of Canterbury, 14 April 1806. 
43 Bayley, Londoner in Rupert’s Land, p. 18. 
44 ‘Charlotte Barmby to Robert Goodwin’ 11 May 1793, LMA, CLC/453/MS06481/001, Business and 
private correspondence of Robert Goodwin, 1776-97, p. 53; ‘John Barmby to Robert Goodwin’ 12 May 
1797, ‘Charlotte Barmby to Robert Goodwin’ 13 May 1798 and ‘John Barmby to Robert Goodwin’ 
May 1798, LMA, CLC/453/MS06481/002, Business and private correspondence of Robert Goodwin, 
1797-1801, pp. 10, 25, 27. 
45 ‘John Louttit to Robert Goodwin’ 17 June 1796, LMA, CLC/453/MS06481/001, Business and private 
correspondence of Robert Goodwin, 1776-97, pp. 80-1. 
46 Webster, Twilight of the East India Company, especially pp. 24-6, 32-3, 36-8, 51-2; and Anthony 
Webster, The Richest East India Merchant: The Life and Business of John Palmer of Calcutta, 1767-
1836 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2007), particularly pp. 10-4. 
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who collected the servants’ wages when they returned to London, and thence, on the next 
outbound voyage, paid the money to the person who the servant had chosen to receive 
them.47 These reimbursements were thus subject to a long delay, yet it was also a highly 
insecure payment method. The death of a ship captain in the early 1780s led to the loss 
of all the servants’ property that had been in the captain’s possession.48 The Company 
introduced a new mode of payment in the mid-1780s that ended the servants need to 
handle cash directly, and thus removed the ship captains from the remittance process.49 
Transactions in Rupert’s Land were thenceforth conducted on a credit and debit system 
that enabled the Company’s employees to purchase goods from the Company’s posts and 
have payments made to individuals and financial institutions in Britain.50 In essence, the 
Company took control of the remittance system and essentially provided its servants with 
financial services. Therefore, in addition to the small scale of these transactions in 
comparison to those required by the EIC’s servants, ‘private trade’ in the case of the HBC 
did not allow for an organised ‘Agency House’ to rise up and eventually challenge the 
Company’s Charter. While John Louttit occasionally fulfilled orders for Company 
servants, the servants paid for these purchases by drawing on their account with the 
Company. 
The HBC’s servants thus had several ways in which to access imported 
commodities while they worked in North America; Robert Goodwin had goods purchased 
by and gifts sent from friends and family in Britain, and he placed orders with tradesmen 
like John Louttit. Goodwin also asked the Company to fulfil many of his requests for 
imported commodities. For most of the period between 1783 and 1821, the Company paid 
the shipping and customs’ charges that arose from all the packages sent to the Company’s 
servants, whether they were gifts from associates or Company purchases. On 25 May 
1820, however, the Company issued the following notice to its officers in Hudson’s Bay: 
We observe that there is a considerable increase in the number and size of 
the packages sent to the Bay for our servants and which seldom come to 
the house till the ships are on the point of sailing, they take up a great 
proportion of room in the ships and occasion not only considerable 
inconvenience but a heavy expense in custom house and shipping charges. 
We do not wish that our servants should be prevented from receiving 
supplys[sic.] from their friends in Europe, but it is necessary that we should 
in the Month of January be in possession of the tonnage required by each 
individual, that a calculation may be made of the additional room wanted. 
                                                 
47 Rigg, Men of Spirit, p. 141. 
48 Ibid., p. 141. 
49 Ibid., p. 141. 
50 Ibid., p. 141. 
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We therefore desire that you make it publically known that the indulgence 
of sending goods free can no longer be allowed, and that it will be necessary 
for the agent of the particular in England to make application in the month 
of January (accompanied by a list of the articles for which freight is 
requested) for a shipping permission, and if granted they must pay at the 
rate of 5/ per foot cube measurement or £10 per ton weight at the option of 
the Company, to cover the expenses of freight, export duty and shipping 
charges… before they will be allowed to be received on board.51 
The Company’s plan to impose freight charges on the servants’ packages was contested. 
In response to the complaints from its servants, the Company halved the charge to £5 per 
ton or 2s. 6d. per cubic foot.52 The timing of this change in policy is important. While the 
Company did not meet with Ellice and Simon McGillivray until December 1820, it seems 
more than a coincidence that the Company moved to introduce charges on the servants’ 
packages at a time when the Company had sent George Simpson to meet with the 
dissident wintering partners of the NWC at Fort William.53 The London Committee 
evidently felt that they were in a position to end the practice of offering its servants free 
shipping on their packages, yet the fact that the Company had provided this indulgence 
shows that this policy was designed to maintain the loyalty of the Company’s servants.  
III.   Uncovering the Cargoes 
Before considering the specific commodities that the servants requested the Company to 
purchase on their behalf, it is necessary to outline the methodology that was used to 
analyse the ‘servants’ commissions’.54  The account books detail the orders that the 
Company fulfilled for its servants over a continuous 27-year period between 1787 and 
1813. There are a number of purchases in the ledgers after 1813, but these are less detailed 
than those of the preceding years and so have been discounted. The servants’ orders were 
matched with the information contained in the Company’s employment records so as to 
allow the purchases to be analysed according to the servant’s origin, wage, and 
occupation.55 A set of problems does arise from the cross-referencing of these financial 
and biographical sources. While the purchases are continuous for the period 1787-1813, 
there is a gap in the official lists of servants between 1801 and 1811. The surviving 
servants’ contracts help to fill in some of the missing blanks, but some details needed to 
                                                 
51 HBCA, A.6/19, London Correspondence Book Outwards — Official, 1816-26, fo. 99. 
52 HBCA, A.1/52, London Minute Book, 1818-21, fo. 112. 
53 Campbell, Lord of the Northwest, p. 282. 
54 See HBCA, A.16/111-3, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1897. 
55 HBCA, A.30/3-16, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1785-1819; and HBCA, 
A.32/1-19, Servants’ Contracts, 1783-1818. 
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be inferred and deduced to make the fullest sense of the data. For instance, if a servant 
was listed in 1800 and was still recorded in 1812, some of the intervening details were 
deduced by following the conventional patterns of career advancement. Indeed, it was 
unusual for a servant to contract at a lower annual wage than what they had previously 
earned, as experience was valued and rewarded. Biographical sheets from the HBC 
archives were also used to determine the occupations of some servants during these 
intervening years, although these biographies are by no means comprehensive.56 In some 
cases, no logical assumptions were attainable and so the servant’s order was discounted. 
This was especially the case with a small number of the Orkneymen employed by the 
Company, as many had the same name and hence an order could not always be matched 
to a particular servant. The Company’s account books often listed the post at which the 
servant was stationed at, and so it was usually possible to deduce who the order related 
to by comparing this with the location of the servant as recorded in the lists of servants or 
the servant’s contract. For some Orkneymen, however, even the post data is not sufficient 
to identify the specific servant as there were sometimes Orkneymen with an identical 
name at the same post. In most cases, however, it was possible to match the orders to the 
corresponding origin, wage, and occupation of the purchaser. 
Figure 6.3 shows the servants’ per capita purchases according to their recorded 
‘place of origin’.57 ‘Per capita’ in this sense is in relation to the number of servants in the 
Company’s employ in 1800, in respect of their place of origin. The servants who 
originated from North America were the ones who routinely placed the highest value 
orders with the Company. These were either French-Canadians or British emigrants from 
the Canada or the ‘native sons’ of the Company’s servants. The reason for this was 
because such servants received their wages through commodity purchases. These orders 
were often large and regularly surpassed the servant’s entire annual wage. As Figure 6.3 
shows, the servants who were least likely to place orders with the Company were 
Orkneymen. This is partly because Orkney was the predominant source of the Company’s 
low-paid labourers, but it is also probably because Orkneymen sought to save a greater 
proportion of their wages. While there were only six ‘other Scots’ employed by the 
Company in 1800, their per capita purchases were far higher than was the case for 
Orkneymen. This is because they performed better paid occupations such as surgeons and 
                                                 
56 See HBC Biographical Sheets < http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/archives/hbca/biographical > [Accessed: 
15/09/2016]. 
57 The servants stated their place of origin when signing a contract with the Company, but this did not 
necessarily accurately reflect their birthplace. 
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masters.58 The English servants’ per capita purchases were also higher than was the case 
for Orkneymen as they were often officers and thus were better paid. In consideration of 
the striking disparity between the spending patterns of British and North American 
servants, future analysis of the purchases by wage focuses on the Company’s British 
servants.  
While the servants’ origins were important in determining the value of the 
purchased goods, wages were, of course, a significant factor. As is evident in Figure 6.4, 
the lowest paid British servants, those earning below £10 per annum, requested very few 
goods from the Company. Indeed, their per capita purchases only amounted to £0.47 over 
the whole 27-year period. The limited purchases of these servants are, therefore, likely to 
reveal the commodities that they most treasured. The next wage level (£11-20) spent over 
10 times more with a spend of £5.05.59 Evidently, the higher wages brought greater 
financial security, which stimulated more purchases. The increase was less remarkable 
for the next wage level. Servants earning between £21 and £40 per annum each purchased 
                                                 
58 HBCA, A.30/10, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1800. 
59 See Figure 6.4. 
Figure 6.3. HBC’s servants’ per capita purchases by place of origin, 1787-1813 (in £). 
 
Notes: Only the entries that could be matched to a servant and for whom a corresponding place of origin 
was identifiable were included. The per capita purchases were calculated by dividing the wage level’s 
total purchases of goods for the period 1787-1813 by the total number of British servants at each wage 
level in the year 1800. 
Source: HBCA, A.16/111-13, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Books — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-
1897; HBCA, A.30/3-13, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1785-1813; and 
HBCA, A.32/1-18, Servants’ Contracts, 1783-1815. 
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£15.49 worth of goods over the period. In other words, wages doubled while the value of 
their purchases tripled. The most critical point, however, appears to have occurred at the 
next wage level. At £94.06, there was a six-fold increase in the per capita purchases of 
the £41-70 category.60 Thus it appears that servants at this wage level were far more 
inclined to order goods from the Company. For the top earners, their spending took a 
linear form; their wages approximately doubled and their per capita purchases followed 
suit (£204.56). To sum up, the lowest paid workers were unlikely to use their meagre 
earnings to order imported commodities, while the ‘middling servants’ purchases actually 
resembled a similar spend to wage ratio than that of the highest earners. 
Wages and origins do not, however, account for all of the variations in the servants’ 
spending patterns. The servant’s occupation was another factor. Figure 6.5 shows the per 
capita purchases of the British servants employed by the Company according to their 
occupation, and Table 6.1 shows the average annual wage that was paid to these 
vocations. The ‘low status’ occupations were the ones who ordered the lowest value of 
goods from the Company but the roles within this grouping were not ranked in the same 
                                                 
60 See Figure 6.4. 
Figure 6.4. HBC’s British servants’ per capita purchases by wage, 1787-1813 (in £). 
 
Notes: Only the entries that could be matched to a servant and for whom a corresponding wage was 
identifiable were included. The per capita purchases were calculated by dividing the wage level’s total 
purchases of goods for the period 1787-1813 by the total number of British servants at each wage level 
in the year 1800. 
Source: HBCA, A.16/111-13, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Books — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-
1897; HBCA, A.30/3-13, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1785-1813; and HBCA, 
A.32/1-18, Servants’ Contracts, 1783-1815. 
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order as average earnings. Labourers were the lowest spenders and poorest earners, and 
mariners were the highest spenders and richest earners but this was not the case for canoe-
men and artisans. Canoe-men actually spent slightly more despite earning £6 less than the 
artisans, with a spend of £4.45 for the canoe-men as opposed to £4.19 for the artisans. It 
seems, therefore, that mobility influenced consumption. This difference probably 
indicates that the canoe-men’s travels impacted upon their consumer spending, either for 
practical or sentimental reasons. Indeed, the increased distance away from the more 
populated posts on Hudson’s Bay perhaps accentuated these servants feeling of 
detachment from their home communities, which prompted the purchase of goods that 
reminded them of home. For the ‘high status’ occupations, per capita purchases and wages 
were in accordance but there are still a number of unexpected observations. The surgeons 
Figure 6.5. HBC’s British servants’ per capita purchases by occupation, 1787-1813 (in £). 
 
Notes: Only the entries that could be matched to a servant and for whom a corresponding occupation was 
identifiable were included. The per capita purchases were calculated by dividing the wage level’s total 
purchases of goods for the period 1787-1813 by the total number of British servants at each wage level in 
the year 1800. See Table 6.1 for a discussion of the vocations that are contained within these occupational 
groups. 
Source: HBCA, A.16/111-13, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Books — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-
1897; HBCA, A.30/3-13, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1785-1813; and HBCA, 
A.32/1-18, Servants’ Contracts, 1783-1815. 
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and traders were paid similar amounts but their spending is somewhat different. The per 
capita purchases of the surgeons was £50.74 while it was only £34.80 for the traders. Like 
canoe-men, traders spent much of their time in the interior and this seems to have had the 
effect of lowering their per capita purchases below what would be expected rather than 
increasing it. On average, officers were paid a third more than surgeons but their per 
capita purchases were almost double. It therefore appears that the officers’ superior 
position induced them to order more goods from the Company. For the clerks, even 
though they were only paid around £17.40 per annum, their per capita purchases came to 
£27.63. Thus while they were paid £3 less than artisans, they spent more than six times 
what the artisans did. Indeed, the clerks spending pattern was actually akin to that of the 
officers for while they were paid 70 per cent less than their superiors they also purchased 
72 per cent less. The clerks’ and officers’ orders therefore appear to have shared a similar 
pattern, with each spending a comparable proportion of their wages. This may well be 
because the clerks were the servants that were most frequently promoted into the officer 
class and their purchases thus reflected this occurrence. Above all, this synopsis of the 
servants’ purchases in relation to their performed duties indicates that wages alone do not 
entirely account for the servants’ consumer behaviour. 
Alongside the plethora of trade goods that were intended to entice Aboriginal 
traders to part with their trapped furs, the Company’s ships were stuffed with cotton shirts, 
Britannia tea pots, riveted china bowls, gingerbread, watches, coloured ribbons, and many 
Table 6.1. Average annual wage of occupations employed by the HBC in North 
America in the year 1800 (in £). 
 Low Status  High Status 
 Artisan a Canoe-men b Labourer Mariner c  Clerk d Officer e Surgeon  Trader f 
Wage 20.72 14.31 9.29 24.65  17.40 58.42 40.00 40.04 
Notes: The average wages were calculated from the wages stated in the HBC’s list of servants for 
the year 1800 and for which a corresponding occupation was identifiable. 
a includes armourer, blacksmith, boat builder, bricklayer, builder, canoe builder, carpenter, 
cooper, distiller, engineer, joiner, mason, millwright, net maker, oil boiler, sawyer, smith, tailor, 
and shipwright; 
b consists of boat-man, boat steerer, bowsman, canoe-man, craft master, middleman, pilot, patroon, 
patroon of small craft, patroon of the woods, runner to Indians, and steersman; 
c includes harpooners, mates of the brig, schooner, or sloop; masters of the brig, schooner, shallop, 
or sloop; sailors; seamen; and whalers; 
d comprises accountant, assistant, clerk, storekeeper, and writer; 
e consists of chiefs, factors, locum tenens, masters, residents, seconds, and superintendents; 
f includes inland trader, interpreter, linguist, and trader. 
Source: HBCA, A.30/10, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1800. 
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other commodities that had been ordered by the Company’s overseas servants. In order 
to establish the servants’ spending priorities, the ordered commodities were assigned into 
‘consumer’ and ‘producer’ goods. Consumer goods were generally finished items that 
were ready to be ‘consumed’, whereas producer goods were primarily tools and 
equipment that were required by certain occupations to carry out their duties. Consumer 
goods is a particularly large and unwieldy category and so was further broken down into 
dress, food and drink, household goods, books, and other consumer items.61 
Table 6.2 shows all the Company’s servants’ purchases of consumer and producer 
goods; 91 per cent of the purchases relate to consumer goods, whereas only 9 per cent are 
associated with producer goods. This was somewhat expected. The servants were 
employees and their employers supplied the majority of the tools, equipment, and raw 
materials that were required to undertake their professions, although it is clear that there 
were some items in short supply. Basic hardware such as knives and scissors comprised 
a significant proportion of the purchased producer goods but there was also a sizeable 
number of specialised instruments that many of the servants appear to have purchased on 
their own account so that they could adequately perform their duties. Telescopes, 
spyglasses, sextants, artificial horizons, thermometers, compasses, barometers, and 
drawing instruments were frequently requested. Many of these items were essential for 
navigational purposes and for scientific observations. There were noticeable instances, 
however, when these devices exceeded mere practical utility. For example, in 1799, the 
famed explorer Peter Fidler purchased a nine-inch ivory sector and a six-inch ivory 
protractor to the combined cost of £2 13s.62 Put another way, Fidler spent over a fifth of 
the entire annual wage of the average labourer on two standard instruments. William 
Auld, the master of Churchill Factory who originated from Edinburgh, did something 
similar.63 In 1811, Auld acquired three sets of wooden stamps for the making of his own 
thermometer scales for which the HBC charged 7s. 6d.64 The first set of stamps were 
‘figures of the special size’, the second set were ‘letters consisting of the whole alphabet 
of the same size as the figures’, and the final were ‘letters of small capitals’. The purchases 
made by Fidler and Auld highlight the fact that even producer goods could be decorative 
and thus acquired the additional purpose of displaying the owner’s wealth and social 
status. Producer goods could also acquire leisurely functions. James Clouston, an 
                                                 
61 See Table 6.2 for a discussion of what these categories contain. 
62 HBCA, A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1802, fo. 59. 
63 HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘William Auld’. 
64 HBCA, A.16/113, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1810-97, fo. 3.  
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Orcadian schoolteacher at Eastmain House, requested a telescope that was capable of 
observing the passing of Jupiter’s satellites.65 The most vivid example is provided by a 
clerk from London. In 1804, Thomas Swain purchased a ‘3/2 feet achromatic telescope 
with mahogany table and brass stand one eye to be for day objects three for astronomy, 
rackwork sliding rods &c in a mahogany box’.66 The cost of the device was a staggering 
£31 10s. and Swain was only paid around £30 per year at this time.67 In certain cases then, 
producer goods could perform alternative functions and edge into the realm of consumer 
goods. 
The bulk of the servants’ purchases were related to dress, food and drink, household 
goods, books, and other consumer items, and Table 6.2 shows the servants’ purchases for 
                                                 
65 No cost was recorded for the telescope and so it appears unlikely that the item was actually sourced and 
despatched. HBCA, A.16/113, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1810-
97, fo. 2; and HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘James Clouston’. 
66 HBCA, A.16/112, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1802-10, fo. 20. 
67 HBCA, A.30/10, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1800, fo. 37. 
Table 6.2. HBC’s servants’ purchases of consumer and producer goods, 1787-1813 
(in £). 
 1787-1800 1801-1813 Total 
Consumer Goods 
     Dress a 
     Food & Drink 
     Household Goods b 
     Books 
     Other c 
     Total 
Producer Goods d 
     Total 
 
757 (43%) 
290 (16%) 
116 (7%) 
259 (15%) 
190 (11%) 
1,612 (91%) 
 
155 (9%) 
 
2,424 (51%) 
1,182 (25%) 
217 (5%) 
286 (6%) 
243 (5%) 
4,352 (91%) 
 
433 (9%) 
 
3,182 (49%) 
1,472 (22%) 
333 (5%) 
545 (8%) 
434 (7%) 
5,966 (91%) 
 
589 (9%) 
Overall Total 1,767 4,785 6,555 
Notes: Other entries in the account books that are not included in the above table are either illegible, 
indistinguishable, or pertain to ‘slops, carriage & porterage’. The total value of the discounted entries 
is £795. 
a includes textiles, clothing, accessories, haberdashery, and personal adornments; 
b comprises commodities that are primarily associated with the domestic living space such as bedding, 
cooking, cleaning and washing equipment, decorations, furniture, lighting, stationary, and tableware; 
c primarily consists of armaments and other items relating to leisure such as musical instruments; 
d contains tools (largely knives and scissors), equipment required for navigation and scientific 
observation (sextants, thermometers, etc.), raw materials (dyestuffs, mercury, etc.), and heavyweight 
textiles for tents (canvas, ‘ravenduck’, and Russia sheeting). 
Source: HBCA, A.16/111-13, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Books — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-
1897. 
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each of these articles. The highest purchases were for articles of dress. This category 
consisted of any item that was worn or used to decorate the body and included textiles, 
clothing, accessories, haberdashery, and personal adornments. Almost half of the 
servants’ purchases were for these sorts of consumer goods. The second highest category 
was food and drink which accounted for 22 per cent of the orders. These purchases were 
mainly for non-essential foodstuffs such as tea, sugar, and gingerbread. Dress and food 
and drink comprised 78 per cent of the purchases of consumer goods. The remaining 
purchases were spread fairly equally between household goods (6 per cent), books (9 per 
cent), and other consumer goods that were primarily for leisure (7 per cent). Dividing the 
period in half reveals some interesting shifts in consumption. The overall proportions 
spent on producer goods remained the same between 1787-1800 and 1801-13 but this was 
not the case for the sub-categories within consumer goods. Dress and food and drink 
actually increased in importance, rising from 43 to 51 per cent and 16 to 25 per cent 
respectively. The other categories declined in importance, most noticeably that for books 
which fell from 15 to 6 per cent. Why this change occurred is not entirely clear but it took 
place in the context of an expanding British and North American workforce as well as 
increased ventures into the interior. What is clear beyond doubt is that the servants’ 
purchases of perishable consumer items vastly outweighed their spending on durable and 
semi-durable consumer goods. Indeed, spending on books alone was higher than that 
spent on household goods. The proportion of the servants’ purchases assigned to each of 
the five types of consumer goods is similar to that found by Nash in his study of the 
mercantile inventories of South Carolina merchants in the mid-eighteenth century.68 For 
consumer goods, Nash found that the composition of the merchants’ inventories were as 
follows: dress (textiles, clothing/haberdashery) comprised 68 per cent, food and drink 
(groceries) made up 16 per cent, household goods (bedding and domestic hardware) 
accounted for 10 per cent, books (1 per cent), and other goods (6 per cent).69 The most 
striking difference between Nash’s findings and the HBC’s servants’ orders is that the 
servants purchased more books (9 per cent).70 Perhaps this reflected the lack of amenities 
in Hudson’s Bay.  
When the purchases are analysed according to the servants’ place of origin a 
number of differences between the British and North American servants are apparent. 
                                                 
68 Nash, ‘Domestic Material Culture’, p. 29. 
69 Ibid., p. 29. 
70 See Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.3 shows that those who permanently lived in North America spent far less on 
books than did the British servants and opted instead to allocate a greater proportion of 
their spending on articles of dress and food and drink. This discrepancy between the two 
sets of consumers somewhat explains some of the differences previously noted when the 
period was analysed in two halves. Even so, both sets of servants shared the inclination 
to distribute the majority of their spending towards dress and non-essential foodstuffs. 
A comparison of the British servants’ wages and their per capita purchases of 
consumer and producer goods offers a number of insights into the servants’ consumer 
behaviour (Figure 6.6). Major shifts in the types of commodities that the servants ordered 
occurred as their wages increased. Per capita purchases across each of the categories did 
not increase in a linear way as wages rose. In the lowest income level, where purchases 
were very limited, servants principally ordered items of dress (55 per cent), producer 
goods (27 per cent), and food and drink (14 per cent), and spent very little on books (4 
per cent) or household and other consumer goods (0 per cent).71 When wages were 
effectively doubled in the next income classification the servants’ purchases markedly 
                                                 
71 See Figure 6.6. 
Table 6.3. HBC’s servants’ per capita purchases of consumer and producer goods 
by place of origin, 1787-1813 (in £). 
 British Isles North America 
Consumer Goods 
     Dress  
     Food & Drink 
     Household Goods  
     Books 
     Other  
     Total 
Producer Goods  
     Total 
 
4.28 (45%) 
2.02 (21%) 
0.54 (6%) 
1.14 (12%) 
0.62 (7%) 
8.60 (91%) 
 
0.82 (9%) 
 
34.41 (54%) 
15.08 (24%) 
2.76 (4%) 
0.58 (1%) 
3.93 (6%) 
56.76 (90%) 
 
6.53 (10%) 
Overall Total 9.42 63.29 
Notes: Only the entries that could be matched to a servant and for whom a corresponding place of 
origin was identifiable were included. The per capita purchases were calculated by dividing the wage 
level’s total purchases of consumer and producer goods for the period 1787-1813 by the total number 
of British servants at each wage level in the year 1800. 
Source: HBCA, A.16/111-13, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Books — Servants’ Commissions, 
1787-1897; HBCA, A.30/3-13, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1785-1813; 
and HBCA, A.32/1-18, Servants’ Contracts, 1783-1815. 
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increased, largely because purchases for the lowest earners were so restricted. As was 
discussed in the previous section, the servants’ overall purchases did not usually adhere 
to a linear relationship with wages and neither, it seems, did the proportions allocated to 
each category of goods. In other words, they shifted in accordance with the servants’ 
changing priorities. While per capita purchases in the £11-£20 category increased for all 
of the commodity groups, it was not evenly distributed. Dress maintained its position as 
the main article purchased but its share of overall spending increased to 73 per cent. 
Producer goods, on the other hand, lost out and fell to third-place in the commodity 
rankings, equating to 6 per cent of purchases. Even though its share remained unchanged, 
food and drink now accounted for the second highest purchase. The proportion spent on 
books remained static at 4 per cent but household and other consumer goods advanced 
slightly to encompass 2 and 1 per cent. It seems, therefore, that improving attire was the 
servant’s key objective at this income level. 
The next wage increment (£21-£40) stimulated further modifications to the 
commodities that the servants ordered from the Company. Per capita purchases of dress 
doubled in line with the increase in wages but the growth in the purchase of other items 
Figure 6.6. HBC’s British servants’ per capita purchases of consumer and producer 
goods by wage, 1787-1813 (in £). 
 
Notes: The size of the circle indicates the per capita purchases which were calculated by dividing the 
wage level’s total purchases of consumer and producer goods for the period 1787-1813 by the total 
number of British servants at each wage level in the year 1800. 
Source: HBCA, A.16/111-13, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Books — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-
1897; HBCA, A.30/3-13, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1785-1813; and 
HBCA, A.32/1-18, Servants’ Contracts, 1783-1815. 
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was more notable. Purchases of producer and household goods quadrupled while that of 
books and food and drink increased six-fold.72 The growth in purchases of other consumer 
goods, most of which were associated with leisurely pursuits, was even more pronounced 
at 18 times the previous amount. Indeed, the spending that was promoted by the rise in 
wages was primarily channelled towards leisure and supplementing diets. As a 
consequence of these changes, the proportion of spending allocated to the different 
categories altered once again. Dress was still the main purchase but its share had fallen to 
50 per cent of the amount spent. The proportion allocated to food and drink increased to 
25 per cent and it remained the second highest per capita purchase. Producer goods stayed 
third (9 per cent) while the other consumer goods jumped to fourth-place (7 per cent).73 
Books were fifth with a rounded share of 7 per cent whereas household goods languished 
at 3 per cent. It is clear that the servants at this income level spent their earnings on a 
wider variety of goods than those on lower wages and particularly focused on acquiring 
non-essential foodstuffs. 
It was, however, in the £41-£70 category where the most dramatic and wide-ranging 
changes occurred. As noted previously, at this stage wages roughly doubled yet spending 
increased six-fold. Once again, the increase in the servants’ spending was not evenly 
distributed across all commodity groups. The three-fold increase in the value of dress 
purchases was overshadowed by a rapid growth in the amount spent on other items. The 
value of the orders increased six-fold for food and drink, seven-fold for the miscellaneous 
consumer goods, eight-fold for producer goods, nine-fold for household goods, and most 
impressive of all, spending on books was 16 times greater than it was previously. It is 
clear that the servants at this wage level not only spent a greater proportion of their 
earnings but used them to acquire a far more extensive range of goods than those with 
lower wages. This deduction is further confirmed by analysing the way in which the £41-
£70 servants distributed their spending. The highest per capita purchase was no longer 
dress which accounted for 27 per cent of purchases but food and drink which comprised 
28 per cent.74 Indeed, this was the only wage level where apparel did not top the spending 
list. Books supplied one of the most substantial changes. They ascended to 19 per cent of 
the purchases, and comprised the third highest per capita purchase. The remaining goods 
made further headway. Producer goods now made up 12 per cent of the purchases and 
                                                 
72 See Figure 6.6. 
73 See Figure 6.6. 
74 See Figure 6.6. 
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other consumer goods comprised 9 per cent. Yet again, household goods came up last 
with a share of 5 per cent. In light of the considerable growth in purchases and the 
proliferation of this spending across a wide spectrum of goods, it seems that this income 
level was of profound importance for consumers. Was this a case of the ‘middling 
servants’ leading the ‘consumer revolution’? 
For the highest earners, dress and household goods were the two articles where the 
servants focused their increased spending. Dress purchases were three times higher than 
was the case for the £41-70 servants, and their purchase of household goods was six times 
higher.75 Spending in the other categories either developed in line with, or were slightly 
below the increase in wages. The rankings of the commodity groups shifted yet again in 
accordance with these uneven growth rates. Dress resumed its place as the highest per 
capita purchase at 37 per cent, and books assumed second place with a share of 20 per 
cent, surpassing spending on food and drink which now only accounted for 17 per cent 
of the purchases. The share allocated to household goods increased to 13 per cent, while 
producer and other consumer goods both declined to 7 per cent. It seems, therefore, that 
the ‘elite’ servants distinguished themselves from their subordinates by spending lavishly 
on the more decorative items of dress and household goods. The purchases of the other 
commodities had apparently reached a decisive stage in the previous wage distribution.  
This analysis of the servants’ purchases in relation to their wages undoubtedly 
shows that as the servants’ earnings increased their spending priorities changed. In other 
words, as their wages increased their purchases of producer and the various kinds of 
consumer goods did not progress in a parallel fashion. The servants instead focused their 
efforts on purchasing specific types of commodities at each wage distribution. Sometimes 
this took the form of improving one sort of good, while at others — such as in the case of 
the ‘critical’ £41-£70 wage level — changes to consumer spending were remarkably 
diverse and wide-ranging.  
Before looking in greater depth at the specific commodities purchased by the 
servants, it is useful to consider what effect a servant’s occupation had on the 
commodities that they ordered. Figure 6.7 shows the servants’ per capita purchases on 
the six commodity groups in relation to their occupation. With a share of between 60 and 
80 per cent, the low status occupations assigned a much greater proportion of their 
spending towards items of dress than did their high status counterparts, who only 
apportioned 30 to 40 per cent. Interestingly, the canoe-men distributed 19 per cent of their 
                                                 
75 See Figure 6.6. 
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purchases to food and drink whereas the labourers only assigned 9 per cent. Similarly, the 
traders allotted 37 per cent of their spending towards food and drink, which was 
substantially greater than that of the clerks, officers, and surgeons who only apportioned 
around 20 per cent. It seems that those who worked inland were more inclined to purchase 
Figure 6.7. HBC’s British servants’ per capita purchases of consumer and producer 
goods by occupation, 1787-1813 (in £). 
 
Notes: The size of the circle indicates the per capita purchases which were calculated by dividing the wage 
level’s total purchases of consumer and producer goods for the period 1787-1813 by the total number of 
British servants at each wage level in the year 1800. See Table 6.1 for a discussion of the vocations that 
are contained within these occupational groups. 
Source: HBCA, A.16/111-13, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Books — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-
1897; HBCA, A.30/3-13, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1785-1813; and HBCA, 
A.32/1-18, Servants’ Contracts, 1783-1815. 
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additional foodstuffs, perhaps as a way to ensure that they had access to such ‘luxuries’ 
in the remote interior. Per capita purchases of books also showed great variation. The 
officers’ purchases accounted for 48 per cent of the spending on books but only comprised 
18 per cent of their total spending. The surgeons, however, were more disposed to 
purchase books, assigning 32 per cent of their spending to this end whereas the traders 
and clerks both allocated less than 10 per cent. In addition, the clerks and officers appear 
to have shared certain aspects of their material culture. Both occupations apportioned a 
similar share of their purchases towards extra foodstuffs and other consumer goods. 
IV.   Dress in the Sub-Arctic 
The servants assigned almost half of the goods purchased in their orders towards adorning 
their bodies. Textiles, clothing, accessories, haberdashery, and personal adornments were 
imperative items of daily life and many servants placed orders with the Company for such 
goods. Which of these items were more important? What exactly did the servants spend 
their money on within these categories and why? And who spent their earnings on what?  
Table 6.4 shows how the servants’ purchases were distributed across the major 
items of dress. Accounting for 46 per cent of spending, the bulk of the servant’s purchases 
related to personal adornments. These were overwhelming for watches and the chains that 
attached to them which allowed them to be easily pulled from a waistcoat pocket and for 
the personal seals to which they were also frequently adjoined.76 Pocket watches were 
expensive items and could comprise a significant proportion of a servant’s annual wage. 
In 1793, William Linklater, an Orkneyman employed as a steward, paid £7 1s. for a 
jewelled silver watch with an accompanying chain and seal.77 This was a considerable 
expense for an individual who only earned £15 per annum. There are many other 
examples of low-paid servants acquiring these illustrious timepieces. John Park, another 
Orcadian, worked as a canoe-men on an annual wage of £25 and in 1805 paid £9 1s. for 
a new silver watch.78 That same year another canoe-man, John Moore, purchased a silver 
watch that cost 70 per cent of his yearly wage.79 The Company’s officers were not to be 
                                                 
76 Styles, Dress of the People, pp. 104-5. 
77 HBCA, A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1802, fo. 19; 
and HBCA, A.30/5, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1791-3, fo. 81. 
78 HBC Biographical Sheeets, ‘John Park’; HBCA, A.16/112, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — 
Servants’ Commissions, 1802-10, fo. 38; and HBCA, A.30/10-11, Names &c of the Company’s Servants 
at Hudson’s Bay, 1800-12, fo. 35, 28. 
79 Moore was paid around £16 per annum and the watch cost £11 3s. See HBCA, A.16/112, Officers’ and 
Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1802-10, fo. 39; and HBCA, A.30/10, Names &c 
of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1800, fo. 34. 
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Table 6.4. HBC servants’ purchases of articles of dress, 1787-1813 (in £). 
 1787-1800 1801-1813 Total 
Accessories a 
     Hats & Caps 
     Shawls  
     Other b 
     Total 
 
27 (76%) 
0 
9 (24%) 
36 (5%) 
 
138 (58%) 
54 (23%) 
42 (19%) 
234 (10%) 
 
165 (60%) 
54 (20%) 
51 (20%) 
270 (9%) 
Clothing a 
     Upper Body c 
     Lower Body d 
     Total 
 
29 (51%) 
29 (49%) 
58 (8%) 
 
198 (80%)  
51 (20%) 
249 (11%)  
 
228 (74%) 
79 (26%) 
307 (10%) 
Haberdashery a 
     Buttons 
     Ribbons 
     Other 
     Total 
 
7 (23%) 
16 (54%) 
7 (23%) 
30 (4%) 
 
63 (19%) 
183 (56%) 
79 (24%) 
325 (14%) 
 
70 (20%) 
199 (56%) 
86 (24%) 
355 (12%) 
Personal Adornment a 
     Buckles 
     Watches, Chains & Seals 
     Other e 
     Total 
 
19 (3%) 
534 (93%) 
22 (4%) 
575 (77%) 
 
1 (0%) 
773 (94%) 
52 (6%) 
826 (36%) 
 
20 (1%) 
1,307 (93%) 
74 (5%) 
1,401 (46%) 
Textiles a 
     Cottons f 
     Linens 
     Silks 
     Woollens g 
     Total 
 
13 (30%) 
3 (7%) 
3 (6%) 
25 (56%) 
44 (6%) 
 
120 (18%) 
32 (5%) 
9 (1%) 
513 (76%) 
674 (29%) 
 
133 (19%) 
35 (5%) 
12 (2%) 
538 (75%) 
718 (24%) 
Overall Total 743 2,308 3,051 
Notes: Entries that included more than one sub-category and no individual cost for each item were 
discounted. The omissions are to the value of £106.  
a the percentages included alongside each sub-category relate to the overall purchases of the 
respective category. The percentages stated in the category totals correlate to the overall total; 
b primarily consists of belts, handkerchiefs, neckcloths, umbrellas, and wigs; 
c clothing worn above the waist which is mainly comprised of shirts and waistcoat pieces; 
d clothing worn on or below the waist such as gartering, shoes, and stockings; 
e includes broaches, earrings, jewellery, necklaces, and rings; 
f contains calicos, chintz, cottons, fustian, gingham, nankeens, Scotch crape, and velveteen; 
g comprises cloth (Broad, Scarlet, second, superfine, fine), corduroy, flannel, gauze (Scotch), 
Highland Plaid, kerseymere, woollens, worsteds, and worsted lace. 
Source: HBCA, A.16/111-13, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Books — Servants’ Commissions, 
1787-1897. 
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outdone and sometimes spent even more on their watches or attempted to make them 
more elaborate. George Gladman, the second-officer at Moose Factory who was from 
London, acquired ‘a new silver gilt watch’ that was ‘capt [capped] and jewelled’ for £8 
8s.80 The master of the Beaver Brig, George Taylor from Berwick in Northumberland, 
spent £12 on a new capped and jewelled watch in 1795, which was perhaps partially 
induced by his promotion to the captainship of a brig as opposed to the smaller sloop that 
he had commanded the previous year.81 An elevation in social status then, especially one 
that granted an allowance for a servant, dictated that an improvement be made to a 
gentleman’s watch. The timepieces of the Company’s postmasters were in another league. 
William Auld spent £36 15s. on a ‘jewelled and silver capt [capped]… chronometer with 
6 holes’.82  
New purchases were not the only way in which money was spent on watches as 
they were still, even by the end of the eighteenth century, somewhat unreliable and so 
required regular maintenance.83 Table 6.5 shows that nearly one-third of the purchases on 
watches and their related accessories were for repairs to be carried out. Thus, not only did 
the acquisition of a watch require a significant amount of capital it also entailed a 
                                                 
80 HBCA, A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1802, fo. 66; 
and HBCA, A.30/10, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1800, fo. 16. 
81 HBCA, A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1802, fo. 25; 
and HBCA, A.30/6, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1794-5, fos. 36, 82. 
82 HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘William Auld’; and HBCA, A.16/113, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book 
— Servants’ Commissions, 1810-97, fo. 21. 
83 Styles, Dress of the People, pp. 98-9. 
Table 6.5. HBC’s servants’ purchases of watches, chains, and seals, 1787-1813 (in £). 
 1787-1800 1801-1813 Total 
Watches, Chains & Seals 
     New a 
     Repairs b  
     Total 
 
379 (71%) 
155 (29%) 
534 
 
512 (66%) 
261 (34%) 
773 
 
891 (68%) 
416 (32%) 
1,307 
Percentage of Consumer Goods 33 18 22 
Notes: Watches, chains and seals were commonly purchased at the same time and are therefore usually 
recorded in the same entries in the account books.  
a includes a few entries where a new watch was purchased and another was simultaneously repaired but 
since the new watch comprised the bulk of the purchase cost they do not significantly alter the findings; 
b improvements to the watches were occasionally recorded alongside the customary ‘cleaning and 
repairing’. 
Source: HBCA, A.16/111-13, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Books — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-
1897. 
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considerable financial commitment to keep it in working order. In order to satisfy the 
requests of its servants, the HBC kept up a roaring trade with London watchmakers. 
Joseph Jolly at Dean Street, Fetter’s Lane, and William Fidgett at Bell Court, Fenchurch 
Street, were the two favoured watchmakers that both supplied new watches and repaired 
and improved existing ones for the Company’s servants during the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries.84 
Why did the Company’s servants purchase watches? In 1967, E. P. Thompson, in 
his pioneering article ‘Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism’ associated the 
substantial rise in clock and watch ownership at the end of the eighteenth century with 
the advent of industrial capitalism in England.85 The ‘tyranny of the clock’ was born as 
the factory system dictated a greater synchronisation of labour than more task-orientated 
crafts. Over the past few decades, however, a number of historians have established that 
the labouring classes had begun to acquire watches and clocks in the late seventeenth 
century, and thus long before the initial stages of the industrial revolution.86 Pocket 
watches were a ‘multi-faceted asset’ and it was this capacity to serve several different 
functions that made it appeal to ‘every rank of men’.87 Different groups of servants no 
doubt placed greater emphasis on a particular aspect of watch ownership. For the canoe-
man and the sailor, a watches ability to serve as a portable store of wealth was probably 
of greater importance than it was for the Company’s officers who used their timepieces 
to convey their position in the Company’s hierarchy, while the novelty of a watch 
probably appealed equally to both.88 Watches were a key step in the visualisation of clock 
time and were so successful because: they had utility value, acted as a form of investment, 
displayed status and identity, and satisfied their owner’s curiosity for all things 
mechanical. In the frontier society of Hudson’s Bay then, watches were commonplace 
                                                 
84 The first indication that the HBC conducted business with Joseph Jolly was in 1787 and the first mention 
of William Fidgett was in 1796. See A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ 
Commissions, 1787-1802, fos. 12, 15, 32, 37. 
85 See E. P. Thompson, ‘Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism’, Past and Present, No. 38 
(1967), pp. 56-97. 
86 See Paul Glennie and Nigel Thrift, ‘Reworking E. P. Thompson’s “Time, Work-discipline and Industrial 
Capitalism”’, Time and Society, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1996), pp. 275-300; Paul Glennie and Nigel Thrift, 
Shaping the Day: A History of Timekeeping in England and Wales 1300-1800 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), especially pp. 109-10, 125; Weatherill, Consumer Behaviour, pp. 25-8; and 
Styles, Dress of the People, pp. 97-107. 
87 Moira Donald, ‘“The Greatest Necessity for Every Rank of Men”: Gender, Clocks and Watches’, in 
Moira Donald and Linda Hurcombe, eds., Gender and Material Culture in Historical Perspective 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 54-75. 
88 Glennie and Thrift, Shaping the Day, pp. 176, 419; Paul Glennie and Nigel Thrift, ‘The Spaces of Clock 
Times’ in Patrick Joyce, ed., The Social in Question: New Bearings in History and the Social Sciences 
(London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 151-74; and Thompson, ‘Time’, p. 70. 
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consumer items, which is perhaps as far an environment as one can get from the ‘dark-
satanic mills’ of the early British industrial revolution.  
Servants were also willing to invest in seals that were usually attached to the chain 
that held a watch and its key.89 Seals could be made out of a number of materials and 
signalled the owners identity in a variety of ways. A tailor, Magnus Garrock, purchased 
a black seal cypher in 1795.90 Peter Fidler asked for a stone seal cypher with the initials 
PF in 1794 which cost a reasonably inexpensive 7s.. 91  Several other servants also 
requested seals that were engraved with their initials. The London surgeon, Mark S. 
Fielding had his gold seal and cypher etched with MSF to the cost of £2 14s. 10d.92 Louis 
Jolicoeur, a French-Canadian labourer had his gold seal that was worth £1 8s. engraved 
with LJC.93 Seals could also bare the servants’ identity in more distinctive ways. Arwell 
Sutherland, a sailor, requested a silver seal with the cypher AS and a crest of the 
Sutherland clan which consisted of a cat and the motto ‘sans peur’ meaning ‘without fear’ 
of which the Company had to source from a specialist tradesmen by the name of Mr Hill.94 
Similarly, the writer Joseph Howie from Cirencester in Gloucestershire ordered a gold 
seal cypher with a crest of his initials and a demi Lion rampart to the value of £2 8s.95 
The ownership of watches and seals was thus not restricted to the more affluent servants 
and they were seemingly in wide usage amongst the Company’s English, Scottish, and 
North American employees. In contrast to the vast amounts that were spent on watches, 
chains, and seals, little was spent on buckles, one of the hallmarks of the Birmingham 
‘toy’ trades and one of the manufactures that Maxine Berg identified as playing a key part 
in the global trade of British consumer goods at the end of the eighteenth century.96 
Purchases of earrings, necklaces, rings, and other forms of jewellery were also small in 
comparison to the vast sums that were spent on watches and their related auxiliaries, and 
it is clear that many of these items were for the servants’ companions and children in 
Hudson’s Bay. 
                                                 
89 Styles, Dress of the People, p. 103. 
90 HBCA, A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1802, fo. 26; 
and HBCA, A.30/6, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1794-5, fo. 6. 
91 HBCA, A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1802, fo. 23. 
92 HBCA, A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1802, fo. 68; 
and HBCA, A.30/10, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1800, fo. 24. 
93 HBCA, A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1802, fo. 56; 
and HBCA, A.30/9, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1799, fo. 7. 
94 HBCA, A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1802, fo. 26; 
and HBCA, A.30/6, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1794-5, fo. 65. 
95 HBCA, A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1802, fo. 56; 
and HBCA, A.30/9, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1799, fo. 25. 
96 Berg, Luxury and Pleasure, pp. 167-8, 306-7. 
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Textiles were the second highest purchase within the dress category (24 per cent).97 
Woollen fabrics were the principal request and accounted for three-quarters of textile 
spending. Cottons were second and comprised around a fifth of the servants’ purchases 
whereas those for linen and silk were rather limited. 98  In the sub-arctic climate of 
                                                 
97 See Table 6.4. 
98 See Table 6.4. 
Table 6.6. HBC’s servants’ purchases of cottons, linens, silks, and woollens, 1787-
1813 (in £). 
 Cottons c Linens d Silks e Woollens f 
Accessories 
     1787-1800 a 
     1801-1813 a 
     Total b 
 
1 (3%) 
19 (7%) 
20 (50%) 
 
0 
3 (9%) 
3 (8%) 
 
1 (12%) 
15 (24%) 
16 (42%) 
 
0 
0 
0 
Clothing 
     1787-1800 a 
     1801-1813 a 
     Total b 
 
18 (56%) 
146 (51%) 
164 (97%) 
 
0 
0 
0  
 
0 
2 (3%) 
2 (1%) 
 
0 
3 (1%) 
3 (2%) 
Haberdashery 
     1787-1800 a 
     1801-1813 a 
     Total b 
 
0 
0 
0 (1%) 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
7 (63%) 
37 (59%) 
44 (98%) 
 
0 
0 
0 (1%) 
Textiles 
     1787-1800 a 
     1801-1813 a 
     Total b 
 
13 (41%) 
120 (38%) 
133 (19%) 
 
3 (100%) 
32 (91%) 
35 (5%) 
 
3 (25%) 
9 (14%) 
12 (2%) 
 
25 (100%) 
513 (99%) 
538 (75%) 
Overall Totals 
     1787-1800 b 
     1801-1813 b 
     Total b 
 
32 (45%) 
285 (32%) 
317 (33%) 
 
3 (4%) 
35 (4%) 
38 (4%) 
 
11 (15%) 
63 (7%) 
74 (8%) 
 
25 (35%) 
516 (57%) 
541 (56%) 
Notes: Entries that included more than one material were discounted. 
a the percentages relate to the total purchases of each material; 
b the percentages correspond to the total purchases across all materials; 
c contains calicos (printed, shawls, and shirts), chintz, cottons (binding, handkerchiefs, shirts, 
stockings, striped, and twilled), fustian, gingham, muslin, nankeens, Scotch crape, and velveteen; 
d consists of cambric and linens (Irish, printed, and plain); 
e includes gold lace and silks (string, thread, twist, sewing, tailors, handkerchiefs, waistcoat piece, 
and hat coverings). 
f comprises cloth (Broad, Scarlet, second, superfine, fine), corduroy, flannel, gauze (Scotch), 
Highland Plaid, kerseymere, woollens, worsteds, and worsted lace. 
Source: HBCA, A.16/111-13, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Books — Servants’ Commissions, 
1787-1897. 
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Hudson’s Bay, it is not surprising that the servants weighted their purchases firmly in 
favour of the generally heavier, warmer, and more durable woollens than towards the 
lightweight textiles. Indeed, the purchases of woollens actually became more pronounced 
over the period as the percentage share allocated to woollen textiles rose from 56 in 1787-
1800 to 76 in 1801-13.99 While it seems reasonable that the consumption of the thinner 
and more expensive silks and that of the cooler linens would be restricted, it is not that 
surprising that a sizeable proportion pertained to the light-weight and less insulating 
cottons, as these were often worn as undergarments.100 
As Table 6.6 shows, if spending on the identifiable fabrics used in clothing, 
haberdashery, and accessories are included with the textiles then purchases of cottons is 
shown to be one-third rather one-fifth. In a study of the textiles contained in Montreal 
merchant inventories between 1760-74, DuPlessis found that linens and woollens each 
accounted for 34 per cent of the stocked textiles, and cottons accounted for 23 per cent.101 
It seems, therefore, that instead of purchasing linens (4 per cent of purchases in Table 
6.6), the HBC’s servants purchased cottons, and, understandably, mostly purchased 
woollens. Ready-made cotton garments actually made up a greater proportion of ‘cottons’ 
than cotton textiles did, although there was no shift in the proportion between the two 
forms over the period. The finished cottons were primarily for cotton or calico shirts and 
were requested in various sizes by a wide range of servants. For example, in 1811, the 
Orkney labourer Robert Rowland acquired 12 cotton shirts for 5s. 6d. each.102 In 1805, 
‘3 dozen boys calico shirts and 1 dozen infants calico shirts’ were requested by an 
Orcadian canoe-men by the name of Benjamin Bruce for which he was charged £9 3s.103 
Two years later Bruce placed another large order for shirts. These were all to be striped 
calico and 12 were for infants, 24 for boys, and 12 for youths.104 Cottons were also 
slightly favoured over silks for shawls, handkerchiefs, and other accessories. Silk thread 
was, however, the dominant fabric that was used in haberdashery. While this could be 
because silk was more often specified it probably shows that while silk was expensive it 
was admired by servants who sought to use it to provide a fashionable finishing effect to 
their hand-made clothes.  
                                                 
99 See Table 6.4. 
100 DuPlessis, The Material Atlantic, p. 115; and Styles, Dress of the People, pp. 86-7, 95. 
101 DuPlessis, The Material Atlantic, p. 66. 
102 HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘Robert Rowland’; and HBCA, A.16/113, Officers’ and Servants’ Account 
Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1810-97, fo. 10. 
103 HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘Benjamin Bruce’; and HBCA, A.16/112, Officers’ and Servants’ Account 
Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1802-10, fo. 35. 
104 HBCA, A.16/112, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1802-10, fo. 61. 
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Haberdashery was the servants’ third highest purchase within the dress category 
(Table 6.4), which, when combined with spending on textiles, shows that the purchase of 
items for the making of clothes exceeded that of ready-made garments. Ribbons 
comprised the bulk of the purchases in the haberdashery category. Many different colours 
and widths were requested and they could be rather expensive. Albeit an exceptional 
example, the order requested by Robert Goodwin in 1802, at that time the second in 
command at Albany Fort, illustrates the diverse forms that these ribbons could take: 
1. 8 yards of yellow broad ribbon; 2. ½ a piece of yellow narrow ribbon; 
3. ½ a piece of blue dark ribbon; 4. ½ a piece of blue sky ribbon; 5. ½ a 
piece of red ribbon; 6. ¼ a piece of red ribbon; 7. 8 yards green ribbon; 8. 
8 yards red ribbon; 9. 8 yards blue sky ribbon; 10. and 11. 4 yards of each 
kind; 12. is yellow about 12 yards and of red, blue, green [illegible] sky 
colour of about 10 yards of each kind; 13. 2 yards…105 
At a costly £10 9s. 7d., Goodwin’s purchase of the above ribbons was over one-eighth of 
his annual wage.106 These ribbons were not for Goodwin himself but, most probably, for 
his three daughters in Hudson’s Bay.107 The Company’s servants also attempted to secure 
their ‘native daughters’ futures by finding them a suitable partner from within the 
Company’s workforce, which was another reason why relationships with Aboriginal 
women declined over the period.108 Therefore, just as ribbons played a prominent role in 
practices of courtship in eighteenth-century England, they occupied a similarly important 
position in the frontier society of Hudson’s Bay.109 The ribbons were often given as gifts 
to women who either tied them in their hair or attached them to their clothing. Clearly the 
servants used a tradition that was familiar to them to secure female companionship.  
Buttons were another significant article within the haberdashery category and 
comprised one-fifth of the purchases.110 Whereas the requested ribbons were usually for 
women, the buttons were most often for men. The buttons were frequently described as 
being metal, gilt, and plated as Berg has suggested, and were occasionally engraved.111 
They were purchased in large quantities and were frequently specified as being for 
                                                 
105 HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘Robert Goodwin’; and HBCA, A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account 
Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1802, fo. 78. 
106 Goodwin’s stated wage in 1800 was £70 with a £10 allowance for a servant. See HBCA, A.30/10, Names 
&c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1800, fo. 6. 
107 HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘Robert Goodwin’. 
108 For example, around 1799 Thomas Bunn ‘married’ Sarah McNab who was the daughter of John McNab, 
the Chief at Albany House. See Bayley, Londoner in Rupert’s Land, p. 13. Also see Brown, Strangers 
in Blood, pp. 73-4. 
109 Styles, Dress of the People, pp. 315-6. 
110 See Table 6.4. 
111 For instance, see Berg, Luxury and Pleasure, pp. 166, 306-7. 
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waistcoats, coats, and vests. Buttons were fashion items and this is plainly evident in some 
of the descriptions that were used. In 1810, for instance, the postmaster William Auld 
requested ‘4 pairs steel polished and studded coat buttons of the price of 2 or 3 shillings 
each 4 colours of 4 different patterns’.112 John McKay, the master of the inland post of 
Brandon House, similarly asked for ‘1 gross of coat buttons handsome ones’ and ‘1 gross 
of waist buttons handsome ones’ in 1804 for which he was charged £2 5s..113  The 
purchase of stylish buttons was not solely the preserve of the officer class. In 1807, 
Humphrey Favell, a servant born in Hudson’s Bay who worked as a labourer for which 
he was paid £16 per annum, spent £1 2s. on ‘½ gross of fashionable large buttons and ½ 
gross of fashionable small buttons’.114 Spending on buttons was significant and provided 
the key finishing touch to the upper part of a gentlemen’s outfit. Indeed, the servants’ 
purchases of buttons was more than triple the amount spent on buckles. The remaining 
share of haberdashery purchases were mainly for the pins, needles, thread, string, and 
thimbles that were essential for making and repairing clothes.  
Slightly less was spent on clothing as was spent on haberdashery (Table 6.4). As 
previously shown, ready-made garments were mainly cottons but there were other items 
beyond cotton shirts that were acquired.115 Waistcoat pieces, petticoats, shifts, stockings, 
gartering, boots, shoes, and skates were all features of the servants’ requests. Some of the 
more decorative items were waistcoat pieces. Servants from Britain and North America 
asked for designs that were ‘fancy’, ‘handsome’, ‘fine’, and ‘showy’ and it was not only 
‘elite’ servants which made these requests.116 Many of the cases are of relatively low-paid 
servants. George Moore was a canoe-builder who earned £25 each year, and Thomas 
Isham was a labourer that was only paid a meagre £8 per year.117 Thus despite their low 
earnings some servants took great pride in owning at least some form of fashionable attire. 
                                                 
112 HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘William Auld’; and HBCA, A.16/113, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book 
— Servants’ Commissions, 1810-97, fo. 2. 
113 HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘John McKay’; and HBCA, A.16/112, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book 
— Servants’ Commissions, 1802-10, fo. 12. 
114 HBCA, A.16/112, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1802-10, fo. 58. 
1812 was the first year in which Humphrey Favell was mentioned in the lists of servants. See A.30/11, 
Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1812, fo. 32. 
115 See Table 6.5. 
116 HBCA, A.16/112, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1802-10, fos. 4, 32, 
34, 57. 
117 When no wage was clearly discernible the wage rates were reasonably deduced by using information 
from the first available year and then following the servant’s expected path of advancement. HBCA, 
A.16/112, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1802-10, fos. 32, 34; 
A.30/12, Names &c of the Company’s Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1813, fo. 31; and A.32/14, Servants' 
Contracts, 1806-1807, fo. 39. 
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The servants’ purchases of accessories were the lowest out of the five categories 
and accounted for only 10 per cent of the purchases but it was by no means 
unimportant.118 Most of these purchases were for hats, especially those made out of 
beaver fur. John Easter — an Inuit employed by the Company — purchased three such 
hats in quick succession, one in 1807 and another two in 1808, which each cost £1 6s. or 
about the same price as 5 or 6 cottons shirts.119 Beaver hats were also purchased for the 
servants’ female companions and children, reaffirming the view that women and children 
did wear such hats. William Auld acquired one ‘beaver hat for a woman size with small 
feathers’ and one ‘high priced’ beaver hat for a girl of 18 years of age in 1811.120 The 
increase in relationships between the Company’s servants and indigenous women is 
clearly expressed in the acquisition of shawls. There were no shawls listed prior to 1800 
yet they made up 23 per cent of the spending on accessories between 1801 and 1813.121 
Like the men’s waistcoat pieces, the shawls were to be fashionable and were described in 
terms such as ‘fine’, ‘neat’, ‘of the Norwich pattern’, ‘a dark pattern’, and ‘handsome’.122 
Evidently, many of the purchased items of dress were not just made by officers and 
other well-paid occupations. There are examples of labourers, canoe-men, artisans, and 
mariners who spent some of their earnings on their attire but a question still remains as to 
how profuse these purchases were. Using the per capita purchases of the Company’s 
British servants, Figure 6.8 shows that the greatest part of the servants’ purchases were 
assigned to personal adornments. It also indicates that when those on the lowest wages 
actually spent some of their earnings they choose to spend it on timepieces and their 
related accessories. Watches, it seems, were cherished and highly desired items, so much 
so that servants prioritised spending on them over improving their clothes. When the 
servants did spend money on clothing they were more likely to purchase woollens. This 
was not the case across all of the income categories as it appears that the ‘middling 
servants’ were more inclined to spend money on cottons. The per capita purchases of 
cottons were £0.77 for those earning between £21 and £40, and £2.19 for those between 
£41 and £70, whereas the figures for woollens were only £0.51 and £0.46. It seems, 
                                                 
118 See Table 6.4. 
119 HBCA, A.16/112, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1802-10, fos. 59, 
69. Easter was recorded as an ‘Esquimaux slave’ in the list of servants for Albany in 1785 and it was 
noted that he was serving for life in the entries for 1794-9. HBCA, A.30/3, Names &c of the Company’s 
Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1785-7, fo. 29; and HBCA, A.30/6-9, Names &c of the Company’s Servants 
at Hudson’s Bay, 1794-9, fos. 4, 48, 5, 48, 4, 4. 
120 HBCA, A.16/113, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1810-97, fo. 2. 
121 See Table 6.4. 
122 HBCA, A.16/111-2, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1810, fos. 
72, 12-14, 27, 45. 
 
~280~ 
 
therefore, that when the middling servants purchased clothing they were more likely, even 
in the frozen climes of Hudson’s Bay, to buy cottons over woollens. In addition, when 
comparing clothing and haberdashery, Figure 6.8 shows that ready-made garments were 
more appealing to those on lower incomes. On the other hand, the higher paid servants 
preferred to allocate more of their spending towards the materials required to make their 
own outfits. 
V.   A Taste of Home 
After dress, items of food and drink were the servants’ second highest purchase. The 
annual shipment of provisions to Hudson’s Bay was somewhat precarious and the 
supplied foodstuffs were not always adequate for the servants’ needs.123 Sourcing local 
supplies of fish, geese, partridges, plover, duck, rabbits, buffalo, venison, and moose, 
alongside the cultivation of vegetables and the raising of livestock eased the reliance on 
food imports, although these resources were susceptible to the harsh environmental 
conditions of Rupert’s Land and met with varying degrees of success.124 Instances of 
scurvy were recorded at the Company’s posts in the late eighteenth century, something 
that points towards the ill effects of the scant and monotonous high-protein content of the 
servant’s diet.125 In light of this rather bleak portrayal it is perhaps unsurprising that some 
servants were keen on adding greater variety to their eating and drinking regimes.  
While it is an exceptional example, the order made by Goodwin in 1797 indicates 
some of the culinary delights that some servants were accustomed to and were willing to 
spend some of their earnings on. The consignment came to the grand total of £19 15s. 3d. 
and contained: currant jelly (six pots), bohea tea (12 lbs.), green tea (6 lbs.), hyson tea (1 
lb.), chocolate (4 lbs.), coffee (4 lbs.), loaf sugar (114 lbs.), moist sugar (112 lbs.), pepper 
(6 lbs.), pimento (2 lbs.), ginger (2 lbs.), nutmeg (¼ lb.), raisins (4 lbs.), almonds (2 lbs.), 
and plums (1 box).126 Two years later, Goodwin placed another order that brimmed with 
foodstuffs. This time the package included prunes (28 lbs.), pepper (14 lbs.), ginger (4 
lbs.), currants (14 lbs.), sugar candy (6 lbs.), sultanas (28 lbs.), black tea (6 lbs.), green 
tea (4 lbs.), moist sugar (112 lbs.), nuts (1 bunch), almonds (½ a bunch), a twelfth night 
cake seasoned with sweetmeats (also known as a King and Queen cake), and an 
                                                 
123 Rigg, Men of Spirit, pp. 67-73. 
124 Ibid., p. 67. 
125 Ibid., p. 71. 
126 HBCA, A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1802, fo. 41. 
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Table 6.7. HBC’s servants’ purchases of food and drink, 1787-1813 (in £). 
 1787-1800 1801-1813 Total 
Groceries a 
     Chocolate 
     Coffee  
     Dried Fruits b 
     Spices c 
     Sugar 
     Tea 
     Tobacco d 
     Total 
 
    ‘Grocery’ e 
     Total Groceries 
 
3 (2%) 
4 (2%) 
4 (2%) 
3 (2%) 
123 (68%) 
42 (23%) 
3 (1%) 
183 (66%) 
 
20 (10%) 
202 (73%) 
 
13 (5%) 
28 (11%) 
3 (1%) 
3 (1%) 
128 (48%) 
91 (34%) 
0 
266 (22%) 
 
573 (68%) 
839 (71%) 
 
17 (4%) 
32 (7%) 
7 (1%) 
6 (1%) 
252 (56%) 
133 (30%) 
3 (1%) 
449 (31%) 
 
592 (57%) 
1,041 (71%) 
Other a 
     Alcohol f 
     Butter 
     Cheese 
     Gingerbread 
     Grains g 
     Ham 
     Mustard 
     Nuts h 
     Peppermint Drops 
     Other i 
     Total 
 
29 (39%) 
3 (4%) 
0 
22 (12%) 
0 
0 
0 
15 (8%) 
0 
4 (6%) 
74 (27%) 
 
8 (2%) 
119 (34%) 
7 (2%) 
98 (37%) 
16 (5%) 
4 (1%) 
2 (1%) 
54 (20%) 
20 (6%) 
19 (6%) 
347 (29%) 
 
37 (9%) 
122 (29%) 
7 (2%) 
119 (27%) 
16 (4%) 
4 (1%) 
2 (1%) 
70 (16%) 
20 (5%) 
24 (6%) 
421 (29%) 
Overall Total 275 1,186 1,462 
Notes:  
a the percentages included alongside each sub-category relate to the overall purchases of the 
respective category. The percentages stated in the category totals correlate to the overall total; 
b includes currants, figs, plums, prunes, raisons, and sultanas; 
c contains pepper, pimento, nutmeg, and saffron; 
d tobacco was included in food and drink for comparison with other imported plantation produce; 
e after 1800 groceries were increasingly listed under the heading of ‘grocery’ which never included 
gingerbread or nuts which is why, despite their foreign origin, these two articles were not included 
in the grocery category used in this analysis; 
f includes brandy, French brandy, mead, port, and wine; 
g contains flour and oatmeal; 
h consists of almonds, Barcelona nuts, Spanish nuts, and walnuts;  
i primarily includes entries of ‘butter and cheese’ but also biscuits, cinnamon water, currant jelly, 
guinea cakes, jam, lemon juice, and Twelfth Night (King and Queen) cakes. 
Source: HBCA, A.16/111-13, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Books — Servants’ Commissions, 
1787-1897. 
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unseasoned twelfth night cake to be sent to his son in Yoxford, Suffolk.127 The requests 
were usually considerably smaller than those made by Goodwin. In 1805, an Orcadian 
clerk by the name of Alexander Kennedy spent £4 9s. 9d. on loaf sugar (28 lbs.), ‘good’ 
green tea (4 lbs.), and gingerbread (28 lbs.).128 Despite earning twice as much as Kennedy, 
George Taylor only purchased £2 2s. worth of foodstuffs that same year and this did not 
include any tea or sugar but consisted of gingerbread (56 lbs.) and nuts (½ bushel).129 
There was much variation in what the servants purchased, which indicates the individual 
tastes and preferences of each servant. Tea and sugar were often purchased together but 
this was not always the case. Some servants requested either black or green tea whereas 
others ordered both variants in addition to coffee and chocolate. A wide range of spices 
and dried fruits were sought after by particular servants, while others seemed content with 
a bag of nuts or some gingerbread cakes. Unlike Goodwin, most servants did not make 
regular purchases. This suggests that the majority of these purchases were either 
occasional luxuries or were sourced from elsewhere. 
The ‘new’ imported groceries, especially tea and sugar, dominated the servants’ 
food and drunk purchases. Table 6.7 shows that sugar accounted for over half of the 
grocery purchases and so it is clear that the servants were inclined towards spending 
money on sweetening their food and drink. Tea made up almost one-third of the purchases 
whereas the amount of coffee and chocolate purchased was limited. Tea was clearly the 
favoured non-alcohol beverage for the Company’s servants. Tea-drinking did not, 
however, take the expected form. Despite the fact that four-fifths of the tea sold at the 
EIC’s auctions was black tea, the HBC’s servants seem to have purchased greater 
quantities of green tea. 130  Indeed, this was true for both the British and the North 
American servants. The British servants distributed 56 per cent of their purchases towards 
green tea whereas the North American servants allocated 69 per cent.131 Why this is the 
case is not abundantly clear. The omission of entries where no variety was stated does not 
                                                 
127 HBCA, A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1802, fo. 54. 
128 HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘Alexander Kennedy’; HBCA, A.16/112, Officers’ and Servants’ Account 
Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1801-10, fo. 28; and HBCA, A.30/10-11, Names &c of the Company’s 
Servants at Hudson’s Bay, 1800-12, fos. 25, 33. 
129 HBC Biographical Sheets, ‘George Taylor’; HBCA, A.16/112, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book 
— Servants’ Commissions, 1801-10, fo. 33; HBCA, A.30/10-11, Names &c of the Company’s Servants 
at Hudson’s Bay, 1800-12, fos. 41, 24. 
130  According to quantities sold by the EIC in 1817. See Hoh-cheung Mui and Lorna H. Mui, The 
Management of Monopoly: A Study of the East India Company’s Conduct of its Tea Trade, 1784-1833 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984), p. 117. 
131 Calculated according to the quantities recorded in the commissions of goods to servants. See HBCA, 
A.16/111-13, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1897. 
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account for the discrepancy. It is perhaps indicative of a distinctive form of tea 
consumption in the frontier society of Hudson’s Bay. What is certain, however, is that by 
the late eighteenth century, tea-drinking was not mainly confined to women, as the 
Company’s servants participated in this form of consumption.132 Tobacco was, of course, 
not an item of food and drink but was included for comparative purposes with the other 
groceries. However, very little tobacco was ordered in the way of requests as the item 
was part of the trade goods that were offered to Aboriginal traders and so was readily 
available from the Company’s posts in Hudson’s Bay. Indeed, the servants’ commissions 
list more snuff boxes than they do rolls of tobacco. 
While important, ‘groceries’ did not account for all of the foodstuffs ordered by the 
servants. Gingerbread, butter, and nuts were all significant purchases. Indeed, almost as 
much was spent on gingerbread and butter as was spent on tea. Nuts were usually 
purchased by the bushel and were largely for almonds and for what was termed 
‘Barcelona’ or ‘Spanish’ nuts. Alcohol was not as prolific an item as might first be 
expected; brandy, rum, and other spirituous liquors were readily stocked at the 
Company’s trading posts. While purchases were small for other miscellaneous foodstuffs, 
they perhaps illustrate the servants’ longings for home. Currant jelly, jam, guinea cakes, 
peppermint drops, and Twelfth Night cakes not only served to break the monotony of the 
provided rations but could invoke memories of home. Perhaps one of the clearest 
examples of this is when Goodwin ordered two Twelfth Night cakes, one for himself in 
Hudson’s Bay and one to be delivered to his son in England.133 
Comparing the British servants’ per capita purchases on the principally acquired 
foodstuffs according to their wage allows for a number of key trends to be identified 
(Figure 6.9). It is clear that both sugar and tea reached into the purchases of the lowest 
earners and that most of the servants were inclined towards these two commodities when 
they placed an order for food and drink. It also shows that gingerbread and butter were 
next in the priority rankings after sugar and tea. On the other hand, coffee, chocolate, and 
nuts only appeared in the purchases of those earning above £21 per annum, which 
reaffirms the view that the consumption of coffee and chocolate was not a major feature 
of the average British diet.134 It is also clear that those in the second-highest wage level 
were the most prolific purchasers of these articles of food and drink, and their purchases 
                                                 
132 This finding reaffirms those of David Hussey and Margaret Ponsonby. See Hussey and Ponsonby, Single 
Homemaker, p. 126. 
133 HBCA, A.16/111, Officers’ and Servants’ Account Book — Servants’ Commissions, 1787-1802, fo. 54. 
134 De Vries, Industrious Revolution, p. 160. 
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routinely surpassed the amount spent by the highest earners. No elite servants purchased 
butter, probably because the Company included this in its provisioning, and so they, as 
the highest ranking servants, ensured that they had an adequate amount before allowing 
other servants a share. The fact that the servants purchased butter at all, especially the 
middling servants, perhaps shows that the provided rations did not adequately fulfil the 
servants’ desires. While there were some purchases of sugar and tea by the Company’s 
low paid servants, they pale in comparison to those of the middling and elite groups, 
which cast doubt onto the extent to which sugar and tea were consumed by all parts of 
British society. Indeed, if sugar and tea were articles of ‘mass consumption’ by 1750 then 
one would expect that the per capita purchases of the Company’s low-ranking servants to 
be more extensive. Therefore, it appears that sugar and tea were occasional indulgences 
for a small proportion of the Company’s labourers, canoe-men, and other low-ranking 
servants. Indeed, it was not until 1853 that tea and sugar became part of the ‘ordinary 
rations’ allocated to the Company’s servants, which was supposedly due to the increased 
importance of tea and sugar in the popular diets of the British population.135 
VI.   Conclusion 
Detailed analysis of the commodities that the HBC’s overseas servants asked the 
Company to purchase on their behalf offers valuable insights into the material culture of 
the North-Atlantic World in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The 
servants’ orders were primarily for less durable consumer items such as watches (which 
needed regular maintenance), textiles, clothing, and non-essential foodstuffs, rather than 
more durable consumer goods. Most significantly, analysis of these orders shows that all 
ranks of the Company’s servants had a strong interest in ensuring that they had a silver 
pocket watch while they worked in Hudson’s Bay, and that a key reason for the success 
of these timepieces was their capacity to serve as a ‘multi-faceted asset’. Sugar and tea 
were the principal additional foodstuffs that the servants requested, and there is evidence 
of the Company’s low-paid servants purchasing these articles. However, the limited 
number of purchases suggests that tea and sugar were only the occasional indulgence of 
some of the low-ranking servants, while the middling servants seemingly consumed far 
greater amounts of these two non-essential foodstuffs. Indeed, the way in which the 
middling servants spent a much higher proportion of their wages than did lower earners, 
                                                 
135 Burley, Servants, pp. 104-5. 
 
~286~ 
 
and the fact that these purchases were on a much wider range of goods, does suggest that 
it was the ‘middling sorts’ who were largely behind the adoption of the new material 
goods that transformed peoples’ dress, diets, and homes during the eighteenth century.  
The Company fulfilled its servants’ orders in an attempt to keep its workforce loyal 
to the Company. This view is further supported by the fact that for most of the period the 
Company offered free shipping on all of the packages that it delivered to Hudson’s Bay, 
whether such goods were purchased by the Company or had been sent from the servants’ 
friends and family. This ‘indulgence’ came to an end in 1821, and coincided with the split 
that had formed between the NWC’s agents and wintering partners. Unlike in the case of 
EIC, the HBC essentially provided its servants with financial services through their 
control of the remittance system, and this, together with the small size of the British 
community in Hudson’s Bay and the remoteness of this environment, did not allow for 
an organised ‘private trade’ to rise up and eventually challenge the Company’s Charter.  
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7 
Conclusion 
 
 
Little attention has been paid to the emergence of monopoly in the British fur trade despite 
the insight it affords to our understanding of the political economy of the British Empire 
in the early nineteenth century. Historians have offered a number of reasons as to why the 
Hudson’s Bay and North West Companies merged in 1821, yet all of these arguments fall 
short of constructing the multi-causal explanation required to comprehend fully how this 
circumstance came about and to situate this development within the wider context of 
British imperial history. This thesis has broadened the scope of fur trade historiography 
to include neglected parts of the commodity trade and has located the findings from these 
new explorations into conceptions of commerce and consumerism in the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth-century Atlantic World. In so doing, the thesis has argued that the 
structure and organisation of the British fur trade encouraged the formation of monopoly 
and supported the continuation of the London mercantilist system. 
This is not to say that other historians were wrong. As Innis and Rich argued, the 
geography of North America did provide the HBC with a shorter, more cost-effective 
route into the interior over the protracted route available to the NWC. The NWC’s internal 
structure, as Campbell correctly argued, left the Company open to splits between the 
wintering partners and Montreal agents, a division that was exploited by the HBC. And, 
as noted by Carlos, the HBC’s access to credit from the Bank of England afforded it with 
a greater capacity to weather the severe financial difficulties that arose during the 
Napoleonic Wars. To these reasons can be added the disruptive impact that the War of 
1812, the Red River Settlement, and the actions of the Earl of Selkirk had on the NWC’s 
operations, as well as the fact that Selkirk and Wedderburn were able to acquire a large 
share of the HBC’s stock.  
All of these factors played a role in the merger of the two companies in 1821, but 
the problem with the extant literature is that it is too focused on the union. The 1821 
settlement was more than a business merger. This was the moment when a single 
company did not just acquire a monopoly of the British fur trade, rather it was granted 
one by the British government. This goes against the accepted view that chartered 
companies were in full retreat by the early nineteenth century, especially in Britain. The 
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Royal African Company, Russia Company, and Levant Company had all seen their 
privileges withdrawn or reduced during the eighteenth century. A mere eight years before, 
the EIC had lost its monopoly of the India trade and looked set to (and would) lose its 
monopoly of the China trade in 1833. The dismantling of these chartered companies and 
their exclusive privileges opened up Britain’s overseas trade to all British subjects, and 
was one of the first stages in the liberalisation of British overseas trade. The fur trade did 
not conform to this broad historical pattern. The British conquest of Canada in 1763 
opened the Montreal fur trade to all British subjects. This ‘free trade’ era did not last. 
Within 20 years the NWC had emerged and it rapidly became the rising star of the 
Montreal fur trade. By 1804, the NWC had eliminated or absorbed any opposition so that 
it commanded the bounty of furs flowing down the St. Lawrence River. Duopoly soon 
became monopoly as the HBC pacified the NWC and had its future dominance secured 
through the bestowal of a royal license that granted the Company the exclusive right to 
the fur trade of the Rocky Mountains and Pacific North-West Coast. In 1821, therefore, 
the British legislature acted to strengthen the position of a chartered company at time 
when the global influence of such institutions was in decline. This intervention was 
carefully enacted so as to circumvent the political difficulty that routinely surfaced 
whenever Parliament was asked to confer such exclusive trading privileges.  
The long-term drift towards monopoly in the fur trade makes clear that there were 
underlying aspects of the trade that promoted its emergence. These included 
environmental factors, issues over imperial security, the absence of political opposition, 
and the economic structure of the trade itself. Intense competition in the trade brought 
about the depletion of the fur-bearing animals upon which the trade ultimately depended, 
particularly the beaver population, and propelled the westward expansion of the trade. 
Edward Ellice argued forcibly to the Select Committee in 1857 that open competition had 
ruined the fur trade. This would have been a striking conclusion to have drawn in the 
early nineteenth century. Understanding of ecological issues in Western thought was very 
much in its infancy and industrial capitalism was in the ascendency. This was an 
admission that when the ‘free market’ was combined with the fur trade it did not bring 
about economic prosperity. In conjunction with environmental degradation was the 
stability of Britain’s empire in North America. Through its weaving of a complex tapestry 
of ties with Aboriginal peoples, the fur trade was always a double-edged sword of 
imperialism. On the one hand, the fur trade fostered goodwill between Aboriginal peoples 
and imperial powers; it enabled the former to access new material goods that — on the 
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whole — raised their standard of living, and it allowed the latter to extract wealth from 
remote regions that lay beyond the scope of settled empire. On the other hand, the 
overzealous extraction of this wealth alongside the introduction of guns made Aboriginal 
communities increasingly dependent upon western fur traders and rendered a continuation 
of their traditional way of life nearly impossible. In the late eighteenth century, therefore, 
the depletion of the animal population in their traditional hunting and trapping grounds 
led to large-scale migrations of the Chipewyan and Assiniboine peoples southwest 
towards and beyond Lake Winnipeg. In a region that was experiencing seismic change, 
the establishment of the Red River Settlement enflamed local tensions and the hostilities 
that followed the Seven Oaks Massacre threatened the foundation upon which the British 
controlled the frontiers of empire in North America. As reports of the violence and 
bloodshed reached Britain, the Colonial Office was alarmed at the rapid deterioration of 
civil order in the fur trade, not least because the occurrences were in the vicinity of the 
border with the United States. While Lord Bathurst was slow to act, Ellice understood 
that the restoration of stability was contingent on a single company controlling the fur 
trade. 
As has been argued by Ogilvie, the central reason why medieval and early-modern 
European states granted exclusive commercial rights and privileges to merchant guilds 
and chartered companies was because these organisations solved particular problems 
encountered by rulers. This hypothesis holds true in the case of the HBC. In the mid-
eighteenth-century debate over the HBC’s Charter, Parliament concluded that a chartered 
company was the best way to finance the factories that were the basis of Britain’s 
sovereignty over Hudson’s Bay. Rather than financial considerations, in 1821 further 
concessions were made to the HBC because the Company was viewed as the most 
effective means through which to regulate the fur trade. The HBC would manage the trade 
by reducing over-trapping and maintaining good relations with Aboriginal peoples. This 
in turn ensured the stability of the frontier regions of Britain’s empire in North America 
and limited the northward expansion of the United States. Indeed, it should be 
remembered that the fur trade and the HBC were as much tools of imperialism as they 
were economic concerns and that the persistence of the HBC owes much to its ability to 
resolve the question of how the British imperial state should govern the vast wilds of 
North America. 
The other central factor that allowed the HBC to acquire a monopoly of the British 
fur trade was the absence of domestic forces within Britain that were hostile to the 
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emergence of monopoly. These aspects were closely tied to the organisation of the trade. 
For British manufacturers, there was already a degree of competition in the fur trade 
between the HBC and the London Houses that supplied the NWC, and the limited 
potential for growth in the trade further curtailed their demands for trade reform. As 
regards the firms whose trade depended upon the supply of furs from North America, 
there was no real motive for them to resist the Company’s rise to prominence. 
Monopolies, of course, often lead to higher prices so it would be thought that British 
furriers and hat manufacturers would have opposed the HBC-NWC union and 
Parliament’s intervention. Both of these groups were certainly willing to lobby the 
legislature when it came to advancing the interests of their trade, and the hatting industry 
was particularly adept at influencing commercial policy. In fact, considering that hat 
manufacturers were rather sensitive to the prices of their raw materials, it is probable that 
they concluded that a stable price and volume of beaver was preferable over the 
uncertainty created by open competition. The distribution and organisation of production 
was similarly important. In the case of the furriers, the production of fine fur garments 
and accessories was confined to the metropolis, and while provincial hat manufacturers 
did produce a significant number of beaver hats the relationship they had with their 
London counterparts was largely cooperative. Unlike in the case of tea or cotton garments, 
fur-related apparel was not an article of mass consumption. The outports, therefore, had 
little to gain from seeking to acquire a share of the nation’s fur imports and there was 
little chance that such attempts would have been successful. Indeed, the NWC was at 
greater liberty to ship its furs to any British port and yet the Company chose to confine 
its imports to London’s docks. Provincial retailers were content to have the metropolitan 
economy supply their fine fur garments, and hat manufacturers were satisfied with 
sourcing their beaver skins from the London market.  
The absence of domestic opposition to the rise of monopoly in the British fur trade 
reaffirms the view that the presence of such forces during the debate over the EIC’s 
Charter in 1811-3 played an important role in ending the Company’s monopoly of the 
India trade. In the case of the fur trade, the lack of these dissenting voices enabled Cain 
and Hopkin’s ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ to shape and guide the formation of imperial 
policy; in this case ensuring that the HBC would prevail over the fur trade. Crucially, 
Ellice was not only the architect of the 1821 Act and the driving force behind the merger 
of the two companies, he was actively sought out by Bathurst to resolve the crisis in the 
fur trade. This is a clear example of the gentlemanly capitalist thesis in action, and does 
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much to explain how it was possible for the HBC to have its position strengthened while 
other chartered companies were in retreat. In essence, the structure and special attributes 
of the fur trade promoted the emergence of monopoly and allowed a charted company to 
persist long after the prevailing orthodoxy had concluded that these institutions limited 
the growth of British overseas trade. 
While this study has broken new ground by exploring neglected parts of the fur 
trade, it has also unearthed new questions which warrant further research. It is known that 
Ellice and his family had extensive interests in the West India trade and owned several 
plantations in the British Caribbean. Did the troubles in the British West Indian economy 
in the early nineteenth century drive Ellice to strengthen his involvement in the fur trade? 
The networks and activities of the HBC’s shareholders and committee members is another 
area of study where further research would be most useful. Little is known about the 
individuals who brokered the HBC’s relationship with the Bank of England or the private 
financiers who also extended credit to the Company. Did these financiers play a hitherto 
hidden role in the merger of the two companies? In addition, the thesis has shown that a 
detailed analysis of the HBC’s post account books is needed for a fuller understanding of 
the consumption habits of the Company’s overseas servants, an undertaking that would 
shed further light on everyday life in these isolated communities and — since all of the 
Company’s servants were men — would help to further address the disproportionate 
focus on women in eighteenth-century studies of material culture. While sources are 
scarce, a more thorough comparison of the Canada merchants’ relationship with British 
manufacturers and Aboriginal peoples’ responses to their trading goods with that of the 
HBC would greatly contribute towards debates over the efficiency of chartered 
companies in overseas trade. Finally, one of the untold stories of this period is the rise of 
the British sealskin trade. A study of this commodity trade could add much to our 
understanding of Britain’s maritime empire.  
This thesis has shown that the merger between the HBC and NWC in 1821, and the 
Parliamentary Act passed to regulate the fur trade of that same year should be accorded 
greater significance within imperial and economic history. Only a multi-casual 
explanation can account for why the British fur trade ended up as a more robust model of 
the mercantilist system in 1821 than was the case in 1783. The study has reaffirmed 
Ogilvie’s argument that institutions with exclusive commercial privileges endured for so 
long because of the advantages they offered to the rulers of early modern states, and has 
endorsed aspects of Cain and Hopkins’ ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ thesis of British imperial 
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expansion. It has also identified the special attributes of the fur trade that explains why 
the historical development of this commodity trade diverged from the evolution of other 
trades. The ‘old colonial system’ would live on in the fur trade until the HBC 
‘surrendered’ its rights to the Dominion of Canada in 1870. It was, therefore, not Free 
Trade that swept away the HBC’s Charter and monopoly in the fur trade but rather the 
booming settler empire. By the mid-nineteenth century the HBC was no longer viewed 
as the defender of empire in North America but as an impediment to its prosperity. At the 
1857 Parliamentary Committee on its affairs it was not the Company’s commercial 
acumen that was in question but its capacity to advance white settlement, ‘civilise’ 
Aboriginal peoples, and develop the territory under its control. If the Committee members 
present were rather bemused at the reasons presented by Ellice for the maintenance of the 
HBC’s Charter in 1821, it was because decades of industrialisation had transformed the 
Atlantic World into a very different place. With the advent of industrial capitalism, the 
railroad steamed towards the British North American wilderness and the impending rise 
of the fur farm heralded a new area of the fur trade. Ellice’s handiwork brought almost 
half a century of stability to the HBC’s domain but British imperialism, as pragmatic as 
ever, eventually vowed that it was time to shed its fur coat and the anachronistic 
institution that came with it. Yet as the empire and the world of commerce and consumers 
moved on, the Company would transform itself into the chain of department stores that 
still stand on the streets of Canada to this day, and whose interests, with its recent move 
into the German and Netherlands retail markets, once again spans the Atlantic.1  
 
                                                 
1 The Financial Times, ‘Hudson’s Bay Company launches Netherlands push’, 17 May 2016. 
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